Israel and the Nuclear Program of Iran

Israel’s approach to Iran combines efforts to influence American and international policy with strengthening its own capacity to counter or deter Iran and its regional allies.[1] Israeli officials have generally sought objectives extending beyond preventing the assembly of a nuclear weapon: ending Iranian uranium enrichment, reducing missile capabilities, and curbing support for armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen.[1] These broader objectives connect the nuclear issue to Israel’s concerns about Iranian military power and regional activity.[1]

Since 2009, Israeli strategy has rested on three principal instruments: clandestine countermeasures, intensive diplomacy, and the presentation of a concrete military option.[2] Israel accepted economic, diplomatic, and security costs in pursuing this combination of measures.[2] During Netanyahu’s premiership after 2009, Israeli leaders repeatedly threatened military action intended to destroy or delay Iran’s nuclear program.[6] Earlier Israeli preemptive attacks on nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 formed part of the historical context for these threats.[6]

The central technical distinction is between producing sufficient weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and completing a nuclear weapon.[7] Iran’s expansion of enrichment after 2019 shortened the material-production timeline, but producing a weapon would require additional steps whose assessed duration remained unclear in the supplied October 2026 assessment.[7] Monitoring, access to facilities, the survival of enriched material, and Iran’s retained scientific knowledge therefore matter alongside physical damage to installations.[7][8]

Iran announced cooperation with the United States on peaceful atomic energy in 1957, opened a Tehran nuclear research center with an American-supplied reactor in 1967, signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, and ratified it in 1970.[9] Formal American and European nuclear cooperation ended with the Islamic Revolution of 1979.[9] Israel and Iran had maintained friendly relations before the revolution.[9]

The international crisis developed around the disclosure in 2002 of undeclared facilities at Natanz and Arak, including uranium-enrichment and heavy-water activities.[10][11] Iran said its nuclear work was peaceful and invited International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, while suspicions about weapons development generated pressure for suspension.[10][11] In 2003, Iran reached an agreement with Britain, France, and Germany to suspend suspect activities.[11] Enrichment was frozen during 2003–2005, while construction continued on a uranium-conversion plant at Isfahan.[12]

Iran produced uranium gas in August 2005 and, in 2006, broke IAEA seals at Natanz and began uranium enrichment.[11] The IAEA referred the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which adopted a resolution in July 2006 and imposed sanctions that December; American and European sanctions followed.[11] By November 2007, Iran reported operating at least 3,000 centrifuges.[11]

The disclosure in 2009 of a heavily fortified underground enrichment facility near Qom intensified international pressure.[10] Further United Nations sanctions were accompanied by American and European Union measures targeting Iran’s oil and natural-gas industries.[10] Iran nevertheless continued developing centrifuge infrastructure during the first decade of the 2000s despite pressure and attacks on enrichment facilities.[13] Its conduct during this period included avoiding enrichment and stockpile thresholds that Israel and the international community had treated as red lines.[13]

Direct American–Iranian negotiations mediated by Oman began in 2013, against a background of mounting nuclear tensions.[13] Following Hassan Rouhani’s election that year, Iran renewed negotiations with the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.[10] The American approach combined engagement with pressure, including sanctions if Iran did not negotiate seriously.[14]

An interim agreement reached in Geneva in November 2013 was intended to last six months, halt enrichment above 5 percent, and provide modest sanctions relief.[15] It was presented as a first step toward a broader settlement incorporating additional restrictions and verification for peaceful nuclear use.[15] A framework agreement followed in April 2015.[10]

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, was concluded in Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran and the P5+1—the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—with the European Union also participating in the agreement.[13][16] Its stated purpose was to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.[16] Phased sanctions relief depended on IAEA verification that Iran had implemented key nuclear commitments.[16]

The agreement limited enrichment to 3.67 percent and to one facility at Natanz, reduced the enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms, and provided for IAEA monitoring of related activities.[17] It constrained both uranium enrichment and the heavy-water reactor program, while also restricting advanced-centrifuge research.[5][18] Nuclear-related sanctions were to be lifted, but some sanctions concerning missiles, terrorism, and human rights remained.[17] A snapback mechanism allowed the restoration of United Nations sanctions in response to Iranian noncompliance.[17] In January 2016, the IAEA confirmed completion of the measures required for Implementation Day.[11]

Netanyahu opposed the emerging agreement while stating that Israel did not object to a civilian nuclear program in Iran.[4] In his March 3, 2015, address to the United States Congress, he argued that the proposed arrangement would preserve too much Iranian nuclear infrastructure, leave an insufficient breakout interval, and allow major restrictions to expire after roughly a decade.[19] He contrasted an American estimate of approximately one year with a shorter Israeli estimate and urged that restrictions remain while Iran continued what he described as aggression, support for terrorism, and threats against Israel.[19]

Israel’s effort to prevent the agreement did not succeed, and the congressional speech strained relations with the Obama administration and alienated some Democrats.[20] In 2016, Israel’s Defense Ministry maintained that Iranian statements toward Israel and ballistic-missile activity remained concerns even if Iran complied with the nuclear agreement.[21] It also emphasized that disagreement over the agreement did not diminish the importance of the American–Israeli alliance.[21]

Mossad agents seized Iranian nuclear documents from a Tehran warehouse on January 31, 2018.[22] On April 30, Netanyahu announced that Israel had obtained more than 100,000 documents concerning Project Amad, Iran’s secret military nuclear program.[3] The material included an Iranian document indicating an earlier intention to design, produce, and test five missile-mounted nuclear warheads.[3] Reported descriptions of the collection included 55,000 pages and another 55,000 files stored on 183 compact discs.[23]

The archive became an instrument in Israel’s campaign to influence international opinion before the American decision on the JCPOA.[3] Israel presented the disclosure as evidence of Iranian deception and grounds for opposing the agreement in its existing form.[3] Western European governments seeking to retain the agreement instead argued that the material reinforced the value of an arrangement containing supervisory mechanisms.[3]

On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA and the restoration of sanctions, a decision Netanyahu strongly supported.[5][24] Other parties sought to preserve the agreement.[18] The renewed American sanctions campaign did not force Iran to capitulate or negotiate a better agreement.[24]

Iran announced in May 2019 that it would begin stepping back from its commitments.[25] Beginning in July, the IAEA verified activities exceeding JCPOA limits, and the range of such activities subsequently expanded.[5] Iran increased both its enriched-uranium stockpile and enrichment levels.[26] A July 2020 explosion damaged a centrifuge-production plant at Natanz; Iran blamed Israel.[25] Another attack on Natanz in April 2021 was reported as likely Israeli action.[25]

In February 2021, Iran ceased implementing the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement, and JCPOA-specific monitoring and verification stopped.[5] Iran began enriching uranium to 60 percent that April, while indirect negotiations to restore the agreement opened in Vienna without producing a settlement.[25] By early 2023, an estimate placed the time needed to produce sufficient weapons material at approximately 12 days, although the additional time for weaponization remained unclear.[26]

The deterioration of the agreement coincided with a broader escalation in direct conflict.[25] Iran attacked Israel directly in April and October 2024.[25] Israel’s October 26 response to the October 1 missile attack struck Iranian air defenses and sites associated with its missile program.[25]

American–Iranian talks mediated by Oman began in April 2025 and centered on restrictions on enrichment and other nuclear activities.[27] Iran opposed complete dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure.[27] Israeli concerns about restoring the earlier framework included the accumulated technical knowledge and research that, in a contemporary assessment, would prevent a return to the earlier one-year breakout interval.[27]

A June report placed Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to as much as 60 percent at 408.6 kilograms, roughly half again its previous size.[28] Using an IAEA yardstick, the report said this could provide material for nine nuclear weapons if further enriched; this was not a finding that Iran possessed nine weapons.[28] The report also described undeclared nuclear activities involving material at three locations under investigation.[28]

Israel launched Operation Rising Lion in the early hours of June 13, 2025, amid stalled nuclear negotiations.[27][29] Approximately 200 Israeli aircraft struck about 100 targets, including nuclear facilities, military sites, and regime infrastructure.[29] The opening attacks killed senior military leaders and several nuclear scientists and significantly damaged Natanz, air-defense systems, and missile infrastructure.[29][30] The United States said it had not participated in the initial Israeli strikes.[29]

Israeli strikes hit nuclear facilities or related sites in Natanz, Isfahan, Parchin, Bonab, Tehran, and Arak.[30] Israel’s broader objectives included blocking Iran’s path to nuclear weapons, limiting its missile program, and countering its regional allies.[8] In a subsequent briefing, the Israeli military spokesperson said that forces had struck more than 1,100 targets since June 13.[31] A Tehran facility producing and testing rotors for advanced centrifuges was also struck.[30] Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles.[6]

Israeli leaders described Iran’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs as existential threats.[6] A June 17 communication to the United Nations formally conveyed Israel’s explanation that it had launched an operation against Iran’s nuclear-weapon and ballistic-missile programs.[32] During the conflict, Netanyahu also identified regime change as a possible outcome.[6]

On June 22, the United States struck Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.[26] Fordow’s deep underground location was particularly important because Israel could damage the Iranian program but could not destroy that facility with its own air power.[26] A ceasefire announced on June 24 ended the 12-day conflict.[26] Israel accepted an American proposal for a bilateral ceasefire, and Netanyahu declared that Israel had “removed the threat of annihilation by nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.”[32][6]

After the June 2025 strikes, the IAEA withdrew its inspectors from Iran.[5] The 408.6-kilogram stockpile had last been seen by inspectors on June 10, and the agency subsequently sought access to account for it.[33] Without access to nuclear sites, the agency no longer had the oversight needed to verify its status.[33]

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—the E3—invoked the JCPOA snapback mechanism on August 28, 2025.[5] United Nations sanctions were reimposed on September 27, and the agreement effectively ceased to be in force.[5] These developments replaced the earlier framework of nuclear restrictions and phased sanctions relief with renewed sanctions.[5]

The United States and Israel began renewed attacks on targets in Iran on February 28, 2026, after weeks of negotiations over limits on Iran’s nuclear program and the reach of its military.[34] A June 2026 American–Iranian memorandum of understanding included further nuclear negotiations and an Iranian reaffirmation that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons.[1][7] Iranian government statements after February 2026 likewise indicated no intention to develop such weapons.[7]

Netanyahu said Israel was not a party to the memorandum and was not restricting its own actions to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.[1] The memorandum did not address Iran’s missile program or support for proxy militias, leaving a gap between its scope and Israel’s broader objectives.[1] The nuclear issue remained unresolved, while the October 2026 assessments did not establish how much the 2025 and 2026 attacks had reduced Iran’s enrichment or weapons-production capabilities.[1][7]

Clandestine countermeasures have sought to disrupt the physical infrastructure and personnel supporting Iran’s nuclear work without relying exclusively on declared military operations.[6][2] During the 2010s, Israel apparently carried out covert actions against Iranian facilities and personnel, with at least one reportedly involving American assistance.[6] These activities were reported or assessed operations rather than a fully acknowledged public record.[6]

Diplomatic pressure has operated through sanctions, efforts to influence American decisions, and campaigns against arrangements Israeli leaders considered insufficient.[1][2] Israel’s opposition to the JCPOA focused on the survival of enrichment infrastructure, the temporary character of major restrictions, and the exclusion of broader missile and regional-security concerns.[4][19] Its position did not necessarily entail opposition to all peaceful Iranian nuclear activity: Netanyahu explicitly distinguished civilian nuclear use from infrastructure he regarded as unnecessary for that purpose.[4]

The military option faces physical and technical limits because Iran’s program is dispersed, fortified, and potentially able to use secret facilities.[27] Destroying installations cannot erase the knowledge or technology held by Iranian scientists.[27] Surviving centrifuges, fissile material, or small facilities could support covert reconstruction, while an attack could encourage Iranian leaders to view nuclear weapons as necessary for deterrence.[27] These were prospective risks identified in strategic analysis, not findings that those outcomes had occurred.[27]

Postwar policy therefore involved a choice between pursuing an agreement with stronger monitoring and relying more heavily on intelligence, military action, and covert operations.[8] More stringent supervision could help preserve military gains, but an agreement alone would not guarantee compliance or eliminate covert activity.[8] A strategy without an agreement could require prolonged operations and sustained American–Israeli coordination.[8]

The nuclear issue has tested the relationship between Israel’s independent security decisions and its reliance on the United States.[1][6] Israel’s 2015 campaign against an agreement pursued by Washington, its support for the 2018 withdrawal, and the combination of Israeli and American operations in 2025 illustrate different forms of that interaction.[6][20] The June 2026 memorandum again highlighted the distinction between American diplomacy and Israel’s stated freedom of action.[1]

A 2016 academic assessment identified uncertainty about whether the United States would use force in Israel’s defense as a factor that could leave Israeli leaders feeling responsible for confronting the Iranian challenge alone.[35] It also examined whether the nuclear agreement represented a shift from preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons toward containing Iran.[35] These questions concern the credibility of security commitments as well as the technical design of nuclear restrictions.[35]

The Iranian case also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing a damaged nuclear infrastructure from an eliminated nuclear capability.[8][27] Stockpiles, scientific expertise, weapon-design work, delivery systems, monitoring access, and political decisions affect different stages of the path to a weapon.[7][27] Consequently, the assessment of Israeli policy cannot rest solely on target counts or the destruction of individual facilities.[7][8]

Iran has maintained that its nuclear program is peaceful, while Israeli officials have characterized it as a weapons threat.[11][32] A November 2011 IAEA report identified activities relevant to developing a nuclear explosive device at least until 2003.[11] American assessments said the weapons program stopped in late 2003; a public 2025 assessment said Iran was not building a weapon and its then supreme leader had not reauthorized that program.[7] In March 2026, the IAEA director general said the agency had no information indicating a structured, systematic weapons-building program, although the program’s status had become unclear after inspectors withdrew.[7]

The archive established a major historical focus for debate but did not supply recent evidence of post-2015 military-nuclear work in Netanyahu’s public presentation.[3] Stronger interpretations emphasized weapon designs, plans for five warheads by 2003, concealment methods, and previously unknown facilities or activities.[22] The distinction between past weapons-related activity and proof of a current weapons-building decision remained essential.[3][7]

Israeli assessments of the JCPOA were not uniform: former defense minister Moshe Yaalon called the American withdrawal “a historic mistake,” and other former security officials argued that the agreement had constrained Iran.[24] Charles Freilich’s assessment, discussed in the Jewish Review of Books, credited the agreement with a setback of several years if sustained, while warning of more favorable Iranian breakout conditions in 2025–2030.[36]

Damage estimates after the 2025 attacks ranged from months of delay in a preliminary, low-confidence American assessment to years of rebuilding in a later CIA assessment.[26] Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir said Iran was no longer a nuclear-threshold state, whereas analyst Ariel Levite later emphasized surviving enriched material and the difference between severely damaging the program and eliminating the threat.[37][38] Reports that much of the 60-percent stockpile survived still required verification and Iranian cooperation.[39]

The legal justification was also disputed: Israel invoked self-defense against an imminent threat, while scholars Marko Milanovic and Ben Saul questioned the evidence of imminence, capability, intent, and exhaustion of diplomacy.[32][40] Other experts cited a potentially less stringent imminence standard for weapons of mass destruction or the existence of an ongoing armed conflict.[40] Separately, Iran, China, and Russia disputed the E3’s standing to trigger snapback sanctions; the E3 defended its authority, and the disagreement continued in Security Council discussions into September 2026.[5]