Timeline of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in 2026

The Gaza ceasefire that took effect in October 2025 provided the framework for negotiations and military deployments entering 2026.[1] A Gaza Peace Summit had taken place in Sharm el-Sheikh on October 13, 2025, preceding efforts to implement a broader transition involving hostage returns, Palestinian technocratic administration, demilitarization, and recovery.[5] The second phase of the US-backed, 20-point Gaza plan envisaged moving beyond the cessation of major fighting toward the disarmament of unauthorized personnel and the reconstruction of the territory.[1]

Israeli forces remained deployed along a boundary known as the Yellow Line, separating Israeli-controlled areas from areas held by Hamas.[6] This deployment represented a partial withdrawal from populated areas rather than a complete Israeli withdrawal or relinquishment of security control.[7] The unresolved questions entering the second phase included who would govern Gaza, whether Hamas would disarm, and who would maintain public order and security.[8]

The wider conflict also continued in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — where Israeli forces conducted counterterrorism operations and officials faced growing concern over attacks by extremist settlers against Palestinians.[1][9] The chronology below follows the developments documented through late October, rather than presenting a complete day-by-day or year-end accounting.

On January 8, Hamas attempted to launch a rocket that fell inside Gaza, after which the Israeli Air Force struck the launch site.[10] No rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel during January, although Israeli operations against weapons, tunnels, and people crossing the Yellow Line continued.[9] Israeli security forces also continued counterterrorism operations in the West Bank, where one attack was recorded during January without Israeli casualties.[9]

On January 14, US envoy Steve Witkoff announced the launch of the Gaza plan’s second phase, describing a transition toward demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.[1] A Palestinian technocratic administration was intended to assume responsibility for civilian affairs, while unauthorized armed personnel were to be disarmed.[1] At that point, formation of the proposed committee represented the principal institutional progress, while arrangements for governance and security remained unresolved.[8]

The National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, or NCAG, held its inaugural meeting in Cairo on January 15.[11] President Donald Trump signed the Board of Peace’s founding charter on January 16, alongside appointments that included Ali Sha’ath as NCAG leader, Nickolay Mladenov as High Representative for Gaza, and Jasper Jeffers as commander of the International Stabilization Force.[11] The NCAG’s mission statement was signed on January 17, and the Board’s charter was launched at a Davos ceremony on January 22.[12][11]

On January 26, Israeli forces recovered the remains of police Master Sgt. Ran Gvili, the last Israeli hostage held in Gaza, and returned them to Israel.[2] His remains were located in a cemetery in Gaza City’s al-Shuja’iyya neighborhood.[9] The recovery completed the return of all living and deceased hostages from Gaza and meant that, for the first time since 2014, no Israeli hostages or hostage remains were held there.[2] Netanyahu identified Hamas disarmament and Gaza’s demilitarization as the next objectives, while Hamas spokesman Hazem Qassem presented the return as evidence of the organization’s commitment to the ceasefire.[2]

The hostage-return arrangements also involved Israel’s release of 250 prisoners serving life sentences and approximately 1,700 Gazans detained after October 7, 2023.[11] By January 26, aid was entering Gaza at a planned rate of 600 trucks daily, while Rafah crossing arrangements, Hamas disarmament, and deployment of an international force remained unresolved.[7]

Overnight January 30–31, Israeli forces struck Gaza targets after eight armed men emerged from an underground structure in eastern Rafah, in the Israeli military’s account.[13] Three men were reported killed and a Hamas battalion commander captured, followed by strikes targeting Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel and facilities.[13] Palestinian reports placed the death toll at approximately 30, including police officers and civilians at a police station.[13] Hamas denied Israel’s allegation of a ceasefire violation, and Qatar condemned the Israeli strikes as a violation of the truce.[14]

The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt reopened to pedestrian movement in both directions on February 2 as part of the second-phase arrangements.[15] Movement required Egyptian coordination and prior Israeli security clearance and was supervised by a European Union mission.[15] The reopening permitted medical evacuations and the return of Palestinians to Gaza.[11] Preliminary arrangements reported before the reopening envisaged an initial limit of 150 people daily, with additional identification and screening procedures.[16]

The first days brought complaints about delays and restrictions.[17] Some Gaza residents approved to leave said Hamas had prevented their departure; one interviewee said only 12 of the 50 people on a departure list had left on the Monday concerned.[17] Israeli claims also identified coordination problems involving the World Health Organization, rather than attributing every impediment to Hamas.[17]

In early February, patrols by Israel’s 7th Armored Brigade found a large weapons cache east of the Yellow Line.[10] The cache included approximately 110 mortar rounds, rockets, and other military equipment concealed among UNRWA blankets and humanitarian supplies, and was described as one of the largest discoveries of longer-range weapons since the October ceasefire.[10]

Israeli operations continued inside the Yellow Line area during February 10–17.[18] At least two armed men were killed on February 14 after men emerged from a tunnel in northern Gaza, with subsequent strikes killing Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives.[18] On February 16, Israeli forces killed six Hamas operatives found in tunnels on the Israeli-controlled side of the line in Rafah, bringing the sector’s reported total of men killed or captured in recent months to approximately 50.[10] Israeli forces also demolished a roughly one-kilometer Hamas tunnel in Beit Hanoun; the military estimated that at least 60 percent of Hamas’s tunnel network remained intact.[10]

A Hamas delegation met Mladenov in Cairo during this period and called for the ceasefire’s second phase to proceed.[18] Hamas representatives also said the proposed international stabilization force should not operate inside Gaza.[18] The Board of Peace held its inaugural meeting in Washington on February 19.[11] Rafah crossing operations were subsequently suspended from February 28 until March 19 because of hostilities in the region.[11]

The Gaza ceasefire largely held during March, although low-level clashes and Israeli operations against Hamas continued.[19] A March 27 assessment placed Israeli control at about half of Gaza and described Hamas as reasserting control in other areas.[19] A proposed decommissioning and reintegration framework envisaged a disarmament process lasting eight months.[19]

Maps distributed to aid organizations in mid-March showed an Orange Line marking a restricted zone estimated to cover 64 percent of Gaza.[10] Israel described the area between the Yellow and Orange lines as facilitating aid delivery and said civilians were not affected.[10] Separately, Israeli military figures counted at least 22 ceasefire violations by Palestinian groups between February 28 and April 6, and 139 since the truce began in October 2025.[6]

During March, the Knesset enacted a law prescribing the death penalty for West Bank Palestinians convicted of murder in terrorist attacks.[1] The law was expected to face an appeal to Israel’s Supreme Court.[1] At the end of March, a cabinet decision approved 34 settlements in Area C, comprising legalization of 10 outposts and establishment of 24 new settlements.[20] This brought the number of communities approved since January 2023 to approximately 102.[20]

An online survey conducted March 23–28 included 607 Israeli adults: 504 Jewish and 103 Arab respondents.[21] Support for Trump’s Gaza plan stood at 54 percent overall, while 49 percent supported its proposed second stage, including a temporary Palestinian government of experts and an international stabilization force.[21] Support for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority differed sharply between the surveyed groups, reaching 26 percent among Jewish respondents and 67 percent among Arab respondents.[21]

In April, the Board of Peace pressed Hamas to accept a staged disarmament framework.[1] Hamas rejected the proposal while seeking changes and alleging that continued Israeli attacks and restrictions on aid violated the ceasefire.[1] In May, Hamas said any weapons handover should form part of a framework leading to a Palestinian state.[1]

The NCAG had not entered areas remaining under Hamas armed control by the May 14 cutoff of the Board’s implementation report.[11] The proposed governance framework designated the committee as the transitional authority for civilian administration and security, required armed factions to leave governance, and envisaged verified weapons decommissioning in phases.[11] Israeli withdrawal was to proceed in stages in response to verified progress, while reconstruction would begin in areas certified as demilitarized.[11]

Rafah traffic increased after its March reopening, reaching as many as 200 crossings on an April day compared with a previous average of approximately 50.[11] During the reporting period from November 17, 2025, to May 14, 2026, nearly 300,000 metric tons of humanitarian aid were delivered, with distribution by UN agencies and partners increasing by more than 70 percent over pre-ceasefire levels.[11] Supplies included shelter materials, water, sanitation and hygiene items, and medical goods.[11]

Basic food needs had stabilized and most bakeries were functioning, but widespread displacement, inadequate shelter, acute water shortages, and shortages of medicines and other essentials persisted.[11] Unemployment was estimated at approximately 80 percent.[11] A World Bank, UN, and European Union assessment placed Gaza’s recovery and reconstruction needs at $71.4 billion over the following decade.[11]

In mid-May, the Israeli military confirmed that it had killed Hamas’s Gaza chief and military leader, Izz al-Din al-Haddad.[10] Israel identified him as a senior figure in the October 7 attack who had helped rebuild Hamas’s capabilities and planned attacks during the ceasefire.[10] On May 27, Hamas confirmed that an Israeli strike in Gaza City had killed Mohammed Odeh, described as al-Haddad’s recently named successor, together with his wife and two children.[10]

On June 1, Israel killed Youssef Ayesh Awad Ramadan, identified as a deputy commander of a Nukhba Force cell who had participated in the October 7 invasion and hostage-taking.[10] Israeli military assessments during June described Hamas as rebuilding its capabilities and preparing for renewed conflict while shifting toward smaller-scale guerrilla tactics.[10]

Israeli control of Gaza also expanded during this period.[1] Netanyahu said on May 17 that Israel held 60 percent of the territory and later suggested the share could rise toward 70 percent.[1] In June, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the American plan envisaged non-Hamas Palestinian governance rather than expanded Israeli territorial control.[1]

A July summary of Israeli humanitarian data recorded approximately 1.78 million tons of food entering Gaza between October 10, 2025, and June 7, 2026, alongside more than 18,000 tons of medicines and medical supplies.[22] The figures included an approximately 72 percent fall in food prices between September 2025 and May 2026 and water provision above basic World Health Organization emergency standards.[22] These were government figures concerning supplies entering Gaza, distinct from the earlier figures for humanitarian aid distributed by UN agencies and partners.[22][11]

On July 6, Hamas said it was prepared to transfer authority and dissolve its Gaza government.[23] The Board of Peace responded that its assessment would be guided by actions rather than promises and called for an agreed roadmap enabling the NCAG to assume full governing authority.[23] Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar said Hamas also needed to disarm.[23]

A July 7 review found that Hamas had not disarmed, the technocratic committee had not entered Gaza, the international stabilization force had not deployed, and substantial reconstruction had not begun.[24] Israeli military and Shin Bet estimates placed Israeli operational control at approximately 65 percent of Gaza in early July, while Hamas retained control over substantial areas.[24]

Violence in the West Bank also intensified.[25] OCHA data recorded 1,380 attacks by extremist settlers across approximately 250 communities from January through July, injuring roughly 900 Palestinians.[25] Earlier in the year, Israeli military officers reportedly told Netanyahu that Jewish attacks on Palestinians accounted for as much as 80 percent of West Bank incidents logged by Israeli troops.[1] A separate reported UN-linked count recorded at least 13 Palestinians killed in settler attacks after the start of the 2026 US–Israel conflict with Iran, compared with 15 during all of 2025.[1]

A July 24 confrontation left four Palestinians and two Israelis dead.[26][27] The Israelis were identified as Benayahu Mellet and Yuval Ezra, and the Palestinians as Farouk, Ibrahim, Jawad, and Imran Ramadan.[27] During the confrontation, a Palestinian seized an Israeli weapon and opened fire; four additional Israelis were wounded, and an Israeli officer’s death was described as possibly resulting from friendly fire.[26] The incident was followed by attacks damaging Palestinian property and an Israeli military operation across the West Bank.[26]

On July 30, Trump announced a Board of Peace agreement for phased Hamas disarmament.[28] The 15-point roadmap proposed transferring civilian governance and security to the NCAG, supported by an International Stabilization Force, with verification of obligations at each stage.[28] Its text, published July 31, called on Hamas and other factions to end military operations and gradually decommission and store heavy weapons, military production sites, weapons depots, and tunnels.[29] An international verification committee was to monitor compliance, and weapons decommissioning was linked to phased Israeli withdrawal.[29]

Israeli officials described disarmament as a prerequisite for withdrawal.[28] Hamas negotiator Ghazi Hamad said Hamas would not begin disarmament before Israeli military operations ended, aid increased, and Israel withdrew completely.[28] Hamas’s approval of the roadmap was reported, while Netanyahu’s office indicated opposition to the proposal.[30]

Public opinion reflected the difficulty of the proposed sequence.[31] A July 26–30 survey of 608 Israeli adults found 48 percent support for Trump’s Gaza plan overall.[31] Among Jewish respondents, 27 percent supported transferring authority to a temporary Palestinian expert government and deploying an international force before Hamas disarmament, while 57 percent opposed that order.[31] Among Arab respondents, 58 percent supported the proposed sequence.[31]

On August 17, a possible alternative framework was reported under consideration.[32] Instead of sequential demilitarization across five sectors, Hamas would hand over weapons throughout the areas it controlled before Israeli forces withdrew.[32] The alternative was an option being considered, not an adopted agreement.[32]

On September 21, an explosive device detonated against an Israeli military engineering vehicle in the Israeli-controlled area around the Yellow Line.[33] The vehicle was damaged without injuries, and Israel struck Hamas infrastructure in response.[33] The Israeli military characterized the explosion as a Hamas ceasefire violation.[33]

On September 23, the Board of Peace presented a $2.45 billion recovery proposal comprising 66 projects over six months.[3] The projects covered infrastructure, housing, healthcare, economic recovery, and security.[3] Implementation was to begin in Rafah and expand elsewhere in Gaza as security conditions permitted.[3]

The plan remained stalled over the sequence of Hamas disarmament, transfer of governing authority to the NCAG, and Israeli withdrawal.[3] Netanyahu insisted that Hamas disarm before Israeli forces withdrew.[3] On September 27, Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya described the roadmap as a complete package beginning with completion of the first ceasefire phase and extending through the weapons question to establishment of a Palestinian state.[34] His statement reiterated Hamas’s position that the weapons provisions could not be separated from its wider political and military demands.[34]

On October 8, Palestinian Authority Vice President Hussein al-Sheikh informed France that the Palestinian Legislative Council election scheduled for November 28 would be postponed.[4] He cited what he called fundamental obstacles imposed by Israeli authorities.[4] Palestinian officials also identified lack of access to Gaza, the Palestinian Authority’s budget crisis, and escalating settler violence as obstacles to holding the vote.[4] Legislative and presidential elections were subsequently scheduled together for September 11, 2027.[4]

Israeli strikes continued in Gaza.[35] On October 10, the Israeli military reported strikes against Hamas personnel and a Palestinian Islamic Jihad antitank commander, together with destruction of four weapons depots.[35] The military said the targets were involved in attacks and efforts to rebuild Hamas’s capabilities.[35]

An October 12 account recorded approximately 1.37 million people, or 65 percent of Gaza’s population, living in tents or makeshift shelters.[36] A July humanitarian assessment had found that only 1 percent of rubble had been cleared from roads and essential facilities, while 71 percent of water and sanitation infrastructure was reported damaged as of August.[36]

The Hamas-run Health Ministry reported 1,488 people killed and 5,281 wounded by Israeli strikes and gunfire between the ceasefire’s beginning and October 11, 2026; those figures did not distinguish civilians from combatants.[36] Israeli control was estimated at around 63 percent of Gaza, compared with approximately 53 percent initially.[36] Israel maintained that it would not withdraw or permit reconstruction to proceed until Hamas disarmed and ceded power.[36]

On October 13, the United States credited the ceasefire framework with returning every living and deceased hostage, establishing the Board of Peace and a Palestinian technocratic administration, increasing humanitarian assistance, and producing a costed recovery plan.[5] It also warned that rebuilding Gaza would be a difficult, multi-year undertaking.[5]

By October 15, the Board of Peace had not built its first military facility inside Gaza, although preparations for possible weapons handover sites and reconstruction partnerships continued.[37] The NCAG remained outside the Strip, while Hamas-affiliated officials continued administering services and regulating trade.[37] The Israeli military counted 31 ceasefire violations by Hamas and other Palestinian groups between October 1 and 15.[37] Separate reporting stated that Israel had not permitted the NCAG to enter Gaza or assume governing authority.[38]

On October 17, masked Israeli attackers assaulted Palestinian olive harvesters and accompanying French, Belgian, and Polish diplomats near Taybeh in the Benjamin area.[39] The diplomats alleged that a Belgian consular vehicle was damaged.[39] The Israeli military said the incident was known and under review, while police and military officials disagreed about the adequacy of the military presence.[39]

On October 19, Israeli police said 10 suspects had been detained in several locations following weekend attacks on Palestinians, a Washington Post photojournalist, and European diplomats.[40] Police linked two suspects to the attack on diplomats and four to the attack on the photojournalist.[40] Further incidents were reported in the South Hebron Hills and near Hebron.[40]

On October 21, Israeli forces detained approximately 70–80 volunteers accompanying a Palestinian family during an olive harvest near Nahalin.[41] Those detained included New York congressional nominee Brad Lander, T’ruah chief executive Rabbi Jill Jacobs, and a former Israeli deputy attorney general.[41] Lander was released with a warning, while Israeli detainees were formally arrested and foreign nationals were taken for military interrogation.[41]

On October 23, two Palestinian gunmen attacked an Israeli military checkpoint near Hebron, killing Staff Sgt. Ron Yonatan Roytman and Sgt. Yuval Shai Svilem and wounding three other soldiers.[42] Israeli soldiers killed both attackers.[42] The military’s preliminary assessment was that the gunmen had intended a larger attack on nearby Israeli civilians but opened fire at the checkpoint after failing to reach the highway.[42] Hamas praised the attack without claiming responsibility.[42]

Israel subsequently launched a major counterterrorism operation in Hebron involving the army, Shin Bet, Border Police, and Civil Administration.[43] The operation included searches for weapons and terror infrastructure, questioning of suspects, movement restrictions, and announced demolitions and closures.[43] Israeli officials described the targeted structures as illegal or presenting security risks.[43]

By the evening of October 24, Israel’s defense minister said approximately 2,000 Palestinians had been displaced during the operation.[44] Palestinian reporting citing the Hebron governor placed displacement at more than 200 families, while the mayor said another 2,500 people faced possible displacement.[44] The Israeli military said troops had searched approximately 200 sites and detained 10 people for questioning.[44]

In a broader account of weekend operations on October 24, the military said Israeli forces had operated in approximately 40 West Bank villages and 400 locations, making about 40 arrests.[45] Those detained included people identified as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad members and others suspected of incitement or public-order offenses.[45] Forces also demolished memorials to Palestinians involved in attacks that killed Israeli civilians.[45]

By mid-October, the recovery of every Israeli hostage had been completed, but the proposed transfer of Gaza’s governing authority had not occurred.[2][38] Hamas remained armed, the NCAG remained outside Gaza, and reconstruction was still constrained by disagreement over weapons, security, and withdrawal.[37][38] The year’s successive frameworks therefore produced a distinction between establishing transitional institutions and enabling them to exercise authority inside the territory.[11][37]

The humanitarian record likewise combined increased supplies with enduring deprivation.[11] Aid deliveries and functioning bakeries improved basic food availability during the earlier reporting period, but widespread displacement, unemployment, inadequate shelter, and essential-service shortages persisted.[11] By October, the scale of makeshift housing and damage to water and sanitation infrastructure demonstrated how far physical recovery remained from the objectives of the proposed reconstruction programs.[36]

In the West Bank, the October checkpoint attack and subsequent Hebron operation added to a year already marked by counterterrorism operations, settler attacks, and new settlement approvals.[42][43] Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections had been deferred until September 2027 rather than taking place during 2026.[4]

The ceasefire’s durability and the incomplete implementation of its political framework were distinct features of the documented period: major transition institutions were created and all hostages returned, while armed incidents and disagreements over governance continued.[5][11] Military violation counts, humanitarian statistics, and estimates of territorial control used different reporting periods and definitions and should not be combined into a single uniform measure.[6][22]

The July roadmap generated a substantive dispute over whether Hamas had accepted disarmament or only weapons storage under the NCAG.[29][46] Accounts of the July 24 West Bank confrontation also differed over whether Israeli participants entered the Palestinian village and attacked homes or were attacked near its outskirts.[26][27] Settler-violence datasets used different incident definitions, although the available monitoring systems both indicated a rising trend.[25]

On October 26, a UN-mandated commission alleged that Israeli control of Gaza had expanded from approximately 53 percent to at least 60 percent and that Israeli fire across the advancing front had killed at least 196 Palestinians during the period examined.[47] It also reported 34,176 Palestinians still displaced in the West Bank as of August following Israeli operations since January 2025.[47] Israel rejected the commission’s findings and described its work as an effort to demonize and delegitimize the country; these remained commission allegations and assessments rather than adjudicated findings.[47]