Water Supply and Sanitation in Palestine

The West Bank and Gaza have different water-resource and infrastructure problems: the Mountain Aquifer is the principal natural freshwater source for West Bank Palestinians, whereas Gaza has depended heavily on its coastal aquifer, supplemented by desalination and water supplied from Israel.[5][2] Water access involves not only the volume available but also drinking-water quality, distribution losses, continuity of service, electricity, and sewage disposal.[1][2]

A 2017 baseline placed access to basic water at approximately 88% of the Palestinian population and access to basic sanitation at 30%.[1] Sustainable supply was insufficient to meet needs, and infrastructure could not deliver the required quantities.[1] Within those broad figures, conditions differed sharply: a 2014 estimate put access to safe drinking water through the public network below 11% in Gaza, compared with almost 97% in the West Bank.[2]

Network access did not necessarily mean continuous supply: some West Bank communities received water only weekly, while many Gaza households depended on tanks, bottles, containers, or intermittent deliveries.[5][2] Gaza’s high population density and rapid population growth also strained water, sewage, and electricity services, alongside restrictions on imports.[6]

The 1993 Declaration of Principles called for experts from both sides to prepare a water-development program covering resource management in the West Bank and Gaza, studies of each party’s water rights, and equitable use of joint resources during and after the interim period.[7] The 1995 Interim Agreement subsequently established detailed water and sewage provisions in Article 40.[3]

Article 40 recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank while leaving their settlement to permanent-status negotiations.[3] It estimated future additional Palestinian needs there at 70–80 million cubic meters annually and established an interim additional-water framework totaling 28.6 million cubic meters per year.[3] Its provisions assigned particular supplies and projects to Israel and particular wells, pipelines, and source-development responsibilities to the Palestinian side; the listed Israeli commitments included five million cubic meters annually for Gaza.[3]

For Gaza, the agreement provided that the Palestinian Council would operate, manage, and develop water systems and resources, including drilling, while preventing harm to resources.[3] The 1995 arrangements excepted systems serving settlements and military installations and required payment to Mekorot for Israeli water and related expenses.[3] These provisions describe the interim agreement rather than subsequent operational arrangements.[3]

In September 2005, water installations in areas evacuated by Israel were transferred to Palestinian operation in working order.[8] The Gaza handover included 29 wells, five pumping stations, five reservoirs, and 40 pipelines, with stated production capacity of up to 4.5 million cubic meters annually.[8] At that time, Mekorot planned to continue supplying five million cubic meters annually for Gaza and 32 million for West Bank areas.[8]

The Joint Water Committee experienced prolonged interruptions after its establishment under the interim agreement.[9] In January 2017, an agreement resumed its work after six years without regular operation, with Israeli and Palestinian water officials participating.[10] The agenda included additional allocations, new wells, shared reservoirs, environmental matters, tariffs, agricultural reuse, and hydrology, together with development of a strategic plan extending to 2040.[10]

The Mountain Aquifer extends from the Mount Carmel foothills to the Beersheba Valley and from the Judean and Samarian Hills toward the Mediterranean; rainfall replenishes it, and groundwater flows northward, westward, and eastward.[9] Its Eastern, North-Eastern, and Western basins underpin the allocation and development arrangements governing much of West Bank water supply.[3]

The agreement’s aquifer schedule estimated total annual recharge at 679 million cubic meters.[3] For the Eastern Aquifer’s Jordan Valley portion, it recorded 40 million cubic meters for Israeli users, 24 million from wells and 30 million from springs for Palestinian users, and 78 million remaining to be developed.[3] The North-Eastern Aquifer figures were 103 million for Israeli users, 25 million for Palestinian users around Jenin, and another 17 million from East Nablus springs; the Western Aquifer figures were 340 million used within Israel and 22 million for Palestinians.[3]

A separate historical resource table estimated usable annual water at 362 million cubic meters in the western basin, 145 million in the northern basin, and 172 million in the eastern basin, assigning totals of 483 million to Israel and 196 million to the Palestinian Authority.[5] Successive drought years raised questions about whether replenishment continued at the estimated rate.[5] Other historical estimates placed Israeli use at approximately 70–75% of annual Mountain Aquifer yield, or 430–460 million cubic meters, and Palestinian use at 25–30%, or 160–170 million.[9]

The Eastern Aquifer was described in a 2014 assessment as lying entirely in Area C, while the Western and North-Eastern aquifers were shared with Israel.[11] That assessment recorded Palestinian abstraction of 87 million cubic meters in 2011 against an annual allocation of 138.5 million.[11] These figures concern particular historical estimates and accounting frameworks, not present-day measurements.[11]

The Joint Water Committee established under Article 40 had equal Israeli and Palestinian representation and required consensus decisions.[3] Its responsibilities included coordinated management, resource and system protection, monitoring, arrangements for water transfers, and dispute resolution.[3] New wells, increased extraction, and water-system development generally required prior committee approval.[3]

Projects involving Area C also required Israeli Civil Administration authorization, including wells, conveyance infrastructure, wastewater-treatment facilities, and reuse projects.[11] Although conflict resolution fell within the committee’s mandate, its institutional arrangements provided no separate dispute-resolution mechanism, and unanimity gave each side a practical veto.[5]

Rawabi illustrated the implications for urban development: its proposed connection required a nine-kilometer link to the existing network, partly crossing Area C.[11] By the 2014 assessment, an application submitted to the committee more than four years earlier had received no reply.[11] A proposed regional wastewater-treatment plant serving 18 surrounding villages also required Civil Administration approval because its planned site was in Area C.[11]

In 2011, water-network management faced both political constraints and Palestinian Authority management challenges, including approval requirements and the authority’s inability to prevent network theft in Area C.[12] During the same year, Israel permitted rehabilitation of 57 licensed wells in the Eastern Basin, increasing supply in the predominantly agricultural Jordan Valley.[12]

New Palestinian wells drilled after Oslo provided approximately 13 million cubic meters annually by the 2014 assessment, below the 20.5 million described as allocated for additional Palestinian water during the interim period.[11] Half of Palestinian wells had dried up over the preceding two decades, and annual Palestinian production had fallen by 20 million cubic meters since 1994, with increased purchases from Israel partly offsetting the decline.[11]

Historical Israeli supply figures reflect different years and territorial scopes.[13] In 2008, direct Israeli supply to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank reached 51.8 million cubic meters, against a stated Israeli obligation of 31 million.[13] Palestinian purchases from Mekorot totaled 51 million cubic meters in 2012, costing approximately $37 million.[11] A 2017 company account put supply in Judea and Samaria, excluding Gaza and the Jordan Valley, at 52 million cubic meters annually, compared with a stated Oslo supply commitment of 25 million.[14]

A 2008 estimate placed average daily consumption in West Bank urban areas at approximately 60.5 liters per person and the population without an established grid connection at about 215,000.[9] Some villages lacked running water for much of the year, requiring rainwater collection or purchases from commercial sellers.[9] Another 2008 estimate placed average consumption, including livestock, at 66 liters per person daily, with some northern areas at approximately one-third of that level.[15]

The latter assessment counted 227,000 people in 220 communities without plumbing connections, three-quarters in the northern West Bank, and another 190,000 in communities with minimal infrastructure.[15] Even connected towns could receive water only during part of the day, with neighborhoods supplied in rotation, while remote areas could experience interruptions lasting days or weeks.[15]

Around 2011, one administrative count recorded systems in 372 of 439 Palestinian towns and villages, leaving 67 small communities containing approximately 120,000 people without them.[5] An alternative estimate counted about 180 villages without supply, and some relatively large towns received water only once weekly.[5]

Unconnected Area C communities relied on more expensive tanker water, particularly in the Hebron, Jenin, and Tubas governorates.[11] Checkpoints and other movement barriers could increase transport costs, while poor tanker-water quality was linked to adverse health effects and economic losses.[11] In 2017, aging and deteriorated pipes and illegal tapping contributed to frequent system failures and distribution losses.[1]

Gaza’s domestic water supply in 2015 totaled approximately 95 million cubic meters: 86% came from municipal groundwater wells, 3% from UNRWA wells, 4% from desalination, and 7% from Mekorot.[2] A more precise comparison recorded 95.3 million cubic meters for Gaza and 119.6 million for the West Bank.[2] Approximately 90% of Gaza’s population depended on tanks, bottles, or containers rather than safe drinking water directly from the public network.[2]

In 2015, 96.4% of natural water extracted from Gaza’s coastal aquifer failed the cited drinking-water standard.[2] Chloride exceeded the cited limit in 201 of 249 wells, while nitrate concentrations exceeded it in approximately 90% of extracted aquifer water.[2] Over-pumping encouraged seawater intrusion, and untreated sewage contributed nitrate pollution.[2] Small desalination facilities could reduce salinity without necessarily removing other pollutants.[2]

Chemical and isotopic research published in 2005 identified several salinity sources: lateral movement of naturally saline groundwater, seawater intrusion, and human-caused nitrate pollution.[16] Natural mineral dissolution and groundwater reactions also formed part of the regional geochemical process.[16] Salinization threatened the present and future water supply of more than one million people at the time.[16]

By 2016, Israeli supply to Gaza had reportedly increased from five million cubic meters annually before Operation Protective Edge to ten million afterward, delivered through two pipelines.[17] Estimated annual demand was 200 million cubic meters.[17] Approximately 40 private desalination facilities operated without supervision, and four in five residents bought drinking water from private suppliers in 2014.[17]

A European Union–funded, UNICEF-implemented plant at Deir al-Balah was intended to provide drinking water to 75,000 people through a €10 million project.[18] In 2016, its first construction stage was expected to produce 6,000 cubic meters daily, with a planned second stage doubling capacity to 12,000; testing was still required before public distribution.[18] A 2014 household measure had found good-quality water in only 5.8% of Gaza households.[18]

A 2022 assessment estimated annual unmet demand at 102 million cubic meters in Gaza and 33 million in the West Bank.[19] It placed reliance on desalinated drinking water at 90% of Gaza’s population, supplied by 154 public and private facilities, more than 100 of them unlicensed or uninspected.[19] Israeli water accounted for approximately 10% of consumption, while three larger desalination facilities were not fully functional because of energy and maintenance difficulties.[19]

Only 31% of the Palestinian West Bank population was connected to a sewerage network in the 2017 baseline, and only 5–10% of Palestinian wastewater was treated.[1] An earlier estimate put wastewater generated by Palestinian towns and villages at approximately 52 million cubic meters annually: 62.5% was untreated or entered cesspits, 32.7% was treated in Israel, mostly after flowing through streams, and 4.8% was treated at El-Bireh.[5]

Israeli towns and villages in the West Bank generated approximately 19 million cubic meters annually in that accounting, with 85% treated and 15% untreated or entering cesspits.[5] The figures excluded another 15 million cubic meters flowing into the Kidron Valley from Jerusalem-area communities.[5] A 2009 accounting instead divided Palestinian wastewater into four million cubic meters treated in Palestinian plants, 14 million in Israeli plants, and 34 million untreated.[13]

Approximately 15 million cubic meters of West Bank wastewater were collected and treated inside Israel in 2011.[11] Some wastewater was also treated in Israeli plants in the West Bank and subsequently reused by Israel.[11] In 2017, a proposed arrangement envisaged piping Kidron-stream sewage to a plant near Nabi Musa and using treated water in the Jordan Valley, including for Palestinian agriculture.[14]

Gaza’s wastewater treatment was closely tied to electricity supply and maintenance.[2] In 2016, a regional facility built with more than $80 million in international investment was not operating because of inadequate electricity.[17] Although a six-megawatt allocation had been approved, the distribution network could not deliver it, and a dedicated line was under consideration.[17]

Historical estimates placed untreated or poorly treated Gaza sewage discharged into the sea at approximately 108,000 cubic meters daily during the period examined in a study addressing 2017 conditions.[2] A separate 2017 baseline estimated 90,000 cubic meters of raw sewage entering the Mediterranean or percolating into the aquifer each day, increasing waterborne-disease risks.[1]

By 2022, Gaza had seven sewage-treatment facilities.[19] Even during regular operation, the estimated balance was 70,000 cubic meters treated, 20,000 discharged untreated into the sea, and another 20,000 discharged on land, polluting groundwater.[19] Treated water also went to the sea rather than agricultural reuse because suitable infrastructure was absent.[19]

Cross-border treatment projects included a 15-kilometer, 12-inch pipeline approved in June 2019 to divert wastewater from Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun to the Sderot treatment plant.[20] Expected to cost more than NIS 15 million, it was intended to replace a temporary pumping arrangement that strained local infrastructure and occasionally burst.[20]

During fighting in August 2014, damage affected Gaza’s water, sewage, and electricity systems, including extensive underground infrastructure.[21] Repairing one well was followed by street flooding because downstream pipes were damaged; a main sewage line in Jabalia was repaired, but three of five wastewater-treatment facilities remained out of service.[21] Groundwater was being pumped at approximately three times its replenishment rate, alongside seawater intrusion and sharply rising purchased-water prices.[21]

In June 2024, approximately 67% of water and sanitation facilities and infrastructure were estimated to have been damaged or destroyed over the preceding eight months.[22] Municipal production stood at 28% of its pre-October 2023 level, with estimated network losses of 50% because of damage.[22] Insecurity, access constraints, and fuel shortages impeded pumps and desalination plants, while overcrowding increased competition for water and latrines.[22]

By October 2024, approximately 90% of Gaza’s roughly 2.1 million residents had been displaced, with most experiencing overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and acute shortages of water and other essentials.[23] Flooding around displacement sites and medical points threatened to increase disease risks and further undermine sanitation access.[23]

An Israeli-Palestinian NGO initiative reported in August 2024 planned off-grid solar power, desalination, and wastewater treatment for three displacement camps serving approximately 10,000 people.[4] The camps relied on manually emptied cesspits, cleaned about every three days, while sewage facilities were idle because of damage and lack of electricity.[4] Donated solar desalination machines were planned, together with an initial wastewater-treatment test serving 500 people at Zomi camp.[4]

For October 2025–June 2026, facilitated supply through external lines and desalination facilities averaged more than 70,000 cubic meters daily, excluding an unknown amount from local wells.[24] Sources included three Israeli lines, an Egyptian line, and southern desalination facilities, with at least 170 local wells and pumping facilities operating.[24] Distribution used trucks, networks, and public points, and estimated likely supply was at least 40 liters per person daily.[24]

Sanitation and wastewater management remained major challenges, particularly in densely populated areas.[24] Emergency projects included pumping stations, sewage-line restoration, chemical-toilet compounds, expanded trucking, and more than 100,000 cesspits; nearly 200,000 sanitation and pest-control items and waste-collection vehicles were also facilitated.[24] An August 2026 damage estimate placed the affected share of water and sanitation infrastructure at 71%, with households outside relatively intact parts of central Gaza buying tanker water or depending on humanitarian organizations.[25]

Fifteen streams identified in a 2007 study crossed the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank or Gaza, many carrying raw sewage or low-quality effluent.[26] Agricultural runoff, urban stormwater, and industrial discharges added pollution, creating health hazards and ecological damage, while over-pumping had dried some headwaters.[26] Israel’s River Restoration Administration, established in 1994, provided a coordinating framework, and chemical and biological monitoring of the Zomar/Alexander and Hebron/Besor/Gaza streams was proposed to assess restoration options and costs.[26]

A 2012 valuation study found common Israeli and Palestinian preferences concerning water use and stream restoration, together with comparable willingness to pay for restoration.[27] The findings supported cooperation and the use of cost-benefit analysis in treatment and allocation policy.[27]

Planned assistance in 2017 combined supply, sanitation, and institutional strengthening through infrastructure investment, training, and pilot technologies to reduce losses and improve reliability.[1] Estimated intended benefits included sustainable basic water access for more than 365,000 people and basic sanitation for nearly 22,000 Palestinians.[1]

Climate and urbanization research identified possible pressures from higher temperatures, lower and more erratic precipitation, reduced aquifer replenishment, and increasing urban demands on freshwater quality and quantity.[28] Projections discussed in 2022 included declining average rainfall in the southern coastal plain, more intense rainfall and flood risks, and sea-level rise that could worsen inland seawater intrusion.[19]

A 2024 systems study proposed energy-efficient desalination to raise potable supply to 150 million cubic meters annually and expanded tertiary wastewater treatment producing more than 150 million cubic meters annually for agricultural reuse.[29] Its baseline placed water supply below 100 liters per person daily and described electricity supply as substantially below peak demand.[29] These were planning proposals, not completed facilities or achieved production levels.[29]

The division of shared groundwater and responsibility for shortages remain major disputes.[9] Palestinians argue that recharge within the West Bank and restrictions on drilling support a larger entitlement; Israel argues that it uses water flowing naturally into its territory, including resources used before 1967, and that restrictions protect against over-pumping and deterioration.[9] Earlier agreements and international water law do not unequivocally resolve the division.[9]

Assessments of the Joint Water Committee differ over whether equal representation and mutual vetoes provided effective cooperation or preserved underlying inequalities in power and capacity.[5] Disputes also concern additional Area C approvals, development potential in the eastern basin, wastewater commitments, and the intended timeframe of the agreement’s future-needs estimate.[5] Accounts of committee interruptions differ, although regular work resumed by agreement in 2017.[9][10]

The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs argues for greater emphasis on Palestinian institutional responsibility, citing historical network expansion and pipeline losses of 33.6%, compared with 11% in Israel.[30] Its reported figures put supply growth at 66 to 120 million cubic meters annually between 1967 and 1995 and connected communities at four to 309, followed by 641 of 708 communities connected in March 2010.[30] A separate Jerusalem Center article argues that political developments interrupted a 1995 program of pipeline repair, reduced pumping, treatment, desalination, and Israeli imports.[31]

Other historical accounts identify Israeli approval and import restrictions alongside Palestinian management problems, while recording Israeli approvals of donor-funded projects.[12] Damage to community water pipes during a December 2013 demolition at Ein Ayoub and difficulties importing Gaza spare parts also formed part of these accounts.[32] Explanations for wartime damage likewise differ, including an Israeli-government assessment emphasizing Hamas’ use of civilian areas for terror infrastructure and firing at Israel.[33]

Statistics require attention to dates, definitions, and geography rather than combination into a single current measure.[5][19] In particular, 2022 Gaza assessments relied heavily on underlying data with gaps and reliability questions, and humanitarian production and damage estimates from 2024 and 2026 describe different periods and indicators.[19][24]