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Realignment Plan

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01In brief

Realignment plan was a 2006 proposal by Ehud Olmert to evacuate Israeli settlements in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — while retaining major settlement blocs and establishing new borders. Also called “convergence,” it envisioned a major reorganization of Israel’s settlement presence; contemporary accounts projected the evacuation of tens of thousands of settlers. Olmert presented negotiations as preferable but reserved unilateral action if diplomacy failed, linking the initiative to preserving Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The proposal remained operationally undeveloped and was taken off the government’s agenda during the period of the Second Lebanon War.

02Overview

The proposal combined settlement evacuation with the consolidation of Israeli population centers into blocs that Israel intended to retain.[6] Its central purpose was to establish a defined boundary between Israel and a future Palestinian state, rather than continue maintaining dispersed settlements across much of the West Bank.[1][7] Olmert’s government connected that territorial objective to maintaining a democratic Israel with a Jewish majority, preferring an agreement but reserving the possibility of acting without one.[4]

The security barrier was an important reference point, not a finalized proposed border. The government said its route would be adapted to permanent borders, while Olmert’s public vision also identified the Jordan River as a security border.[4][8] The relationship between civilian evacuation, the proposed boundary, and future IDF deployment remained unresolved.[4] The initiative therefore involved several related questions—where settlers would live, which population centers Israel would retain, how security would be maintained, and whether new borders could gain international acceptance.[4]

“Convergence,” “realignment,” and “consolidation” all appeared in discussions of the initiative.[6][9] Olmert initially used “convergence,” and at his May 2006 White House meeting used “realignment” as its English translation.[6] These labels referred to a proposal for withdrawal and consolidation rather than a completed operational program specifying every evacuation, military deployment, and expenditure.[4][6]

03Origins and Political Development

On January 24, 2006, then-acting prime minister Olmert told the Herzliya Conference that drawing Israel’s permanent borders was the country’s most important task.[10] He linked that task to preserving a Jewish majority and a democratic state, while presenting two states as the answer to the aspirations of both peoples.[10] His formulation included retaining important security areas and Jewish settlements within them, together with a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty.[10]

During February and March, Olmert and security adviser Avi Dichter outlined an arrangement encompassing major settlement blocs, a united Jerusalem, and the Jordan Valley.[4] Isolated settlements would be consolidated into larger blocs, and Dichter said the Israel Defense Forces would retain territorial control to prevent terrorism.[4] Olmert aimed to achieve national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and said the barrier would be moved to those borders.[4] On March 8, he said the Palestinians would receive a “reasonable” amount of time to meet his conditions before Israel proceeded unilaterally.[6]

The proposal became part of Kadima’s campaign in the March 2006 Knesset election, in which the party placed first.[1] Its emergence reflected growing Israeli doubts about the prospects of achieving an agreement through negotiations after Hamas’s electoral victory, although Olmert said he would first seek negotiations with Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas.[4][9] Kadima’s platform supported retaining the large settlement blocs and a united Jerusalem while committing to the Road Map and a phased diplomatic process.[11] That process included dismantling armed groups, reforming Palestinian Authority security forces, and a Palestinian commitment to prevent incitement.[11]

After the March 28 election, Olmert interpreted the outcome as a majority endorsement of his unilateral-withdrawal policy.[12] He nevertheless called on Palestinian leaders to negotiate, saying Israel would take its destiny into its own hands if they did not.[12] When presenting his government to the Knesset on May 4, he reiterated the commitment to determine Israel’s final borders and evacuate additional settlements, with or without Palestinian Authority agreement, while announcing his intention to seek an accord.[2]

In that May policy presentation, Olmert argued that dispersed settlement and the intermingling of populations endangered Israel’s future as a Jewish state.[13] He called for realignment through dialogue with settlers, internal reconciliation, and the broadest possible consensus, while maintaining the main settlement concentrations and Jerusalem as parts of Israel.[13] The government’s May guidelines similarly connected permanent borders to Israel’s Jewish and democratic character and stated that the security barrier would be adapted to conform to those borders.[4]

04Proposed Territorial Arrangements

Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, and Ariel were among the major settlement blocs Olmert intended Israel to retain.[2] The government sought to use the security-fence route as a de facto reference line and evacuate settlements east of the eventual border.[7] Contemporary reporting also identified the Jerusalem envelope, the Ariel region, and the Jordan River as elements of Olmert’s vision of Israel’s future borders.[8]

Olmert said the aim was to “completely separate from the majority of the Palestinian population” within four years while preserving a stable Jewish majority.[8] His proposal involved moving residents from isolated settlements into larger blocs west of the barrier, and he also announced that funding would be redirected from settlements toward the Negev, Galilee, and Jerusalem.[6] On June 14, he described three central elements: giving up an Israeli presence across much of the territories, concentrating settlement populations in blocs, and having some settlers return inside the Green Line.[14]

Contemporary estimates varied, reflecting the absence of a finalized map. One account projected the evacuation of 20,000–80,000 settlers and envisaged leaving 65–90 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians.[2] Another described withdrawal from 72 settlements involving 60,000 people, while also saying that as many as 70,000 of an estimated 250,000 settlers could be withdrawn and that Israel would annex about 15 percent of West Bank land.[3]

Jerusalem formed a distinct part of these territorial discussions: alongside his commitment to a united Jerusalem, Olmert expressed willingness to withdraw from outlying Palestinian suburbs.[2] Retention of the principal settlement concentrations was also central to descriptions of the proposal as evacuating most settlements while keeping five large blocs.[15] At his May 23 meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush, Olmert said major Israeli population centers would remain under Israeli control and become part of Israel through a final-status agreement.[16]

The Jordan River occupied a particularly strong place in Olmert’s security language; he identified it as a security border in his public description of Israel’s future boundaries.[8] Nevertheless, the relationship between a Jordan River security border, the civilian evacuation line, and any redeployment of the IDF remained to be worked out.[4]

05Negotiations and Proposed Implementation

At the White House on May 23, 2006, Olmert presented realignment as a means to “reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the Palestinians, and guarantee Israel’s security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.”[16] He said he would first make efforts to negotiate with Abbas, but would consider another route if negotiations could not implement the Road Map’s principles.[16] He also argued that Israel could not wait indefinitely for a Palestinian entity that refused to change or promote dialogue.[16]

In his May 24 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, Olmert specified conditions for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority: renunciation of terrorism, dismantling terrorist infrastructure, acceptance of previous agreements and commitments, and recognition of Israel’s right to exist.[17] Realignment would become the alternative if bilateral negotiations proved fruitless and the Palestinians ignored Israel’s offer of peace.[17] He presented it as a way for Israel to shape its future without being held hostage to Palestinian terrorism, while reducing friction and preventing conflict.[17]

Olmert described a three-to-four-year timetable in May, again emphasizing that Israel would first try to negotiate implementation.[18] He treated the Road Map as the diplomatic framework, invited Abbas to negotiate, and said he would not negotiate with a Palestinian entity that refused to recognize Israel.[18] In June, he reiterated that negotiations were preferable and that the government would seek talks with Palestinian officials meeting international conditions, including ending terrorism and recognizing Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state.[19]

The initiative had not become a fully developed operational plan: officials had not specified the number of settlers to be moved, the redeployment of Israeli forces, or the cost.[4] Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni created a committee to develop a plan.[4] The distinction between civilian evacuation alone and military withdrawal remained especially important, as did the question of how Israel would counter security threats within the West Bank after settlement removals.[4]

A March 2006 analysis by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs interpreted consolidation as removing the civilian presence while retaining IDF control.[9] It recommended dismantling settlements and ending Israeli civil control in evacuated areas while retaining military deployments for defense and as “negotiating cards” in future talks.[9] The same analysis treated the territorial extent as dependent on the barrier route and agreements with settlement leaders and coalition partners, noting that some proponents also wanted to retain the Jordan Rift Valley as a security zone.[9]

06Public Opinion and Withdrawal from the Agenda

A June 26, 2006 Hebrew University poll found 50 percent opposed realignment and 46 percent supported it.[20] The same poll found that 54 percent believed the election had given Olmert a mandate to carry out withdrawal, while 58 percent favored holding a referendum.[20] These findings distinguished views about the policy itself from views about electoral authorization and the procedure for approving such a consequential decision.[20]

A Midgam poll conducted July 9–10 found support at 36 percent and opposition at 59 percent.[20] Maagar Mohot surveys reported 52 percent opposition and 19 percent support on July 16, followed by 50 percent opposition and 28 percent support on July 19.[20] These separate polling snapshots showed that opposition had become substantial by early and mid-July.[20]

Security developments on both borders undermined the initiative.[2] On June 25, Palestinian terrorists entered Israel from Gaza, killed two soldiers, and abducted Gilad Shalit.[2] On July 12, Hezbollah terrorists crossed the Lebanese border, killed and captured Israeli soldiers, and fired rockets and mortars.[2] The subsequent Second Lebanon War accelerated the erosion of support for convergence, reinforcing concerns about Hezbollah’s rockets after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the concurrent rocket campaign from Gaza.[5] Experience following the Gaza withdrawal had already raised doubts about the difficulty of controlling a border.[5]

During July, Olmert continued to express commitment to separation from the Palestinians and to secure, internationally recognized borders.[21] He described the intended Palestinian outcome as contiguous territory in which an independent state could be established, and realignment as a gradual separation of Israelis and Palestinians.[21] The plan nevertheless came off the government’s agenda during the period of the war.[5]

In September, Finance Minister Abraham Hirchson said that convergence was no longer on the agenda, citing the changed situation in the Middle East and saying the government was adopting the Road Map in accordance with a government decision.[22]

07Significance and Subsequent Assessments

Realignment linked the determination of Israel’s borders to the preservation of a Jewish majority, democratic government, and separation from the Palestinian population.[4][10] Olmert presented settlement consolidation not simply as evacuation but as a strategy for retaining principal Israeli population centers while enabling territorial continuity for a Palestinian state.[16] His June formulation explicitly paired a security border for Israel with a Palestinian state living peacefully alongside it.[14]

The government sought to make the security-fence route a de facto boundary while avoiding confrontation with settlement residents and the international community.[7] A fence-line guideline for construction permits, however, was not official government policy.[7] The initiative thus had implications for settlement policy even though the proposed large-scale evacuation did not materialize.[7][23]

Retrospective commentary emphasized the distance between the ambitious campaign proposal and its eventual political fate.[23][24] The Jewish Review of Books summarized Olmert’s pledge as evacuation of most of the West Bank within four years and described convergence as a plan that never materialized.[23] A postwar Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs analysis judged consolidation “virtually dead” after the Lebanon war.[24]

A later Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs article characterized the intended withdrawal as reaching the security fence or a line near it.[25] A retrospective Jewish News Syndicate account stressed a different aspect of preparation: a team originating under Ariel Sharon was tasked with mapping Israeli interests in a possible unilateral move, not choosing the boundary or settlements for evacuation.[26] It said an August 2006 report identified implementation problems and treated the barrier as a starting point for an adjusted border.[26]

08Controversies

The unilateral option faced significant Israeli, Palestinian, and international opposition.[4][6] Benjamin Netanyahu criticized it as a concession that would endanger Israel; Meretz leader Yossi Beilin preferred an agreement with the Palestinian Authority; and Shas entered the coalition without committing to settlement evacuation.[6] Beilin also objected that moving settlers across the fence could leave them within the West Bank.[27] Palestinian leaders rejected the proposal: the PLO defended a state throughout the territories occupied in 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital, Abbas warned unilateral action would end the two-state solution and increase violence, and Ismail Haniyah called it “a recipe for conflict.”[4]

Bush said a negotiated final-status agreement was preferable and that any changes affecting final borders had to be mutually agreed.[16] In June, the European Union said it would not recognize unilateral changes to the pre-1967 borders and urged renewed talks with Abbas.[28] Numerical estimates and territorial descriptions remained projections rather than an agreed map or completed evacuation program.[4][2] Beilin’s later report of Olmert discussing withdrawal from 90 percent of the West Bank was an account of remarks, not a detailed official plan.[29]

Sources

  1. 1Institute for National Security Studies, Volume 10, No. 3, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  2. 2Encyclopedia.com, Olmert, Ehud (1945–), accessed on November 8, 2026.
  3. 3Encyclopedia.com, Jewish Settlers Protest Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  4. 4U.S. Department of Justice, Congressional Research Service, Document 70194, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  5. 5Institute for National Security Studies, The Second Lebanon War, Chapter 12, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  6. 6U.S. Department of Justice, Congressional Research Service, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  7. 7Institute for National Security Studies, Olmert's Legacy in the Occupied Territories: Strengthening the Settlement Blocs, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  8. 8Ynetnews, Olmert plans West Bank pullout, J’lem expansion, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  9. 9Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Dilemmas of Israeli Policy After the Hamas Victory: From Disengagement to Consolidation?, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  10. 10Globes, Olmert: Setting Israel's borders is our main task, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  11. 11Ynet, Kadima, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  12. 12Globes, Disappointment for Kadima; Likud crashes, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  13. 13Globes, Olmert’s Statement of Intent: “Dispersed Settlement in Judea and Samaria Endangers the State’s Existence”, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  14. 14Ynet, Olmert: “The Convergence Plan Is Inevitable”, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  15. 15Jewish Virtual Library, Fact Sheets: The “Pre-1967 Border” - The “Green Line”, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  16. 16U.S. National Archives, President Bush and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel Participate in Joint Press Availability, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  17. 17Jewish Virtual Library, Ehud Olmert Administration: Speech to Joint Session of Congress, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  18. 18Ynet, Bush: Convergence Is a Bold Idea; The Way Is Through Negotiations, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  19. 19Prime Minister’s Office, Knesset Speech on Disengagement Evacuees, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  20. 20Jewish Virtual Library, Israeli Public Opinion Polls: Opinion on Unilateral Measures, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  21. 21Prime Minister’s Office, Questions and Answers, July 2006, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  22. 22Globes, The art of being finance minister, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  23. 23Jewish Review of Books, Walking the Green Line, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  24. 24Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Hizballah in Lebanon: The War Was Not Supposed to End This Way, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  25. 25Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, No End to Palestinian Claims: How Israel and the Palestinians View Borders, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  26. 26Jewish News Syndicate, Israel’s non-disengagement, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  27. 27The Jerusalem Post, Politics: Whose partner?, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  28. 28Ynetnews, EU rejects realignment plan, accessed on November 8, 2026.
  29. 29Ynet, Initiative Now, accessed on November 8, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the Realignment Plan?

    The Realignment Plan was a 2006 proposal by Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert to evacuate Israeli settlements in the West Bank while retaining major settlement blocs and establishing new borders. Also called “convergence,” it envisioned reorganizing Israel’s settlement presence and was linked to preserving Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. The proposal remained operationally undeveloped and was taken off the government’s agenda during the period of the Second Lebanon War.

  • Why did Ehud Olmert propose the Realignment Plan?

    Ehud Olmert presented the Realignment Plan as a way to define Israel’s permanent borders, preserve a Jewish majority, and maintain a democratic state. It aimed to separate Israel from most of the Palestinian population while retaining major Israeli population centers and allowing for a contiguous Palestinian state. Olmert preferred negotiations but reserved unilateral action if diplomacy failed.

  • Which settlements and areas did the Realignment Plan propose to retain?

    The plan identified Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, and Ariel among the major settlement blocs Israel intended to retain. Olmert also committed to a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and identified the Jordan River as a security border. The security barrier was a reference point for a possible boundary, not a finalized proposed border.

  • How many settlers would have been evacuated under the Realignment Plan?

    Contemporary estimates varied because the plan had no finalized map. One account projected evacuating 20,000–80,000 settlers, while another described withdrawal from 72 settlements involving 60,000 people. A further estimate said as many as 70,000 of approximately 250,000 settlers could be withdrawn; these figures were projections, not an agreed evacuation program.

  • How did Ehud Olmert propose implementing the Realignment Plan?

    Ehud Olmert said Israel would first seek negotiations with Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas and use the Road Map as the diplomatic framework. He described a three-to-four-year timetable and said unilateral action could be considered if negotiations failed. The proposal was not a fully developed operational plan: officials had not specified the number of settlers to move, military redeployment, or costs.

  • Why was the Realignment Plan taken off the agenda?

    The Realignment Plan lost support amid security developments on Israel’s borders and the Second Lebanon War. Palestinian terrorists killed two Israeli soldiers and abducted Gilad Shalit on June 25, 2006; Hezbollah terrorists killed and captured Israeli soldiers and fired rockets and mortars on July 12. In September, Finance Minister Abraham Hirchson said convergence was no longer on the agenda, citing the changed situation in the Middle East.