Operation Bramble Bush

After the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein remained in power, and Israeli planners worried that Iraq could rearm, including with unconventional weapons. Another rationale was the desire to restore Israeli deterrence after Iraq had fired dozens of Scud missiles at Israel without an Israeli military response. Proponents also believed that removing Saddam might bring down Iraq’s governing system.[1]

One senior officer involved in planning later characterized the motive as principally revenge for the missile attacks, illustrating that participants did not necessarily understand the operation’s purpose in the same way. The strategic concern about a continuing Iraqi threat and the retaliatory motive both appear in accounts of the planning.[1]

The operation’s code name was reportedly assigned at the first working meeting in April 1991 by an IDF Intelligence computer.[1] A separate milestone was the first documented planning directive, dated 20 January 1992, which was circulated from Chief of Staff Ehud Barak’s office to senior defense officials. It tasked Brigadier General Amiram Levin with preparing an operation to kill an enemy-state leader and required absolute secrecy about the assignment and target.[2]

The plan called for Sayeret Matkal personnel to enter Iraq aboard two Air Force Yas’ur helicopters and travel by jeep to a launch position in the Al-Ajwar area near Tikrit. A four-person forward team would confirm Saddam’s presence and position; a team led by Captain A’ would then attack using television-guided missiles. Planners considered other methods before settling on this approach and constructed a model of the intended site at Tze’elim for rehearsal. These were proposed arrangements, not actions carried out in Iraq.[1]

Israeli officials differed sharply over the plan’s viability. Barak supported it, while Military Intelligence chief Uri Saguy strongly opposed it, citing the difficulty of locating Saddam and distinguishing him from a double, doubts about the likelihood of success, and the risk that killing an Arab ruler would unite Arab states against Israel. An analyst consulted by Saguy reportedly estimated about a 20% chance of both killing Saddam and bringing the Israeli team home.[1]

Accounts also differ on Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s approval. Mako and Globes report that at an October 1992 meeting he approved continued preparations.[2][3] Mako quotes the meeting summary as saying that “the prime minister approves the objective.”[2] Ynet describes Rabin as approving a feasibility examination and requiring at least 98% certainty before authorizing the operation.[1] The accounts therefore distinguish approval to continue preparation or assess feasibility from final authorization to execute the assassination; they do not establish that Rabin authorized execution.[1][2]

Preparations ended after a training accident at Tze’elim on 5 November 1992. During Sayeret Matkal’s final rehearsal before senior IDF commanders, two Tamuz missiles were fired at soldiers playing the enemy. Five soldiers portraying members of Saddam’s entourage—Arie Cohen, Shmari Shafran, Elad Shilo, Sharon Tamir, and Eran Vichslevbaum—were killed, and six others, including the soldier portraying Saddam, were seriously injured.[2]

Ynet attributes the disaster to confusion, negligence, and fatigue during the exercise, rather than faulty intelligence. It reports that the operation file did not name Saddam Hussein, referring to him only as “the target,” “the objective,” or “the object.” The accident halted the preparations, and the proposed operation did not take place.[1][2]

Later reporting brought renewed attention to Rabin’s role. Mako and Globes say earlier accounts had portrayed him as opposing or tending to delay preparations, while protocols disclosed in a 2012 investigation indicated that he approved continued preparation.[2][3] Ynet’s account, however, describes approval for feasibility work subject to a very high success threshold, not final authorization to carry out the operation.[1]

The code name also surfaced years later in an anecdote recounted by Ynet: at a 1998 wedding, former intelligence officer Nadav Ze’evi saw a sign warning, “Beware lest you sit on the thorn bush.” Ze’evi and two other former senior intelligence figures understood it as an allusion to the operation’s name.[1]