Views on the Nuclear Program of Iran

Iranian leaders have repeatedly described the country's nuclear program as entirely civilian, insisting that they are not developing nuclear weapons and have no intention of doing so.[2] Officials have cited two principal grounds for their position: the alleged lack of strategic utility of nuclear weapons, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's religious prohibition, or fatwa, against them.[2] At the same time, Iranian leaders have viewed the achievement of nuclear-threshold capability as important for deterring Iran's enemies and safeguarding the regime, a goal distinct from, but related to, the weapons question.[2]

Central to Iran's public argument is the claim that, as a signatory to the NPT, it holds an "inalienable right" to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.[3] Iranian officials have stated that enriched-uranium production is intended for current and future civilian nuclear reactors, and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared in 2025 that the issue of enrichment was "non-negotiable."[4] Iran has simultaneously cited its JCPOA pledge never to seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons.[4]

The legal basis of Iran's claimed enrichment right is disputed. The United States has argued that the NPT's peaceful-use provision is conditional on compliance with the treaty's nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, and that UN Security Council resolutions had required Iran to suspend enrichment-related activities.[5] An INSS analysis similarly contends that the NPT does not confer an unconditional right to enrich, and that Iran's interpretation is not supported by the treaty's nonproliferation provisions.[3] These are competing legal interpretations rather than adjudicated conclusions. The JCPOA text itself framed Iran's position as seeking an indigenous nuclear program for exclusively peaceful purposes and stated that successful implementation would enable Iran to enjoy its NPT right to nuclear energy in line with its obligations — a formulation that implicitly conditioned the right on compliance.[6]

A persistent feature of the debate has been the distinction intelligence agencies draw between Iran's technical capacity to produce a nuclear weapon and a political decision to do so. In March 2025, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified that "Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamanei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003."[4] The Congressional Research Service assessed as of May 2025 that Iran could produce enough enriched uranium for more than a dozen weapons within weeks if it chose to, while weaponization — engineering a deliverable device — would require further steps potentially taking as long as a year.[4]

IAEA findings have documented a significant buildup of enriched material. Iran increased its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent by approximately 50 percent between the agency's November 2024 and March 2025 reporting points, and the IAEA reported that it could not perform some of the verification and monitoring activities envisaged under the JCPOA.[7] The CRS report distinguishes these findings from evidence that Iran had decided to build a weapon.[7]

International attention to the program intensified in 2002, when an Iranian dissident group revealed the construction of a uranium-enrichment facility and a heavy-water reactor; the international community expressed deep suspicion that the activities included weapons development.[8] A 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate judged with high confidence that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, while the IAEA suggested in 2008 that evidence pointed to continued nuclear development after that date — an early illustration of persistent divergences between assessments.[8]

Encyclopaedia Britannica reports that most observers believe Iran seeks at minimum the capability to develop a nuclear weapon, and that its enrichment and stockpiling exceed civilian needs.[9] A common interpretation of Iran's perceived motive is that acquiring that threshold capability could help position the regime against security threats, even absent a final decision to construct a device.[9] A 2025 Washington Institute article noted that U.S. officials disputed how much weight to give the absence of a formal authorization when Iran was technically close to producing highly enriched uranium, while contrasting the U.S. Intelligence Community assessment with Israeli claims that Iran had begun a rapid, secret effort to develop weapon components.[10]

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reached by Iran and the United States, China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, represented a major attempt to constrain Iran's nuclear program through negotiated limits. The agreement capped enrichment at 3.67 percent, limited enriched-uranium stockpiles to 300 kilograms, restricted enrichment operations to the Natanz facility, removed the Arak reactor core, and established expanded IAEA monitoring.[11] Most experts assessed that these provisions would delay Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon by at least a decade.[11]

A Washington Institute study-group assessment described the agreement as having major achievements alongside real limitations. If fully implemented, monitored, and verified, the assessment judged that its restrictions were likely to prevent an Iranian nuclear breakout for up to 15 years.[12] Concrete measures cited included the 300-kilogram cap on Iran's low-enriched uranium stockpile, removal of the Arak reactor core, and monitoring of core elements of Iran's supply chain for 25 years.[12] The assessment also warned that restrictions would lapse over time and raised concerns about timely access to undeclared sites and verification of possible military dimensions.[12]

President Barack Obama defended the agreement in August 2015 as preferable to war and as the most effective available means of preventing a nuclear threat.[13] He cited the removal of two-thirds of Iran's centrifuges, the elimination of 98 percent of its enriched-uranium stockpile for 15 years, and around-the-clock monitoring of key facilities.[13] Obama argued that some provisions — including the prohibition on obtaining a nuclear weapon and robust inspections — were permanent, while other limits had specified durations.[13] He contended that military strikes might delay the program only "by a few years at best," could lead Iran to expel inspectors or move facilities underground, and could weaken the international sanctions coalition.[13]

One year after the agreement's signing, U.S. implementation coordinator Stephen Mull reported that Iran had disconnected two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity, ended enrichment at Fordow, reduced its low-enriched uranium stockpile by 98 percent, and filled the Arak reactor core with concrete.[14] Mull said these steps extended the estimated breakout time from two or three months to at least a year.[14] RAND analyst Dalia Dassa Kaye concluded that Iran had rolled back key elements of its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, while continuing concern about Iran's regional conduct and provisions due to expire.[14]

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has long been a central Israeli national-security objective.[15] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu became a prominent international opponent of the agreement.[1] The Israeli cabinet rejected the JCPOA unanimously.[1] Netanyahu called the agreement "a bad mistake of historic proportions," arguing that it would leave Iran's nuclear infrastructure in place, ultimately legitimize Iran as a nuclear-threshold state, and allow restrictions to lapse.[1]

In his March 2015 address to the U.S. Congress, Netanyahu framed the choice as one between a bad deal and a better deal, not between diplomacy and war.[16] He argued that the proposed inspection regime was inadequate and that sanctions should not be lifted while Iran continued regional aggression, support for terrorism, and threats against Israel.[16] His objections included that the agreement failed to address Iran's ballistic-missile development or its sponsorship of armed groups, and that Iran might use retained knowledge to make nuclear advances after restrictions expired.[7] In a September 2017 UN speech, he called on the agreement's signatories to "fix it or nix it."[7]

In April 2015, Netanyahu said explicitly that Israel did not object to an Iranian nuclear program for civilian purposes but could not accept a military one.[17] He argued that the proposed agreement would allow Iran to retain and expand nuclear infrastructure he considered unnecessary for civilian use, and that a better agreement should roll back that infrastructure entirely while also requiring Iran to end support for terrorism and threats against Israel.[17] He also warned that sanctions relief could finance Iran's military activities and regional proxies, and that the agreement could spur a wider Middle Eastern nuclear arms race.[1]

Former Israeli ambassador and foreign-ministry director-general Dore Gold described Netanyahu's congressional address as exposing a serious disagreement between Jerusalem and Washington, while also noting that the opposition risked making support for Israel a partisan issue in the United States.[18]

Israeli views on the JCPOA and on how to address the Iranian nuclear threat were never monolithic. The CRS recorded that some current and former Israeli officials favored preserving the agreement because it temporarily constrained Iranian nuclear activity, or because they doubted that international agreement on stricter terms was achievable.[7] One described division was between officials who preferred keeping the deal while focusing on challenges in Syria and Netanyahu's camp, which favored using the opportunity to pressure Iran economically and militarily.[7]

Israel's Atomic Energy Commission reportedly endorsed the JCPOA in October 2015: the nuclear experts heading the commission concluded that the agreement would prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon and that violations would be readily noticeable to the relevant observers.[19] This technical assessment stood in contrast to Netanyahu's and other political critics' view that the agreement was inadequate.[19]

In January 2016, IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot described the nuclear agreement and sanctions relief as a strategic turning point, identifying both risks and opportunities, and said Iran's ambition to obtain nuclear weapons would continue to require close monitoring.[20] He separately warned that improved Iranian economic conditions could increase funding for Hezbollah and Hamas.[20]

By 2022, a reported split had opened within Military Intelligence. Senior officials including Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva, Research Division chief Amit Saar, Strategic Division chief Oren Setter, and Iran Division chief Tal Kelman were reported to favor a renewed agreement on the grounds that even a flawed deal could buy time for Israel to prepare a credible military option, whereas the absence of an agreement had accelerated Iran's nuclear progress.[21] IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi, however, had publicly called a U.S. return to the agreement misguided.[22] One reported framing within the Intelligence Directorate was that both an agreement and a military attack were bad alternatives, but that an agreement could delay the program, create time to improve Israeli capabilities, and leave other Iranian threats — including missiles and terrorism — to be addressed separately.[22]

The 2013 INSS strategic survey had similarly assessed that deepening Israel's strategic dialogue with the United States and reaching an agreement with Iran to prevent a military breakthrough was strategically preferable to an attack, treating a strike as a contingency if other approaches failed and noting that it would require coordination with Washington.[20]

Public concern about a nuclear Iran has been pronounced in Israeli society. A March 2012 poll conducted by Tel Aviv University professor Camil Fuchs for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs found that 77 percent of Jewish Israeli respondents considered a nuclear Iran an existential threat, 61 percent believed Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel if it acquired them, and 60 percent agreed that a military attack was the only way to stop Iran's nuclear program.[23] A further 65 percent thought the cost of living under the shadow of an Iranian nuclear bomb would exceed the cost of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities.[23] These findings apply to Jewish Israelis specifically; the poll's published account omitted sample size, sampling method, and margin of error.[23]

A 2010 article by Tel Aviv University researcher Brandon Friedman described Israel's policy debate as especially time-sensitive, focused more narrowly than discussions in the United States and Europe, and organized around four principal options: engagement, sanctions, deterrence, and military strikes.[24] He noted that the Netanyahu coalition doubted engagement and inducement could prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability, and that Israeli debate typically centered on the choice between sanctions and military action.[24] A May 2009 survey he cited found that 49 percent of Israelis said Israel should give the United States an opportunity to find a diplomatic solution.[24] Friedman argued that the main difference between Israel and other states concerned the urgency and timing of action rather than the shared stated goal of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.[24]

In a 2012 discussion, Begin-Sadat Center director Efraim Inbar argued for military action, contending that sanctions would not stop Iran and that a nuclear Iran would be difficult to deter and could trigger a regional arms race.[25] Eytan Gilboa argued that negotiations and sanctions could work only if backed by a credible threat of force.[25] Hillel Frisch argued that the United States retained the ability to address the Iranian threat if necessary, while Joshua Teitelbaum and Ze'ev Maghen focused on regional and ideological context without explicitly choosing between a strike and sanctions.[25]

Those warning against a military strike included former Mossad director Meir Dagan, who argued an attack could give Iran a pretext to pursue nuclear weapons and cause regional war.[26] Former Mossad director Ephraim Halevy said Iran's capabilities were "far from posing an existential threat to Israel."[26] Labor leader Shelly Yachimovich opposed what she called a "reckless adventure" and urged Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak to focus on diplomacy.[26] Critics of a strike also warned that Iran's nuclear facilities and accumulated expertise could not necessarily be eliminated by air attacks, that a strike could delay the program only temporarily, and that Iran might rebuild facilities in harder-to-attack locations.[26] They further cautioned that an attack could rally Iranian support around hardliners, that retaliation could lead to wider conflict and higher oil prices, and that former U.S. officials and diplomats favored pursuing negotiations, diplomacy, sanctions, and international cooperation while maintaining preparedness.[26]

A 2021 opinion article in Ynet argued that sanctions, political pressure, and military threats could not reliably prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons if it decided to do so, and characterized Iran as a rational actor unlikely to use such weapons because of the danger of retaliation.[27] The author argued that Israel should consider deterrence, economic engagement, and containing Iran's regional activity rather than relying on threats to eliminate the program militarily — an opinion that illustrates the range of views in the debate.[27]

American Jewish organizations and communities were divided over the JCPOA. An August 2015 American Jewish Committee survey of 1,030 American Jews found divided views: 51 percent approved of the agreement and 47 percent disapproved.[28] On whether the deal would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, only 5 percent were very confident, 31 percent somewhat confident, 30 percent not so confident, and 33 percent not confident at all.[28] Asked how the deal would affect Israel's security, 43 percent said Israel would be more threatened, 18 percent said less threatened, and 38 percent said the situation would stay the same.[28]

Organizationally, the divisions were also sharp. AIPAC was one of the agreement's strongest opponents, while J Street argued that the agreement had effectively constrained Iran's nuclear program until the United States abandoned it.[29] The National Jewish Democratic Council supported the Obama-era agreement, while groups on the right criticized it as leaving Iran a major threat to Israel.[29] The pattern illustrated political divisions in American Jewish life rather than organizational consensus.[29]

President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, publicly stating that he believed the agreement would delay rather than prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, and criticizing the deal's limits and sunset provisions.[11] Netanyahu welcomed the withdrawal.[7] The deal also did not restrict Iran's ballistic-missile program or other conventional arms, and sanctions related to missiles, terrorism, and human rights had remained in place throughout the JCPOA period.[11]

After the United States reimposed sanctions, Iran announced in 2019 that it would gradually pull back from its commitments.[8] By November 2020, Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile had reached 12 times the level permitted by the deal.[8] In January 2021, Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent, compared with the JCPOA cap of 3.67 percent, and from February 23, 2021, Iran fully suspended implementation of its nuclear commitments.[8][29]

American Foreign Policy Council analyst Ilan Berman argued even during the agreement's operation that it had not fundamentally changed Iranian behavior, criticizing the scale of sanctions relief and its potential regional effects.[14] By contrast, supporters of the agreement argued that its collapse illustrated the danger of abandoning verified constraints.[29] The Democratic National Committee's 2019 resolution called for the United States to return to its JCPOA obligations and described the agreement as a key nonproliferation achievement, citing the reduction of Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile by 97 percent and the establishment of an extensive IAEA verification regime.[30]

INSS analysis describes Israel's preferred approach following the 2025 war as seeking a restrictive agreement with intrusive IAEA inspections while retaining the ability to enforce red lines and disrupt any Iranian effort to break out toward weapons.[15] Israeli policy considerations as described in the analysis included concerns that an agreement alone might not ensure long-term compliance and that sanctions relief could strengthen the Iranian regime.[15] As of the INSS article's publication, there was no evidence that Iran's leadership had decided to pursue a nuclear breakout.[2]

Analysts Amos Yadlin and Ari Heistein presented a view that the JCPOA had set Iran's nuclear program back by several years at least, while warning that Iran could be better positioned to break out in 2025–2030 than before the agreement if it remained in effect under existing terms.[6] They recommended that Israel and the United States develop a parallel plan to address Iran's nuclear and regional activities while Israel maintained a viable military option.[6] Their assessment illustrated a position that criticism of the JCPOA's adequacy did not preclude recognizing that it had imposed a temporary setback.[6]

Nonproliferation experts have also called for a new, verifiable, long-term agreement covering fissile-material production, weaponization, and delivery systems — going beyond the JCPOA's scope — and have criticized that agreement for monitoring weaponization activities less strongly than nuclear activities, and for restrictions that expired over time regardless of whether the IAEA had verified the completeness of Iran's declarations.[29]

European governments who were parties to the JCPOA viewed it as the most effective available instrument for keeping Iran on a path away from a nuclear bomb. German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz described the agreement as a prudent means of achieving that goal and said Germany and other countries should seek solutions through agreements and talks.[31] He acknowledged that the deal was not a final resolution and that progress was also needed to address Iranian missiles capable of reaching Israel and other countries.[31]

Scholz said Germany and the EU differed from the Netanyahu government in their assessment of the situation but shared the goal of ensuring that Iran's nuclear program remained verifiably peaceful.[31] He described preserving the agreement as a way to protect Israel — a framing that directly engaged Israeli critics who argued that the deal endangered Israeli security.[31] His position represented a European argument that diplomacy and verified limits served Israeli as well as broader international interests, despite differing from the Netanyahu government's assessment.[31]

Virtually every dimension of the debate over Iran's nuclear program involves contested assessments. Iran's claim to a peaceful program and an NPT-based right to enrichment is disputed by the United States, Israel, and others who argue that such rights are conditional on compliance with nonproliferation and safeguards obligations, and that Iran's enrichment levels and stockpile volumes exceed any civilian justification.[3][5] The legal interpretation of the NPT on this point has not been formally adjudicated, and the competing positions reflect genuine disagreement about the treaty's meaning.

Assessments of the JCPOA's effectiveness are similarly contested. Supporters emphasized that its limits, monitoring, and breakout-timeline extension represented real nonproliferation gains; critics argued that it preserved dangerous nuclear infrastructure, failed to address missiles and regional activities, and left Iran better positioned once restrictions expired.[1][12][13] These are competing evaluations of the same set of facts rather than questions with a single correct answer.

Perhaps most consequentially, Israeli and U.S. intelligence assessments of Iranian intentions have publicly diverged. U.S. intelligence has distinguished the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium from a decision to build a weapon, while Israeli assessments have at times characterized the threat as more immediate.[10] The absence of a formal Iranian leadership decision to weaponize, as reported by U.S. intelligence, coexists with Iran's rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium — a tension that has structured the policy debate without resolving it.[4][7]