Israel–Hezbollah Conflict Timeline (27 November 2024–26 February 2026)

The cessation of hostilities took effect at 4:00 a.m. local time on 27 November 2024, after two months of open conflict in Lebanon that included an Israeli ground operation in the south. The wider fighting had begun on 8 October 2023, when Hezbollah began attacks on Israel the day after Hamas’s 7 October attack in southern Israel. The Times of Israel reported that Israel had sought to enable about 60,000 residents of northern Israel displaced by Hezbollah’s near-daily attacks to return home.[5]

The U.S.- and French-brokered arrangement set a framework for the end of hostilities and for security arrangements on both sides of the border. The White House called it a permanent cessation; President Joe Biden described it as “designed to be a permanent cessation of hostilities.”[6] The published terms required Lebanon to prevent Hezbollah and other armed groups from operating against Israel, while Israel was to refrain from offensive military operations against targets in Lebanon. The agreement preserved each country’s right of self-defense.[1]

In the Southern Litani Area, only Lebanon’s official military and security forces were to deploy with arms. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) were to dismantle unauthorized military infrastructure and confiscate unauthorized weapons, while Israeli forces withdrew in parallel with the LAF’s deployment. The withdrawal and deployment process was not to exceed 60 days. A U.S.-chaired mechanism, hosted by UNIFIL and including France, was tasked with monitoring, verifying, and assisting implementation.[1]

The agreement’s terms did not settle how the parties would assess compliance or sequence obligations. By the end of 2024, both Israel and Lebanon were alleging violations while implementation was still under way. Later accounts described continuing disagreement over Israeli positions and airstrikes, Hezbollah’s disarmament, the obligations of the Lebanese state, and whether particular Israeli actions constituted enforcement or violations of the cessation.[7][2]

November 2024–February 2025

The ceasefire took effect on 27 November 2024. On 2 December, Hezbollah launched two rockets toward the Mount Dov area; they landed in open areas. Hezbollah characterized the launch as an “initial warning response” to what it called repeated Israeli ceasefire violations.[8] Another account described the weapons as mortars and said Israel responded by striking Hezbollah operatives and 20 rocket launchers across Lebanon. The reports differ in their descriptions of the incident and response.[9]

As the original 60-day withdrawal period ended in late January 2025, Israel said that the Lebanese army had deployed too slowly and that withdrawal depended on effective Lebanese enforcement and Hezbollah’s movement north of the Litani; Hezbollah demanded full Israeli withdrawal and said further delay would violate the agreement.[10] On 26 January, the White House announced an extension to 18 February, with the monitoring committee continuing its work and the United States facilitating discussions about Lebanese detainees captured since the beginning of the war.[11]

On 27 January, Lebanese health authorities reported that 21 civilians had been killed by Israeli fire the previous day while attempting to return to homes in southern Lebanon. The extension followed the missed withdrawal schedule and conflicting assessments of whether the Lebanese army was ready to deploy.[11] Separately, Lebanon’s parliament elected Lebanese Armed Forces commander Joseph Aoun president in January, after more than two years of political deadlock. Aoun appointed Nawaf Salam as prime minister; Salam formed a cabinet on 8 February, the first Lebanese cabinet since 2022. A Congressional Research Service (CRS) account said Hezbollah and its allied Shia party no longer appeared to have sufficient cabinet representation to block decisions, though some ministers were reportedly associated with them.[2]

On 18 February, the IDF completed its withdrawal from the southern Lebanese villages it had not yet left, but retained five positions near the Israeli border. Israel said the positions would serve as a buffer from which it could enforce the ceasefire, and that troops could remain until Hezbollah withdrew beyond the Litani and Israeli leaders ordered them to leave. Lebanese officials regarded the continued presence as occupation or a violation and sought international assistance for withdrawal; UN officials also said the delay violated Resolution 1701, while recognizing progress in LAF deployment.[12] The status and justification of the five positions became a persistent dispute. By August, CRS reported that Israeli forces remained at those positions and continued airstrikes against Hezbollah targets across Lebanon.[2]

March–April 2025

On 22 March, six rockets were fired from Lebanon toward Metula in northern Israel. The IDF said it struck Hezbollah targets in response; an FDD account described the action as Israel’s most extensive and intense operations in Lebanon since the ceasefire began, with more than 50 Hezbollah targets hit in one day. Hezbollah denied responsibility for the rocket fire and said it remained committed to the ceasefire. The Lebanese Armed Forces reported finding three crude launchers north of the Litani; the available account did not establish who fired the rockets.[13]

One cited account said three rockets crossed the border and were intercepted, while three fell in Lebanon.[14] FDD, citing Lebanon’s Health Ministry, reported nine people killed and 38 wounded in Israeli operations on 22 March, followed by one killed and one wounded on 23 March. It counted 53 Lebanese locales targeted during 18–23 March by airstrikes, artillery fire, or ground operations. These are attributed figures, not independently verified totals.[13]

On 28 March, two rockets were fired from Lebanon toward northern Israel; one was intercepted and the other fell in Lebanese territory. Hezbollah denied responsibility, and the Lebanese army said it had located the launchers and was investigating who had fired them.[15] Israel struck targets in Lebanon that day, including a building in Beirut’s Hadath neighborhood that the IDF said stored Hezbollah drones.[15] The strike was among the first in Beirut since the ceasefire.[16] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned the Beirut strike as a violation, while Israeli leaders characterized strikes as a response to the rocket fire and enforcement of the ceasefire.[15]

On 1 April, an Israeli strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs killed Hassan Ali Mahmoud Badir. The IDF identified him as a senior operative in Hezbollah’s Unit 3900 and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, and said he was helping Hamas plan an imminent attack on Israeli civilians. Hezbollah confirmed Badir’s death and that of his son, also an operative. Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported four deaths and seven injuries; Lebanese leaders condemned the attack as a violation of sovereignty and the ceasefire, while Hezbollah reiterated that it remained committed to the agreement.[17]

On 20 April, the Lebanese army announced it had foiled a planned rocket attack on Israel. Acting on intelligence, troops raided an apartment near Sidon, seized rockets and launch pads, and arrested several people linked to the plot. The report connected the arrests with earlier detentions of suspects accused of launching rockets in late March.[9] On 27 April, the IDF struck infrastructure in Beirut’s Dahiyeh district after issuing an evacuation warning. Israel said the material posed a significant threat; Aoun called on the United States and France to compel Israel to stop attacks, warning they could undermine stability.[16]

May–September 2025

Israel continued to conduct strikes that it described as targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure. On 5 June, it struck what it said were underground drone-manufacturing facilities in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The Lebanese army said Israeli violations and Israel’s failure to respond to the ceasefire committee were weakening the committee and the army’s role; it warned that continued strikes could lead it to stop cooperating on searches of sites.[18] On 27 June, the IDF struck a command site at Beaufort Ridge. Israel said an underground facility that had previously been made inoperable was being rebuilt to restore Hezbollah’s control over firepower and defense systems. Hezbollah deputy secretary-general Na’im Qassem rejected a Lebanese government request to surrender the group’s missile arsenal, calling it a defensive capability.[9]

Lebanon’s domestic debate increasingly focused on establishing a state monopoly on weapons. In his January inaugural address, President Aoun had said the state should hold that monopoly. On 5 August, Prime Minister Salam said the cabinet had instructed the LAF to prepare an implementation plan by 31 August. In early August the government directed the army to prepare a plan to dismantle armed militias, including Hezbollah, by year’s end; in early September it adopted a five-phase plan covering the area south of the Litani, the Litani–Awali region, Beirut and its surroundings, the Beqa’a Valley, and the rest of Lebanon. The plan did not set a fixed completion timetable for each phase, and the army initially concentrated on the south.[3]

On 7 August, the cabinet approved the objectives of a U.S. proposal for gradual removal of non-state armed groups’ presence both north and south of the Litani and called for Israeli withdrawal and an end to hostilities. Hezbollah-affiliated and allied Shiite ministers walked out, and Hezbollah rejected the disarmament decision. Lebanese representatives argued that Israel should first withdraw, return Lebanese detainees, and stop its attacks.[19] The proposal was politically contested; accounts differed on the precise stages and deadlines, and the approval of objectives did not mean disarmament had been completed.[20]

On 5 September, Information Minister Paul Morcos said the army would begin implementing the plan but had limited logistical, material, and personnel resources. The cabinet kept plan details secret; ministers from Hezbollah’s political bloc, the allied Amal party, and an independent Shiite minister withdrew from the meeting.[21] On 9 September, Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi said the LAF would fully disarm Hezbollah near the Israeli border within three months.[9] These were government statements about expected implementation, not confirmation that disarmament had occurred.

The United Nations reported that, during the period from 21 June to 20 October, Israeli forces remained at five positions and maintained two buffer zones north of the Blue Line, with no progress reported on their withdrawal under the cessation agreement. The same report recorded the Lebanese cabinet’s August decision to pursue Hezbollah disarmament by the end of 2025.[22]

October–December 2025

Reports during the autumn continued to describe Israeli strikes and allegations that Hezbollah was rebuilding its military capabilities. A 7 November N12 report, citing an Alma assessment, described alleged efforts north of the Litani involving weapons production and repair, arms and money smuggling, recruitment, training, and restoration of infrastructure. It reported Israeli strikes on military infrastructure in four southern Lebanese villages and on a Hezbollah cell near Tyre. These descriptions of rebuilding and violations were claims reported by the article, not independently adjudicated findings.[23]

On 23 November, Israel said it had killed Hezbollah chief of staff Haytham Ali Tabatabai in a targeted strike in Beirut’s southern suburbs. Hezbollah confirmed his death and named four other operatives killed; Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported 28 wounded. Israel said Tabatabai had led the organization’s reconstruction after the 2024 fighting and described the strike as a response to ceasefire violations and a threat to Israel. President Aoun called for international intervention to stop Israeli attacks.[24]

The first anniversary of the ceasefire, 27 November 2025, brought competing activity counts. The IDF reported that more than 370 operatives, most of them Hezbollah members, had been killed and that about 1,200 targeted ground operations had taken place since the agreement began. The operations, according to the IDF, targeted weapons depots, launch sites, launchers, observation positions, and firing positions. A separate account cited UNIFIL as having identified more than 360 weapons depots in south Lebanon that were transferred to the Lebanese army.[25]

Another anniversary report counted 669 Israeli airstrikes across Lebanon during the year, averaging nearly two a day, based on an Alma report, and cited Israeli army figures of about 1,200 ground raids. It gave two different Hezbollah death totals: about 218 whose identities had been published, and more than 300 according to the Israeli military. It also reported that 18 Hamas members and ten members of other groups had been killed in Lebanon during the period. These totals reflect different reported counts rather than a single agreed figure.[26]

On 3 December, Israeli and Lebanese civilian representatives met in the U.S.-organized implementation mechanism in what was described as their first direct talks in decades. Israel said Hezbollah’s disarmament was mandatory regardless of economic cooperation; Prime Minister Salam said economic cooperation could follow a peace agreement, not precede it. The representatives reportedly agreed to meet again to discuss possible economic cooperation.[27] On 4 December, Israel struck what it said were Hezbollah weapons depots in four southern villages after issuing evacuation warnings. The IDF said the depots were among civilians and violated the understandings. It also reported having conducted more than 1,200 raids and small operations in southern Lebanon since the ceasefire.[27]

On 13 December, the IDF postponed a planned strike on alleged Hezbollah infrastructure in Yanouh after the Lebanese army, through the monitoring mechanism, requested access to search the site. The IDF said it allowed the search and continued monitoring the target; Lebanese media reported UNIFIL was present. On 20 December, Salam said the first phase of the weapons-consolidation plan south of the Litani was days from completion and Lebanon was ready to proceed north. Israel continued to question the army’s efforts as Israeli aircraft increasingly struck Hezbollah targets, including in the capital.[28][29]

January–26 February 2026

On 8 January 2026, the Lebanese army said it had achieved the objectives of the first phase of its weapons-consolidation plan and had operational control south of the Litani, except in areas under Israeli control. It said it would continue addressing tunnels and remaining weapons and cited limits on access and freedom of action, as well as delays in promised military aid. Israel’s Prime Minister’s Office called the effort “an encouraging beginning, but are far from sufficient,” and said Hezbollah continued to rearm and rebuild facilities. Israel’s foreign ministry also said extensive Hezbollah infrastructure remained south of the river.[30]

A February congressional witness reported that the LAF had claimed operational control, while Israeli officials considered its performance inadequate; the witness said there was no independent U.S. assessment resolving the difference.[31] The dispute reflected the broader conflict over whether Lebanese deployment and weapons seizures had met the agreement’s requirements, and whether the remaining Israeli positions and operations prevented full implementation.

On 11 January, the IDF said it conducted two waves of strikes against seven Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon, using more than 30 munitions. The targets included weapons-storage sites and an underground storage facility. Israel said one site was struck again because Lebanese soldiers had visited but not dismantled the infrastructure. The attacks followed the LAF’s announcement of first-phase completion.[32] A report attributed 87 Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon to January, more than twice December’s total and the highest monthly count since the November 2024 ceasefire began; roughly half were said to have targeted infrastructure north of the Litani.[33]

On 15 January, Foreign Minister Youssef Rajji said, “so long as Hezbollah is not completely disarmed, Israel has the right to continue its attacks.” Hezbollah supporters and prominent figures, including a Hezbollah member of parliament, condemned his statement.[34] On 19 January, the IDF said strikes targeted rocket-launching sites, training camps, and tunnel shafts used to store weapons, citing unusual military activity. The strikes followed an incident in which Israeli forces fired across the border at a person approaching the security fence.[35]

A congressional witness described a January incident in Yanuh in which the LAF, acting on Israeli intelligence supplied through the ceasefire mechanism, entered to seize an alleged Hezbollah arms cache. A Hezbollah liaison officer reportedly gathered a crowd that obstructed the search; when the army returned the next day, the weapons had been removed. This account was testimony, rather than an independently established incident record.[36]

Israeli operations continued in February. On 2 February, Lebanese media reported strikes at Kfar Tebnit and Ain Qana after Israeli evacuation warnings. On 14–16 February, the IDF said it struck Hezbollah depots and launchers and killed an operative in a drone strike at Hanin; Israel said the sites and activity violated the ceasefire. Separately, Israel said it struck Palestinian Islamic Jihad members at Majdal Anjar on 15 February, with Lebanese state media and the health ministry reporting four deaths.[37][38]

On 16 February, the Lebanese army commander presented the cabinet with the next phase of the weapons-control plan, focused on the area north of the Litani. The government approved it; the information minister said implementation was expected within four months, possibly extending to eight, but no specific final timetable was set. Hezbollah ministers did not object at the meeting.[4] In a speech that day, Qassem said Hezbollah did not want war but would not disarm, and described its stance as “active defense” if attacked.[4]

Between 16 and 23 February, the IDF reported strikes on weapons depots and military sites in south Lebanon and on three Hezbollah headquarters in the Baalbek area of the Beqa’a Valley. It said operatives planning attacks on Israel were killed; Hezbollah confirmed eight of its operatives, including a senior commander, died in the Beqa’a strikes. Lebanese media reported at least ten killed and 24 wounded in those attacks, figures that differ from the organization’s account of its own dead.[4] A separate report on the 20 February strikes gave a Lebanese-reported toll of at least ten killed and 50 wounded in the eastern Lebanon strikes; it also described a separate Israeli strike on a Hamas command center in the Ain al-Hilweh camp near Sidon.[39]

On 19 February, the IDF said it struck weapons depots, missile launchers, and other military sites in several areas of southern Lebanon. It said the sites were used to advance attacks against Israel and violated the ceasefire. Israel reported that more than 400 Hezbollah operatives and members of allied groups had been killed in strikes since the ceasefire, with hundreds of sites hit and more than 1,200 raids and small operations conducted.[40] On 24 February, two senior Lebanese officials said Israel had sent an indirect warning that it would strike Lebanon hard, potentially including civilian infrastructure such as the airport, if Hezbollah joined a possible U.S.–Iran war. The report described a warning and Lebanese diplomatic concern, not an announced Israeli decision.[41]

On 25 February, N12 reported that Israel had sent strong messages to Hezbollah and the Lebanese government through an increased number of strikes on targets and senior operatives amid preparations for a possible confrontation involving Iran.[42] On 26 February, the IDF said it struck eight military compounds belonging to Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force in the Beqa’a Valley, which it said were used to store weapons, including rockets, and train for planned attacks. Israel described the activity and Hezbollah’s rearmament as violations of the ceasefire understandings.[43] A Jerusalem Post report the same day described Hezbollah’s stated position as conditional: it would stay out of a war and not attack Israel if a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iran were limited to certain capabilities, but would join if the aim were to kill Iran’s supreme leader or topple the regime.[44]

By 26 February 2026, the cessation remained in force in name, but its central security and withdrawal arrangements were still under dispute. Israeli forces continued to hold five positions inside Lebanon and conducted strikes that Israel described as responses to Hezbollah activity or efforts to prevent the group from rebuilding. Lebanese officials and Hezbollah described the continuing Israeli presence and attacks as violations, while Israel argued that the Lebanese state had not sufficiently removed Hezbollah’s military capabilities.[12][2]

The Lebanese government’s weapons-control plan represented an effort to extend state authority in stages, first south of the Litani and then northward. The LAF’s January announcement that the first phase had been achieved did not settle the issue: Israel called the progress insufficient, and testimony before the U.S. Congress said no independent U.S. assessment had resolved the discrepancy.[30][31] The second phase, approved in February, had no specific final deadline in the reported account.[4]

The period also included limited direct contact through the ceasefire mechanism. Civilian representatives met in December 2025 to discuss implementation and possible economic cooperation, while the LAF and IDF used the mechanism in reported searches and consultations. The meeting did not resolve the parties’ different sequencing demands: Israel insisted disarmament was necessary, while Lebanon’s prime minister said economic cooperation should follow a peace agreement.[27][28]

The available chronology records no new full-scale war by 26 February 2026, but it does document repeated strikes, contested claims of violations, and concern that Hezbollah might enter a wider conflict involving Iran. Hezbollah’s stated conditional position on such a war, and the reported Israeli warnings, underscored the risk of renewed escalation without establishing that either side had begun a new campaign.[41][44]

The record of this period is shaped by sharply different accounts of the ceasefire’s obligations and performance. Israel emphasized the need to prevent Hezbollah from restoring military infrastructure and described its strikes as defensive or as enforcement of the agreement. Lebanese officials and Hezbollah emphasized Israel’s continued presence at five positions and its attacks, which they described as violations. The agreement itself both prohibited offensive military operations in Lebanon and preserved self-defense rights, leaving the application of those clauses central to the dispute.[1][12]

Figures for operations and casualties are likewise attributed to different institutions and reports, not to a jointly agreed accounting. The IDF’s first-anniversary figures of more than 370 operatives killed and about 1,200 ground operations differ in scope from reports counting named Hezbollah members or individual airstrikes. One anniversary report gave about 218 Hezbollah deaths with published identities and more than 300 according to the Israeli military; the discrepancy should not be collapsed into a single total.[25][26]

Responsibility for the March 2025 rocket launches was not conclusively established in the cited accounts. Hezbollah denied responsibility, and the Lebanese army said it was investigating or had found launchers; Israeli strikes followed. The sources also report different casualty totals for March 2025 and the February 2026 strikes, with figures attributed to Lebanese authorities, media, or parties to the conflict.[13][15][13][4]

The chronology is therefore best read as a sequence of dated events alongside competing claims, rather than as a final adjudication of compliance. Reports range from official agreement texts and government statements to news accounts, advocacy research, and congressional testimony. Some sources offer broad assessments rather than incident-by-incident documentation, and the record does not provide a complete account of every event through the final date. One commentary source gives a ceasefire agreement date of 24 November 2024, but the agreement text and the other principal accounts date the cessation’s entry into force to 27 November; the latter is used here as the start of the timeline.[1][45]

The principal controversy was not simply whether incidents occurred, but how the agreement’s duties were to be interpreted and sequenced. Israel and Lebanon accused one another of violations from the early implementation period onward. Disputes centered on Israeli withdrawal, the five retained positions, Israeli strikes, Hezbollah’s weapons and infrastructure, and whether Lebanese army deployment was sufficient. The parties’ descriptions of particular incidents—especially the March 2025 rocket launches—remain conflicting or unresolved in the cited accounts.[7][10][13]

Lebanese claims that the LAF had achieved operational control and completed the first phase south of the Litani conflicted with Israeli assessments that Hezbollah was rearming and that the state’s effort was insufficient. The sources do not provide an independent determination that reconciles the competing evaluations.[30][31] Reported casualty totals and combatant identifications also vary by source and should remain attributed, rather than treated as agreed facts.[13][4]

Some broader allegations in the bundle are explicitly source-specific tallies or commentary. For example, HonestReporting reported 1,925 Hezbollah ceasefire violations through January 2026; that figure is its tally, not a mutually accepted or independently verified count.[46] The article’s chronology accordingly distinguishes reported claims from settled outcomes and does not resolve disputes that the available evidence leaves open.