Operation Change of Direction 11

The broader Operation Change of Direction was announced by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on July 17, 2006, following Hezbollah’s abduction of Israeli soldiers and continuing rocket fire. Olmert set out objectives that included returning the captured soldiers, ending hostilities, deploying the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, and removing Hezbollah from the area in connection with UN Security Council Resolution 1559.[5] For much of the war, Israel relied chiefly on air and standoff attacks, alongside limited ground operations. Israeli leaders hesitated to commit large ground forces because of anticipated casualties and the IDF’s limited readiness for major combat after years focused on the Palestinian intifada.[6]

As the campaign continued, Israeli leaders concluded that standoff attacks alone would not stop the Katyusha barrage, while a large ground action carried substantial casualty risks.[6] The Winograd Commission described a strategic choice between a short strike relying mainly on standoff firepower and a large ground operation intended to alter conditions in southern Lebanon, temporarily occupy territory, and clear Hezbollah infrastructure. It found that Israel entered the war without choosing between those options or establishing an exit strategy, and did not prepare for a major ground operation until the first week of August.[3]

On August 9, the cabinet approved an expanded ground plan in principle and authorized Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz to decide whether and when to activate it in light of diplomatic developments.[3] That in-principle approval was distinct from the later decision to activate the plan; the Congressional Research Service dates Olmert’s authorization of the offensive to after the Security Council passed Resolution 1701 on August 11.[7]

Resolution 1701 was adopted on August 11. It called for a full cessation of hostilities, deployment of Lebanese forces and an expanded UNIFIL presence in southern Lebanon, and Israeli withdrawal alongside that deployment.[7] The impending diplomatic settlement set a narrow window for the ground offensive.

The final offensive was intended to advance toward the Litani River, destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, push its operational units away from Israel’s border, suppress short-range rocket fire, and improve conditions for Israeli interests during Security Council deliberations.[2] Shuker reports that it was also intended to change both conditions in southern Lebanon and the military image of the campaign.[1]

There were competing views about its scale and timing. Chief of Staff Dan Halutz argued that the ground operation was needed to reduce rocket fire and improve the campaign’s imagery. Shaul Mofaz later argued that only six hours had been allocated to a mission planned to take several weeks, making its objectives impossible to accomplish in the available time.[1]

The issuance of the invasion order on August 11 left approximately three days for the expanded offensive, rather than the five or more days the IDF had initially hoped to have. During the final 72 hours of combat, the number of Israeli ground troops in Lebanon tripled to an eventual high of about 30,000.[6]

Fighting at Wadi Saluki on August 11–12 was among the major engagements. Two tank companies and at least one infantry division attacked Hezbollah hilltop positions under heavy missile and anti-tank fire. At least 11 Israeli tanks were hit and at least 12 Israeli soldiers were killed before Israeli forces took the area.[5]

A separate helicopter-borne mission sought to land troops deep in Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon, east of Tyre, to move through rocket-launch areas and attack launchers and crews. A first-person account places the insertion on August 12 and describes a force composed of regular and reserve paratroopers of the Fire Division.[4] After a helicopter was hit, further landings were stopped and troops already on the ground were told to take cover rather than continue to their original objectives. More than 200 troops had assembled, but the mission was later canceled as the ceasefire approached.[4]

A helicopter carrying five crew members was shot down in Lebanon on August 12. The crew members were Nisan Shalev, Daniel Gomez, Sami Ben-Naim, Ron Mashiah, and Keren Tendler.[8] The grounded force later destroyed a multi-barrel Katyusha launcher and a Hezbollah armored vehicle, but did not reach its original objective before returning to Israel on foot.[4]

The airborne mission was intended to be the largest such operation in IDF history.[4] It was canceled as the ceasefire approached, and the troops returned to Israel on foot.[4] The ceasefire took effect on August 14, after which Israeli forces began withdrawing.[7]

The offensive reached the Litani area, but coordination among force elements during its final phase was poor, according to the RAND account.[6] The Winograd Commission concluded that the large-scale offensive was not completed and produced no military gains.[3]

Casualty figures depend on which portion of the final fighting is counted. A 2026 Maariv account reports 33 Israeli military deaths in 30 hours during Change of Direction 11.[8] A Mako chronology reports 35 deaths in battles accompanying the August 11 advance and 33 in the ground maneuver during the war’s final two days.[9] A separate Mako report says 24 soldiers were killed and 60 wounded in the ground operation that began on August 11.[10] These figures use different scopes and should not be treated as directly interchangeable.

The operation unfolded as the Security Council’s ceasefire arrangements were taking shape. Resolution 1701 provided for Lebanese forces and an expanded UNIFIL presence in southern Lebanon, alongside Israel’s withdrawal.[7] The ceasefire came into effect on August 14, ending the 34-day conflict.[7] The Winograd Commission found that late preparation and the diplomatic timetable constrained the operation’s completion, and criticized broader failures in strategic planning and the formulation of an exit strategy.[3]

Assessments of the operation distinguish its outcome from the decision to launch it. The Winograd Commission found that the offensive failed to limit rocket fire or change the course of the war, was not completed, and had an unclear contribution to the diplomatic outcome. At the same time, it judged the goals legitimate and the decision to begin the operation within the political and professional discretion of its makers—not a failure in itself.[3] A Washington Institute account similarly says the Commission vindicated Olmert’s decision, citing his sincere perception of Israel’s interests and concerns about ceasefire terms and a possible delay before UNIFIL was reinforced.[11]

Other assessments emphasize the timing and the desire for a visible achievement. Shuker reports that Peretz viewed the operation as a way for Israel to appear to have taken the final action before being asked to stop fighting, while warning that it would not improve the ceasefire terms.[1] She also reports criticism from Mofaz and senior officers who doubted the late operation’s military value, and quotes former chief of staff Moshe Ya’alon as saying soldiers had died for a media “spin.”[1] Shuker cites a survey in which 28 percent supported an immediate ceasefire, amid limited political achievements, and argues that public pressure for visible results helped push the decision toward a ground operation.[1]

The broader strategic context also shapes historical assessments. Dekel argues that the war’s stages can be distinguished clearly only in retrospect because they unfolded in response to developments rather than according to prior planning. In his account, the preceding stage did not create enough pressure to establish suitable exit conditions; Hezbollah recovered from its initial shock, adapted, and continued firing rockets, while Israeli leaders struggled with delayed planning and an exit strategy.[2] The final offensive thus remains a prominent example in discussions of the gap between operational aims, diplomatic timing, and the results achievable in a late ground campaign.