Twenty-Fifth Government of Israel

The election for the Thirteenth Knesset took place on June 23, 1992. Labor won 44 seats, Meretz won 12, and Shas won six. Rabin formed a coalition of the three parties with 62 of the Knesset's 120 seats.[1][2] Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party, which together held five seats, agreed to support the government from outside the coalition. Their votes helped produce a 67-member majority for the government in the confidence vote.[2]

President Chaim Herzog opened the first sitting of the Thirteenth Knesset on July 13, 1992, and Rabin presented his government that day. A last-minute disagreement over Meretz's demand for another portfolio was settled by appointing two additional deputy ministers from the party.[3] The government's recorded term ran from July 13, 1992, to November 22, 1995.[4]

The coalition brought together secular-liberal Meretz and the ultra-Orthodox Shas, parties with sharply different positions on religious affairs.[5] Shimon Peres became foreign minister, Avraham Shochat finance minister, Shulamit Aloni education and culture minister, and Aryeh Deri interior minister.[4][1] The government also appointed Nawaf Massalka as deputy health minister and Walid Haj Yahia as deputy agriculture minister; a retrospective described it as the first Israeli government with two Arabs in ministerial positions.[6]

The Labor-Shas coalition agreement stipulated that a peace agreement involving the relinquishment of territory under Israeli sovereignty or control would be submitted to a referendum or new elections before it was signed.[2]

At its investiture, the cabinet had 17 members: 13 from Labor, three from Meretz, and one from Shas.[1] The cabinet expanded after Meretz received another seat during a coalition compromise in December 1992. By the August 30, 1993 meeting that considered the first Oslo agreement, it had 18 members—13 from Labor, four from Meretz, and one from Shas.[7]

Rabin served as prime minister and defense minister, while Peres held the foreign ministry. Other senior ministers included Shochat at finance, Aloni at education and culture, Deri at interior, David Libai at justice, Haim Ramon at health, and Moshe Shahal at police and communications.[4][1] The cabinet therefore combined Labor's dominant position with representatives of Meretz's secular constituency and Shas's religious constituency.

Disputes between Meretz and Shas emerged early, especially over religious affairs and statements by Education Minister Shulamit Aloni. Following a coalition crisis in December 1992, Meretz received another cabinet seat and Shas gained control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs through a deputy minister.[1]

The immediate trigger for Shas's departure was a judicial ruling. On September 8, 1993, the Supreme Court required Rabin to dismiss Interior Minister Aryeh Deri and Deputy Minister Rafael Pinhasi after indictments were filed against them. On September 14, the day after the Washington ceremony for Oslo I, Shas's ministers and deputy ministers resigned and the party left the government.[2]

The departure reduced the formal coalition to 56 members. The government continued with outside support from the five members of Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party. Three members of Ye'ud, a faction formed by defectors from Tzomet, joined the coalition in January 1995, raising its formal strength to 59.[2][8]

The government also faced an early security crisis in December 1992. After Hamas terrorists kidnapped and killed Border Police officer Nissim Toledano, Israel deported 415 Hamas activists from Gaza and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — to Lebanon. The deportations drew international condemnation, including United Nations Security Council Resolution 799.[9]

The government's central diplomatic initiative developed through a secret channel opened in Oslo in January 1993 while the public Washington negotiations remained stalled. The initial participants were Israeli academics Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak and senior PLO official Ahmed Qurie, known as Abu Ala. Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin informed Peres of the channel in February, and in May Rabin approved the participation of Foreign Ministry director general Uri Savir as an official Israeli representative.[7]

The parties initialed a draft agreement in Norway on August 20, 1993. Rabin presented it to the cabinet on August 30, where ministers debated it for five and a half hours before approving it by 16 votes to none, with two abstentions.[7][10] Rabin initially treated the Gaza provisions as reversible and repeatedly described Gaza as a "test case." He argued that Israel would resume direct responsibility for security if the Palestinian side failed to confront terrorism.[10]

Israel and the PLO exchanged letters of mutual recognition on September 9–10. The PLO recognized Israel, renounced terrorism, and agreed to pursue changes to the Palestinian Covenant; Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people for negotiations.[7][11] Foreign Minister Peres and Palestinian representative Mahmoud Abbas signed the Declaration of Principles in Washington on September 13 in the presence of Rabin, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, and U.S. President Bill Clinton.[2]

The declaration established a framework for an interim Palestinian self-government authority and an elected council in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Permanent-status questions, including Jerusalem, borders, and refugees, were deferred, while Israel retained specified security responsibilities during the interim period.[7][11]

The Knesset endorsed the Declaration of Principles on September 23, 1993, by 61 votes to 50. Five of Shas's six members abstained, while the sixth was absent; support from Hadash and the Arab Democratic Party was therefore important to the result.[2][7]

Opposition came from Likud, settler leaders, and other right-wing parties that rejected negotiations and territorial withdrawals involving the PLO. Hamas and Islamic Jihad also opposed the process and carried out terrorist attacks intended to disrupt it.[7] Rabin continued the negotiations while emphasizing that diplomacy depended on security. In an address quoted by the INSS study, he stated: "A peace without any security does not mean anything to me, but real peace increases the security of the State of Israel."[7]

The vote also intensified controversy over the government's parliamentary basis. Labor, Meretz, and Shas had formed the original cabinet coalition, but Arab-party members who remained outside the coalition supplied decisive votes on confidence and peace-process measures.[12][2]

The government unanimously approved the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 1, 1994, and Rabin and Arafat signed it in Cairo on May 4. It provided for Israeli withdrawal from the Jericho area and most of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority assumed responsibility for public order and internal security in the transferred areas, while Israel retained responsibility for the security of Israelis and control of the borders with Jordan and Egypt.[7]

The agreement contained 23 articles, four annexes, four accompanying letters, and six maps. It established a Palestinian Authority with legislative, executive, and judicial responsibilities and required the creation of a Palestinian police force. During the signing ceremony, Rabin discovered that Arafat had not signed the Jericho map; the ceremony continued after Arafat added his signature.[1]

The Knesset approved the agreement on May 10 by 52 votes to none. Right-wing opposition members stayed away from the vote.[7]

The government simultaneously advanced negotiations with Jordan. On July 25, 1994, Rabin, King Hussein, and President Clinton signed the Washington Declaration, announcing the termination of the state of belligerency between Israel and Jordan.[1]

The Knesset approved the resulting peace treaty by 105 votes. On October 26, 1994, Rabin and Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul-Salam Majali signed the treaty at the Arava border crossing, with Clinton attending as a witness.[1][13] The agreement ended the formal conflict and established diplomatic relations between Israel and Jordan.

Rabin and Arafat signed the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly called Oslo II, in Washington on September 28, 1995. Clinton and representatives of Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union attended the ceremony.[14]

The agreement created Areas A, B, and C. Area A was placed under Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B under Palestinian civilian administration and Israeli security control; and Area C under Israeli control.[7][15] The 315-page agreement, which included seven annexes and nine maps, provided for Palestinian control of six major towns and civic authority and public-order responsibilities in 440 Arab villages. It also established arrangements for Israeli redeployments and elections for a Palestinian Authority president and council.[1][14]

The Knesset approved Oslo II on October 6, 1995, by 61 votes to 59.[7][14] The one-vote margin reflected the sharp division within Israeli politics over the security risks, territorial provisions, and expected consequences of the Oslo process.

The government also pursued an extensive domestic agenda. It increased the education budget by 75 percent and enacted the National Health Insurance Law.[16] Implemented in 1995, the national insurance system made access to health care a right for all Israelis.[17]

Other measures protected single parents and people with disabilities, liberalized income-support entitlements, and included a 1994 law intended to reduce poverty and income inequality that was extended in 1995. The government also introduced maternity benefits for adoptive mothers, minimum unemployment allowances, and additional social-insurance provisions.[17]

Former ministers later emphasized that the government pursued diplomatic, social, and economic policies simultaneously. Uzi Baram described it as one of the few governments to advance all three agendas at once, while Ephraim Sneh recalled Rabin's attention to social justice, education, housing, and health care.[18] A 1999 economic assessment drawing on Bank of Israel reports recorded average annual GDP growth of 5.4 percent during 1992–1996, while also criticizing the fiscal and current-account imbalances that developed during that period.[19]

On November 4, 1995, right-wing extremist Yigal Amir shot Rabin as the prime minister left a pro-Oslo rally in Tel Aviv's Kings of Israel Square. Amir fired three shots as Rabin approached his vehicle, striking him twice.[20] A subsequent investigation and judicial commission concluded that no organization had stood behind the assassination, although other individuals were prosecuted for prior knowledge or assistance.[1]

Rabin's death brought his premiership to an abrupt end. Peres served as acting prime minister until he formed the Twenty-Sixth Government on November 22, 1995. That date is also recorded as the formal end of the Twenty-Fifth Government.[4][21]

The Twenty-Fifth Government substantially changed Israel's diplomatic and domestic institutions. The Oslo agreements produced mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, established the Palestinian Authority, and created the administrative division into Areas A, B, and C.[7][11][14] The peace treaty with Jordan ended the formal conflict between the two states and established diplomatic relations.[1][13]

Domestically, the government's education spending and social legislation altered national priorities. The National Health Insurance Law was its most prominent institutional reform, making health-care access a legal entitlement and expanding the state's role in guaranteeing coverage.[16][17]

Rabin's assassination became a defining event in Israeli political memory. Israel subsequently established Yitzhak Rabin Memorial Day, observed on the twelfth day of the Hebrew month of Heshvan rather than permanently on the Gregorian date of November 4.[20] The government's diplomatic program remained the subject of sustained disagreement over terrorism, territorial compromise, Palestinian self-government, and the long-term prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

Historical assessments of the government are dominated by disagreement over the purpose and consequences of the Oslo Accords. Supporters have described the agreements as a diplomatic breakthrough and a framework for Palestinian self-government, while critics have portrayed them as a strategic error that exposed Israel to greater security risks. The agreements' effects therefore remain contested rather than a settled historical judgment.[7][15]

The INSS study advances a specific interpretation of Rabin's strategy: that he viewed political separation from the Palestinians as a means of preventing a binational state and preserving Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. That analysis is a scholarly framework for understanding his motives, not a conclusion accepted by all historians or political participants.[7]

Contemporary sources also differ in some administrative details, including which additional ministerial portfolios Rabin personally held. Such discrepancies do not alter the verified dates of the government, the composition of its coalition, or the chronology of its principal diplomatic agreements.[4][1]