2020 Israel–Palestine Peace Plan

The 181-page “Peace to Prosperity” document presented a possible Palestinian state alongside Israel while assigning Israel sovereignty over settlements and most of the Jordan Valley, together amounting to approximately 30% of the West Bank.[3][4] Published with maps and appendices and divided into 22 chapters, it addressed borders, Jerusalem, security, refugees, governance, economic development, and the conditions under which Palestinian statehood could proceed.[5] It was offered as a basis for negotiations rather than an already negotiated Israeli-Palestinian agreement, and the Palestinian Authority had not participated in its drafting.[4][1]

The proposed settlement combined territorial separation with continuing Israeli security authority: Palestine would be fully demilitarized, while Israel would retain overall security control and responsibility at international crossings.[3] Palestinian statehood depended on governance reforms, recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, ending specified financial incentives for violence, and disarming armed organizations in Gaza.[4] A four-year period was associated with meeting these conditions and preserving areas designated for a future Palestinian state from specified forms of Israeli settlement construction.[6]

The political framework followed a separate economic initiative proposing $50 billion in investment and development assistance.[7] Its territorial provisions envisaged land exchanges, transportation links between separated areas, and arrangements allowing Israelis and Palestinians to remain in their homes, including in enclaves within territory assigned to the other state.[3][5] These provisions were proposals and targets, not territorial changes or economic results that actually occurred.[1]

The initiative emerged from three years of work by Trump administration officials and was released in two stages: an economic component in 2019 and the political framework in January 2020.[1][6] Its preparation took place amid deteriorating relations between Washington and the Palestinian leadership following U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017.[4] The Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority suspended high-level contacts with the administration after that recognition, while aid reductions and changes in diplomatic ties further worsened relations.[4] By the plan’s announcement, the Palestinian Authority had not engaged with Trump’s team for more than two years.[1]

The economic component was presented at a June 2019 workshop in Bahrain, before publication of the proposed borders and political conditions.[6] Palestinian officials rejected the premise that economic incentives should influence their positions on core political demands and boycotted the meeting.[6][8] Without Palestinian participation, the conference proceeded without the Israeli government, although some businesspeople attended.[8] Palestinian businesspeople were warned against attending, and 15 who participated subsequently faced arrest, threats, and harassment on their return.[8]

Trump presented the political framework alongside Netanyahu at the White House on January 28, 2020, after obtaining expressions of support from both Netanyahu and his political rival Benny Gantz.[4] Netanyahu said Israel was prepared to begin immediate negotiations on its basis, while Trump described the accompanying map as the first indication of what Israel was prepared to relinquish for peace.[9] Gantz also accepted the proposal and said he would implement it if he won the Israeli election.[10]

The Palestinian leadership rejected the initiative rather than entering negotiations on its terms.[1] Mahmoud Abbas called an emergency meeting of Palestinian leaders and declared, “Jerusalem is not for sale, and all our rights are not for sale...and the [U.S.] conspiracy deal will not pass.”[11] He also said he would change the Palestinian Authority’s functional role, an announcement that raised the possibility of suspending Israeli-Palestinian security coordination rather than establishing that such a suspension had already occurred.[11]

The territorial framework proposed Israeli sovereignty over approximately 30% of the West Bank, including settlements and most of the Jordan Valley, with Palestinians potentially obtaining sovereignty over the remainder and additional territory through compensatory swaps.[4] All of Gaza would form part of the proposed Palestinian state.[3] Unlike earlier U.S. frameworks, the proposal did not use the Green Line as the reference point for its territorial calculations.[2]

One calculation placed the Palestinian allocation within the West Bank at 3,907 of 5,834 square kilometers, or approximately 67%, increasing to nearly 71% when 259 square kilometers of adjacent swap areas were included.[2] A broader calculation, including Gaza, East Jerusalem, part of the northern Dead Sea, half of Jerusalem’s “No Man’s Land,” and swap territory, put the Palestinian share of the combined areas counted at 83%.[2] The proposal itself described the exchanged territory as giving Palestine land “reasonably comparable” in size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza.[3]

The land exchanges included areas in the western Negev, while roads, bridges, and tunnels would connect Palestinian areas with limited physical contiguity.[4][5] Proposed links between Gaza and the West Bank included a tunnel and two fast-access roads, with a modern railway also envisaged as a possible means for Palestinians to cross the Jordan Valley.[12] The high-speed Gaza–West Bank connection would pass over or under Israeli sovereign territory.[3]

The plan stated that approximately 97% of Israelis in the West Bank would be incorporated into contiguous Israeli territory and approximately 97% of Palestinians there into contiguous Palestinian territory.[3] It also allowed both Israeli and Palestinian enclaves inside territory allocated to the other state, with access routes and Israeli security responsibility.[3] Palestinians in enclaves within Israeli territory could remain under Palestinian civil administration, and neither Israelis nor Palestinians would be required to leave their homes.[5]

All 449,000 Israeli settlers in 128 West Bank settlements would remain in place under the proposed arrangement.[2] Fifteen settlements, with approximately 14,000 residents, would become Israeli sovereign enclaves inside the proposed Palestinian state and would be subject to a temporary four-year freeze on outward expansion.[2] In comparison with a settlement-bloc approach assigning Israel approximately 8% of the West Bank, this territorial framework increased Israel’s share to approximately 31%.[2] Illegal outposts, estimated at about 80, were identified for evacuation, while established settlements, including isolated communities, would remain.[12]

The Jordan Valley would remain under Israeli sovereignty, leaving the proposed Palestinian state without a border with Jordan.[13] Palestinian-owned or controlled agricultural enterprises in the valley could continue operating through Israeli licenses or leases.[3] The proposal linked this allocation to Israel’s national security requirements.[3] In a supportive interpretation, an analysis published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs characterized the arrangement as providing Israeli “defensible borders,” with approximately 30% of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area, under Israeli sovereignty.[14]

The proposal also contemplated transferring the Triangle communities from Israeli territory to the Palestinian state, subject to agreement between the parties.[3] Communities identified in discussion of this provision included Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baqa al-Gharbiyye, Umm al-Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Tira, Kafr Bara, and Jaljulya.[12] Hundreds of Triangle residents protested the possibility that their citizenship could change; senior Israeli officials subsequently said these communities would not be included in a border revision.[6]

The proposal declared that Jerusalem would remain Israel’s undivided sovereign capital while locating a Palestinian capital in areas east and north of the existing security barrier.[3] These included Kafr Aqab, eastern Shuafat, and Abu Dis; Palestinians could call their capital Al Quds or choose another name.[3] The U.S. embassy to Israel would remain in Jerusalem, and a future U.S. embassy to Palestine would be established in Al Quds following an Israeli-Palestinian agreement.[3]

The barrier would function as the dividing line between the two capitals.[3] Fourteen of Jerusalem’s 16 Arab neighborhoods, including the Old City, would remain under Israeli sovereignty, while areas beyond the barrier, including Shuafat Refugee Camp, Kufr Aqab, and Abu Dis, would form the Palestinian capital.[15] This differed from the Clinton Parameters, which envisaged all Arab neighborhoods becoming part of a future Palestinian state.[15]

Approximately 294,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem would remain in areas assigned to Israeli sovereignty.[2] They would be offered Israeli citizenship, Palestinian citizenship, or continued Israeli permanent-resident status.[2] These options recognized that some residents might wish to retain a political identity separate from both Israel and Palestine.[15]

The plan called for existing holy-site governance arrangements to continue, the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif to remain uninterrupted, and holy sites to remain open to peaceful worshippers and tourists of all faiths.[2] Jerusalem’s holy sites would remain under Israeli responsibility, with Jordan’s custodial role regarding Muslim holy sites continuing.[15][4] U.S. Ambassador David Friedman subsequently stated that the existing prohibition on non-Muslim worship at the Temple Mount would continue.[4] The implications of the text’s separate language supporting prayer by people of every faith became a point of debate.[6]

Palestinian statehood was conditional on criteria to be assessed jointly by Israel and the United States after consultation with the Palestinian Authority.[3] These included elections, human rights, religious freedom, rule of law, an independent judiciary, and transparent, credit-worthy financial institutions.[3] The proposal also required freedom of the press, protection of minority rights, effective control of Palestinian territory, and demilitarization.[5]

Recognition provisions called for mutual acknowledgment of Israel and Palestine as the nation-states of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples respectively.[5] Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state was a new condition in an official U.S. peace proposal.[12] Other requirements included ending incitement and glorification of violence, changing curricula and textbooks promoting hatred or antagonism, and ending payments to terrorists serving sentences in Israeli prisons.[5] Palestinian leaders were also expected to halt specified international initiatives and legal actions against Israel and the United States.[4][5]

The Palestinian state would have no army and would remain fully demilitarized.[3] Its security forces would maintain public order, enforce the law, conduct counterterrorism operations, and prevent attacks against Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.[5] Israel would retain overriding security responsibility, control of international crossings, and control of the airspace and electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan River.[3] At least one Israeli-operated early-warning station would remain in Palestinian territory, and Israel could undertake security measures, including incursions, to preserve demilitarization.[3]

The framework nevertheless envisaged Palestinians taking responsibility for as much internal security as possible.[3] A phased process would begin with Israeli assessment of Palestinian counterterrorism capacity in part of the West Bank, expand if benchmarks were met, and remain reversible if performance deteriorated.[5] Israel would determine whether conditions for transferring security authority had been satisfied and could reverse those transfers.[13] The proposal also envisaged a joint review mechanism involving Israeli, Palestinian, and U.S. representatives at border crossings.[5]

For Gaza, implementation of Israel’s commitments depended on control by the Palestinian Authority or another body acceptable to Israel, the disarmament of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other armed groups, and complete demilitarization.[3] If Hamas participated in a Palestinian government, it would have to recognize Israel, commit to nonviolence, accept previous agreements, and disarm armed organizations.[3] Israeli captives and remains still held when a peace agreement was concluded would be returned immediately if earlier efforts had not secured their release.[5] Major improvements in living standards were tied to a ceasefire and governance capable of protecting international investment from renewed conflict.[5]

During the four-year negotiating period, Israel would refrain from establishing new settlements, expanding existing settlements, or advancing construction plans in areas designated outside Israel; isolated Israeli enclaves would also be restricted to their existing footprints.[5] Restrictions on demolishing structures included exceptions involving safety risks and punitive demolitions following acts of terrorism.[6] Palestinian obligations during this period included institutional development and ending specified payments to families of prisoners and people killed in attacks.[5]

In a February 2020 interview, David Friedman described the framework as a negotiating basis rather than an agreement Washington would impose.[16] He presented it as two states side by side with overriding Israeli security control, and emphasized human rights, religious freedom, press freedom, and an end to incitement and specified payments as statehood conditions.[16]

The proposal excluded a Palestinian right of return to Israel and envisaged a peace agreement ending all claims relating to refugee or immigration status.[3] Refugees seeking permanent residence would have three options: absorption into Palestine subject to restrictions, integration in their existing host countries with those countries’ consent, or resettlement in participating Organization of Islamic Cooperation member states.[3] The third option was limited to 5,000 people annually for ten years, a maximum of 50,000 if participating countries agreed.[17]

Israel could bar individual refugees regarded as security threats and would have a role in determining admission numbers to Palestine.[13] The proposal stipulated that “The rate of movement of refugees...into the State of Palestine shall be agreed by the parties.”[13] It proposed internationally supported compensation, emphasized compensation at the state level, and identified Jordan as a host country entitled to compensation.[13] Refugee-related funding was incorporated into the broader economic assistance framework.[13]

Following a peace agreement, refugee status would end and UNRWA would cease operating under the proposal.[5] A separate international mechanism would address Jewish refugees from Arab countries, including compensation for their losses and compensation to Israel for absorbing them.[5] The framework thus addressed both Palestinian and Jewish refugee claims rather than treating the refugee question solely as a Palestinian issue.[5]

In discussing these provisions, a Mosaic article quoted the plan’s statement that the Arab-Israeli conflict “created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem.”[18] The article highlighted its call for a “just, fair, and realistic solution” for Jewish refugees, including compensation for lost assets through an appropriate international mechanism.[18]

The economic framework sought $50 billion over ten years for development in Palestinian territories and neighboring countries.[8] The package emphasized employment, infrastructure, healthcare, and education, while linking development to wider regional cooperation.[7][8]

Its investment proposals covered roads, border crossings, electricity generation, water, communications, housing, industry, agriculture, high technology, tourism, hospitals, and education.[5] Specific themes included economic opportunities for women and upgrading Gaza’s power plant.[8] Reforms were intended to encourage private-sector growth and regional trade alongside physical infrastructure.[5]

Stated targets included creating more than one million Palestinian jobs, halving poverty, doubling GDP over more than a decade, raising exports from 17% to 40% of GDP, and ensuring continuous electricity in the West Bank and Gaza.[5] These figures represented the proposal’s aspirations, not achievements.[5] The 38-page economic document called on Arab states to provide development aid, but the solicited funding did not materialize and the United States did not offer funds.[8]

Palestinian leaders rejected the proposition that financial incentives could substitute for their political demands.[6] Their boycott of the Bahrain meeting preceded their rejection of the political framework.[8][1] Although the overall initiative was rejected, its opportunities for regional cooperation and investment received serious attention.[7]

The Israeli government formally endorsed the plan, but Palestinian rejection prevented it from becoming a mutually accepted negotiating framework, and it was never implemented.[1] Netanyahu and Gantz’s favorable responses contrasted with Abbas’s categorical opposition.[10] At the time of release, CRS assessed prospects for negotiations as dim amid Palestinian opposition.[4]

International responses ranged from rejection to cautious encouragement of renewed talks.[1] The Arab League rejected the plan, while some U.S.-allied Arab states took a more affirmative stance.[1] Statements from the UN Secretary-General, European Union, and European foreign ministers treated the proposal as a possible impetus for negotiations without endorsing its terms.[1] On February 1, 2020, the Arab League said it would not cooperate with U.S. implementation efforts and identified the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative as the appropriate basis for a negotiated peace.[6]

Shortly after publication, Netanyahu said his government would consider measures effectively applying Israeli sovereignty unilaterally to West Bank settlements and the Jordan Valley.[4] The conceptual maps indicated areas expected eventually to come under Israeli sovereignty, but questions remained concerning domestic authority and the implications of proceeding without negotiations.[4] A May 2020 analysis by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs reported that U.S. support depended on joint Israeli-American boundary work and Israeli acceptance of the full framework, including construction restrictions in areas designated for Palestine.[19] It also reported the U.S. position that annexation should form part of a peace process in which Palestinians had a say.[19]

In August 2020, Israel and the United Arab Emirates announced an agreement to normalize relations alongside suspension of Israel’s planned application of sovereignty in parts of the West Bank.[20] The U.S. administration had asked Israel to suspend the declaration while the UAE agreement advanced.[20] A senior diplomatic source described the suspension as postponement rather than permanent removal of sovereignty from the agenda.[20]

Public-opinion findings underscored the gulf between the two societies’ responses.[21] An October 2020 Palestinian-Israeli Pulse report found that 93% of Palestinians opposed the plan and 5% accepted it, while among Israeli Jews 51% accepted it, 30% rejected it, and 19% were uncertain or did not know.[21] An earlier poll conducted January 31–February 6 found 66.5% of Palestinians strongly opposed and 22.7% somewhat opposed, compared with 8.5% somewhat supportive and 0.8% strongly supportive; 1.5% did not know.[22]

The principal disputes concerned whether the proposed Palestinian entity would constitute a viable sovereign state and whether extensive Israeli security authority and territorial allocations could produce a negotiated settlement.[4][23] A February 6, 2020 letter signed by 107 U.S. House members argued that disconnected Palestinian enclaves under Israeli control did not amount to a viable state and that the proposal facilitated permanent occupation and unilateral annexation.[23] The signatories also criticized the absence of Palestinian consultation and publication shortly before Israel’s third election in a year.[23] CRS reported that European Union and United Nations officials raised concerns about possible Israeli annexation and its legality.[6]

Religious-access language created a separate ambiguity: the plan supported maintaining the Temple Mount status quo but also stated that people of every faith should be permitted to pray there.[6] U.S. officials subsequently qualified this language by saying existing arrangements would not change without agreement.[6] Territorial estimates likewise varied by source and calculation, and the figures should not be treated as interchangeable.[2][24] The cited polling pages also omitted sample information, limiting the methodological context available for their results.[21][22]