Israeli–Palestinian Joint Water Committee

The JWC's formal remit as defined by Article 40 covers seven broad functions: coordinated management of water resources and water and sewage systems in the West Bank; protection of those resources and systems; exchange of information about water and sewage laws and regulations; oversight of joint supervision and enforcement; resolution of water and sewage disputes; coordination of water cooperation and supply between the parties; and ongoing monitoring.[2][4]

The committee has an equal number of Israeli and Palestinian representatives and is co-chaired by the heads of the respective Israeli and Palestinian water authorities.[5] Its operating rule — that "all decisions of the JWC shall be reached by consensus, including the agenda, its procedures and other matters" — gives each side an effective veto over every aspect of the committee's work, including its procedural operations.[1][2] The Knesset Research and Information Center noted that, as a consequence of this structure, the arrangement had no independent dispute-resolution mechanism when the two sides could not agree.[6]

The JWC operated through four subcommittees covering hydrology, water projects, sewage, and water prices.[6][5] An Israeli Water Authority factsheet also described an urgent-project fast-track mechanism capable of approving projects within 21 days.[5]

The JWC was formally constituted by Article 40 of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, signed in Washington on September 28, 1995, between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.[7][8] That provision, found in Annex III, Appendix 1 of the agreement and sometimes called the "Water Agreement," established the JWC as a permanent body for the interim period, operating under the auspices of the Civil Affairs Committee.[9][1]

An analysis by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs points to two September 1993 protocols that established joint organs for economic and regional-development cooperation, including work on water resources and equitable utilization, as precursors to the JWC framework.[10] A separate JCFA commentary states that the 1993 Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Oslo II Accord called for a Palestinian water authority, which was established in 1995.[11] Article 40 stated explicitly that Israeli-recognized Palestinian water rights in the West Bank were to be negotiated in permanent-status talks, making the JWC an interim mechanism rather than a final resolution of the underlying water-rights question.[1][9]

Schedule 8 of Oslo II required prior JWC approval before either side could license or drill new wells, increase extraction from any water source, develop water resources or systems, or construct or modify water and sewage systems.[2][9] For agreed additional-water projects, the committee was to review geo-hydrological and technical details and specifications before final design and implementation.[2] The JWC was also responsible for determining changes in extraction and resulting supply when hydrological or climatological conditions required adjustment, and for preparing and updating extraction quotas based on existing licenses and permits.[2]

At least five Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams (JSETs) were to operate in the West Bank under JWC control from the agreement's signature date.[2] Each team was to include at least two representatives from each side and was tasked with monitoring extraction, unauthorized connections and water use, new well drilling, pollution prevention, and water and sewage system operation.[2] When a team could not agree on corrective action after detecting an infringement, the matter was referred immediately to the two JWC chairmen.[2][2]

For infrastructure in Area C, JWC approval was not always sufficient on its own: projects there could also require a separate permit from the Israeli Civil Administration.[6] A World Bank report described this as a significant constraint, noting that because water infrastructure almost invariably passes through Area C, the dual-approval requirement applied to the great majority of West Bank water and wastewater development.[12] A Water Authority representative told the Knesset that the Civil Administration almost always approved projects already approved by the JWC, while other assessments characterized the additional process as lengthy, bureaucratic, and lacking Palestinian representation.[6]

Palestinian approvals granted through the JWC included approximately 60 drinking-water wells, 11 agricultural-irrigation wells, 22 observation wells, and upgrades to approximately 55 older wells.[6] Approvals also covered hundreds of kilometers of water pipes and dozens of reservoirs and pumping stations, as well as water-supply system expansions serving Israeli communities in the West Bank.[6] The committee's work included not only formal meetings but also exchanges of letters, telephone conversations, and daily contacts between the two sides' water administrations.[6]

Article 40 set out quantitative arrangements for water supply during the interim period while deferring the negotiation of full Palestinian water rights to permanent-status talks.[9][1] The agreement recognized an immediate need to make 28.6 million cubic meters (MCM) per year available to Palestinians, with the breakdown assigning specific additional supplies and well sources to each side.[1][9] Among the specified measures, 17 MCM per year was to be developed by the Palestinians from the Eastern Aquifer or other agreed West Bank sources, intended for the Hebron, Bethlehem, and Ramallah areas.[1] The agreement also acknowledged future Palestinian needs in the West Bank at 70–80 MCM per year and indicated that Palestinians could develop remaining estimated needs from the Eastern Aquifer and other agreed sources.[1][9]

Sources report somewhat different figures in describing the agreement's interim quantities. The agreement text, as hosted by the Jewish Virtual Library and referenced by NGO Monitor, gives 28.6 MCM per year as the interim additional-water quantity.[2][13] An Israeli Water Authority factsheet gives 23.6 MCM per year as the interim-period figure and states that 5 MCM of that amount was for the Gaza Strip; this differs from the 28.6 MCM total in the agreement text and is not reconciled in the reviewed sources.[5] A World Bank report describes a Palestinian annual allocation of 138.5 MCM and a 20.5 MCM transitional-period figure, quantities that also differ from those in the agreement text without explaining how the different categories relate.[12][12]

The World Bank report documented that Palestinians had not drawn their full agreed allocation: of the 138.5 MCM the report attributed to the Palestinian side, Palestinians abstracted 87 MCM in 2011, and new Palestinian wells drilled since the Oslo Agreement supplied 13 MCM per year.[12] The 1995 interim allocations remained operative long after the five-year interim period for which they were designed, because no replacement agreement was reached following the breakdown of the peace process and the Second Intifada.[8] A 2011 news report stated that the interim agreement was still being applied because no successor had been signed and that water needs had changed considerably since the agreement's quantities were fixed.[14]

Water was among the substantive issues addressed in the Annapolis negotiating process. A separate water negotiating committee operated alongside the JWC during those talks, led by Professor Uri Shani for Israel and Fadel Kawash for the Palestinians.[15] The parties discussed water quantities and management, water quality, wastewater treatment, environmental quality, and water security.[15]

The parties' positions diverged significantly on which sources were shared and subject to joint allocation. The Palestinians sought discussion of shared-source boundaries and rights encompassing the Jordan basin, the Carmel aquifer, and the coastal aquifer. Israel did not regard the Jordan basin and those aquifers as shared, while expressing willingness to address the Mountain Aquifer and Jordan River water south of the Bezek River.[15] Disagreements also extended to data, allocation principles, and the scope of shared sources.[15] The Annapolis water negotiations were suspended without real progress, and their positions remained unresolved.[15]

After operating regularly from 1995, the JWC entered a prolonged period of effective inactivity beginning around 2010. A State Comptroller review found that the committee had not convened to approve projects since August 2010.[16] For more than five years, neither the Israeli Water Authority nor the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories had examined activating any dispute-resolution mechanism to break the deadlock.[16]

The two sides offered conflicting explanations for the breakdown. Israeli officials, including Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Yoav Mordechai in November 2016, attributed the impasse to Palestinian refusal to approve water projects serving Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria — something the consensus requirement gave the Palestinian side the power to block.[17] Mordechai said the deadlock had delayed dozens of West Bank water-infrastructure projects and that the Palestinian Authority had not provided its estimates of future Palestinian water needs for infrastructure planning.[17]

The Palestinian Authority's position, articulated by Palestinian Water Authority director Mazen Ghoneim in June 2016, was that the committee had not met in five years because Israel used the forum to press Palestinians into approving water projects for Israeli settlements.[18] Ghoneim called for renegotiating the allocation ratio established by the 1995 accords, arguing that population growth and worsening leakage had reduced the effective Palestinian share in practice.[18]

The stalled JWC had direct consequences for Palestinian infrastructure. Rawabi's proposed nine-kilometer water connection included a segment in Area C and required a JWC permit.[12] The application had received no reply after more than four years, and the World Bank identified the delayed connection among the Area C constraints threatening the project's schedule and viability.[12]

On January 15, 2017, Israeli and Palestinian officials signed an agreement intended to renew the JWC's regular functioning after the six-year hiatus.[19] The agreement was signed by Coordinator of Government Activities Yoav Mordechai and Palestinian Authority Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, with Israeli Water Authority representative Moshe Grazi and Palestinian Water Authority director Mazen Ghoneim also participating.[19] Topics identified for discussion under the renewed framework included increased water supplies to the West Bank and Gaza, drilling of new wells, water tariffs, agricultural use of reclaimed water, hydrological issues, and coordination over shared water reservoirs.[19] The parties also announced a joint strategic-planning mechanism intended to operate until 2040.[19]

Israel undertook to help develop and modernize West Bank water infrastructure, maintain existing infrastructure, and approve new projects, and officials said the agreement would enable faster installation of water, sewage, and treated-wastewater pipes.[19][3]

The JWC's future has featured in broader discussions about regional arrangements and Israeli-Palestinian relations. A 2023 INSS publication included "renewal of the activity of the Joint Water Committee" among a package of water-related measures proposed in the context of normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia.[20] The same publication also proposed coastal land for a Palestinian desalination station with Saudi or international financing, and Palestinian wastewater-treatment facilities in the West Bank.[20] The publication did not explain why JWC activity had again lapsed or specify in detail how or where it would be restarted.[20]

Analysts have also examined what would happen to the JWC if the Oslo framework were terminated. An INSS assessment warned that the committee could cease to exist in that scenario and that Israel would then have less incentive to coordinate water use — a concern that underscores the JWC's role as the primary bilateral tool for managing shared water resources.[21]

Evaluations of the JWC's performance diverge substantially depending on the source. The Israeli Water Authority described the committee as having convened regularly, approved the majority of applications from both sides, and operated with a fast-track mechanism for urgent projects.[5] A Knesset Research and Information Center review similarly documented a substantial volume of approved projects.[6]

Critics pointed to structural limitations and implementation gaps. The World Bank characterized the JWC as reflecting asymmetries in power, capacity, information, and interests between the parties, and described the committee as functioning more as a distribution model than as a genuine joint management institution.[6] The World Bank also identified the dual-approval requirement — JWC plus Israeli Civil Administration — as a constraint on Palestinian water and wastewater development in Area C, noting that the process did not include a Palestinian representative at the Civil Administration stage.[6][12]

Implementation shortfalls were documented on the Palestinian side as well. Only about half of authorized Palestinian drillings had been carried out.[6] An Israeli Water Authority factsheet similarly recorded that many approved Palestinian projects, including 25 wells, had not yet been implemented.[5] The BESA Center claimed that the JWC had approved permits for approximately 40 Palestinian drilling sites in the eastern Hebron hills but that Palestinians had drilled at only about one-third of those sites over the preceding 20 years — though these figures, presented from a distinctly advocacy-oriented perspective, should be understood as claimed rather than independently verified measures of performance.[22]

The reporting period matters when assessing these accounts. A 2011 news report stated the committee had met regularly since 1995.[14] Later sources documented the extended interruption from approximately 2010 to 2017. The Israeli Water Authority's factsheet, describing regular convening and broad approvals, was written against the backdrop of the Israeli government's account of the committee's functioning, while Palestinian officials described a different experience of the same institution.[5][18]

Several aspects of the JWC's operation and the water arrangements it administered remain contested. The agreement text gives 28.6 MCM per year as the interim additional-water figure.[2] The Israeli Water Authority factsheet instead gives 23.6 MCM per year and states that 5 MCM of that amount was for Gaza.[5] The World Bank report uses a separate 138.5 MCM annual allocation and a 20.5 MCM transitional figure; none of the reviewed sources reconcile these quantities with one another.[12]

The reasons for the JWC's roughly six-year interruption are disputed between the parties. Israeli officials attributed the deadlock to Palestinian refusal to approve water supply for Israeli communities — citing the consensus rule as the mechanism by which one side could block the whole committee — while the Palestinian Authority characterized the forum as one Israel used to press for approvals Palestinians found unacceptable.[17][18] The explanation that a Palestinian Authority boycott of JWC meetings caused Rawabi's water delay was reported in some sources but was not corroborated by independent accounts, and the specific dates of any formal boycott were not documented in the reviewed material.[11]

The JWC's period of inactivity is described as six years in some sources and seven years in others — with the Jewish Virtual Library overview using six years and NGO Monitor, citing a 2018 INSS-EcoPeace publication and a 2017 State Comptroller report, giving seven years.[3][13] These descriptions are not independently reconciled in the reviewed sources.

More broadly, Israeli and Palestinian officials and commentators have presented competing accounts of the committee's record, the extent of Israeli compliance with Oslo water obligations, and the causes of Palestinian water shortfalls. A 2014 BESA perspective paper by Haim Gvirtzman argued that Palestinian water shortages stemmed primarily from Palestinian policy choices, including incomplete use of approved drilling sites, leakage, and limited wastewater treatment. This is an Israeli-perspective assessment rather than a neutral institutional finding.[22] Questions concerning water rights, allocation principles, implementation obligations, and shared-source boundaries were not resolved during the Annapolis process and remain open.[15]