Nuclear Power in Israel

Israel’s nuclear-electricity proposals concern a possible addition to an electricity system dominated by natural gas, not the conversion of an existing commercial nuclear fleet.[1][3] The country’s nuclear research centers at Soreq and near Dimona are distinct from electricity-generating power stations, both in their functions and in the scale of their reactors.[6] Professional discussion has included a first commercial station in the Negev and possible small modular reactors serving industrial and high-technology demand.[1]

The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure’s roadmap to 2050 treats nuclear power as an option under early evaluation.[4] It calls for preliminary inter-ministerial feasibility studies and identifies technological, regulatory, and policy questions that would have to be addressed before a power reactor could be established.[4] Its nuclear scenarios are planning exercises rather than decisions to construct plants.[4]

The electricity system provides an important context for these proposals: in 2022, natural gas supplied nearly 70% of generation, coal about 20%, and renewables about 10%, primarily from solar energy.[4] A 2026 account placed natural gas at approximately 72% and described a preceding decade in which gas generation increased while coal and diesel declined.[3] Government Resolution 465, adopted in October 2020, set a target of 30% renewable electricity by 2030, with solar expected to supply most renewable generation.[3]

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion established the Israel Atomic Energy Commission on June 13, 1952.[7] The commission advises the government on nuclear policy and research priorities, implements government policy, and represents Israel in international nuclear organizations; its director general reports directly to the prime minister.[7] Its activities began at a research institute near Rehovot, before the development of the Soreq and Negev research centers.[7]

In 1957, an Israeli committee considered two large reactors for industrial electricity production but rejected them because of their expense.[8] It selected a research reactor instead, intending to give scientific and technical personnel experience with problems associated with power reactors and to prepare for possible future nuclear generation.[8] Natural uranium was chosen partly because Israel hoped to produce as much of its fuel as possible from domestic potash resources; ground was broken for the plant in 1959.[8]

The Soreq Nuclear Research Center was founded in 1958, and its research reactor began operating in 1960.[7] The Nuclear Research Center Negev was established at the end of 1959, with the site chosen as part of a policy to develop the region.[7] The Dimona complex developed through Israeli-French cooperation, with Norway supplying heavy water, and included research-reactor and nuclear-waste-disposal activities rather than a commercial generating station.[9]

A January 1961 diplomatic summary recorded Israeli expectations that a power reactor might follow in perhaps ten years, or possibly fifteen years or more.[10] It presented Dimona as a research tool intended to provide experience, rather than as a reactor intended to generate electricity.[10] The planned complex extended beyond the reactor itself to hot and cold laboratories, waste-disposal facilities, a facility for rods, offices, library services, and a medical unit.[10]

In July 1964, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson announced that a three-person team from the Department of the Interior and the Atomic Energy Commission would begin discussions with Israeli representatives in Tel Aviv about desalination.[11] Following Johnson’s June meeting with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, the team was to investigate the technical and economic feasibility of a combined nuclear-power and seawater-desalination plant in Israel.[11] The announcement concerned a feasibility investigation, not authorization to construct a plant.[11]

The initiative reflected expectations that nuclear installations might supply both electricity and fresh water.[11] A U.S. study cited in the announcement suggested that large combined plants could produce these outputs at competitive costs by about 1975 in some water-short coastal areas.[11] By February 1965, anticipated acquisition of a power-and-desalination plant had increased Israeli interest in importing slightly enriched-uranium reactors and reduced interest in developing natural-uranium reactors domestically, although the direction of atomic-energy development remained uncertain.[12]

A proposal circulated in 1967 envisioned three large nuclear plants: two on Israel’s Mediterranean coast and a third near the northern Gulf of Aqaba, in either Jordan or Israel.[13] It envisaged raising an initial $200 million and assigning the International Atomic Energy Agency responsibility for plant operations and nuclear-material accounting.[13] The first plant was to produce the equivalent of approximately 450 million gallons of fresh water daily.[13] These provisions remained a proposal rather than evidence of a completed installation.[13]

Nuclear electricity was considered again in the 1970s, but the proposed Negev station did not advance into an operating plant.[14] Retrospective reporting describes international pressure as a reason for the proposal’s rejection.[14] A separate account linked cancellation of a prospective U.S.-Westinghouse arrangement to India’s 1974 nuclear test and the subsequent creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[15] Later reporting also described earlier plans being shelved after nuclear accidents elsewhere.[16]

In 2007, Infrastructure Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer said he intended to bring the possibility of a nuclear station before the cabinet amid concern about electricity supplies.[14] The proposed station had a capacity of 1,200 megawatts, estimated at 8–10% of future electricity needs.[14] Contemporary estimates put construction time at at least eight years, meaning the project would not resolve the immediate shortage.[14]

In 2009, Israeli officials sought U.S. assistance for a civilian nuclear plant in the southern Negev, with no response from Washington yet reported.[16] The proposal envisaged international monitoring of the civilian reactor without extending monitoring to Israel’s other nuclear capabilities.[16] A government report prepared for the Infrastructure Ministry had judged a nuclear plant suitable for Israel’s needs, and land in the south had already been reserved for such a purpose.[16]

Israel announced plans in March 2010 for a third, civilian reactor to produce electricity and expressed willingness to subject it to nuclear safeguards.[17] That year, the Israel Electric Corporation and the Israel Atomic Energy Commission signed an agreement to develop engineering and technical infrastructure for a possible future plant.[18] No plant was then in the works: the agreement aimed to preserve accumulated knowledge and pass it to a new generation, including through a proposed undergraduate program for electrical engineers specializing in nuclear power.[18] The limited number of engineers with atomic backgrounds was an identified concern.[18]

In 2011, the Ministry of National Infrastructures commissioned an external feasibility study while reconsidering a Shivta station.[19] The proposed Israel Electric Corporation project would produce 1,200 megawatts, roughly 10% of the corporation’s then-current generating capacity.[19] The study also examined designating an area as “ex-territorial,” but did not establish that the plant had been approved.[19] In 2012, Israel remained classified among countries without nuclear power plants that had nevertheless proposed power reactors.[20]

By 2017, the Shivta site was statutorily reserved, the electricity corporation retained relevant professional expertise, and many government experts supported construction.[2] In 2019, the Energy Ministry approached the Finance Ministry about hiring an international radiation-protection expert; earlier plans had envisaged a 1,300-megawatt station in the southern Negev.[21] Following electricity-market reform ending the corporation’s generation monopoly, a future project was expected to be built by a private entity instead.[21] The ministry intended to submit recommendations within eighteen months, with supply diversification and reduced dependence on gas-fired stations presented as potential benefits.[21]

In May 2025, the Energy Ministry said it was preparing work on nuclear electricity generation for presentation to the government in the second half of the year.[22] The work apparently included regulations, and Energy Minister Eli Cohen said he wanted to present a professional study enabling the government to decide whether to establish a nuclear-energy facility.[22] An inter-ministerial committee also recommended a comprehensive examination of energy security, including nuclear power and other low-emissions sources.[22]

A May 2025 site proposal identified an area near Shivta in the Negev for review by a regional planning and building committee.[23] The review ruled out Besor because of proximity to a military airfield and relevant international airport guidance, Nitzanim because of contamination concerns in the event of a military strike and doubts about economic feasibility, and Beit Guvrin because of dense population and its use as an Israel Defense Forces training zone.[23]

A separate 2025 planning development concerned Rogem, approximately twelve kilometers north of the previous proposed location near Shivta.[24] The Southern District Planning Committee unanimously recommended advancing the Rogem location to the National Planning and Building Council after concerns arose about suspected geological faults at the earlier site.[24] This was a recommendation about a possible location, not a government decision to build a station.[24] The Energy Ministry’s stated rationale was to prepare for potential energy-supply gaps after natural-gas reserves decline.[24]

In December 2025, Cohen said Israel was seriously examining a nuclear power plant and had established an expert team to formulate principles for a national nuclear-energy strategy.[25] He intended to bring its recommendations to the cabinet, but the announcement supplied neither a cabinet construction decision nor a construction schedule.[25] By May 2026, professional discussion of a Negev station and small modular reactors had grown, while Israel still had no commercial nuclear reactors generating electricity.[1]

Soreq’s five-megawatt reactor began operating in 1960 under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program.[26] A light-water, pool-type reactor, it was used for training and research in reactor physics, radiography, neutron diffraction, activation analysis, and gemstone color treatment.[26] Its intended contribution was to develop applications of nuclear technology in electricity, industry, medicine, and agriculture, not to supply commercial electricity.[26] Civilian research at the center also included space science.[27]

Israel undertook to use the Soreq reactor for civilian purposes under its supply agreement.[26] Oversight initially involved the United States and later passed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, while reactor safety remained the responsibility of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission.[26] The reactor is a safeguarded civilian research facility, distinct from the larger Negev center near Dimona.[28] Stated oversight arrangements for Soreq include a safety unit and a committee reporting to the prime minister.[29]

Plans to replace reactor functions with accelerator-based research have appeared over several periods.[27][28] A 2008 report described a newly purchased German particle accelerator expected to replace the reactor’s research role and permit eventual shutdown.[27] Israeli officials subsequently planned to phase out the reactor by 2018 because of its age and the dwindling supply of U.S.-provided highly enriched uranium fuel, with an accelerator intended to assume many research and medical functions.[28] These were plans and forecasts, not confirmation that shutdown occurred on that timetable.[27][28]

In 2014, Israel completed a project returning spent highly enriched uranium fuel from Soreq to the United States.[30] The Soreq Applied Research Accelerator Facility was intended to take over major reactor tasks as part of efforts to phase out highly enriched uranium fuel.[30]

Research-reactor safety involves issues different from those of commercial generating stations.[6] The quantity of fissile material at Dimona was described as about two orders of magnitude smaller than in a 1,000-megawatt electricity-generating reactor.[6] The reactor is housed in a containment building and undergoes maintenance and upgrades, including component replacement and checks of the steel tank holding fuel rods and the neutron absorber during maintenance cycles.[6] Published planning also envisaged eventual shutdown and replacement by a new system.[6] Spent fuel requires safe storage and continuous cooling because it continues to emit radiation and decay heat.[6]

The Ministry of Energy issued a call for a fusion-research consortium led by the Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University, and the Soreq Nuclear Center.[5] A proposed next step was a national nuclear-fusion research institute with investment of approximately NIS 30 million.[5] This initiative concerned fusion research rather than construction of a conventional nuclear-fission power station.[5]

A larger proposal reported in 2026 responded partly to rising electricity demand and data-center expansion.[31] The Energy Ministry recommended a middle investment option of NIS 500 million to NIS 1 billion over five to seven years, involving consortia of public institutions, private companies, and research organizations, with possible participation by Rafael and Elbit.[31] Soreq’s particle accelerator and other research infrastructure could support the work.[31] The proposal was not an approved government program and had no funding allocation, while commercially viable fusion remained a distant and uncertain prospect.[31]

The ministry’s 2050 roadmap estimates that land constraints and required safety distances from population centers would limit nuclear capacity to approximately 15–20% of demand.[4] Nuclear generation would therefore need to operate alongside sources such as solar energy, hydrogen, or natural gas with carbon capture, rather than replace the entire energy system.[4] The roadmap also identifies a balancing problem between intermittent solar generation and nuclear power’s constant output, requiring energy storage.[4]

Its conditional “red” pathway assumes several nuclear plants operating by 2050, either two large plants or several smaller ones.[4] Nuclear power and red hydrogen together supply approximately 20% of the energy mix in that scenario, while the electricity-generation table assigns nuclear about 19% of generation.[4] The pathway depends on technological development, resolution of policy issues, techno-economic analysis, and public discussion.[4] It forms part of integrated decarbonization planning premised on the conclusion that no single technology can achieve carbon neutrality alone.[4]

Diversification has a longer history in Israeli energy policy: dependence on imported fuel contributed to the selection of coal as a strategic electricity source, while the later introduction of natural gas reduced fuel-import dependence and enabled private electricity producers.[32] One policy recommendation proposed approximately four gigawatts of nuclear capacity as a future energy source, without establishing government approval or a construction commitment.[32]

A separate business-as-usual scenario projected that natural gas would meet 70% of electricity-production and large-industry energy needs within a decade, with renewable electricity reaching 10%.[32] That scenario also emphasized Israel’s continued position as an “electricity island,” with insufficient grid redundancy making backup diesel and fuel oil necessary.[32] Nuclear proposals have consequently been discussed alongside questions of diversification, reserve supplies, and long-term energy security rather than solely as individual construction projects.[21][24]

Israel’s non-signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty creates diplomatic and practical questions about civilian nuclear cooperation.[22] Reporting has identified possible difficulty obtaining approvals and reluctance among international companies, rather than establishing that a civilian station is legally impossible.[22] Earlier coverage described treaty membership and international inspections as requirements, while later discussion emphasized obstacles involving fuel, expertise, industrial capacity, cost, workforce, security, and public acceptance.[18][15] A SAPIR Journal essay argues that non-membership explains Israel’s failure to pursue civilian nuclear power and that small modular reactors and microreactors justify renewed exploration; this is an advocacy assessment, not an adopted government policy.[33]

Local opposition has focused on planning as well as technology.[23] The Ramat Negev Regional Council opposed the Shivta-area proposal, and local officials criticized consultation and questioned whether the site assessment was current.[23] Questions remained about potential builders, fuel supply, desert cooling, and water availability.[23] A 2017 assessment had already identified geopolitical considerations and public opposition as reasons a station was unlikely in the near future.[2]

The broader nuclear-ambiguity debate also shapes discussion.[34] Adam Raz’s 2016 historical analysis presents ambiguity as an early-1960s compromise among policymakers and argues that secrecy restricted public debate about civilian electricity and desalination reactors.[34] Historical records contain differing descriptions of Dimona’s purpose: a 1961 U.S. assessment reported Israel’s stated precursor-to-power-stations rationale while assessing potential experience relevant to plutonium production.[35] Israeli and French assurances described peaceful purposes, and visiting U.S. scientists reported that the facilities matched the scope and peaceful character previously presented to them.[10][36] Their account also identified concerns about supplier boycotts, sabotage, and disclosure of scientific capabilities as explanations for secrecy.[36] These historical assurances and assessments are distinct from evidence that a commercial electricity station was constructed.[1]