Blockade of the Gaza Strip

The restrictions encompass several different instruments: controls at land crossings, limitations on imports and exports, restrictions on passenger travel, maritime interdiction, fishing limits, and restricted access to land near Gaza’s perimeter fence.[2][3] Israel and Egypt have cited security concerns for their controls, with Israel identifying the prevention of Hamas’s renewed military capabilities as a central objective.[1] Egypt’s prolonged closures of Rafah have also tightened Gaza’s isolation and increased the population’s dependence on goods entering through Israeli-controlled crossings.[4]

The distinction between the wider closure and the naval blockade is important to both chronology and administration.[2] Restrictions on people and goods developed before Hamas’s June 2007 takeover, intensified afterward, and included restrictions on trade, fuel, electricity, and movement.[3][2] The formal naval blockade was a separate measure introduced during Operation Cast Lead in January 2009.[2] Its stated purposes included preventing weapons, ammunition, military supplies, terrorists, and money from entering by sea, as well as preventing maritime threats from leaving Gaza.[2]

The policy has combined security objectives with an effort to weaken Hamas economically and politically.[2] The land-crossing restrictions adopted in 2007 were described in Israeli official deliberations as serving both the prevention of military supplies and a broader strategy of “indirect economic warfare” intended to restrict Hamas’s capacity to act against Israel.[2] Over time, the administration of civilian goods shifted from a limited list of permitted supplies toward a prohibited-items system, while controls remained on weapons and goods with potential military applications.[2]

Restrictions on movement intensified during the second intifada in 2000 and again following Hamas’s 2006 election victory.[3] Israel withdrew its military forces from Gaza in 2005.[1] A historical account by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs places subsequent crossing arrangements within that disengagement: it identifies September 12, 2005, as the termination of Israeli military rule and describes November agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority covering movement, exports, Rafah, and Kerem Shalom under European Union supervision.[5]

After Hamas’s election victory, Israel expanded measures of isolation and economic pressure, including stopping transfers of tax and customs revenues collected for the Palestinian Authority.[3] The abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2006 brought further restrictions intended to prevent weapons smuggling and to stop entry by Gaza residents into Israel except in humanitarian cases.[4] Economic and political measures therefore preceded the more comprehensive closure associated with Hamas’s takeover in June 2007.[6]

Following that takeover, border crossings closed and fuel arrangements changed.[7] Dor Alon stopped supplying Gaza’s gas stations while continuing deliveries to the power station, which then produced about one-third of Gaza’s electricity.[7] The company said its decision was coordinated with Israel’s military and defense establishment.[7] Restrictions on exports and civilian imports subsequently became central elements of the closure policy.[3]

On September 19, 2007, Israel’s Security Cabinet declared Gaza a hostile area and authorized measures affecting goods, fuel, electricity, and movement.[8] The decision followed Hamas’s takeover and attacks on Israel, including rocket fire that had recently wounded 69 Israeli soldiers at Zikim.[8] Defense Minister Ehud Barak described the political objective as weakening Hamas and strengthening Salam Fayyad.[8] The government also stated that implementation should take humanitarian considerations into account and avoid a humanitarian crisis.[6]

The immediate consequences included sharp reductions in goods entering Gaza and interruptions to travel.[9] Goods entering fell 73 percent from June 2007, and an estimate cited for the end of that year indicated that only 41 percent of food-import needs were being met.[9] After Rafah closed on June 9, approximately 6,000 Palestinians remained on the Egyptian side for nearly two months.[9] Restrictions also impeded implementation of $213 million in donor-funded humanitarian projects.[9]

A shuttle service for some students and people holding foreign visas or residency operated four times and enabled 550 people to leave Gaza before being discontinued after the hostile-entity declaration.[9] It resumed following a petition in December, transported 484 students and their families, and then stopped again.[9] These arrangements illustrate that passenger access included intermittent exceptions rather than unrestricted movement.[9]

In January 2008, amid sustained rocket attacks on southern Israeli communities, Israel sealed its border with Gaza and temporarily prevented fuel imports.[10] Hamas forces subsequently demolished parts of the Gaza–Egypt barrier, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak temporarily allowed passage to alleviate civilian hardship.[10] Later that year, during an escalation of hostilities, virtually no humanitarian goods or fuel entered between November 5 and December 25.[11] Fuel shortages caused widespread blackouts and damage to electrical-grid infrastructure; additional humanitarian goods were admitted immediately before and during Israeli airstrikes beginning December 27.[11]

Maritime restrictions developed on a separate track.[6] Israel issued maritime notices in 2008, and its military chief of staff identified that year’s flotilla attempts as the trigger for a maritime closure imposed on security grounds.[6] On January 3, 2009, the defense minister ordered a naval blockade extending up to 20 nautical miles from Gaza’s coast.[2] A notice circulated through Israeli and international maritime channels declared the area closed to all maritime traffic “until further notice.”[2] The Israeli Navy announced the blockade on January 6.[6]

International pressure to ease restrictions increased after the 2008–09 Gaza conflict.[12] On May 24, 2010, Israel permitted 250 tons of cement to enter Gaza, then the largest such shipment since the wider blockade began.[12] Maritime challenges had meanwhile become increasingly prominent: the first Free Gaza Movement mission, in August 2008, brought two vessels carrying medical supplies and about 45 activists, and four subsequent missions also reached Gaza.[10] A May 2010 flotilla ended in a confrontation between activists and Israeli commandos in which nine activists were killed.[13]

After the Mavi Marmara incident, Israel announced a major revision of its civilian-goods policy in June 2010.[13] The measures provided for a published prohibited-items list, generally permitting goods not listed; expanded supervised entry of construction materials; increased crossing capacity; and streamlined some medical and humanitarian travel.[13] Cargo was still to be inspected and delivered through Ashdod, and the naval blockade remained in force.[13] The government presented the change as keeping weapons out while liberalizing civilian imports.[14]

The revised policy significantly increased the volume and variety of permitted imports, although restrictions remained on dual-use goods and equipment needed for industry and basic services.[15] The United States’ special envoy welcomed additional supplies entering through Kerem Shalom and expressed an expectation that crossing capacity would meet demand.[13] In December 2010, Israel also approved a gradual, restricted plan for goods to leave Gaza for destinations outside Israel and to the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[2]

Egypt announced the permanent reopening of Rafah for Palestinian passenger travel in May 2011, with about 1,200 people a day able to pass, but the crossing remained closed to trade.[10] Discussions of further easing formed part of ceasefire negotiations after the 2012 and 2014 conflicts.[3] Following the 2014 hostilities, some restrictions on selling Gaza-produced goods in Israel and the West Bank were lifted for the first time since 2007.[3] Commercial transfers to the West Bank resumed, and exports to Israel were permitted in March 2015.[15]

During 2007–2010, permitted imports were largely confined to basic humanitarian products, principally food, fodder, medical supplies, and hygiene items.[15] Exports and transfers to the West Bank were banned during the first two years, while three of the four goods crossings between Gaza and Israel closed.[15] Rafah’s near-complete closure by Egypt aggravated these restrictions, and smuggling tunnels became an important route for construction materials, livestock, fuel, cash, and food.[15]

The early system regulated the composition of imports as well as their volume.[3] Mathematical formulas were used to calculate food quantities, while a senior Israeli official summarized the intended balance as “no prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis.”[3] A commentary by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs offers a different emphasis, describing food quantities as limited by crossing capacity rather than a numerical ceiling and identifying quotas for fuel and agricultural products.[5] That account lists medical supplies, international humanitarian assistance, approved public projects, agricultural materials, and private-market goods in descending order of priority.[5]

After the 2010 changes, the principal goods restrictions increasingly concerned items classified as dual-use: materials or equipment with civilian applications that could also serve military purposes.[3] Examples included cement, X-ray machines, wood planks, pipes, medical equipment, water pumps, and some productive-sector raw materials.[3][15] Such goods could be important to industry and to rebuilding or maintaining water, sewage, and electricity infrastructure.[3] Approval delays affected development and infrastructure projects.[15]

Israel continued to restrict cement and metals on the grounds that Hamas could use them for fortifications or attacks.[16] Cargo handling was consolidated at Kerem Shalom, while three other cargo crossings closed and the Egyptian crossing did not handle regular cargo.[16] In January 2012, approximately 4,500 truckloads entered monthly, compared with about 2,500 before the flotilla incident and a monthly average of 10,400 across all crossings in 2005.[16] Israeli officials said planned terminal improvements could increase inbound traffic by approximately 50 percent by mid-2012.[16]

Crossing access also changed in response to security events.[17] After rocket fire, Kerem Shalom closed for several days between February and April 2013, while passage through Erez was restricted to humanitarian cases.[17] Imports during those three months fell 17.5 percent compared with the preceding quarter.[17] A later account described restrictions on private construction materials after discovery of a tunnel near Ein Hashlosha and further limits on civilian goods following the abduction and killing of three Israeli teenagers in 2014.[18]

Construction restrictions affected roughly 270 projects in the period described by that 2014 account; only ten continued, mostly projects associated with the United Nations or Qatari government.[18] Construction then represented a reported 28 percent of Gaza’s GDP.[18] After the 2014 campaign, supervised construction supplies were permitted again.[18] The Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism subsequently facilitated imports for international organizations, individuals, and private-sector use.[15]

Under the reconstruction arrangements described for 2017, Israel controlled the pace of construction-material entry and held oversight and veto powers over individual projects and their components, within a mechanism supervised by the United Nations.[3] More than 10,000 types of items had been submitted for approval by July 2017.[3] The mechanism therefore involved review of project inputs as well as decisions about whether an overall reconstruction project could proceed.[3]

Passenger movement remained tightly regulated.[3] Annual average departures through Erez rose from 32,400 in 2008–2010 to 62,000 in 2011–2013 and 141,645 in 2014–2016.[15] Even the later figure remained below one-third of departures recorded in 2004, when around 1,000 Palestinians entered Israel to work each weekday.[15] In 2017, passage was mostly available to businesspeople, medical patients, and employees of international organizations.[15]

Restrictions also applied within Gaza’s agricultural and maritime areas.[15] A buffer zone along the fence included agricultural land, while a six-nautical-mile fishing zone was maintained during the period covered by the 2017 reconstruction account.[3] Across the longer period since 2006, permitted fishing distances varied between three and six nautical miles, with occasional extensions to nine miles, compared with the 20-nautical-mile fishing area specified in the Oslo Accords.[15] Following the 2014 campaign, the permitted distance widened from three to six miles.[18]

The contraction in Gaza’s external trade was especially pronounced during the initial years of restrictions.[15] Average monthly truckloads leaving Gaza fell from 961 in the first half of 2007 to 17 in the second half and three in 2008.[15] Outgoing traffic subsequently recovered to 178 truckloads per month in 2016 and 303 in January–May 2017, still below one-third of the first-half 2007 level.[15] Exports and transfers during 2016 remained below 20 percent of their pre-restriction level.[15]

The loss of access to nearby markets was particularly consequential because more than 85 percent of Gaza’s goods had previously been sold in Israel and the West Bank.[19] A report on export restrictions described outgoing sales as approximately 2 percent of their pre-June 2007 level, averaging about two truckloads a day at the time.[19] A separate assessment similarly placed 2013 exports below 2 percent of the pre-blockade level.[17] Although some exports resumed after 2010, access to Gaza’s principal neighboring markets remained largely restricted during that phase.[15]

Imports also fell substantially before the 2010 policy revision.[20] Monthly inbound traffic averaged approximately 10,400 truckloads in 2005, compared with 2,400 during June 2007–June 2010.[20] By the end of 2010, despite easing, weekly truckloads remained below 40 percent of the pre-blockade level, with only one commercial crossing open.[21] Comparisons with earlier import volumes require attention to changing demand: population growth, reconstruction, and infrastructure requirements increased Gaza’s needs by 2015–2016.[15]

Industrial activity and employment suffered severe losses.[15] The 2007–2009 export ban and restrictions on transfers to the West Bank contributed to the closure of 95 percent of industrial establishments and the loss of 120,000 jobs.[15] Real GDP per capita declined 5.3 percent between 2006 and 2016, while unemployment rose from 34.1 percent in the first quarter of 2006 to 40.6 percent in the last quarter of 2016.[15] These economic conditions also reflected hostilities and other contributing factors.[15]

Another set of indicators recorded unemployment rising from 29.7 percent in 2007 to 41.7 percent in 2016, with annual GDP per capita falling from $1,096 to $970 in 2014.[3] In the period covered by that assessment, 47 percent of households experienced food insecurity, approximately 2.5 times the share in the West Bank.[3] These figures were discussed alongside isolation, recurrent hostilities, infrastructure damage, and Palestinian political divisions, rather than as consequences of the blockade alone.[3]

In 2010, an estimated 80 percent of Gaza’s population relied on international food aid.[21] Civilian difficulties included restrictions on reconstruction, trade, movement, and medical access.[21][1] A later economic study covering an 11-year period ending in 2018 estimated combined losses from the blockade and the 2008–09, 2012, and 2014 wars at $7.8 billion to $16.7 billion.[22] It recorded total economic growth of 4.8 percent while the population grew by more than 40 percent, unemployment increasing from 35 percent in 2006 to 52 percent in 2018, and poverty rising from 39 percent in 2007 to 55 percent in 2017.[22]

Economic isolation also altered the balance between Hamas and Gaza’s private sector.[3] Restrictions damaged private businesses, increased civilian dependence on government and international assistance, and encouraged a parallel tunnel economy along the Egyptian border that generated revenue for Hamas’s government and military wing.[3] An assessment of the policy found that it did not weaken Hamas politically or militarily.[3] A 2010 analysis likewise concluded that isolation had helped strengthen Hamas’s control rather than turning Gaza’s population against its rule.[13]

Later wartime supply restrictions constituted additional episodes beyond the longstanding closure arrangements.[23] On October 9, 2023, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant announced a “complete siege,” stating that electricity, food, and fuel would be withheld.[23] Israel resumed water supply to southern Gaza on October 15, and more than 80 aid trucks entered through Rafah beginning October 21 by the publication of a subsequent report.[23] These measures and partial resumptions were distinct from the restrictions introduced after 2007 and the naval blockade declared in 2009.[23]

On March 2, 2025, Israel again suspended humanitarian aid deliveries after Hamas rejected a proposed ceasefire extension, and on March 9 announced that electricity supplies would also stop.[24] Reporting at the time described the suspension as ongoing and did not establish its eventual end date.[24] That account also described an earlier post-October 7, 2023 suspension lasting 48 consecutive days.[24]

Legal disagreement has concerned the naval blockade, land-crossing restrictions, Israel’s responsibilities after disengagement, and the conduct of the 2010 flotilla interception as separate questions.[1][2] In January 2008, Israel’s Supreme Court rejected petitions challenging fuel and electricity reductions, accepted that the promised quantities met essential humanitarian needs at that time, and held that Israel must avoid deliberately harming civilians.[25] The court also stated that Israel did not exercise effective control over events in Gaza after disengagement and was not required to allow unlimited goods or ensure welfare beyond essential humanitarian obligations.[25]

The Turkel Commission concluded that the naval blockade and land-crossing policy had not become disproportionate during the period it examined through May 31, 2010, while warning that comprehensive restrictions might not remain proportionate indefinitely and recommending effective supervision and periodic high-level review.[2] The 2011 Palmer Panel considered the naval blockade a legitimate security measure meeting customary requirements for notification, effectiveness, and enforcement, but criticized the flotilla operation’s force as excessive and unreasonable.[26] Its report expressly stated that its findings were not intended to decide legal questions.[27]

By contrast, the 2010 Human Rights Council fact-finding mission concluded that the blockade inflicted disproportionate civilian damage, constituted collective punishment, and was unlawful.[6] Five independent UN human-rights experts later rejected the Palmer Panel’s legal conclusion, particularly its separation of maritime restrictions from the wider closure.[28] Turkey also rejected the blockade’s legality.[27] These assessments did not produce a uniform international legal determination.[6][27]

International political responses have likewise challenged continued restrictions.[29] General Assembly Resolution 70/90, adopted December 9, 2015, described prolonged closures and movement restrictions as effectively amounting to a blockade, called for sustained opening of crossings, and urged an end to those restrictions; it also referred to rocket fire into Israel.[29] Israel has disputed the degree of legal responsibility attributed to it by international actors citing its control over most borders, airspace, maritime access, and buffer zones.[1]