Palestinian Springs in the West Bank: Access and Control Disputes

The term encompasses several legally and factually distinct patterns. U.S. State Department reports used the language of expropriation when relaying NGO claims that 26 springs on privately owned Palestinian land had been converted into recreational parks and that Palestinian shepherds and farmers had been denied access.[1] Later reports describe water diversion, infrastructure vandalism, unauthorized construction, and competing claims of control or ownership at individual sites.[2][5]

The reviewed named cases do not identify a formal state order transferring ownership of a spring. Some involve findings concerning privately owned land and government demolition orders, while others rest on accounts from residents, utilities, NGOs, military authorities, or regional councils that disagree about access and site status.[4][5]

Oslo II's Annex III, Article 40, explicitly recognizes Palestinian water rights in the West Bank, with those rights to be negotiated in a permanent-status agreement.[3] For the interim period, the agreement calls for coordinated management of water and sewage resources, and transfers to the Palestinian side powers and responsibilities over water and sewage systems relating solely to Palestinians, subject to specified exceptions.[3]

Schedule 8 of Oslo II requires that new wells, increased extraction from any water source, and development of water resources by either side receive prior approval from the Joint Water Committee (JWC), a body with equal Israeli and Palestinian representation making decisions by consensus.[3] Schedule 10 of the same agreement provides average annual estimates of extraction at the time of signing: Palestinian users drew approximately 30 million cubic meters (mcm) from springs in the Jordan Valley, 17 mcm from East Nablus springs, and 2 mcm from springs near Nablus, while Israeli users drew 103 mcm from the Gilboa and Beisan springs in the north-eastern aquifer zone, including water from wells.[3] These are agreement-era baseline figures, not records of subsequent compliance or allocation.

The Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research notes that water issues were left for permanent-status negotiations rather than resolved by the 1995 Interim Agreement.[6] Regarding the broader legal context, the legality of West Bank settlements is itself contested: Palestinian authorities, UN bodies, and the EU regard settlements as violating Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, while Israel's position is that the provision prohibits involuntary population transfer rather than voluntary movement.[6]

The U.S. Department of State's 2010 Human Rights Report stated that some NGOs reported an increase in settler expropriation of natural springs on privately owned Palestinian land in the West Bank, attributing to Yesh Din the documentation of 26 springs converted into recreational "nature parks."[1] Palestinian residents described intermittent water supplies and said settlers and their security guards denied access to shepherds and farmers.[1] The 2011 State Department report repeated the same figure of 26 springs and similar descriptions of restricted access, without establishing that these represented new cases counted that year.[7]

The 2010 report also provided broader water-supply context: citing the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, it stated that Israel controlled 85 percent of the West Bank water supply and allocated an average of 16 gallons per person per day to Palestinians, compared with 63 gallons per person per day for Israeli settlers — below the World Health Organization minimum of 26 gallons for basic hygiene and food security.[1] The 2011 report, citing Amnesty International, put average Palestinian supply at 18.5 gallons per person per day, while the Palestinian Water Authority claimed Israel controlled 90 percent of the shared Mountain Aquifer.[7]

A 2012 Calcalist report described research prepared by Dror Etkes for the UN, which identified Ein Ariq — renamed "Heroism Spring" by settlers — as one of dozens of cases where settlers allegedly took over spring areas near settlements and limited Palestinian access.[8] Palestinian officials from Lubban al-Sharqiya stated the spring stood on ancestral land with title documents registered in Nablus, and that generations of Palestinians had used it for livestock and agriculture.[8] A representative of the adjacent settlement of Eli offered a different account: the spring had been neglected, the Nature and Parks Authority had cleaned and improved the site, and Palestinians could visit except during olive harvest, when entry was restricted for both communities to prevent friction.[8]

In 2016, N12 reported that COGAT described construction at Ein Kfir, Einot Anar, and Ein Amasha as unauthorized, and said demolition orders had been issued for Ein Kfir, with some previously carried out.[5] The IDF stated at the time that Palestinians were generally allowed access to springs, though access could be restricted at specific sites for security reasons or to prevent friction.[5] The Shomron Regional Council maintained that Ein Kfir sat on state land within Alon Moreh's jurisdiction, and that Ein Amasha was open to all local residents without distinction.[5]

The Einot Anar spring complex became a focus of Israeli High Court litigation. In 2014, youths from the settlement of Neria renovated the site and dedicated it to three Israeli teenagers murdered that year, with donors and the Binyamin Regional Council contributing more than NIS 500,000.[9] The organizations Emek Shaveh and Yesh Din petitioned on behalf of residents of Deir Ammar and Ras Karkar in 2017, describing Nabi Anar as a Muslim pilgrimage site on private Palestinian land and alleging unlawful exclusion of its owners.[9]

Following the High Court's annulment of the 2017 Settlement Regulations Law — which had been designed to retroactively legalize settler construction on private Palestinian land in exchange for compensation — the state informed the court it would demand that the construction at Einot Anar be dismantled within 90 days.[4][9] Supporters of the memorial described the demolition order as unjust.[9] The springs and surrounding paths are located in Area C, within an archaeological site under the jurisdiction of the Civil Administration.[4]

Ein Samiya, located approximately 16 kilometers northeast of Ramallah, has been the site of repeatedly reported incidents. The Palestinian utility Jerusalem Water Undertaking described the station there as a frequent target of vandalism; a nearby resident said attackers entered spring stations, damaged equipment, removed cameras, and interrupted water supply.[2] The Israeli military said it had received reports of intentional damage by Israeli civilians, that no suspects had been identified, and that Palestinian water authorities had been permitted to carry out repairs.[2]

In July 2025, settlers reportedly redirected water from Ein Samiya toward a nearby pool called Shepherds Spring.[10] Reports differed on the number of Palestinian communities served: The Jerusalem Post cited approximately 20 nearby villages and some city neighborhoods, while a Times of Israel account relaying Haaretz estimated 30 villages.[2][10] The Times of Israel reported four vandalism incidents at Ein Samiya's wells in the preceding month, causing damage to security cameras and water infrastructure and producing prolonged outages.[10]

A May 2026 Times of Israel report, citing Peace Now, stated that settlers had taken over the Ein Samiya spring during the preceding year, renovated it, and prevented Palestinian access; Bedouin communities near the site had continued using the spring to water livestock, while residents of a nearby hamlet had fled after repeated settler attacks following October 7, 2023.[11]

An August 2025 Ynet report described damage to the pumping system, motors, pipes, and communications and electrical infrastructure at Ein Samiya, with water being redirected into a stone pool for Jewish bathers under the name "Shepherds' Spring."[12] Taybeh Brewery manager Madis Khoury, quoted in the same article, said 18 villages received all their water from wells around Ein Samiya and another 14 depended on the spring in part, affecting approximately 70,000 people.[12] She said Palestinian users had previously received 15 percent of the spring's flow, and contrasted Palestinian consumption of 73 liters per person per day with 369 liters for Israeli settlers and a WHO recommendation of 100 liters. She said affected communities had to rely on smaller, costlier quantities purchased by the Palestinian Water Authority from Mekorot after the supply was disrupted.[12] These figures and effects are attributed to Khoury in the Ynet article.

At Fasayil in the Jordan Valley, a Reuters report published by The Times of Israel stated that settlers cut irrigation pipes in June 2026 and channeled water from a spring to an ancient pool at an archaeological site, which was then advertised as a tourist attraction.[13] Farmer Saad Nemer said the spring had supported local livelihoods and agriculture for generations and that his water supply remained cut off.[13] He presented a 2025 land-ownership document from COGAT and a map from the 1957 registration of his title deeds, which he said showed his land included both the spring and pool.[13] Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich pledged financial support for the attraction; COGAT and Smotrich's office did not respond to requests for comment.[13]

Near Ein al-Auja, north of Jericho, a 2025 Jerusalem Post report described a Bedouin encampment whose residents relied on trucked-in water despite a large spring a few hundred meters away that they described as reserved for settlers' use.[14] In August 2024, Ynet relayed a Palestinian news agency account that settlers had taken over a spring near Beit Furik, east of Nablus, with a Palestinian activist saying settlers had "stormed the spring and driven people away"; no Israeli authority or settler response was included in the brief.[15]

An April 2026 INSS analysis by researchers Udi Dekel and Tammy Caner described settler violence as including "displacement of Palestinians from water sources," alongside seizure of grazing land and displacement from farmland, as part of a broader pattern of pressure on Palestinian communities.[16] The authors cited approximately 870 "Jewish nationalist crime" incidents in 2025 according to IDF data, alongside 1,732 "settler violence incidents" reported by the UN, with the difference attributed to differing classification methods.[16] A separate INSS analysis described Area C, which constitutes 60 percent of the West Bank, as under Israeli civilian and security control, noting that the 1995 Oslo II agreement had envisaged its gradual transfer to Palestinian jurisdiction, a transfer that did not occur.[17]

NGO Monitor has disputed the evidentiary basis of some accounts of spring takeovers, particularly OCHA's March 2012 report "How Dispossession Happens," which NGO Monitor characterized as heavily reliant on material from B'Tselem, Yesh Din, and Who Profits, and as ignoring negotiated water arrangements and other contextual complexities.[18] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs argues that Israel's legal position permits expropriation of private property for public purposes with compensation, but that the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that taking private land for a settlement is permissible only when required for security — non-security settlement expropriation being prohibited.[19]

The reviewed sources describe named cases as alleged informal settler takeovers, denial of access, water diversion, infrastructure damage, or unauthorized construction rather than identifying a formal state expropriation order transferring ownership of a named spring. Reports on Ein Samiya and Einot Anar illustrate the distinction between alleged site control, infrastructure damage, private-land findings, and demolition enforcement.[2][4] The Fasayil report separately describes diverted water and a farmer's property claim rather than a completed legal determination of ownership.[13]

The 2010 and 2011 water-allocation figures are attributed to different organizations and refer to distinct measures, populations, or water resources, so they should not be treated as directly interchangeable.[1][7] The later consumption and service-area figures in the Ynet report are statements attributed to an individual spokesperson rather than independent measurements supplied by the article.[12] Israeli military and regional council statements in contemporaneous news reports generally contest or qualify access and ownership claims advanced by Palestinian residents and rights groups, without constituting independent legal determinations about the status of individual springs.[5]