Thirty-seventh Government of Israel

The November 1, 2022 election returned a right-wing and religious parliamentary majority supporting Benjamin Netanyahu, whose parties together secured 64 of the Knesset’s 120 seats.[1] Netanyahu returned to the premiership after a year and a half out of office, beginning his sixth term as prime minister and heading his sixth government.[1] The parties supporting the existing government won 51 seats, leaving Netanyahu’s partners with the parliamentary strength to assemble a new coalition.[7]

Likud won 32 seats, Shas 11, United Torah Judaism seven, Religious Zionism seven, Otzma Yehudit, also called Jewish Power, six, and Noam one.[8] Religious Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam had contested the election on a common slate before constituting separate components of the governing coalition.[8] Likud therefore accounted for exactly half of the coalition’s 64 members.[9] The Religious Zionism–Otzma Yehudit joint list, associated with Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, won 14 seats, eight more than in the previous election.[10] Shas and United Torah Judaism together increased their representation from 16 seats in 2021 to 18 in 2022.[10]

Coalition negotiations produced agreements setting out commitments among the participating parties before the government sought the Knesset’s confidence.[11] Those agreements were political commitments rather than legally binding instruments.[11] The published policy guidelines were likewise not legally binding, although they were attached to the coalition agreements and treated as an integral part of them.[12]

Preparatory legislation addressed several demands arising from the coalition negotiations.[11] One amendment changed the conditions under which Knesset members could leave a faction without incurring electoral sanctions.[11] Another permitted a person with a suspended prison sentence to be appointed a minister and increased the permitted number of ministers.[11] A third expanded the national security minister’s authority to establish police policy, particularly in relation to investigations.[11] These measures preceded the confidence vote and helped establish the legal framework within which the incoming administration would operate.[11]

The Anti-Defamation League welcomed the formation of Netanyahu’s coalition on December 22, before its final parliamentary approval, while expressing concerns about the expected appointments and powers of some coalition participants.[13] A separate January 1, 2023 letter from leaders of the Jewish Agency, World Zionist Organization, Keren Hayesod, and Jewish Federations of North America congratulated Netanyahu while seeking consultation about possible changes affecting Jewish religious status and immigration.[14] These communications placed relations with Diaspora Jewish institutions among the issues confronting the government at its outset.[13][14]

On December 29, 2022, the Knesset approved the new government by 63 votes to 54, and the government was sworn in that day.[15] The 63 affirmative votes were the recorded confidence-vote total, distinct from the coalition’s overall membership of 64.[15] Netanyahu presented ministerial assignments and policy guidelines before the vote.[15]

The initial senior ministerial lineup placed Yoav Gallant at the Defense Ministry, Eli Cohen at the Foreign Ministry, Bezalel Smotrich at the Finance Ministry, Yariv Levin at the Justice Ministry, and Itamar Ben-Gvir at the National Security Ministry.[16] Smotrich also became a minister within the Defense Ministry, and both he and Ben-Gvir received security-related responsibilities alongside their principal portfolios.[16] Aryeh Deri, the leader of Shas, was appointed vice prime minister and minister of health and interior under the coalition agreement.[17] Ministers sometimes held more than one portfolio, and assignments changed over the administration’s term.[18]

Before the confidence vote, Netanyahu identified three principal objectives: preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, developing infrastructure and extending economic growth throughout Israel, and expanding peace agreements with Arab states with the goal of ending the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1] The published guidelines similarly committed the government to opposing Iran’s nuclear program, strengthening national and personal security, and strengthening Jerusalem.[12] They also pledged to deepen cooperation with the states participating in the Abraham Accords and pursue further peace agreements.[19]

Domestic commitments included reducing poverty and social disparities, lowering living and housing costs, improving public transportation, encouraging Jewish immigration, and strengthening education and Jewish identity.[12] More specific undertakings included free early-childhood education for children aged zero to three, an additional half income-tax credit point for each child of working parents, and a 20 percent increase in conscript soldiers’ pay.[19] The guidelines also proposed freezing electricity, water, and municipal-tax prices as part of the response to inflation and living costs.[19] These were stated policy commitments, not a record of completed implementation.[19]

The guidelines pledged to preserve Israel’s Jewish character and heritage while respecting the practices and traditions of members of all religions.[1] They also promised to maintain the longstanding religion-and-state status quo, including arrangements at holy places.[1] Commitments concerning Arab society included combating crime, improving personal security, expanding education and opportunities for young people, and investing in infrastructure in Arab localities.[12] Judicial and governance changes were placed ahead of other legislation among the government’s published priorities.[19]

Settlement policy formed another prominent element of the coalition program.[1] The guidelines called for promoting settlement throughout the Land of Israel, specifically naming the Galilee, Negev, Golan, and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[1] Coalition agreements declared that the Jewish people possessed an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River.[16] Additional commitments concerned sovereignty, the status of settlement outposts, immigration under the Law of Return, and non-Orthodox conversions.[20]

The agreement with Otzma Yehudit included commitments to legislate a death penalty for terrorists and regularize existing settlements and outposts.[21] It set a target of deciding within 60 days to recognize established communities and regularizing “young settlement” sites within 18 months.[21] These provisions described intended actions in coalition agreements rather than evidence that the measures had been completed.[21]

On January 4, 2023, Justice Minister Levin announced the first stage of a judicial-reform program.[22] The areas he outlined included changing the composition of the judicial appointments panel, restricting courts’ ability to invalidate legislation, introducing a parliamentary override clause, permitting ministers to appoint their own legal advisers, and canceling the reasonableness test applied to government decisions.[22][19] The coalition agreements had already proposed allowing the Knesset to reenact legislation struck down by the High Court.[20]

An early judicial decision concerned Deri’s ministerial appointments.[17] On January 18, a 10–1 extended High Court panel voided his appointments as interior and health minister, finding them extremely unreasonable in view of his convictions and latest sentence.[17] Some justices also relied on estoppel arising from statements he had made during sentencing.[17]

Large demonstrations accompanied the judicial legislation from its opening weeks.[23] Approximately 30,000 people attended a major protest at Tel Aviv’s Habima Square on January 7, while estimates for January 14 demonstrations in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Beersheba ranged from 50,000 to 80,000.[23] Protests subsequently involved strikes and opposition from reservists and other groups as the legislative process continued.[23]

During the initiative’s first eight months, there were 1,816 demonstrations against it in approximately 200 locations, alongside about 70 demonstrations supporting the government and its initiative.[2] Police estimates exceeded seven million protester attendances, while the protest movement claimed more than ten million.[2] These were cumulative attendance estimates rather than counts of distinct participants.[2] Demonstration activity fell after Netanyahu froze the legislation and opened talks with the opposition, then rose again as the reasonableness legislation advanced.[2]

Gallant warned in March that the societal rift was affecting the military and creating a security threat.[24] Netanyahu announced Gallant’s dismissal on March 26, and the following day announced a pause in the judicial legislation amid mass protests and a general strike.[24][25] On March 27, Netanyahu said the pause in the second and third readings was intended to allow genuine dialogue and seek broad agreement.[25] Benny Gantz and opposition leader Yair Lapid agreed to talks under President Isaac Herzog, and the Histadrut called off its general strike.[25]

On July 24, 2023, the Knesset enacted an amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary preventing courts from reviewing the reasonableness of decisions by the government, prime minister, or ministers.[5] Its scope included appointments and decisions to refrain from exercising authority.[5] The vote was 64–0 after opposition members left the chamber.[24] The measure was narrower than the full judicial program announced in January, concentrating on reasonableness review of decisions at the government and ministerial level.[5]

The government also changed administrative arrangements affecting settlement policy.[26] Smotrich’s Defense Ministry responsibilities formally encompassed civil-affairs units dealing with West Bank and Gaza issues, including a planning commission overseeing settlement construction and home demolitions in the West Bank.[26] A June 2023 change eased and expedited settlement-construction approvals.[26] Some administrative authority was subsequently transferred to a civilian administrator answerable to Smotrich.[26]

The October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack was followed by declarations concerning a special situation on the home front.[27] On October 8, the cabinet confirmed a state of war effective from 6:00 a.m. on October 7.[27] The government’s initial stated aims included degrading Hamas’s military capabilities and those of associated terrorist groups, securing the release of Israeli hostages, and removing Hamas from power.[3]

Netanyahu and Gantz announced an emergency government on October 11, adding opposition figures to the existing administration and establishing a smaller war-management cabinet.[4] Netanyahu, Gallant, and Gantz were its three principal members, with Gadi Eisenkot and Ron Dermer as observers.[4] Gantz, Eisenkot, and Gideon Sa’ar were to serve as ministers without portfolio, and the agreement provided for automatic extensions of senior appointments during the war.[4] The arrangement was intended to concentrate on managing the conflict rather than pursuing unrelated initiatives.[6]

On October 12, the Knesset approved appointments to the expanded emergency government by 66 votes to four.[28] Five National Unity members—Gantz, Eisenkot, Sa’ar, Hili Tropper, and Yifat Shasha-Biton—were sworn in as ministers.[28] Shas’s Ariel Bosso was also sworn in as health minister.[28] The expansion added participants to the existing government rather than replacing it with a successor administration.[4]

On January 1, 2024, the High Court of Justice, sitting as a 15-justice panel, ruled that it could review Basic Laws and their amendments in exceptional cases.[5] By an 8–7 majority, it invalidated the amendment eliminating reasonableness review of government and ministerial decisions.[5] The majority concluded that the amendment severely damaged core characteristics of Israel as a democratic state.[5] Minority justices differed over the Court’s authority or favored a narrow interpretation instead of invalidation.[5]

New Hope, led by Sa’ar, left the wartime coalition in March 2024.[26] Gantz and his National Unity party withdrew on June 9 following disagreements over wartime policy and postwar planning, leaving Netanyahu with his prewar coalition.[6] Gantz said political considerations were obstructing the war effort; his departure did not bring down the government.[29] New Hope rejoined the government in September.[26]

In November 2024, Netanyahu dismissed Gallant as defense minister and replaced him with Yisrael Katz, while appointing Sa’ar foreign minister.[26] Netanyahu and Gallant had clashed over the prospects of achieving “total victory” against Hamas, hostage-release efforts, and conscription for ultra-Orthodox Israelis.[26]

Otzma Yehudit left the government in January 2025 in protest against the ceasefire agreement with Hamas.[30] After Israel resumed its military campaign in Gaza, Likud and Otzma Yehudit announced on March 18 that the party would return and its ministers would rejoin the government.[30]

The judicial program, largely set aside after October 7 and the outbreak of war, was revived by Levin in early 2025.[31] In March, the Knesset passed legislation changing the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee and the judicial appointment process, scheduled to take effect when the next Knesset was sworn in after the 2026 election.[31] In the final days of the 25th Knesset, additional legislation gave the government the ability to disregard the attorney general’s position on the legality of its policies and moved the Department for Internal Police Investigations from the State Attorney’s Office to an agency within the Justice Ministry.[31]

Disagreements with ultra-Orthodox coalition partners over military-service exemptions brought the government close to dissolution in May 2026.[7] A dissolution initiative passed a preliminary stage 110–0 and a first reading 106–0 before Netanyahu reached an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties.[7] The government remained in office, and the election stayed scheduled for October 27.[7] On July 17, the Knesset formally dispersed after approving a dissolution measure by 62–0.[7]

The October 27, 2026 election left Netanyahu’s bloc with 53 seats, Gadi Eisenkot’s bloc with 48, and Arab parties with 19, producing no majority for either principal bloc.[7] The outgoing government continued serving while negotiations for a successor proceeded.[7] Its continuation in office did not depend on retaining the parliamentary majority that had supported its original legislative program.[7]

On November 8, President Herzog gave Yashar leader Eisenkot the mandate to form the next government after 67 Knesset members recommended him.[32] Eisenkot received 28 days to assemble a coalition, with a possible 14-day extension.[32] As of the November 13 update, coalition negotiations remained unresolved and Netanyahu’s administration had not been replaced.[7]

Although it lacked a parliamentary majority, the caretaker government remained responsible for ongoing administration until a successor took office.[7] Legal guidance required restraint on nonurgent matters and warned against decisions that could create irreversible circumstances for the next government.[33]

At the government’s first meeting after the election, held on November 11, only 13 of its 33 ministers attended.[33] The government approved Netanyahu’s proposal to appoint Foreign Minister Sa’ar as interior minister.[33] Because the administration was serving in a caretaker capacity, that appointment did not require Knesset approval.[33]

The administration therefore remained the Thirty-seventh Government during the post-election transition, rather than ending automatically when the Knesset dispersed or the election took place.[7] A successor still needed to be formed and take office before the outgoing government’s service would conclude.[7]

The scale of the judicial-reform protests was one of the most extensively quantified features of the government’s early period: demonstrations occurred across approximately 200 locations, with cumulative attendance estimates running into millions.[2] The political crisis also extended into the reserve forces, including public concern about reservists refusing to serve, and intersected with disputes over proposed military-service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men.[34] Public disagreement consequently encompassed both the distribution of institutional authority and the relationship between domestic politics and national security.[34]

The constitutional arguments remained sharply divided.[24] Proponents of restricting reasonableness review argued that courts had intervened excessively in the discretion of elected officials; critics regarded the standard as an important means of reviewing arbitrary government action.[24] The government presented its broader program as restoring balance among elected institutions and the judiciary, while opponents warned that it would weaken judicial checks and protections.[24] The January 2024 ruling itself became part of this debate, with disagreement among the justices about reviewing Basic Laws and about whether interpretation could resolve the amendment’s problems without striking it down.[5]

A March 2023 survey found markedly different expectations among coalition and opposition voters.[35] Large majorities of coalition voters believed the proposed changes would help protect IDF personnel against prosecution abroad and preserve security forces’ freedom of action, whereas majorities of opposition voters expected harm to those protections and to minority rights.[35] Approximately half of Jewish respondents believed the changes would harm minority groups.[35] The survey recorded expectations and political perceptions rather than establishing the proposals’ eventual effects.[35]

Diaspora Jewish responses highlighted a different dimension of the administration’s significance.[14] The January 1 letter from major Jewish institutional leaders warned that changes to the Law of Return or conversion arrangements “could threaten to unravel the ties between us and keep us away from each other.”[14] Its signatories asked to participate in future discussions about such changes.[14] The Anti-Defamation League’s December statement likewise combined congratulations with concern about the judiciary, minority communities, LGBTQ rights, religious pluralism, and Palestinian affairs.[13]

The settlement and administrative program also generated substantial debate.[26] U.S. and Palestinian Authority officials criticized the June 2023 easing of settlement-construction approvals.[26] Critics characterized transfers of administrative authority to a civilian official answerable to Smotrich as movement toward de facto annexation; that characterization remained an assessment of the policies rather than an agreed legal description.[26] The coalition’s declaration of an exclusive Jewish right to the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River was also understood as conflicting with Palestinian aspirations for statehood.[16]

Commentators offered differing explanations for the government’s electoral mandate and priorities.[36][22] In an April 2023 essay, former Knesset member Stav Shaffir described the 2022 vote as Israel’s fifth election in three years and argued that coalition-building and the failure of Labor and Meretz to unite helped determine the outcome.[36] She wrote that Likud received 23 percent of the vote and that Meretz failed to cross the electoral threshold.[36] This interpretation emphasized how electoral organization and coalition arithmetic shaped the government rather than treating the result as a simple endorsement of every subsequent policy.[36]

Hillel Halkin argued that ultra-Orthodox coalition parties sought legislation exempting Haredi yeshiva students from military service, while Religious Zionism and Jewish Power sought to prevent judicial interference with settlement expansion and practices he characterized as discriminatory toward Israeli Arabs.[22] He attributed the government’s retreat from its initial judicial program to a combination of protests, reservists’ strike threats, business warnings, economic concerns, foreign reactions, and polling showing some Likud voters turning against the plan.[22] His account connected the reduced legislative package to pressure exerted outside parliament.[22]

Economic commentary also focused on reactions within Israel’s technology and financial sectors.[37] Amir Tibon wrote that, six weeks into Netanyahu’s sixth term, several high-tech companies had moved billions of dollars out of Israel in response to the judicial proposals.[37] He also reported private warnings from major-bank executives that the movement of money reflected a wider trend.[37] These figures and explanations were Tibon’s reported account, rather than an independently established aggregate total.[37]

Assessments of the October 7 intelligence failure identified problems across political, military, and intelligence levels rather than a single failure.[3] The wartime government’s stated objectives combined the degradation of Hamas and associated terrorist groups with hostage release and the removal of Hamas from power.[3] Subsequent departures and dismissals exposed disagreements over how to pursue those objectives and how to plan for the period after the fighting.[6][26] The government’s institutional record thus included both a major domestic constitutional confrontation and the creation, contraction, and reconfiguration of an emergency wartime administration.[4][6]