01In brief
Societal breakdown in Gaza during the Gaza war is the disruption of public services, livelihoods, social relationships and public order in the Gaza Strip during the conflict beginning in October 2023. By October 2024, an assessment reported that 17 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals remained functioning and that 87 percent of schools had been damaged. Mass displacement, infrastructure destruction, hunger and insecure aid distribution accompanied weakened government institutions, although municipal workers and emergency committees continued to operate in some places. Conditions changed substantially across locations and periods, with local administration and attempts to restore order existing alongside looting, armed-group violence and severe shortages of essential services.
02Overview
By the end of 2023, more than 1.9 million people—over 85 percent of Gaza’s population—had been internally displaced, many into overcrowded shelters with limited food, water and toilets.[1] Damage to electricity and water infrastructure, spreading communicable disease, interruption of schooling and repeated communications blackouts affected several foundations of civilian life simultaneously.[1] Humanitarian agencies shifted toward emergency shelter, food and medical assistance while their own ability to reach different areas deteriorated.[1]
The deterioration of services did not follow a uniform pattern of institutional disappearance: some ministries, security forces and municipalities continued operating partially or nearly fully in early 2024.[3] By October, municipal workers linked to Hamas were still collecting rubbish and repairing water, sewage, electricity and road infrastructure in some areas, while emergency committees sometimes replaced collapsed local government.[2] Elsewhere, attacks on aid convoys, black-market activity and the absence of effective control produced episodes of looting and disorder.[2]
Food availability and household access became distinct problems: supplies entering Gaza still had to pass through a damaged and insecure distribution system before reaching residents.[4] Displacement, damaged warehouses, convoy insecurity and the destruction of local food production compounded shortages and dependence on assistance.[4] These disruptions also extended beyond immediate survival, affecting employment, education, family routines, religious gatherings and the ability of residents to resolve disputes through police or other institutions.[5][6]
03Origins and Wartime Development
More than 1.4 million Palestinians were internally displaced within three weeks of the October 7, 2023 attack.[7] Communications were initially cut during the ground invasion, limiting armed groups’ coordination but also restricting the emergency response of paramedics and humanitarian organizations.[7] Between October 7 and December 31, fewer than 100 trucks entered Gaza daily, compared with a prewar average of about 500.[1] Israel cited security concerns, including the possibility that Hamas or other armed groups would use fuel for military purposes.[1]
On November 6, 2023, the Palestinian Ministry of Education suspended the school year for Gaza’s 625,000 schoolchildren.[1] By year’s end, UNRWA was sheltering nearly 1.4 million people in about 155 installations and providing emergency food, healthcare and other assistance.[1] Its operations had shifted from regular services to emergency response, 142 staff members had been killed, and its ability to serve all areas worsened as fighting moved south.[1]
Government activity declined markedly in Gaza City and northern Gaza during fighting and displacement, but some northern services resumed after Israeli forces withdrew in mid-January 2024.[3] The north and south were nearly disconnected, complicating central control.[3] Hamas’s government media office said that 140 government facilities had been destroyed since October 7, even as parts of the administration continued functioning.[3]
Displacement increasingly concentrated civilians in Rafah after Israeli forces moved into Khan Yunis.[7] A February assessment placed Rafah’s population close to one million, against a prewar population of approximately 300,000, creating a heavy municipal burden.[3] By the time of the May 2024 ground operation, nearly 1.4 million civilians were sheltering in the Rafah area, about one million of them already displaced from farther north.[8] Approximately one million people apparently left during May for makeshift camps elsewhere that lacked adequate water, sanitation and aid access.[8]
A UN team visiting Khan Yunis in April 2024 found damage to every building it visited, paved roads reduced to dirt tracks, and unexploded ordnance at major intersections and in schools.[9] The remaining residents faced severe shortages of food, water and healthcare alongside the destruction of Nasser and Al Amal hospitals.[9] By June 3, approximately 1.7 million of Gaza’s roughly 2.1 million residents were displaced, mostly in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.[8]
By August 2024, successive evacuation orders had displaced roughly 90 percent of the population at least once, with families repeatedly fleeing into a shrinking, crowded area.[10] Recent orders had also cut the World Food Programme off from its last operational warehouse in central Gaza and forced five community kitchens to evacuate and seek new locations.[10] A January 17, 2025 assessment likewise placed cumulative displacement at about 90 percent of approximately 2.1 million residents, rather than describing the number displaced at one particular moment.[11]
04Public Services and Everyday Survival
Gaza City Municipality announced on December 24, 2023, that its services had collapsed because of fuel shortages.[3] Garbage accumulated in streets and near hospitals, while stopped pumps contributed to sewage and drainage overflowing into neighborhoods.[3] An emergency committee provided limited rubble clearance and water-pipe connections, although large municipalities including Jabalia, Nuseirat, Khan Yunis and Rafah continued providing many services during the period covered by the February assessment.[3]
By early July 2024, approximately 330,000 tons of solid waste had gone untreated or unburied.[12] Satellite imagery and other open-source material identified at least 225 large garbage piles, with about 2,000 tons being added daily, while none of Gaza’s three organized landfill centers was operating.[12] Israeli authorities and aid organizations worked on sanitation repairs; COGAT said it had approved ten locations for waste concentrations and allowed fuel for humanitarian needs and routine garbage-site maintenance.[12]
At the end of 2023, only about one-third of Gaza’s hospitals were assessed as operational, and no hospitals were operating in the north.[1] Many facilities were functioning only partly, and some also sheltered displaced people.[1] More than 350,000 infectious-disease cases were estimated by the end of that year.[1] An October 2024 assessment reported 17 of 36 hospitals still functioning, illustrating continuing medical activity amid extensive damage and reduced capacity.[2]
Poliovirus was detected in sewage in July 2024, followed by a confirmed case in a ten-month-old infant in August.[7] UN agencies requested a pause in fighting to conduct a vaccination campaign.[7] In 2025, fuel shortages threatened the continuation of humanitarian operations, while approximately one-third of hospitals were described as partly or barely functioning.[13] More than 10,000 people required medical evacuation, with eight evacuations recorded since March 18 in the period covered by those figures.[13]
Telecommunications damage and shortages of fuel and electricity regularly reduced network coverage to less than 10 percent of pre-conflict capacity during 2023.[1] Blackouts disrupted ambulance services, humanitarian work, banking, access to life-saving information and the reporting of civilian casualties and human-rights abuses.[1] These interruptions affected both the delivery of assistance and residents’ ability to seek it.[1]
Normal classroom education remained unavailable to Gaza’s estimated 625,000 school-aged children in May 2024 because schools had closed, sustained damage or become shelters.[14] Volunteer-run tent classes and remote instruction provided some learning opportunities, but the planned tent-school effort met only a small portion of the need.[14] An October assessment reported damage to 87 percent of schools.[2]
Housing destruction and loss of income further constrained daily survival.[15] A January 2025 account put water supply at less than one-quarter of its pre-October 7 level and described hundreds of thousands of displaced people living in tents.[15] Average unemployment reached an estimated 79.7 percent between October 2023 and September 2024, while a reported GDP comparison showed an 84.7 percent fall in October 2024 against October 2023.[15]
A September 2025 commentary by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs linked cash shortages to restrictions on new currency entering Gaza after October 7.[16] It described ceased banking operations, steep exchange rates and an informal trade in cleaning and repairing worn banknotes, arguing that a lack of usable cash prevented some residents from buying available supplies.[16]
05Food Access and Humanitarian Distribution
Virtually all households in Gaza were skipping meals daily by December 2023.[1] In four out of five households in the northern governorates and half of displaced households in the south, people went days and nights without eating, while adults often went hungry so children could eat.[1] Inadequate food access affected 97 percent of northern households and 83 percent of southern households.[1] By year’s end, 576,600 Palestinians were assessed at catastrophic or starvation levels of food insecurity, with the entire population facing an imminent risk of famine.[1]
By March 2024, only 22 of the 43 warehouses operating before the war were still working.[4] Aid faced inspection and access procedures, delays at crossings and checkpoints, warehouse damage, looting and crowds surrounding deliveries.[4] Destroyed bakeries, markets and farmland reduced local sources of food and livelihoods, leaving many displaced residents dependent on assistance.[4] In nearly two-thirds of northern households, people reportedly went entire days and nights without eating at least ten times during the preceding month.[4]
The February 2024 assessment described police monitoring incoming aid trucks but disorderly distribution within Gaza, including reports of gangs robbing trucks and Hamas operatives seizing goods intended for civilians.[3] In March, armed and masked members of clans, civil-society organizations and political factions, including Fatah, began escorting some convoys.[17] Efforts to restore convoy protection combined community groups with discreet police involvement where possible.[17]
A peer-reviewed study using COGAT shipment records estimated that 478,229 metric tons of food entered Gaza from January through July 2024.[18] After adjusting for projected losses, its authors calculated average supplies equivalent to 3,004 kilocalories per person daily.[18] They found that supplied energy, protein and fat generally exceeded Sphere minimums, while dietary iron did not, but explicitly identified an absence of reliable data on crucial dimensions of food access and consumption.[18]
A June 2024 food-security update found that available evidence did not indicate famine was occurring at that time, after deliveries and nutrition, water, sanitation and health responses increased relative to earlier projections.[19] The risk nevertheless remained high amid fighting and restricted humanitarian access, and more than 495,000 people—over 20 percent of the population—were at the most severe food-insecurity level.[19] More than half of surveyed households had sold clothes to buy food, one-third had gathered and sold rubbish, and over 20 percent reported going entire days and nights without eating.[19]
In November 2024, organized armed gangs were reported to be stealing food and other assistance near the Kerem Shalom crossing, with truck drivers facing killings, beatings and abductions.[20] Some residents linked the thieves to local crime families, while remnants of Hamas security forces attacked gangs elsewhere.[20] The incidents illustrate how convoy insecurity could persist even where supplies had crossed into Gaza.[20]
During May 20–27, 2025, 15 aid trucks were reported looted while traveling to bakeries, alongside incidents at warehouses and bakeries in Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Nuseirat and Khan Yunis.[21] Of approximately 140 bakeries operating previously, about 50 remained, and only about half of those were believed to be working.[21] Looting provoked public anger and appeals to preserve solidarity during the humanitarian crisis.[21]
Following the resumption of aid in late May 2025, mass evacuations, infrastructure damage, looting, diversion by multiple actors and distribution failures continued undermining safe and equitable access.[22] Some distribution sites experienced overcrowding, violence and breakdowns of order.[22] The distinction between food entering Gaza and food reaching households remained central to later planning for food security, whose authors identified reliable distribution data as unavailable.[23]
On August 22, 2025, famine, or IPC Phase 5, was classified in Gaza Governorate.[13] Famine thresholds were projected for Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis in the following weeks, while access limitations prevented classification of North Gaza despite descriptions of similar or worse conditions.[13]
08Significance and Recovery Needs
A joint World Bank–UN–EU recovery assessment estimated physical damage at $35.2 billion and economic losses at $22.7 billion.[32] More than 1.2 million people—nearly 60 percent of the population—had lost their homes, while more than 1.9 million had been internally displaced, many repeatedly.[32] Estimated losses included $6.8 billion in health, $2.4 billion in education and $1.6 billion in social protection, with recovery and reconstruction needs placed at approximately $71.4 billion.[32]
Damage estimates published in January 2025 also indicated extensive destruction of agricultural assets, government institutions and religious buildings.[15] A separate year-end 2023 satellite-image analysis identified 350 schools and approximately 170 mosques and churches as damaged or destroyed.[1] These losses accompanied interrupted learning, employment and community activities rather than affecting housing alone.[1][33]
The UN General Assembly’s December 11, 2024 resolution identified displacement, hunger, disease, poverty and destruction of homes, hospitals, refugee camps and facilities used as shelters, as well as lost learning and livelihoods.[33] It passed with 159 countries supporting, nine opposing and eleven abstaining.[33]
Planning for postwar food security identified housing, adequate food and water, energy, health services, mental-health care and preventive care as needs for much of the population.[23] A December 2025 Jerusalem Center analysis argued that Hamas’s diminished administrative capacity did not remove the problem of fragmented armed power: residual Hamas forces, other factions and clan militias complicated any actor’s attempt to establish a monopoly on force.[34]
09Controversies and Assessment Limits
The extent of breakdown and responsibility for aid failures remained disputed, with continuing local administration and renewed policing complicating descriptions of total governmental collapse.[3][27] UN officials emphasized impediments to assistance, while Israeli officials cited security problems, looting and distribution difficulties.[8] Aid organizations alleged that requests for convoy protection were rejected and that Israeli forces sometimes failed to intervene against looting; the IDF denied these allegations and described targeted measures against looters.[20]
Specific incidents also rested on conflicting or preliminary accounts.[35] Following the February 29, 2024 crowding incident around aid trucks in Gaza City, Palestinian sources reported 104 deaths, while the IDF’s initial account attributed most deaths to a stampede and acknowledged firing at some people approaching its forces.[35] Allegations of Hamas attacks on protest activists, including torture and a protester’s death, depended on attributed accounts rather than independently established findings.[30]
Some broader estimates require particular caution: an indirect-mortality estimate cited in July 2024 put combined direct and indirect deaths at 186,000, rather than providing an individually documented death count.[7] Figures describing damage to all twelve higher-education institutions, disruption of nearly 90,000 students’ studies and more than 350 teachers and academics killed relied on Hamas-provided data that could not be independently verified.[14] South Africa’s later dossier supplied contested causal and legal interpretations of food scarcity and damaged social bonds, distinct from the famine classifications it cited.[13]
Sources
- 1U.S. Department of State, Israel, West Bank and Gaza, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 2The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Countering Hamas’s Shadow Governance in Gaza, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 3Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, February 2024 Assessment, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 4The Times of Israel, (Reuters), Aid Amid Destruction, Lawlessness and Red Tape, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 5Globes, India is convinced: Israel is facing a strategic defeat, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 6The Jerusalem Post, Inside Gaza's crisis: Hamas's control crumbles as violence escalates, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 7Encyclopaedia Britannica, Israel-Hamas War, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 8Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief, June 2024, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 9United Nations Digital Library, Global Humanitarian Overview 2025, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 10The Times of Israel, (AP), Gaza Displacement, August 2024, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 11EveryCRSReport, Congressional Research Service, Israel-Hamas Cease-Fire in Gaza, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 12The Times of Israel, (Shomrim), Gaza’s Garbage and Sanitation Crisis, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 13United Nations Digital Library, South Africa’s Public Dossier Transmitted to the Security Council, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 14The Times of Israel, (Reuters), Gaza’s Education System, May 2024, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 15Globes, $80b to rebuild Gaza Strip - but who will rule?, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 16Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Economy of Hamas and How Israel Should Deal with it, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 17The Times of Israel, (Reuters), Clans and Factions Protect Gaza Aid, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 18Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Food supplied to Gaza during seven months of the Hamas-Israel war, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 19The Jerusalem Post, Global UN-backed NGO says Gaza facing high risk of famine, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 20Globes, Weapons worth $20 billion: One of Israel’s fateful moments is approaching, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 21Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Spotlight on the Conflict, May 20–27, 2025, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 22Institute for National Security Studies, Aid Under Fire: Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Assistance to the Gaza Strip, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 23Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Providing food security in Gaza for the “day after”, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 24Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, PA and Hamas Vying for Support of Palestinian Clans, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 25Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Are There Alternatives to Hamas Rule in Gaza?, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 26Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Spotlight on the Conflict, December 10–17, 2024, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 27The Times of Israel, Aid Looting and Shootings, June 2025, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 28Encyclopaedia Britannica, Associated Press, Published by Britannica, October 2025, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 29The Times of Israel, March 2025 Protests Against Hamas, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 30Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Demonstrations in the Gaza Strip Against Hamas, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 31Jewish Virtual Library, U.S. Department of State 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: The Palestinian Authority, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 32Jewish Virtual Library, The Israel-Hamas War: The Humanitarian Crisis in Gaza, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 33Jewish Virtual Library, UNGA Resolution A/ES-10/L.32: Support for the Mandate of UNRWA, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 34Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Gaza After the War: Hamas, Society, and the Problem of What Comes Next, accessed on November 19, 2026.
- 35Globes, Over 100 Palestinians killed in Gaza stampede, accessed on November 19, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What does societal breakdown in Gaza during the Gaza war mean?
Societal breakdown in Gaza during the Gaza war refers to the disruption of public services, livelihoods, social relationships and public order in the Gaza Strip during the conflict that began in October 2023. It involved mass displacement, damage to infrastructure, hunger and insecure aid distribution, alongside weakened government institutions. Conditions varied across places and periods, and some municipal workers and emergency committees continued operating even as disorder and shortages persisted.
How many people were displaced in Gaza during the war?
By the end of 2023, more than 1.9 million people—over 85 percent of Gaza’s population—had been internally displaced. By June 3, 2024, approximately 1.7 million of Gaza’s roughly 2.1 million residents were displaced, mostly in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions. An August 2024 assessment reported that roughly 90 percent of the population had been displaced at least once.
How were hospitals and schools affected in Gaza?
An October 2024 assessment reported that 17 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals remained functioning and that 87 percent of schools had been damaged. Hospitals often operated only partly, and some also sheltered displaced people. Normal classroom education remained unavailable to an estimated 625,000 school-aged children in May 2024, although volunteer-run tent classes and remote instruction offered some learning opportunities.
Why did food aid not always reach people in Gaza?
Food entering Gaza still had to pass through a damaged and insecure distribution system before reaching residents. Aid faced delays at crossings and checkpoints, warehouse damage, looting and crowds around deliveries, while displacement and the destruction of local food production increased dependence on assistance. Reports also described armed gangs stealing aid and distribution sites experiencing overcrowding and violence.
What happened to local government and public order in Gaza?
Local administration did not disappear uniformly: some ministries, security forces and municipalities continued operating partially or nearly fully in early 2024. Municipal workers collected rubbish and repaired infrastructure in some areas, and emergency committees sometimes filled gaps left by weakened local government. Elsewhere, attacks on aid convoys, looting, armed-group violence and ineffective policing contributed to disorder.
How did the war affect social relationships and political dissent in Gaza?
Displacement and the humanitarian crisis disrupted family routines, community activities and traditional clan structures, while disputes over basic supplies sometimes became violent. In March 2025, demonstrations against the war and Hamas rule took place in several locations, with protesters calling for an end to the fighting and some demanding Hamas’s removal. Street demonstrations stopped after March 28, while activity continued mainly online.
What are the estimated recovery and reconstruction needs in Gaza?
A joint World Bank–UN–EU recovery assessment estimated physical damage at $35.2 billion and economic losses at $22.7 billion. It estimated that more than 1.2 million people had lost their homes and placed recovery and reconstruction needs at approximately $71.4 billion. The assessment also identified substantial losses in health, education and social protection.
07/Social Relationships and Political Dissent
Families scattered across shelters sometimes separated their sleeping arrangements, including teenagers sleeping apart from parents and daughters.[6] An August 2024 account described weakened family authority and traditional clan structures, unemployment and reliance on donations, fewer weddings, limited informal classes, rare mass prayers and few mourning tents.[6] Escalating clan conflicts and violent clashes were also reported during the humanitarian crisis in May 2025.[21]
Hundreds demonstrated against both the war and Hamas rule in several locations in March 2025.[29] Protesters in Beit Lahia and Jabalia called for an end to the fighting, with some chanting “Hamas out” and “We want to eat.”[29] A participant described security personnel in civilian clothing breaking up a protest, while some local media presented the gatherings as anti-war events without mentioning demands for Hamas’s removal.[29]
The demonstrations began in Beit Lahia on March 25 and spread over the following two days to Gaza City, Nuseirat, Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis, with individual gatherings ranging from dozens to hundreds.[30] Street demonstrations stopped after March 28, while activity continued mainly online.[30] One protester explained participation through the words, “What invited me was hunger, poverty and death.”[30]
Political expression also operated within restrictions on journalism and activism.[31] Arrests, harassment, interrogation, violence, access and movement restrictions, and pressure toward self-censorship affected journalists and activists under Hamas rule.[31] No legal or independent institutions were described as capable of holding Hamas accountable, alongside reports of unlawful killings, disappearances, abuse and arbitrary detention.[31]