Renewable Energy in Israel

Solar power accounts for approximately 92% of Israel’s installed renewable-energy capacity, making it the dominant technology in the country’s renewable electricity system.[1] A November 2025 capacity breakdown recorded 7,118 megawatts (MW) of photovoltaic generation, 242 MW of solar thermal generation, 53 MW of wind power, and 343 MW in other categories, including biogas, wave energy, hydropower, and landfill-related generation.[1] The reported total was 7,756 MW, rising to approximately 8 gigawatts (GW) by the end of 2025.[1]

Renewable electricity and solar water heating represent distinct components of the energy system.[3] In 2022, solar water heating supplied 428,500 tonnes of oil equivalent of energy, accounting for 37% of total renewable-energy production under the government’s accounting.[3] Electricity-generation percentages therefore do not describe the whole contribution of renewable energy, particularly the long-standing use of sunlight to heat household water.[3]

The expansion of renewable electricity has taken place within a system still heavily dependent on fossil fuels: natural gas supplied 68% of electricity generation in 2022 and coal supplied 22%.[3] Renewable sources supplied 9.8% of generation that year, while the separately calculated renewable share of electricity consumption was 10.4%.[3] By 2024, preliminary figures placed actual renewable electricity consumption at 14.7%, compared with an estimated potential share of 16.2% based on installed capacity.[4]

The distinction between installed capacity, annual generation, actual consumption, and potential consumption is important to interpreting these figures.[4] Actual consumption measures renewable electricity consumed during the year, whereas potential consumption estimates the annual output that installed facilities could supply.[4] Behind-the-meter generation and self-consumed rooftop electricity complicate measurement, and some output must be estimated rather than directly metered.[4]

Geography is central to development: major demand centers lie in central Israel, while approximately 75% of solar capacity is in the south and north—50% and 25%, respectively.[1] About 85% of ground-mounted capacity is in the south.[1] This separation between production and consumption makes transmission capacity a major constraint, while dense settlement and competing land uses encourage solar installations on buildings and other occupied spaces.[1]

Solar water heating had reached mass use in Israel before large-scale solar electricity became a major policy objective.[5] A contemporary report in 1976, following approximately two decades of research, estimated that 20% of the population heated household water with solar energy.[5] It described rooftop collectors made from glass plates with a nickel-based coating, connected to a water tank, and estimated that fuel savings could recover the initial investment within two and a half years.[5]

By June 1981, a contemporary account reported 460,000 solar water heaters serving more than one-third of homes and saving approximately 120,000 tons of oil annually.[6] Widespread adoption was reinforced by a 1980 regulation requiring solar water heaters on new residential buildings up to nine floors.[2] The legal framework included exceptions for high-rise buildings and buildings or portions used for industry, vocational purposes, or hospitals, as well as specified exemptions involving shading or unreasonable architectural harm.[7] Requirements also addressed collectors’ appearance and backup heating.[7]

Early electricity experiments included a solar pond at Bin Boqeq on the Dead Sea shore, which began operating in 1980 and produced 150 kilowatts (kW); a larger pond was then planned.[6] Another demonstration at Beit Ha’aravah used a salinity gradient to trap solar heat in a pond’s lower layers.[8] That project occupied 250,000 square meters and used a low-temperature turbine developed by Ormat with a 5 MW rating.[8] Its estimated average electrical output was approximately 570 kW, but thermal storage permitted generation during periods of peak demand; thermodynamic efficiency was approximately 1% at best.[8]

Industrial solar heat was demonstrated by Luz Corporation at a potato-chip factory in Sha’ar Ha’negev.[8] Sun-tracking parabolic trough mirrors heated oil in a tube to more than 200°C, providing steam for the factory.[8] Luz subsequently used related collectors in California power plants, but went bankrupt before completing negotiations for a similar Israeli plant.[8]

Research infrastructure developed alongside these applications.[8] A solar-technology test center was established at Sde Boker in 1985, and in 1991 the government assigned Ben-Gurion University responsibility for converting it into a solar research facility.[8] Work there included photovoltaics, solar radiation, solar-thermal power, and photovoltaic systems feeding electricity into the grid.[8] A Negev solar-radiation survey, established in the 1980s with the university and Meteorological Service, collected measurements at approximately ten sites to help identify future power-station locations.[8]

A 2002 government decision encouraged electricity providers to build and operate renewable installations, setting goals of up to 2% of customer electricity supply by 2007 and up to 5% beginning in 2016.[7] The earlier goal was not achieved: renewables accounted for only 0.09% of electricity produced in 2007.[7] Renewable technologies nevertheless extended beyond solar, with a 2010 inventory identifying wind generation in the Golan Heights, hydropower at several northern locations, energy-from-trash operations at three locations, and proportionally limited biogas production.[7] Among 334 environmental-technology companies active in 2008, 105 focused on renewable energy.[7]

Renewable electricity grew from approximately zero in 2010 to more than 4% in 2019.[2] The 2019 policy framework specified at least 17% renewable electricity generation by 2030, with interim goals of at least 10% by 2020 and 13% by 2025, and provision for reviewing the 2030 target in 2022.[2] A separate solar-specific target announced in October 2016 called for solar power to supply 10% of electricity by 2020.[8]

In June 2020, a new plan proposed increasing renewable electricity to 30% by 2030 from approximately 5% at the time.[9] Solar was expected to provide 90% of renewable electricity, with wind, water, and biomass supplying the remainder.[9] Government Resolution 465, adopted on October 25, 2020, established a 30% renewable-electricity target for 2030 and a 20% interim target for 2025.[3][10]

The 2020 plan envisioned solar-system capacity rising from 2,248 MW to 15,773 MW and storage power capacity increasing from 300 MW to 3,000 MW.[9] Solar output was expected to reach 80% of afternoon electricity consumption and sometimes exceed consumption, with surplus power stored in batteries.[9] Estimated investment totaled NIS 80 billion across generation, storage, grid development, and related requirements.[9] An associated land estimate was 140,000 dunams, including 84,000 dunams of open land and additional space on rooftops, reservoirs, fish farms, and road interchanges.[9]

A May 2022 implementation program contained approximately 50 measures, including incentives for solar systems near demand centers, enabling local authorities to supply electricity, requiring large consumers to install solar systems, accelerating transmission construction, and piloting independent energy compounds.[11] At the end of 2021, renewable capacity was approximately 3,600 MW and supplied about 8.1% of electricity demand.[11] The program’s assessment envisaged 80% of solar potential coming from dual-use installations and 20% from open land, reflecting a 20,000-dunam limit imposed by planning institutions.[11]

Official generation figures subsequently recorded renewable shares of 4.7% in 2019, 5.9% in 2020, 7.7% in 2021, and 9.8% in 2022.[3] During 2024, 911 MW of renewable capacity was connected, bringing year-end installed capacity to 6,813 MW, or 27.2% of total electricity capacity.[4] Annual installed-capacity growth nevertheless slowed to 15%.[4] Renewable electricity consumption rose from 3,372 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2019 to 10,908 GWh in 2024, while total consumption increased from 67,158 GWh to 74,369 GWh.[4]

A later report recorded a record 1.3 GW of renewable additions during 2025, surpassing the previous 1.1 GW record in 2022, and put renewables at 16.7% of electricity consumed in 2025.[12] The government’s 2026 strategic plan confirmed that the 20% interim target had been missed and projected that, under business as usual, the 30% goal could be reached approximately two years late.[1] In the first nine months of 2026, 612 MW of solar installations were connected, with a contemporary estimate of no more than 850 MW for the full year.[13]

A typical domestic solar water-heating unit combines a 150-liter insulated tank with a two-square-meter flat collector.[8] Its annual average efficiency is approximately 50%, with estimated electricity savings of 2,000 kilowatt-hours per year.[8] On an average day, it can raise the temperature of a tank of water by about 30°C, to approximately 50°C.[8] This direct use of solar heat remains a substantial application alongside electricity production.[3]

Passive solar architecture uses winter sunshine for heating while limiting unwanted summer heat.[8] Insulation, thermal mass, suitably sized south-facing windows, and exterior blinds are central elements.[8] Israel’s first passive solar house, built with sun-dried adobe bricks on Ben-Gurion University’s Sde Boker campus, was completed in the late 1970s, after which the principles became widely adopted by architects.[8]

Electricity installations range from consumer-adjacent systems to large remote facilities.[10] Rooftops, parking canopies, and building-integrated photovoltaics can generate power close to where it is used, reducing reliance on national transmission infrastructure.[10] Ground-mounted arrays, agrivoltaics, reservoir installations, and peripheral rooftop systems provide additional production but require sufficient grid capacity to reach demand centers.[10]

Dual use is a major planning approach because land also serves housing, agriculture, infrastructure, and security needs.[1] Potential locations include rooftops, parking areas, water infrastructure, greenhouses, fences, highway interchanges, and other disturbed or already-used spaces.[1] The 2035 strategy nevertheless concludes that dual use alone cannot provide the required capacity and that large, planned ground-mounted facilities are also necessary.[1]

The Negev contains approximately 85% of land planned or considered to have planning potential for solar development, while central Israel has negligible land reserves for solar generation.[14] Operating facilities include the Ashalim solar-thermal complex.[14] Its historical development included a NIS 4 billion funding agreement approved in July 2015 for a project involving BrightSource Energy, General Electric, and NOY Infrastructure & Energy Investment Fund.[8] The tower design specified a height of 820 feet and approximately 50,000 surrounding heliostat mirrors.[8]

Proposed or planned southern developments include expansion at Ashalim and Tze’elim, Dimona South, Timna, and additional Arava sites.[14] Projects listed in one Negev assessment covered approximately 20,000 dunams, while the Oron–Zin field was undergoing statutory planning with a potential area of up to 110,000 dunams.[14] Their development depends on transmission, statutory planning, environmental considerations, and infrastructure costs.[14]

The proposed 2035 strategy prepares for approximately 26 GW of renewable capacity, compared with about 8 GW installed and 4 GW under construction at the end of 2025.[1] It identifies approximately 14 GW of further development: 5 GW of agrivoltaics, 4.5 GW of ground-mounted facilities, 4 GW of dual-use installations, and 0.5 GW from other technologies.[1] Agrivoltaics combines agricultural activity with solar generation and requires research, planning frameworks, financial and contractual arrangements, and oversight to ensure farming continues.[1] The plan recognizes uncertainty over how much agrivoltaic capacity can be delivered during the decade.[1]

Grid expansion is the main bottleneck identified in the strategy, especially in the north and south.[1] The ministry records approval in 2023 of an approximately NIS 17 billion transmission and substation plan and a separate approximately NIS 22 billion Israel Electric Corporation distribution-grid plan.[1] The government’s transparency report describes approximately NIS 20 billion in transmission development intended to accommodate 30% renewable electricity by 2030.[3] An additional assessment described a NIS 22 billion delivery-system plan, with approximately NIS 12 billion allocated to renewable connections, and reported that only about one-third of monitored projects were expected to finish on schedule.[10]

Storage shifts solar electricity from sunny midday periods to evening demand and can relieve congestion.[15] One kibbutz project diverted surplus solar electricity into storage after reaching its production limit, then sold it later, enabling an additional 2.5 MW of production to be sold during peak hours.[15] Rooftop solar combined with storage can keep generation, storage, and consumption at the same location and provide buildings with electricity for at least several daytime and evening hours.[16] A 2024 assessment anticipated approximately 2.6 GW of storage by the decade’s end, while the later ministry strategy recorded an Electricity Authority expectation of more than 9 GW by 2030.[16][1]

Market rules also support deployment.[3] From January 2024, consumers could purchase renewable electricity through bilateral agreements.[3] Updated feed-in tariffs covered small dual-use photovoltaic installations up to 630 kW and solar systems incorporating storage.[3] Photovoltaic requirements for certain new buildings were still in the final approval stages when the transparency report was prepared.[3] Earlier proposals included requiring buildings with roofs exceeding 750 square meters to install solar systems on at least half the roof, government guarantees for public-body installations, and more flexible apartment-building consent rules.[9]

Smaller applications include photovoltaic panels charging batteries for low-energy lamps at rural bus stops.[8] Sologic’s solar-canopy “etree,” unveiled in October 2014 and first installed at HaNadiv Gardens, combined shade and electricity; proposed features for versions included seating, Wi-Fi, drinking water, and device charging.[8]

Israel’s lack of electricity-grid connections to neighboring countries makes storage and reliable domestic balancing particularly important.[2] Solar generation alone cannot provide stable energy throughout the day, while decentralized production must be integrated without undermining reliability.[2] Most renewable facilities have been described as small, decentralized installations connected to distribution networks, but peripheral production still depends on transmission to serve central demand.[16] Grid flexibility, digital monitoring, coordinated storage development, and faster connections are therefore central elements of the 2035 strategy.[1]

Renewable development also serves objectives of reducing fuel imports and air pollution.[7] The broader policy transition has combined renewables with increased natural gas use and reduced coal and petroleum-distillate consumption.[2] Between 2010 and 2017, coal’s share of electricity fuel fell from 58.6% to 32.4%, while natural gas rose from 39% to 63.6%.[2] The 2016 national emissions-reduction and efficiency program included removing planning, economic, regulatory, and bureaucratic barriers to renewable uptake.[2] Broader financing measures included NIS 500 million in government guarantees over ten years for efficiency and emissions-reduction loans and NIS 300 million in efficiency grants, emphasizing lower-income local authorities and small and medium-sized businesses.[2]

Climate policy provides an additional framework.[17] National goals announced in July 2021 called for emissions reductions of at least 85% from 2015 levels by 2050 and 27% by 2030.[17] A separate electricity-sector goal sought a 30% reduction in carbon emissions by 2030 from the 2015 level of 37.6 million tons.[17] These emissions targets are distinct from renewable-generation percentages.[17] The October 24, 2021 climate plan included 100 implementation actions, infrastructure acceleration focused on removing renewable-energy obstacles, and an interministerial renewable-energy forum.[17]

Israeli research has addressed both materials and large solar systems.[8] Work described in a solar-sector overview included single-crystal cells at Jerusalem College of Technology, amorphous-silicon thin layers at Tel Aviv University, and thin-film materials at Ben-Gurion University, the Technion, and the Weizmann Institute.[8] Solar-thermal research at Ben-Gurion University included a proposed 400-square-meter dish capable of concentrating sunlight up to 10,000 times.[8] The Weizmann Institute’s central-receiver system used 64 heliostat mirrors, each approximately 50 square meters, to direct sunlight toward a receiver on a roughly 50-meter tower.[8] International research cooperation included the July 2018 launch of a $16 million U.S.–Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering, and Water Technology.[18]

Academic assessments illustrate both potential and limitations.[19] A 2022 GIS-based study estimated that 2.93 GW of ground-mounted photovoltaics, producing 5.16 terawatt-hours, could theoretically connect to the existing grid without system changes.[19] This represented approximately 15% of installed capacity and 7% of energy generation in the study’s comparison.[19] Its conclusion was that ground-mounted photovoltaics alone could not meet the 2030 target without other renewable sources and major changes.[19]

A separate 2022 modeling presentation explored combinations of solar, wind, wave energy, waste-derived biomass, and storage.[20] One scenario produced 47.3% renewable electricity in 2030 with 60 GWh of storage; another reached 80.1% in 2050 with 216 GWh.[20] These were modeled possibilities rather than adopted targets, excluded economics, and required further refinement of wind and wave data, crop responses to shade, and environmental effects.[20]

Social organization can influence deployment.[21] Research on five Southern Arava kibbutz communities and local developers found strong acceptance during a solar-development boom beginning in 2011.[21] Co-ownership of solar assets, transparent communication, and kibbutz decision-making structures contributed to support.[21] A 2024 study explored solar and utility-scale batteries as an alternative for ultra-Orthodox communities using diesel generators to avoid electricity associated with Sabbath work.[22] Its estimate for serving 1.28 million people required storage equivalent to 18–24 times a 450-megawatt-hour battery used as its benchmark and projected annual emissions reductions of 188–474 kilotons.[22]

Regional cooperation offers another potential application.[23] A 2021 proposal envisaged Israel obtaining solar electricity from Jordan in exchange for desalinated water, with Jordan’s lower land and labor costs potentially reducing generation costs.[23] This was a proposed arrangement rather than an established electricity supply.[23] During Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week 2021, Masdar and EDF Renewables Israel signed a memorandum to explore renewable opportunities and possible cooperation on existing and future projects.[24]

The 2035 strategy requires a faster deployment rate than recent experience.[1] Annual installations had averaged approximately 1 GW, while its 35%–40% renewable scenarios required approximately 1.4–1.8 GW annually, described as an increase of 1.5 to two times.[1] Those scenarios implied approximately 22 GW and 26 GW of installed capacity, respectively.[1] The strategy prepared for 26 GW partly to accommodate demand uncertainty, without establishing a binding national renewable-generation percentage for 2035.[1]

The appropriate balance between renewables, storage, and gas-fired generation has produced substantive policy disagreement.[25] In 2022, the Environmental Protection Ministry proposed 40% renewable electricity by 2030 rather than the government’s 30%, estimating a need for 18–23 GW of solar panels and 5.5 GW of storage.[25] Its roadmap called for changes to grid priorities and competition rules, amid disagreement with the energy ministry over security of supply and the role of gas.[25]

The likelihood of meeting the 2030 target has also been disputed.[26] In October 2025, Energy Minister Eli Cohen said Israel was on track, while the ministry’s subsequent strategic plan projected a roughly two-year delay under business as usual.[26][1] Grid constraints, lengthy approvals, regulatory complexity, and insufficient coordination remain documented barriers.[1] During the first nine months of 2026, an industry representative reported negative responses to 54% of requested connection capacity because of grid limits; the Electricity Authority attributed delays mainly to war-related deadline extensions, particularly for high-voltage and agrivoltaic projects.[13]

Large solar fields and transmission infrastructure raise environmental, landscape, and competing land-use concerns in the Negev.[14] Competition within the photovoltaic market is another issue: a 2024 study of three tenders found falling production costs alongside a 50% decline in the number of winning firms, with awards concentrating among larger companies.[27] Simulations projected increasing concentration and market power, raising concerns about long-term dominance.[27]

International procurement also involves strategic considerations.[28] Caution about Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors, partly reflecting American pressure, has limited China’s solar role largely to supplying panels and inverters rather than major construction, operation, or local manufacturing.[28] Research boundaries require separate care: the 2022 renewable-pathway model restricted generation to the Green Line while including demand in the Green Line and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[20] That boundary was a specific modeling choice rather than a general definition of the national renewable-energy system.[20]