Thirty-Third Government of Israel

The January 22, 2013 election returned 31 seats to the combined Likud–Yisrael Beiteinu list, 19 to Yesh Atid, 15 to Labor, 11 to Shas, 7 to United Torah Judaism, 6 each to Hatnua and Meretz, 5 to Ra'am/Ta'al, 4 to Hadash, 3 to Balad, and 2 to Kadima.[5] Jewish Home won 12 seats.[6] The Likud–Yisrael Beiteinu list won 832,099 valid votes, representing 23.25 percent of the total, while Yesh Atid won 507,879 votes, or 14.19 percent, making it the election's runner-up.[5]

Netanyahu began coalition negotiations holding the support of just 31 of the Knesset's 120 members.[7] He initially sought to form a government with his "natural partners," who together controlled 61 seats, but a coordinated alliance between Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi confronted him with a choice: include both parties and leave the ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism outside the government, or call new elections.[8] The Lapid-Bennett alliance ultimately determined the coalition's shape, a result that INSS described as "essentially forced on Netanyahu."[8]

Negotiations proceeded in stages. Netanyahu signed a coalition agreement with Hatnua, led by Tzipi Livni, on February 19, 2013, and then agreements with Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi on March 15.[7] On March 16, Netanyahu announced that he had secured a majority, and the Knesset approved and swore in the government on March 18.[6][9] The vote on the new cabinet was 68 in favor and 48 against, with four members absent.[9] The coalition thus comprised 68 of the Knesset's 120 seats: 31 from Likud-Beiteinu, 19 from Yesh Atid, 12 from Habayit Hayehudi, and 6 from Hatnua.[6]

Kadima did not join the coalition; reports at the time indicated that no suitable cabinet post could be found for its leader, Shaul Mofaz.[10] The foreign affairs portfolio was initially held by Netanyahu himself, pending the outcome of Avigdor Liberman's trial; reports noted that Liberman might later join as an additional minister.[11] In July 2014, the Likud–Yisrael Beitenu faction formally split into Likud–The National Liberal Movement and Yisrael Beiteinu.[12]

The government was sworn in with Netanyahu serving as prime minister and initially also as minister of foreign affairs and minister of public diplomacy and diaspora affairs.[13] Ynet reported that Netanyahu took office alongside 21 other ministers and eight deputy ministers. The Law Library of Congress report gives the same figures in its introduction, although a later roster in that report describes 22 ministers including the prime minister and ten deputy ministers.[9][7]

Moshe Ya'alon was appointed defense minister; Yair Lapid, finance minister; Tzipi Livni, justice minister; and Naftali Bennett, minister of industry, trade and labor, as well as minister of religious services and minister for Jerusalem and diaspora affairs.[13] A coalition compromise brokered by Bennett gave Yesh Atid the education portfolio, with Shai Piron appointed education minister; Yael German became health minister; and Amir Peretz was appointed to the environmental protection portfolio.[10] Hatnua's Livni also took on the role of lead negotiator with the Palestinians.[14] Uri Ariel of Habayit Hayehudi became housing and construction minister.[15] A contemporary Globes report said Bennett would also become deputy prime minister with expanded powers.[10]

At the government's first meeting, Netanyahu approved a national-security ministerial committee chaired by himself, with Ya'alon, Lapid, Public Security Minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch, Livni, Bennett, and Home Front Security Minister Gilad Erdan as members.[16] The same meeting unanimously approved extending the deadline for passing the 2013 budget to 135 days from the government's establishment, giving the cabinet 85 days to submit a budget proposal and the Knesset 50 days to approve it in three readings.[16] The first meeting also approved a bill to extend the terms of Israel's chief rabbis, in accordance with the Habayit Hayehudi–Likud-Beiteinu coalition agreement.[16]

Speaking at that inaugural session, Netanyahu urged ministers to put aside their disagreements and cooperate, told them that citizens expected results, and encouraged open discussion so the government could reach balanced decisions.[13]

The coalition agreements set out a wide-ranging policy agenda. Their stated guiding principle for national service was building "a just society, one in which resources, rights and obligations are divided in a fair and equal way."[7] The agreements recognized the importance of preserving Israel as a Jewish and democratic state and protecting its defensible borders.[7]

On governance reform, the agreements proposed reducing the maximum number of ministers, excluding the prime minister, to 18, limiting deputy ministers to four, eliminating ministers without portfolio, and raising the electoral threshold from 2 percent to 4 percent — changes described as intended to reduce government expenditure, minimize Knesset fragmentation, and strengthen stability.[7] The government nevertheless began with 22 ministers including Netanyahu, more than the 18 Yesh Atid had campaigned for.[10] The coalition also proposed raising the Knesset majority required to unseat a government.[10]

On national service, the Yesh Atid and Habayit Hayehudi agreements included a shared supplement titled "The Common Path," which established that every Israeli citizen aged 18 or older had a duty to serve in military or civilian national service, while giving the IDF priority in selecting its personnel.[7] The supplement proposed reducing standard military service to no more than two years, with longer service available for roles designated by the IDF, and set a goal of increasing Haredi enlistment, including at least 1,600 Haredi men in combat units.[7] The agreements also provided for voluntary civilian service for Israeli Arabs.[7]

The Hatnua coalition agreement designated Livni as justice minister and tasked her with leading negotiations with the Palestinians, with the explicit goal of reaching a political accord to end the conflict.[14] It called for a ministerial peace-negotiations team headed by the prime minister and including Livni and the defense and foreign ministers, and specified that any accord would be submitted for government and Knesset approval and, if required by law, a public referendum.[14] The government's basic guidelines, appended to the coalition agreements, similarly committed Israel to pursue a peace agreement intended to end the conflict, and stipulated that on this issue Knesset members could vote according to their conscience.[14]

The push to extend military and national service obligations to Haredi Israelis was the coalition's most politically charged domestic priority and a defining legislative effort of the 33rd government's tenure. Its legal backdrop stretched back to February 21, 2012, when Israel's Supreme Court ruled six to three that the Tal Law — which had regulated draft deferments for yeshiva students — was unconstitutional and could no longer be extended.[17] The court acknowledged some increase in Haredi participation under that law but found it insufficient as deferment numbers continued to rise, and the majority linked further delay in implementing the general draft to increasing draft evasion and a violation of equality.[17]

Sources give different dates for the legislation's final enactment. A Library of Congress account says the Knesset adopted the Defense Service (Amendment No. 19) Law and the National-Civilian Service Law on March 11, 2014, while the State Department's report says the conscription plan was voted into law on March 13.[17][18] The measures established a framework for eliminating the draft deferment and exemption traditionally available to yeshiva students while requiring accommodations for their religious lifestyle.[17] They implemented requirements written into the coalition agreements between Likud Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid, and Habayit Hayehudi.[17]

On March 12, 2014, the Knesset passed what became known as the Equal Service Law in its second and third readings by 66 votes to one; Habayit Hayehudi MK Yoni Chetboun cast the sole opposing vote.[19] The opposition boycotted the vote, though Labor indicated it would have voted in favor.[19] The law set a target that, from 2017 onward, 74 percent of eligible yeshiva students — approximately 5,200 people per year — would be drafted into the IDF, with criminal sanctions including potential imprisonment for eligible men who failed to report.[19]

The legislation set an annual requirement of 3,300 people to be drafted or enter national service, a figure dwarfed by the tens of thousands of yeshiva students aged 18–26 who qualified for the draft.[17] Its limited scope nevertheless provoked strong reactions: protests took place in Jerusalem and New York around the legislation's passage, driven in part by anger at the criminal penalties and what demonstrators viewed as a threat to Haredi communal identity.[17] The State Department's 2014 human rights report noted that implementation lagged through the end of that year amid bureaucratic hurdles, and that a civil-society organization petitioned the Supreme Court in November to invalidate the law, arguing it gave the Haredi community too much favorable treatment.[18]

Reporting in 2015 captured the contested nature of the law's early implementation: the government cited a 39 percent rise in Haredi men drafted between July 2013 and July 2014 compared with the prior year, while IDF figures presented to a Knesset oversight committee showed 1,235 ultra-Orthodox men drafted from July through December 2013 and only 737 from January through June 2014 — a 40 percent decrease between those two half-year periods.[20] Arguments over the law's quotas, exemptions, and sanctions continued after the government's dissolution.

A few months after the government's formation, in July 2013, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to renew negotiations following mediation by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, with all core issues on the table and a nine-month timetable for reaching an agreement.[21] U.S.-sponsored talks were scheduled to run from August 2013 through the end of April 2014.[12]

The arrangements surrounding the resumed talks included an Israeli commitment to release 104 security prisoners in four phases, in exchange for Palestinian commitments not to seek UN recognition of Palestine or take other unilateral measures during the negotiating period.[12] Israel released 78 terrorists across three phases; the fourth release, scheduled for early April 2014, did not take place amid widening disagreements over settlement construction, recognition of Israel, and the question of extending the talks.[12]

The talks collapsed in April 2014 when Fatah and Hamas announced a reconciliation agreement and plans for a unity government.[22] On April 24, 2014, Israel's security cabinet decided to break off contacts with the Palestinian Authority, citing what it described as a unilateral Palestinian action.[22] Netanyahu stated that the Fatah-Hamas agreement showed the Palestinian leadership had chosen an alliance with Hamas rather than peace.[22] Israel also announced economic measures in response.[22] Palestinians, for their part, partly attributed the breakdown to Israeli settlement construction.[23]

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs argues that Netanyahu, his cabinet, and the government were committed to a two-states-for-two-peoples solution, while acknowledging differences of opinion within the coalition, and that the government was prepared to consider painful concessions in exchange for real and enduring peace.[24] The coalition agreements themselves had made clear that any peace accord would require government and Knesset approval and, if mandated by law, a national referendum.[14]

During the 33rd government's tenure, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in response to escalating rocket fire from Gaza. An Israeli government report dates the operation's start to July 7, 2014, when more than 60 rockets and mortars were fired into Israel from Gaza in a single day.[25] A Knesset overview gives the start date as July 8.[12] The operation involved Israeli air bombardment, the deployment of Iron Dome batteries across the country, and a ground operation beginning on July 17 aimed at locating terrorists and destroying a network of underground tunnels dug beneath the border.[25][12] Ground forces withdrew on August 5, and a ceasefire brought the operation to a close on August 26, 2014. Accounts therefore describe either 50 or 51 days of fighting, depending on the stated start date.[25][12]

The costs of the operation shaped the government's subsequent budget negotiations. A budget agreement reached by Lapid and Netanyahu included a NIS 6 billion defense-budget supplement — described as mostly one-time spending — and raised the deficit target to 3.4 percent from the original 3.18 percent.[26] The total state budget was set at NIS 323 billion, with no new taxes, an increased social budget, and a special defense allocation of approximately NIS 4–4.3 billion.[26] Lapid stated that the fiscal measures he had taken as finance minister made it possible to fund the operation while also increasing social spending.[26]

Beyond the conscription legislation, the 19th Knesset enacted several significant measures during the 33rd government's term. The Equal Share of the Burden Law, passed over the strong opposition of ultra-Orthodox members of Knesset, was accompanied by governance legislation raising the electoral threshold to 3.25 percent — fulfilling at least part of the coalition's stated reform agenda.[12] The Knesset also passed the Basic Law: Referendum, which established preconditions for any government decision to sign or ratify agreements that would end the application of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration in areas where they presently applied.[12]

The 19th Knesset additionally passed the Books Law and a revised Prevention of Infiltration Law; the latter came after the High Court struck down two earlier versions for violating Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom.[12] A Jewish Review of Books article placed Naftali Bennett's kosher-certification reforms within a broader political effort to change religious-services regulation and challenge the ultra-Orthodox establishment's institutional hold.[27]

Proposals that did not pass included the proposed Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which stalled amid claims that it could undermine the state's democratic character.[12] A zero-VAT bill introduced by Finance Minister Lapid as a measure intended to reduce housing prices for first-time buyers also failed, with disagreement centering on whether it would actually achieve that goal.[12]

The government struggled with internal tensions throughout its tenure. INSS noted that it often found it difficult to function, with friction running across multiple fronts simultaneously.[8] Disputes accumulated over the Israel Hayom bill concerning the press, the proposed nation-state bill, settlement construction in the territories, conversion legislation, the 2015 budget, and the broader direction of negotiations with the Palestinians.[28]

The budget agreement reached in late September 2014 — approved by the full cabinet on September 24 — satisfied neither Netanyahu nor Lapid and deepened the rift between them.[4] The nation-state bill became another flashpoint: on November 19, 2014, the government approved a proposed text as a starting point for legislation that would define Israel as the Jewish people's nation-state while anchoring its values as both a Jewish and democratic state.[29] Lapid and Livni opposed the bill, while the rest of the cabinet approved proceeding with it; opponents argued it could have discriminatory consequences for Arab citizens, who comprise approximately 20 percent of Israel's population.[30] Former President Shimon Peres warned that the bill would "destroy Israel's democratic status at home and abroad."[30]

Tensions peaked in late November and early December 2014. Netanyahu accused Lapid and Livni of coordinating behind the scenes with ultra-Orthodox factions in an effort to replace him, a charge both ministers denied.[31] On December 2, 2014, Netanyahu dismissed Lapid and Livni from their ministerial posts, instructing the cabinet secretary to issue their dismissal letters, and announced he would no longer tolerate ministers attacking government policy from within the cabinet.[32] He stated that he would seek the Knesset's dissolution in order to obtain a clear electoral mandate.[32]

The dissolution process began with a preliminary reading of a dissolution bill submitted by Meretz and Labor and supported by Likud.[28] The Knesset voted on December 3 to hold early elections, and on December 8, 2014, it formally passed the Law for the Dissolution of the 19th Knesset, 5775-2014, by 93 votes to none, scheduling elections for March 17, 2015.[33][31] The 19th Knesset had been expected to serve four and a half years, through the autumn of 2017; its early dissolution was described by INSS as evidence of a growing governance problem and a challenge to Israel's political stability.[34] Netanyahu presented the 34th government to the Knesset on May 14, 2015.[4]

Several aspects of the 33rd government's formation, conduct, and collapse remain subjects of differing interpretation. On coalition formation, INSS characterized the arrangement as essentially forced on Netanyahu by the Lapid-Bennett alliance, while other accounts emphasize the structural incentives that led to the exclusion of the ultra-Orthodox parties as a natural consequence of Knesset arithmetic and the two parties' coordinated leverage.[8][6]

The reasons for the government's collapse are similarly contested. Netanyahu's stated justification — that Lapid and Livni were colluding with ultra-Orthodox factions to remove him — was denied by both ministers.[31] INSS identified a cluster of legislative and budgetary disputes as the proximate causes, while a Maariv retrospective described the coalition as deeply divided from its very formation across issues including nationality legislation, equal-service reform, construction in the territories, and peace negotiations.[8][28]

The 2014 conscription legislation was contested on multiple grounds: whether its targets were achievable, whether its criminal penalties were proportionate, and whether its overall terms treated Haredi and non-Haredi Israelis equally.[19][17] The sources record competing empirical claims about Haredi enlistment rates under the law, with the government and IDF figures pointing in different directions for the periods measured.[20]

On the nation-state bill, the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs situates the disagreement over it as one significant cause of the government's December 2014 breakup, while this characterization rests on attributed assessment rather than a settled historical judgment.[29] The bill's opponents argued it would harm Arab citizens' status; its proponents described its purpose as affirming Israel's character as the nation-state of the Jewish people in keeping with Israel's Declaration of Establishment.[29][30]