Twenty-Fourth Government of Israel

The Twenty-Fourth Government emerged from an exceptional parliamentary crisis. After the 1988 elections, Yitzhak Shamir led a national unity government comprising Likud, the Alignment, the National Religious Party, Shas, and Agudat Yisrael, with more than 90 Knesset members.[3] On March 15, 1990, the government lost a no-confidence vote by 60 votes to 55. Contemporary accounts described it as the first successful no-confidence vote to bring down an Israeli government.[9]

The immediate dispute concerned the peace process. Labor leader Shimon Peres opposed Shamir's response to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's initiative, while religious parties also had domestic and financial grievances.[2] Five of Shas's six Knesset members were absent from the vote, helping produce the government's defeat.[4] President Chaim Herzog then asked Peres to form a replacement government.

Peres sought a coalition of the Alignment, Ratz, Shinui, Mapam, and Agudat Yisrael, supported by Arab parties. Rabbi Elazar Shach's March 26 speech and Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's decision that Shas would not join weakened his prospects. On April 11, Agudat Yisrael members Avraham Verdiger and Eliezer Mizrahi failed to appear for the planned presentation of the government, leaving Peres with only 59 supporters. He ultimately acknowledged that he could not form a coalition.[3] Yitzhak Rabin later called the maneuver "the stinking trick."[2]

After Peres's attempt failed, President Herzog gave Shamir the task of forming a government. Shamir presented the new cabinet on June 11, 1990, and secured the support of 62 Knesset members.[2]

The government excluded Labor and drew support from Likud, the National Religious Party, Yitzhak Modai's Party for the Advancement of the Zionist Idea, Shas, Degel HaTorah, Tzomet, Tehiya, Agudat Yisrael, and Moledet.[3] Sources differ over the formal status of some parties at the moment of formation. Calcalist reports that the coalition factions initially held 59 seats and received outside support from two Moledet members. It adds that Ephraim Gur joined in July and Agudat Yisrael joined in November, after which the government possessed a parliamentary majority.[10]

The cabinet had 19 ministers.[1] Shamir served as prime minister and held responsibility for the labor and welfare and environment portfolios. Moshe Nissim was deputy prime minister and minister of industry and trade, while David Levy was deputy prime minister and foreign minister. Moshe Arens served as defense minister, Yitzhak Modai as finance minister, and Ariel Sharon as construction and housing minister. Other cabinet members included Rafael Eitan at agriculture, Aryeh Deri at interior, Ehud Olmert at health, and Yitzhak Peretz at immigrant absorption. Chaim Herzog was Israel's sixth president.[1]

During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq fired Scud missiles at Israel. A Twelfth Knesset overview records that Israel suffered at least 40 direct hits but remained outside the war at the request of the United States.[4] Fear that the missiles might carry unconventional weapons caused widespread panic, although casualties were few and property damage was relatively limited.[11]

Shamir's policy of restraint prevented Israel from entering the United States-led campaign against Saddam Hussein. The Knesset overview credits that restraint with giving new impetus to the peace process and changing its course after the war.[4]

Operation Solomon took place on May 24, 1991, amid political turmoil in Ethiopia. Verified sources give slightly different totals: a State Department background note reproduced by the Jewish Virtual Library records 14,000 Ethiopian Jewish immigrants, while the Twelfth Knesset overview gives 15,000.[12][4] A Ynet account describes Shamir as a driving force behind the operation, which sought to rescue the community following the collapse of Mengistu Haile Mariam's government.[5]

The Madrid Peace Conference was held from October 30 to November 4, 1991. Co-chaired by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, it included Israeli, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. The conference was the first occasion on which all these parties gathered for direct negotiations.[6] It also marked Israel's first direct, face-to-face talks with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives.[7]

Israel participated under substantial American pressure. The accepted format placed Palestinian representatives within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and excluded PLO officials and residents of East Jerusalem.[6] During the conference and subsequent talks, Shamir pursued a policy of slowing negotiations to avoid concessions and preserve the Israeli settlement enterprise in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.[13]

The conference produced no formal agreement, but separate bilateral negotiations followed. Talks resumed in Washington in December 1991, and multilateral negotiations opened in Moscow in January 1992.[6] Later accounts credit the Madrid process with establishing channels that contributed to negotiations preceding the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan peace treaty.[7]

Participation in Madrid fractured Shamir's coalition. Right-wing coalition partners resigned in protest, and early elections followed.[14] A later Ynet account states that Moledet, Tzomet, and Tehiya withdrew over the conference and negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. Rather than remain at the head of a minority government, Shamir agreed with the opposition to advance the elections to June 1992.[15]

Relations with Washington were strained by settlement construction in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza. President Bush delayed housing-loan guarantees requested to help absorb immigrants from the Soviet Union and sought assurances that the funds would not finance new settlement activity.[6] The dispute intensified alongside the Madrid negotiations, as the Shamir government continued construction and resisted American pressure over the settlements.[13]

The Twenty-Fourth Government ended on July 13, 1992, after Likud lost the June 23 election for the Thirteenth Knesset.[1] Labor won 44 seats and Likud 32. Labor, Meretz, and the Arab parties together held 61 seats, forming a bloc that enabled Labor leader Yitzhak Rabin to take power. Likud returned to opposition after fifteen years.[8] Shas subsequently joined Rabin's governing coalition.[16]

A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis attributed Likud's defeat partly to perceptions of misgovernment, internal conflict, and questionable conduct by officials. It also argued that Shamir was perceived as concentrating on settlements and territorial issues while showing insufficient concern for unemployment, the economy, and the welfare of traditional Likud constituencies.[17] These are interpretations of the election result rather than neutral descriptions of government policy.

The result was a major defeat for Shamir, who subsequently resigned as chairman of Likud.[16]

Accounts of the March 1990 crisis differ over responsibility for the failed Peres coalition. The politically charged name "the stinking trick" was attributed to Rabin,[2] but participants later disputed whether the attempted change of government was improper or simply a legitimate parliamentary maneuver. Yossi Beilin claimed that Ariel Sharon hid Avraham Verdiger and Eliezer Mizrahi to prevent them from supporting Peres; Mizrahi denied that Sharon, an orchard, or secret meetings played any role.[9]

Sources also describe the coalition's initial composition differently. Ynet lists Moledet and Agudat Yisrael among the parties associated with Shamir's government, while Calcalist reports 59 coalition members, outside support from two Moledet members, and Agudat Yisrael's later entry.[3][10] Operation Solomon totals likewise vary between 14,000 and 15,000 people in verified accounts.[12][4]

Assessments of Shamir's settlement policy, his strategy of slowing negotiations, and the reasons for Likud's 1992 defeat remain interpretive. Later accounts connect the settlement dispute to tensions with Washington,[13] while election analyses emphasize domestic dissatisfaction and disagreement over national priorities.[17]