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Nuclear Program of Iran

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01In brief

The nuclear program of Iran is a national program encompassing nuclear research, electricity generation, uranium conversion and enrichment, and related fuel-cycle activities. Before the June 2025 attacks on its nuclear facilities, Iran held an estimated 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a stockpile whose subsequent condition and location became a central verification concern. Established with American assistance under the shah, the program later became the subject of international inspections, sanctions, negotiations, and military strikes. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action imposed nuclear restrictions in exchange for sanctions relief, but the United States withdrew in 2018 and Iran subsequently moved beyond the agreement’s limits. By November 2026, the International Atomic Energy Agency remained unable to verify important aspects of the program because it lacked access to damaged facilities and complete information about enriched material.

02Overview

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes facilities with distinct functions: the Bushehr electricity-generating reactor, enrichment complexes at Natanz and Fordow, uranium-conversion and metal-processing installations at Isfahan, and the Arak heavy-water reactor project.[1][2] These installations have not operated under the same technical arrangements: Bushehr opened with Russian assistance, whereas Natanz and Fordow became central to domestic uranium enrichment.[1][9] Iran has maintained that its nuclear activities serve peaceful purposes, including electricity generation and medicine, while Western governments have feared that the program could support nuclear-weapons development.[10]

International diplomacy has focused on restricting enrichment, limiting enriched-uranium stocks, addressing the potential plutonium route, and enabling inspection of nuclear material and facilities.[6][7] The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, combined nuclear restrictions with sanctions relief.[7] The agreement did not restrict Iran’s ballistic-missile development, which became a major objection raised by the Trump administration.[7]

The production of enriched uranium and the development of a completed nuclear weapon are separate questions in assessments of Iranian capabilities.[11] Estimates of the time needed to produce weapons-usable material therefore do not establish the time needed to develop, assemble, and deliver a weapon.[11] After the June 2025 strikes, the program’s status also depended on the condition of surviving infrastructure and material and on whether inspectors could obtain access to establish what remained.[12][3]

03Origins and Early Development

Iran’s nuclear ambitions date to the 1950s, during the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, when the United States supported nuclear infrastructure through President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative.[5] An American-supplied research reactor began operating in Tehran in 1967.[1] During the 1970s, the shah’s government planned numerous nuclear power stations.[13] German companies began building the Bushehr power plant in 1975.[9]

Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, accepting an obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons and to permit international safeguards.[5] Its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency was signed on June 19, 1973, entered into force the following year, and established legally binding inspection commitments.[14]

The 1979 Islamic Revolution interrupted the expansion planned under the shah, and American nuclear assistance ended.[1][13] Ruhollah Khomeini ordered the nuclear program suspended, while the new leadership associated nuclear technology with Western influence.[15][5] Construction at Bushehr was abandoned after the revolution.[9]

The Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 helped revive interest in nuclear technology, particularly in light of the war’s heavy toll and Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and missiles against Iran.[5][15] The program resumed in the mid-1980s.[15] In a 1987 letter to Khomeini, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Mohsen Rezaei included “the capability to produce a significant quantity of laser and nuclear weapons” among the resources he said Iran needed.[15]

Foreign assistance contributed to the program’s revival and expansion, including cooperation involving Pakistan, China, and Russia.[5] Iran secretly acquired equipment from Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan during its expansion in the 1990s; Khan’s designs enabled the construction of IR-1 centrifuges that became central to Iranian enrichment.[1] China signed a nuclear-cooperation agreement with Iran in 1990 that enabled Iranian engineers to receive training, and a Chinese-built research reactor became operational in 1994.[9] A 1995 contract with Russia provided for completion of Bushehr, which came online in 2011.[9]

04Facilities and Technical Applications

Natanz and Fordow are uranium-enrichment sites, while Isfahan contains facilities involved in converting uranium between forms used at different stages of the fuel cycle.[2] These installations form part of a chain extending from uranium mining through conversion, enrichment, and further processing.[2]

Bushehr represents a separate electricity-generating component of the program. Construction began under German companies, and the plant was later completed with Russian assistance and brought online in 2011.[1][9] The Arak heavy-water reactor represented a potential plutonium route distinct from the uranium-enrichment route pursued at Natanz and Fordow; it was reconfigured under the nuclear agreement to prevent weapons-grade plutonium production.[1][16]

The program’s technical development also involved centrifuge manufacturing and a transition from first-generation machines toward more advanced designs.[17] The IR-1 originated in equipment and designs obtained through Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network.[1] Under the JCPOA, operating limits and staged research provisions treated the number and type of centrifuges as central elements of the restrictions.[17]

Parchin became significant in connection with questions about military-related research and inspection access rather than commercial electricity generation.[11] After the 2015 agreement, Iran agreed to provide environmental samples from the site but did not allow inspectors to collect those samples themselves.[11] IAEA material also raised questions about a study of adapting a Shahab-3 missile warhead for a nuclear payload, with the agency seeking clarification.[16]

A further installation, the Isfahan Fuel Enrichment Plant, was declared to the IAEA on June 12, 2025. A planned inspection on June 13 could not proceed because bombing began that day.[8] By November 2026, the agency still had not inspected the plant and did not know its exact location, safeguards status, or whether it contained nuclear material.[8]

05Disclosure, Inspections, and International Pressure

The existence of previously undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak became public in 2002, bringing Iran’s enrichment and heavy-water activities to the center of international concern.[18] Iran said its activities were peaceful and subsequently permitted international inspections.[1] The disclosures accelerated a cycle of negotiations, sanctions, and pressure that eventually culminated in the 2015 agreement.[18][7]

One safeguards analysis identifies an Iranian opposition group as the source of the August 2002 disclosures and includes the Isfahan conversion facility among the installations revealed.[14] It says inspections of the disclosed sites were delayed until February 2003.[14] In September 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors called on Iran to suspend enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities.[18]

Iran reached an arrangement with Britain, France, and Germany in 2003 to suspend certain nuclear activities and agreed to ratify an Additional Protocol allowing expanded declarations and broader IAEA access.[18] Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003 but did not ratify it and announced in February 2006 that it would no longer adhere to it.[14] Iran also accepted modified Code 3.1 in 2003, requiring notification when a decision to construct a nuclear facility was made, but suspended that modification in 2007.[14]

In November 2004, the IAEA determined that enrichment, conversion, and plutonium-separation activities had not been declared in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and that a policy of concealment had continued until October 2003.[14] The same record describes inspection delays at Kalaye and Lavizan-Shian in 2003–2004 and restricted access to Parchin in January 2005.[14]

Iran began producing uranium hexafluoride at Isfahan in August 2005 and announced its first uranium enrichment at Natanz in 2006.[18] The IAEA referred the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which adopted Resolution 1696 in July 2006 and imposed sanctions through Resolution 1737 that December.[18]

In September 2009, the United States, France, and Britain announced that Iran had been constructing an undeclared enrichment facility at Fordow, inside a mountain near Qom.[18] Iran began producing uranium enriched to 20 percent at Natanz in February 2010 and at Fordow in December 2011.[16] A November 2011 IAEA assessment identified activities relevant to developing a nuclear explosive device within a structured program before 2004 and raised concerns that some related activities continued afterward.[18][19]

06The Nuclear Agreement and Its Unraveling

Iran and the P5+1—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany—concluded the JCPOA in Vienna on July 14, 2015, following negotiations that included an interim accord.[6][7] The agreement formally took effect on October 18, 2015. Implementation Day followed on January 16, 2016, after Iran completed the nuclear measures required for that stage.[7]

The agreement limited Iran to 5,060 operating IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz through 2024, capped enrichment at 3.67 percent, and restricted its enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms.[17][11] The permitted machines were first-generation IR-1 centrifuges, with staged provisions for manufacturing and operating more advanced centrifuges later.[17] The agreement confined authorized enrichment to limited operations at Natanz, while the Arak reactor was reconfigured so that it could not produce weapons-grade plutonium.[11][1]

The JCPOA established international monitoring and agreed procedures for access to nuclear and military sites, alongside a mechanism for restoring United Nations sanctions if Iran violated its commitments.[10][7] Related arrangements maintained an arms embargo for five years and ballistic-missile sanctions for eight years.[10]

The restrictions did not all expire together. Iran was to remain limited to IR-1 centrifuges through 2024, with staged permission for more advanced machines afterward, while October 18, 2025 was designated as Termination Day under the agreement’s schedule.[17]

A separate investigation into past nuclear activities reached a formal conclusion in December 2015.[19] IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano’s December 2 assessment found that a range of activities relevant to a nuclear explosive device had occurred before the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, with some activities continuing afterward.[19] It found “no credible indications” of such activities after 2009, while also identifying information gaps and limited Iranian cooperation. The IAEA Board of Governors closed the investigation file by consensus on December 15.[19]

President Donald Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and the United States reimposed sanctions.[7] Iran’s president responded that Iran would continue implementing the accord only if it continued receiving economic benefits.[7]

Iran subsequently moved beyond the agreement’s enrichment and stockpile limits. It breached the 3.67-percent enrichment cap in July 2019, returned to 20-percent enrichment at Fordow in January 2021, and began enriching to 60 percent in April 2021.[11][20]

By the end of 2020, the IAEA had reported about 2,500 kilograms of uranium across Iranian nuclear facilities.[11] At the beginning of February 2025, IAEA data showed 275 kilograms enriched to 60 percent.[21] The estimated stockpile at that enrichment level had risen to approximately 440 kilograms before the June 2025 attacks.[3][4] After the attacks, the central safeguards questions became the condition and location of that material and the agency’s lack of access to damaged facilities.[8][3]

07Military Strikes and the Verification Impasse

Israeli and American strikes in June 2025 damaged or destroyed important parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.[12] A June 24 assessment identified damage to Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant and underground cascade halls and assessed that strikes on Fordow likely rendered it inoperable. It also identified damage to uranium-conversion and uranium-metal facilities at Isfahan, near-total destruction of the TABA/TESA centrifuge-manufacturing site at Karaj, damage to facilities associated with weapons-development research, and damage to the Arak heavy-water reactor and its production plant.[12]

The attacks significantly damaged the program without eliminating all relevant capabilities.[12][4] Scientific knowledge, enriched material, and parts of the wider nuclear infrastructure remained, while residual uranium stocks and uninstalled centrifuges continued to present a proliferation risk.[12][4]

Six months after the war, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi had reported 12 inspection visits in Iran, none to sites struck during the campaign.[22] At that stage, the agency had found no satellite evidence of renewed enrichment, and Grossi estimated that the 60-percent uranium and most other enriched material remained at the damaged sites. The agency sought access to those locations and a detailed account of their condition and the uranium stockpile.[22]

Iran canceled a September 9, 2025 agreement intended to enable inspections to resume, initially at facilities that had not been attacked.[22] Grossi warned that the IAEA was losing its ability to verify Iran’s nuclear situation and could not confirm either the program’s peaceful character or the absence of diversion to unknown sites. Iran had not withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the time of that account.[22]

Diplomacy was also stalled by December 2025. Iran–United States talks had stopped ahead of a planned sixth round following the June Israeli strike, with the United States demanding an end to enrichment and Tehran insisting that enrichment was its right. Both sides signaled interest in further talks, but no practical diplomatic step had been taken at the time of the December account.[22]

In late February 2026, the IAEA remained unable to determine whether enrichment-related activities had been suspended or establish the size of the remaining stockpile because access to damaged facilities had not been granted. Some uranium enriched to as much as 60 percent had been stored in an underground tunnel complex at Isfahan.[3] An October 2026 assessment found no detected efforts to repair or rebuild facilities damaged in the 2025 and 2026 strikes, while the agency remained unable to verify the near-weapons-grade stockpile.[3]

By November 2026, the IAEA had still not verified the fate of the approximately 440 kilograms of 60-percent uranium reported before the June 2025 attacks.[3] A November 13 report said Iran had not permitted inspectors to return to facilities bombed in June 2025, while the agency continued to demand information about Iran’s enrichment facilities and enriched-uranium inventory.[8]

08Strategic Significance

The Iran–Iraq War connected nuclear policy with Iranian perceptions of vulnerability to unconventional attack.[15] In an October 2015 interview, former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani expressed a doctrine of “nuclear energy for all and nuclear weapons for none,” while also saying Iran had wanted an option to respond if enemies sought to use nuclear weapons.[15] Analyst Ariel Levite later interpreted Iraqi chemical attacks and perceived international inaction as central to the emergence of Iranian interest in nuclear deterrence.[4]

Iran’s growing stockpile and enrichment levels shortened estimates of the time required to produce weapons-usable material. By late 2024, American and independent analysts estimated that its breakout time had fallen to roughly one week.[20] Such estimates concern fissile-material production and do not by themselves establish how quickly Iran could assemble and deliver a completed weapon or whether its leadership had decided to do so.[11]

In 2018, Israel brought renewed international attention to past weapons-related activity by presenting an Iranian nuclear archive obtained from a secret Tehran compound.[23] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said it included 55,000 pages and 55,000 additional files on 183 compact discs and described Project Amad as a plan to develop five nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles.[24] The archive account attributed to the documents a goal of designing, producing, and testing five 10-kiloton warheads, with the project beginning in the early 1990s. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called the documents authentic.[23]

The program has also connected nonproliferation policy with sanctions and regional security.[7] The Trump administration objected that JCPOA sanctions relief could supply resources for Iranian regional activities and that the agreement did not restrict ballistic-missile development. Supporters instead emphasized its constraints on Iran’s nuclear activities and its mechanism for restoring sanctions.[7]

09Controversies and Assessments

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons, while assessments of past activities, the nuclear archive, and possible covert work have produced differing conclusions about its intentions and compliance.[3][23] Israeli claims concerning Minzadayi and interpretations of activity at Pickaxe Mountain raised further scrutiny, but the available account did not identify current evidence establishing a nuclear-weapons purpose for reported rebuilding at Taleghan-2.[3]

The JCPOA’s adequacy was disputed, particularly its sunset provisions, inspection arrangements, and exclusion of ballistic missiles. Supporters argued that restrictions on enrichment and the plutonium route delayed Iran’s ability to produce material for a weapon, while critics argued that access to undeclared sites and the agreement’s time-limited provisions left important risks unresolved.[6][25]

Estimates of the 2025 strikes’ effects also differed: President Trump declared the program destroyed, whereas a reported Defense Intelligence Agency assessment described a delay of several months.[26] A March 2026 assessment described prewar Iran as capable of moving from threshold status toward an explosive device within weeks and a crude weapon within months if its leaders decided to do so; these were analytical projections, not verified outcomes.[4] Levite subsequently argued that infrastructure damage did not necessarily change the timeline for a small number of simple warheads.[4] Post-strike stockpile estimates were not verified inventories, and the absence of detected reconstruction did not establish inactivity where direct access was lacking.[3]

Sources

  1. 1Ynetnews, Iran atomic sites targeted by diplomacy, sabotage, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  2. 2Globes, Assessing damage to the Iranian nuclear program, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  3. 3Jewish Virtual Library, Iran Continues to Advance Nuclear Program, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  4. 4CTech by Calcalist, “Iran may decide: If all that didn’t work, we should proceed like North Korea”, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  5. 5IMPACT-se, Iran’s Radical Education and Its Implications for Conflict with Israel and Nuclear Talks, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  6. 6Institute for National Security Studies, Iran Agreement Questions and Answers, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  7. 7Internet Archive, Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit (R43333, v96, July 20, 2018) : Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  8. 8Mako, IAEA: Very Concerned About the Nuclear Facility in Isfahan, Iran, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  9. 9Jewish Virtual Library, Iran Nuclear History: Program Development, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  10. 10Calcalist, History: A Nuclear Agreement Between Iran and the World Powers, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  11. 11Mako, The Nuclear Map | Not Only Natanz: This Is How the Iranians Are Approaching an Atomic Bomb, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  12. 12Jewish Virtual Library, Post-Attack Assessment of the First 12 Days of Israeli Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  13. 13Calcalist, Iran – News, Nuclear Program and War in the Middle East, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  14. 14Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Inspections: The Weak Link in a Nuclear Agreement with Iran, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  15. 15Institute for National Security Studies, From Nuclear Threshold to Nuclear Weapons? Reassessing Iran's Nuclear Doctrine, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  16. 16Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Understanding the Current State of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  17. 17Institute for National Security Studies, The JCPOA, Three Years On, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  18. 18Jewish Virtual Library, Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  19. 19Institute for National Security Studies, The IAEA Investigation into Iran's Nuclear Past: Why Was the PMD File Closed?, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  20. 20Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The West Keeps Rewarding Iran's Patience, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  21. 21Globes, Israel reportedly preparing to attack Iran, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  22. 22Institute for National Security Studies, The Deadlock Surrounding Iran’s Nuclear Program, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  23. 23Jewish Virtual Library, Iran’s Nuclear Archive, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  24. 24Globes, Trump: Iran nuclear pact "not an acceptable situation", accessed on November 17, 2026.
  25. 25Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Vital Points on the Iran Deal: Flaws and Positive Elements, accessed on November 17, 2026.
  26. 26Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Iran Approaches a Moment of Decision, accessed on November 17, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What is Iran’s nuclear program?

    Iran’s nuclear program is a national program encompassing nuclear research, electricity generation, uranium conversion and enrichment, and related fuel-cycle activities. Established with American assistance under the shah, it later became the subject of international inspections, sanctions, negotiations, and military strikes. Iran says its nuclear activities serve peaceful purposes, while Western governments have feared that the program could support nuclear-weapons development.

  • What are the main facilities in Iran’s nuclear program, and what do they do?

    Natanz and Fordow are uranium-enrichment sites, while facilities at Isfahan convert uranium between forms used in the fuel cycle. Bushehr generates electricity, and the Arak heavy-water reactor represented a potential plutonium route distinct from uranium enrichment. Parchin became significant in connection with questions about military-related research and inspection access.

  • How did Iran’s nuclear program begin and develop?

    Iran’s nuclear ambitions date to the 1950s, when the United States supported nuclear infrastructure under the shah through the Atoms for Peace initiative. An American-supplied research reactor began operating in Tehran in 1967, and German companies began building Bushehr in 1975. The 1979 Islamic Revolution interrupted the planned expansion, while the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 helped revive interest in nuclear technology. The program resumed in the mid-1980s, with foreign assistance contributing to its later expansion.

  • Why did Iran’s nuclear program become an international concern?

    Previously undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak became public in 2002, bringing Iran’s enrichment and heavy-water activities to the center of international concern. The IAEA later found that enrichment, conversion, and plutonium-separation activities had not been declared in accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations and that a policy of concealment had continued until October 2003. The disclosures accelerated negotiations, sanctions, and international pressure.

  • What restrictions did the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement impose?

    The JCPOA limited Iran to 5,060 operating IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz through 2024, capped enrichment at 3.67 percent, and restricted its enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms. It confined authorized enrichment to limited operations at Natanz and required the Arak reactor to be reconfigured so it could not produce weapons-grade plutonium. The agreement also established international monitoring and procedures for access to nuclear and military sites.

  • What happened to Iran’s nuclear program after the United States withdrew from the JCPOA?

    After the United States withdrew from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and reimposed sanctions, Iran moved beyond the agreement’s enrichment and stockpile limits. Iran breached the 3.67-percent enrichment cap in July 2019, returned to 20-percent enrichment at Fordow in January 2021, and began enriching to 60 percent in April 2021. Before the June 2025 attacks, Iran held an estimated 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent.

  • What is the status of Iran’s nuclear program after the June 2025 attacks?

    The June 2025 Israeli and American strikes damaged or destroyed important parts of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including facilities at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, Karaj, and Arak. By November 2026, the IAEA still had not verified the fate of the approximately 440 kilograms of 60-percent uranium reported before the attacks, because Iran had not permitted inspectors to return to facilities bombed in June 2025. The agency remained unable to verify important aspects of the program because it lacked access to damaged facilities and complete information about enriched material.