Environmental Impact of the Gaza War

The collapse of sewage, wastewater, and solid-waste management is a central feature of the war’s environmental impact in Gaza.[1] Intensive Israeli bombardment caused extensive destruction of infrastructure, productive assets, and service delivery, while damaged buildings and roads generated enormous quantities of debris.[1] Environmental damage also affected the systems needed to sustain everyday life: drinking-water production, irrigation, waste collection, electricity supply, and food production.[1][3]

The environmental burden consists of both physical destruction and potential contamination.[1] Rubble can contain asbestos, hazardous industrial materials, and unexploded ordnance, while damaged sanitation networks allow wastewater to enter streets, soil, and water bodies.[1] Munitions, fuel spills, and damaged energy infrastructure introduce additional pollution risks that require specialized assessment and remediation.[1]

These wartime effects developed against a pre-existing freshwater crisis, excessive extraction from the Coastal Aquifer, marine pollution, and inadequate waste disposal.[1] The conflict also reversed progress in desalination, wastewater treatment, solar power, and rehabilitation of the Wadi Gaza coastal wetland.[5] Environmental recovery therefore involves both repairing wartime destruction and addressing systems that were already operating under substantial pressure before October 2023.[1]

Before October 2023, only 6% of Gaza’s population had access to safely managed, piped drinking water.[1] Freshwater supplies came from the Coastal Aquifer, three short-term, low-volume desalination plants, water piped by Israel’s Mekorot company, and UNRWA and private sources.[1] Water and wastewater treatment depended on energy supplies, and shortages already forced treatment plants to operate below capacity before the escalation.[1]

Over-extraction and deteriorating groundwater quality were longstanding problems.[1] Nitrate concentrations in the Coastal Aquifer were reported at six times the World Health Organization’s recommended level, alongside high chloride concentrations; groundwater contaminants posed particular risks to children and pregnant women.[1] By 2020, the groundwater level had fallen to more than ten metres below mean sea level, increasing vulnerability to seawater intrusion.[1]

Untreated or partially treated sewage and wastewater discharged from Gaza into the Mediterranean increased from approximately 90,000 cubic metres per day in 2012 to 100,000 in 2016 and 110,000 in 2018.[1] These figures describe the pre-war baseline rather than wartime discharge volumes.[1] Untreated wastewater and informal dumps also contributed to soil contamination.[1] A 2014 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary described over-pumping, saline intrusion, sewage entering seawater and soil, and leaking pipelines, while citing reports of damage to wells and sewage facilities during the separate 2014 war.[6]

Solid-waste management faced substantial capacity problems before the current conflict.[1] Gaza generated about 1,726 tons of solid waste daily, and the northern Johr Edeek landfill held approximately 3.9 million tons and was operating beyond capacity.[1] Fires and accumulated waste were already creating environmental and health concerns.[1] Infectious medical waste was often inadequately separated from ordinary waste, although two treatment facilities established during 2020–2023 processed approximately 1–1.5 tons daily.[1]

There had also been environmental improvements.[7] A German-built wastewater treatment plant in central Gaza began operating in early 2021, with an intended capacity to treat effluent for one million people.[7] It was initially expected to send up to 60,000 cubic metres of treated water daily into Wadi Gaza, with that quantity eventually intended to double.[7] Restoration work removed 35,000 tons of garbage from the wetland, which had previously been polluted by sewage and rubbish.[7]

A Ben-Gurion University study published in May 2024 described acute water and electricity shortages, reporting baseline water availability below 100 litres per person daily.[8] Its electricity figures were 137–189 MW per day against estimated peak demand of 390 MW per day.[8] These figures described the study’s baseline conditions rather than measurements of damage caused by the war.[8]

Water and sanitation indicators show the scale of service disruption during the conflict.[9] By June 2024, approximately 67% of water and sanitation facilities and infrastructure were estimated to have been destroyed or damaged over the preceding eight months.[9] Municipal water production stood at 28% of its pre-October 2023 level, while large-scale damage produced an estimated 50% loss in the distribution network.[9] Insecurity, constrained access, and fuel shortages also left some facilities non-operational.[9] A separate 2024 estimate placed overall water-production capacity at 20% of the pre-war level.[3]

By the June 2024 environmental assessment, Gaza’s five wastewater treatment plants had shut down, and water, sanitation, and hygiene systems were almost entirely defunct.[5] A later infrastructure overview described water systems as nearly shut down following extensive damage to desalination facilities and critical wells.[10] Residents depended on water trucks and external deliveries for drinking water, and more than 60% of the sewage system was reported damaged.[10] Damage to water sources, together with electricity and fuel constraints, heightened the risk of waterborne disease.[3]

Gaza water officials subsequently described water-engineering facilities as almost completely collapsed, with water and sewage channels mixing and sewage leakage contaminating the aquifer.[11] Local warnings identified eight Gaza City pumping stations as fully or partly disabled and linked damaged drainage to the possibility of serious flooding.[11] These accounts described operational conditions reported by local officials rather than a program of environmental sampling.[11]

Early public-health indicators illustrated the consequences of deteriorating environmental services.[1] In the three months following the escalation, recorded illnesses included 179,000 acute respiratory infections, 136,400 diarrhoea cases among children under five, 55,400 cases of scabies and lice, and 4,600 cases of jaundice.[1] The reported diarrhoea count was 25 times the pre-escalation figure.[1] In July 2024, poliovirus was detected in sewage samples from Khan Yunis and Deir al-Balah; an unvaccinated baby subsequently contracted the virus in what was reported as Gaza’s first such case in 25 years.[12]

The breakdown of waste collection created a further sanitation burden.[2] In June 2024, an aid worker estimated that approximately 100,000 tonnes of waste were accumulating near displaced people’s tents in central Gaza as temperatures rose, while temporary dumps appeared because main landfill sites could not be emptied.[13] Gaza Municipality later reported more than 260,000 tons of accumulated waste in streets and dumpsites in the city center.[11] Municipal officials identified destroyed dumpsites, blocked access to the main dump, and equipment and fuel shortages as obstacles to collection.[11] In Khan Yunis, the mayor reported that collection had stopped and about 350,000 tons had accumulated at temporary sites near homes and shelters.[11]

By January 2026, reporting described garbage near shelters, sewage leaking into streets and camps, and untreated wastewater contaminating the sea and groundwater.[2] Approximately 90% of waste-collection systems were reported to have collapsed.[2] With few disposal options, residents burned rubbish, producing smoke and dust; burning solid materials for cooking added another source of air pollution.[2] Residents reported breathing difficulties, while generator use was identified as an additional source of carbon dioxide emissions.[2]

Agricultural damage was visible early in the war.[9] The share of agricultural land assessed as damaged increased from approximately 13% in November 2023 to 57% in May 2024, with extensive destruction of orchards, greenhouses, and farmland.[9] Satellite analysis covering May 2017 through May 2024 identified significant deterioration in the health and density of 57% of permanent crop fields and arable land.[14] The identified mechanisms included razing, heavy-vehicle movement, bombing, and shelling.[14] Gaza’s agricultural area was estimated at 151 square kilometres, approximately 41% of the territory.[14]

Damage to fields was compounded by inadequate fuel for irrigation.[10] Electricity disruption also affected refrigeration, irrigation, and crop-incubation equipment, while early reports identified damage to bakeries, grain mills, agricultural land, and water and sanitation facilities from Israeli airstrikes.[15] Fishing production largely stopped because of damaged boats, fuel shortages, and restrictions on security and safe access.[9] The food system and agricultural value chains collapsed or survived only marginally through informal markets, increasing dependence on humanitarian assistance.[9]

Later agricultural estimates indicated further deterioration.[16] Satellite-image analysis estimated that by 10 August 2025, 82.4% of annual crops and more than 97% of tree crops were likely to have suffered damage.[16] A South African dossier submitted to the UN Security Council cited a joint humanitarian report dated 22 August 2025 for an estimate that approximately 98% of cropland was damaged or inaccessible.[17] Separately, estimates attributed to Hamas sources described about 4,000 dunams of vegetables under cultivation out of approximately 93,000 dunams, with 94% of agricultural land described as ruined.[11] Those sources put agricultural production at approximately 28,000 tons, compared with about 405,000 tons previously.[11]

Debris management became one of the largest environmental recovery tasks.[1] The 2024 preliminary estimate exceeded 39 million tons of debris from buildings, roads, and other infrastructure.[1] This amounted to more than 107 kilograms per square metre of Gaza and over five times the debris generated during the 2017 battle for Mosul.[5] Some rubble contained unexploded ordnance, asbestos, other hazardous substances, and human remains.[1]

By October 2025, a later estimate placed debris at 61.5 million tonnes.[18] Nearly two-thirds had been generated in the first five months of war, while an additional eight million tonnes accumulated from April through July 2025, mostly in southern Gaza.[18] A preliminary analysis estimated that at least 4.9 million tonnes could be contaminated with asbestos from older buildings and at least 2.9 million tonnes could contain hazardous waste from known industrial sites.[18] January 2026 reporting separately cited approximately 60 million tons of debris and around four million tons of rubble said to contain hazardous materials, heavy metals, burnt plastic, and chemical waste.[2]

Explosive remnants complicate clearance and the reuse of land.[19] One calculation, based on reported Israeli munitions use and an assumed failure rate of 10–15%, estimated that 6,000–9,000 unexploded Israeli ordnance items could remain, potentially an undercount.[19] The clearance task was difficult to quantify because full munitions quantities and locations had not been disclosed.[19] Explosive hazards could obstruct civilian returns, aid delivery, farming, and commerce; an estimate placed clearance at as long as fourteen years.[19]

Other proposed or implemented military measures raised environmental concerns.[20] Tunnel flooding began at the end of 2023 using pumps drawing Mediterranean water and water from Israel, although the effectiveness of the pumps was unclear.[20] Identified risks included aquifer contamination, soil saturation, and building instability.[20] Tunnel destruction and flooding also prompted concern about land instability and contamination of soil and water.[1] More broadly, mixed debris containing concrete, tires, plastics, organic waste, ammunition, and explosives was identified as a potential groundwater hazard, while damaged sewage systems could expose agriculture and marine life to bacterial and fungal pollution.[21]

Energy infrastructure added another potential contamination pathway.[5] Gaza had an estimated 12,400 rooftop solar systems in 2023, but a large proportion of this infrastructure was subsequently destroyed.[5] Broken panels could release lead and other heavy-metal contaminants into soil.[5] The damage also reversed earlier progress in solar power deployment.[5]

Climate studies attempted to quantify emissions from military activity and reconstruction.[22] Reports on an early study estimated approximately 281,000 metric tons of carbon emissions from 7 October to 4 December 2023.[22][23] One account attributed 99% to Israeli aerial and ground operations, while another reported that almost half of the total came from US cargo flights carrying military supplies; rockets fired from Gaza were estimated at about 713 tons.[22][23] The estimate included aircraft, vehicles, and estimated munitions use. A reconstruction scenario involving 100,000 destroyed buildings produced an estimate of 30 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.[22]

A study covering the first fifteen months estimated that destruction, rubble removal, and rebuilding could produce more than 31 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent.[24] Approximately 29.4 million tonnes were assigned to rubble transport and reconstruction of homes, public buildings, government offices, and roads.[24] That reconstruction estimate was revised downward after correction of assumed average apartment-building sizes.[24] Reported allocations also included roughly half of emissions for Israeli weapons, tanks, and ammunition; nearly 30% for US military-supply shipments; and more than 40% for an estimated 70,000 aid trucks allowed into Gaza.[24] A separate estimate of 557,359 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent concerned construction of Hamas’s tunnel network and Israel’s Iron Wall barrier.[24]

Environmental recovery is closely connected to restoring drinking water, sanitation, food production, and safe access to land.[1] Damaged wastewater treatment, broken pipes, and the use of cesspits increased aquifer pollution, while damage to farmland and vegetation impaired large-scale food production.[25] Later reporting described freshwater as extremely limited and polluted and cited a 384-fold increase in acute hepatitis cases.[25] Recovery from the environmental effects was estimated to require decades.[25]

Rubble-clearance projections illustrate the duration and complexity of recovery.[2] January 2026 reporting cited about 60 million tons of debris and said the United Nations Development Programme estimated that removing most of it would take seven years under the right conditions.[2] A September 2024 estimate put treatment of all rubble at as long as twenty years and $909 million.[25] In January 2025, US envoy Steven Witkoff estimated five years for debris clearance alone and ten to fifteen years for rebuilding.[26]

Other reconstruction accounts used differing totals: an Arab leaders’ plan endorsed on 4 March 2025 envisaged clearing more than 50 million tons, while separate estimates cited 68 million tons and more than 70 million tons of rubble and unexploded ordnance.[26] A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary cited figures of 69% of buildings damaged or destroyed, including 92% of housing units, and estimated rubble removal at twenty-one years and more than $1 billion.[27] Other later reporting placed building damage or destruction at approximately 78% of 250,000 buildings, or around 80% totally destroyed or badly damaged.[25][2]

The Mediterranean creates potential pathways for environmental effects to extend into Israel.[4] During heavy rainfall, sewage was reportedly pumped into the sea using diesel as an emergency measure, and northward currents were identified as a means by which pollution could reach Israeli waters.[4] Sewage had previously caused closure of the Ashkelon desalination plant, demonstrating the sensitivity of coastal infrastructure to marine contamination.[4] Israeli security officials also warned that sewage discharge could lead to closures of Zikim and Ashkelon beaches.[12]

An Ashkelon power-station manager reported that bags, plastics, and other marine debris arriving from Gaza’s direction clogged seawater intakes and sometimes delayed operations.[28] He also linked incoming waste to beach pollution, changes in the marine environment, and dead sea turtles found at the site.[28] These observations formed part of the reported regional concern about marine waste and coastal infrastructure.[28]

Wartime activity also affected nature in Israel.[29] Heavy military vehicles operating in open areas and nature reserves were associated with habitat fragmentation and potential harm to wildlife and plant populations.[29] After border fences were destroyed, dogs entered Israel from Gaza; they were identified as predators and disease carriers capable of competing with local wildlife.[29] Wildlife poisoning deaths were also reported, including animals consuming poisoned bait or prey, although not all incidents were specifically attributed to the Gaza war.[29]

Recovery recommendations emphasized integrating environmental analysis into humanitarian response and early reconstruction.[1] Priorities included restoring sewage, wastewater, and solid-waste services; identifying and removing contamination from munitions, chemicals, and fuel spills; and incorporating environmental issues into multilateral damage-and-needs assessment.[1] Safe debris handling and recycling where possible were recommended to limit further pollution of land and watercourses and avoid unnecessary depletion of natural resources.[1]

Israeli academic research also examined longer-term infrastructure options.[8] The Ben-Gurion University water-energy study proposed expanded wastewater treatment capable of producing more than 150 million cubic metres annually of treated effluent for agricultural reuse, alongside other water and energy measures.[8] Field-based investigation by qualified specialists was identified as essential for selecting appropriate remediation measures once conditions permitted access.[1]

The characterization of environmental destruction as “ecocide” has been advanced by some scholars and activists, including claims that damage to desalination, wastewater infrastructure, and agricultural land reflected deliberate destruction of the environment as a strategy of war.[3] That characterization is not an established finding in the material summarized here.[3]

The 2024 preliminary environmental assessment was prepared during continuing fighting without field-based assessment work.[1] It drew on remote sensing, scientific literature, multilateral assessments, technical information, and, in some cases, unverified media reports, including reports about munitions.[1] Chemical and heavy-metal contamination of soil and the Coastal Aquifer could not be fully established without sampling and analysis.[1] Municipal and Hamas-source estimates, physical-damage indicators, and projections of future harm therefore should not be read as equivalent to measured contamination levels.[1][11]

Some specific causal claims remain unresolved.[30] In September 2026, scientists had neither identified the precise Synechococcus species involved in a bloom disrupting Israeli desalination plants nor established its cause.[30] One researcher proposed sewage from southern Gaza as a possible nutrient source, while another considered it relatively unlikely to be the principal driver; disruption at a Sinai facility further complicated a Gaza-specific explanation.[30] Similarly, the reported tunnel-flooding concerns did not establish measured aquifer contamination, and the sewage poliovirus finding did not establish a particular wartime environmental cause.[20][12]

Emissions and cleanup estimates also depend on assumptions and scope.[22] The early carbon study was not peer-reviewed at the time of reporting, excluded methane and several unquantified sources, and was described as a substantial underestimate.[22] Reports on its approximately 281,000-ton estimate also used differing attribution language for Israeli operations and US supply flights.[22][23] Later reported emissions allocations used accounting categories that should not be combined as a single, mutually exclusive percentage breakdown.[24] Rubble estimates likewise concern different dates and potentially different measurement scopes rather than a single reconciled inventory.[26]