Thirty-First Government of Israel

The government emerged during an abrupt political transition. Ariel Sharon had left Likud to establish Kadima, but a severe stroke on January 4, 2006, left him incapacitated. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became acting prime minister and assumed Kadima's leadership; after Sharon was declared permanently incapacitated in April, Olmert became prime minister.[7]

The election to the 17th Knesset was held on March 28, 2006, with turnout of 63.2 percent. Kadima won 29 seats, Labor 19, Likud and Shas 12 each, Yisrael Beiteinu 11, the Pensioners' Party seven, United Torah Judaism six, Meretz five, the United Arab List four, and Hadash and Balad three each.[3][8]

Kadima formed a coalition with Labor, Shas, and the Pensioners' Party. The four parties held 67 of the Knesset's 120 seats, and the cabinet initially had 25 ministers.[8] On May 4, the Knesset approved the government by 65 votes to 49, with four members absent, after which Olmert and the ministers took their oaths.[9]

Shas joined without accepting in advance the proposed evacuation of settlements in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and reserved its position until the matter reached the government. The coalition agreement also called for raising the minimum wage, reversing a planned pension cut, guaranteeing worker pensions, and increasing social spending.[10]

The government's May 2006 guidelines said it would seek permanent borders preserving Israel as "a Jewish state, with a Jewish majority, and as a democratic state." They called for negotiations based on mutual recognition, signed agreements, the Roadmap principles, an end to violence, and the disarming of terrorist organizations.[11]

Olmert's central territorial proposal, initially called "realignment" and later "convergence," was intended to preserve Israel as a Jewish and democratic state with a large Jewish majority. It envisaged retaining the major settlement blocs of Ariel, Ma'ale Adumim, and Gush Etzion, evacuating smaller settlements, and leaving between 65 and 90 percent of Judea and Samaria to the Palestinians. Contemporary estimates placed the possible number of evacuated settlers between 20,000 and 80,000.[12]

Olmert argued that dispersed settlement endangered Israel's future and that any withdrawal should be pursued through dialogue with settlers, internal reconciliation, and the broadest possible agreement.[13] The plan was not implemented and was shelved after the 2006 conflicts and the criticism surrounding the Lebanon War.[12]

The initial cabinet included Tzipi Livni as foreign minister, Amir Peretz as defense minister, and Avraham Hirchson as finance minister.[14] Later rosters included Ehud Barak as defense minister, Ronnie Bar-On as finance minister, Daniel Friedmann as justice minister, Yuli Tamir as education minister, Meir Sheetrit as interior minister, and Isaac Herzog as welfare and social services minister.[1]

The government's most severe early test began amid simultaneous crises on Israel's southern and northern borders. An Israeli soldier was abducted near Gaza on June 25, 2006. On July 12, Hezbollah terrorists attacked two Israeli patrol vehicles, killing three soldiers, wounding three, and abducting reservists Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev; five additional soldiers were killed during the ensuing rescue attempt.[8][4] Hezbollah subsequently fired more than 4,000 rockets at civilian targets in northern Israel.[15]

After a two-hour meeting on July 12, the cabinet unanimously authorized the campaign that became the Second Lebanon War. The Winograd Commission later wrote that the government "did not want war, did not intend to start one, and did not know that it was starting one," although its decision had the meaning of going to war.[4]

Hostilities ceased on August 14 under UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[8] Sources describe the conflict as lasting either 33 or 34 days.[14][4] Olmert's Knesset address reported 158 Israeli civilian and military deaths, while a later government history listed 44 civilians and 119 soldiers killed; the sources provide different totals and do not resolve the discrepancy.[15][16]

In the same address, Olmert accepted overall responsibility as prime minister, acknowledged shortcomings requiring examination, and pledged to monitor compliance with Resolution 1701 and continue efforts to return the abducted soldiers. He also announced a multi-year recovery program for northern Israel.[16]

Public confidence in the government and military leadership fell sharply after the ceasefire, with late-August polling showing major losses in support for Kadima and Labor.[17] Olmert appointed retired Judge Eliyahu Winograd to lead an inquiry. Its April 2007 interim findings assigned personal blame for failings to Olmert, Peretz, and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.[8]

The final report, submitted on January 30, 2008, described the war as a serious missed opportunity and identified grave failures in political and military decision-making, preparedness, strategic planning, protection of civilians, and coordination. It criticized the decision to go to war without first selecting a coherent military option or exit strategy, while also treating the adoption of Resolution 1701 as an achievement for Israel.[18] The commission issued no personal recommendations for resignation, and Olmert said he would remain in office to address the shortcomings.[14][18]

After the Lebanon War, Olmert expanded the coalition by admitting Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu faction. The party's 11 members increased the coalition to 78 seats, making the government less dependent on Labor. Lieberman became deputy prime minister and minister for strategic threats, a newly created position.[19][20]

Yisrael Beiteinu withdrew on January 16, 2008, because negotiations with the Palestinians were addressing core final-status issues. The coalition continued with 67 seats, while Shas leader Eli Yishai warned that his party would leave if the government made concessions concerning Jerusalem.[8] In September 2008, the remaining coalition parties were Kadima, Labor, Shas, and the Pensioners' Party.[21]

During the night of September 5–6, 2007, eight Israeli aircraft destroyed the Al-Kibar reactor in Syria. The Security Cabinet had empowered Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni to approve the operation's approach and timing.[5] Olmert had sought American participation, but the United States declined to conduct the strike.[22]

Israel kept the operation secret and did not officially clear its details for publication until 2018. Accounts differ on the payload: CTech reported 24 tons of ammunition, while Globes reported 17 tons of explosives.[5][22]

After the Palestinian unity government collapsed in June 2007 and Hamas seized control of Gaza, the Israeli cabinet decided to continue working with Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas. It said contacts could resume with a Palestinian government recognizing the Quartet principles, while Israel would maintain no contact with Hamas and would continue humanitarian supplies to Gaza.[11]

Olmert and Abbas began regular bilateral meetings in 2007. The Annapolis Conference opened on November 27 with nearly 50 countries and major international organizations represented.[6][23] Israel and the PLO committed themselves to continuous negotiations aimed at a treaty, implementation of the Road Map, and an effort to reach an agreement before the end of 2008.[6]

The process had two principal channels: negotiations between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Ahmed Qurei on final-status issues, and direct meetings between Olmert and Abbas.[24] A retrospective by members of the Israeli negotiating team describes eight months of intensive negotiations involving about 300 meetings among senior officials and professional committees.[25] Another account says Olmert and Abbas met 36 or 37 times, with the exact total uncertain.[26]

At their final meeting on September 16, 2008, Olmert presented Abbas with a declaration of principles and a map. According to the Jerusalem Institute study, the proposal placed Jewish neighborhoods built after 1967 under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, while an international trusteeship would administer the Holy Basin without resolving sovereignty. The study describes Israel as annexing 6.3 percent of Judea and Samaria and providing land equal to 5.8 percent in exchange. Abbas asked to take the map for consultation, Olmert refused, and they did not meet again.[24]

Other accounts give different territorial figures. The Jewish Virtual Library reports proposed Israeli retention of about 6.4 percent, a possible reduction to 5.8 percent mentioned by Condoleezza Rice, and a later figure of 4.9 percent attributed to Olmert.[27] These figures describe an unfinished negotiation rather than an agreed document.

The negotiations ended without an agreement. Olmert's impending departure and unresolved differences over borders, settlements, Jerusalem, refugees, and security were among the obstacles identified by the sources.[25][26] Talks were suspended following Olmert's resignation and Operation Cast Lead and were not renewed after Netanyahu's government took office.[24] INSS describes Annapolis as the last sustained effort to achieve a permanent settlement based on two states for two peoples.[25]

Operation Cast Lead began on December 27, 2008, following renewed rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza and the breakdown of a six-month calm. Olmert and Barak agreed on a large-scale offensive, which the National Security Cabinet approved unanimously.[6][28] The operation continued until January 18, 2009, when Israel and Hamas separately declared unilateral ceasefires.[6] A survey conducted the day after the operation began found 81 percent support and 12 percent opposition; a later poll found 48 percent favoring conquest of the entire Gaza Strip and 44 percent supporting the decision to stop.[29]

In November 2007, the government approved an increase of about NIS 500 million in allowances for Holocaust survivors. A 2008 commission chaired by retired judge Dalia Dorner recommended raising the basic allowance for approximately 40,000 survivors to 75 percent of the corresponding German-law allowance; the reported implementation cost was about NIS 440 million.[30]

During the global financial crisis, the Finance Ministry proposed infrastructure investment, business credit, research-and-development support, capital-investment incentives, and labor-market programs. Although the plan described NIS 21.7 billion in infrastructure spending, Calcalist reported that only about NIS 1.5 billion in genuinely new funding was immediately available for 2009.[30]

A series of corruption investigations undermined Olmert's position. On July 30, 2008, he announced that he would leave office after Kadima selected a new leader. On September 8, police said there was an evidentiary basis to indict him in several cases, including the Talansky "cash envelopes" affair. These were allegations and a police recommendation, not a judicial finding of guilt.[31]

Tzipi Livni won Kadima's leadership primary on September 17. Olmert submitted his resignation to President Shimon Peres on September 21 but remained caretaker prime minister.[32][31] Peres asked Livni to form a government, but she could not satisfy coalition demands, including Shas's requests for higher child allowances and assurances that Jerusalem would not be negotiated.[8]

Early elections were held on February 10, 2009. Benjamin Netanyahu formed the succeeding government and was sworn in on March 31, the final day of the Thirty-First Government.[1][6]

The Thirty-First Government's record was dominated by military conflict, coalition instability, and intensive diplomacy. The Winograd Commission created a detailed institutional record of failures in preparedness, strategic planning, ground-force performance, protection of civilians, and political-military coordination during the Lebanon War.[18][33] Its report also recognized positive elements, including Resolution 1701 and the conduct of individual soldiers and commanders.[18]

The Syrian reactor strike demonstrated Israel's ability to carry out a long-range operation while maintaining secrecy intended to reduce the likelihood of Syrian retaliation.[5][22] The Annapolis process produced hundreds of meetings and detailed proposals on borders and Jerusalem but no binding agreement.[25][24]

The Lebanon War's disputed outcome damaged public confidence in Kadima and Labor soon after the government entered office.[17] Kadima nevertheless remained the largest party after the 2009 election, but Livni could not form a governing coalition and Netanyahu became prime minister.[6] Domestically, the coalition agreements and later measures addressed wages, pensions, social spending, Holocaust-survivor allowances, and the economic downturn, although implementation varied.[10][30]

Several numerical details remain disputed in the source record. Approved accounts describe the Second Lebanon War as lasting either 33 or 34 days.[14][4] Olmert's August 2006 address gave an Israeli death toll of 158, whereas a government history listed 44 civilians and 119 soldiers.[15][16] Accounts of the Syrian reactor strike report either 24 tons of ammunition or 17 tons of explosives.[5][22]

The terms of Olmert's 2008 proposal are also reported differently, with figures of 6.4, 5.8, and 4.9 percent appearing in one retrospective and a 6.3-percent annexation paired with 5.8 percent in exchanged land in another.[24][27] These discrepancies should be treated as attributed accounts of unfinished negotiations, not as jointly accepted terms.