Israel–Japan Relations

Israel was the first Middle Eastern country to recognize Japan, while Japan was the first Asian country to recognize Israel.[1] Their relationship encompasses research, investment, commerce, culture, and defense, with technological cooperation becoming especially prominent in the twenty-first century.[1] The countries marked their seventieth anniversary of diplomatic relations in 2022 and subsequently pursued additional arrangements concerning travel, communications, and trade.[4]

For much of the relationship’s early history, Japan’s extensive connections with Arab countries and reliance on imported energy limited the scope of engagement with Israel.[2] The weakening of the Arab boycott around the 1991 Madrid Conference helped open the Israeli market to Japanese consumer products and facilitated cooperation agreements during the 1990s.[2] Later, reciprocal visits by Benjamin Netanyahu and Shinzo Abe helped establish a more extensive framework for economic and security cooperation.[4]

Diplomatic relations have also included Japanese participation in regional development and peace initiatives involving Israel and its neighbors.[5] Alongside bilateral commerce, the countries have maintained educational exchanges, cultural programs, and humanitarian connections that extend beyond government-to-government diplomacy.[3][6]

Japanese contact with the Zionist movement preceded Israel’s establishment.[7] A historical commentary published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs identifies Japan’s support for the Balfour Declaration and a January 6, 1919 letter from Japanese ambassador Sutemi Chinda to Chaim Weizmann supporting a Jewish national home as early milestones; it also notes Japan’s participation in the 1920 San Remo Conference, which assigned the mandate for the territory to Britain.[7]

Japan’s early support for Zionism reflected calculations about British support for Japanese interests in Asia, the political importance of the Balfour Declaration, and the relatively low diplomatic costs of supporting Zionism when Japan had limited engagement with Arab states.[8] This support later declined as Japan drew closer to Nazi Germany and sought to avoid antagonizing Germany and Arab allies such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, although Japan continued helping thousands of Jewish refugees escaping Nazi persecution.[8]

During the 1947 United Nations discussions on partitioning Palestine, Japan remained under Allied occupation and lacked independent foreign relations.[8] It was not a UN member and took no position on partition; Japanese newspapers nevertheless covered Israel’s establishment on May 14, 1948, and the War of Independence, largely through news-agency reporting.[8]

In April 1952, as Japan prepared to regain sovereignty, its Foreign Ministry wrote to other countries expressing interest in establishing diplomatic relations.[8] Israeli officials debated relations with a former Axis power, but Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion decided to proceed as part of expanding Israel’s presence in Asia.[8] Japan recognized Israel on May 15, and the governments announced an exchange of legations.[6]

Israel opened its Tokyo legation in December 1952, establishing its first diplomatic representation on the Asian continent without requiring Japan immediately to provide equivalent resident representation.[8] In 1955, Japan’s minister in Ankara presented credentials as nonresident minister to Israel; Japan subsequently appointed a resident minister and opened a legation.[6] Both legations became embassies in 1963, with Japan’s embassy located in Tel Aviv.[6][8] A 1970 agreement addressed mutual aid and the formulation of legal documents.[6]

The Arab economic boycott remained a central constraint until the late 1980s, during a period when Arab oil accounted for approximately 70% of Japan’s energy imports.[8] Israel left much of the international effort against Japanese boycott compliance to organizations including the B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League.[8] During the October 1973 Yom Kippur War and Arab oil embargo, Arab governments demanded that Japan sever relations with Israel.[8] Japan considered doing so, but US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that a break could harm American interests and his Middle East diplomacy.[8] Japan retained diplomatic relations while issuing a statement supporting Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967 and Palestinian rights under relevant UN resolutions.[8]

Japan permitted a Palestine Liberation Organization office in Tokyo in 1976, and Yasser Arafat visited in 1981 as a guest of the Parliamentary League for Japan-Palestine Friendship.[8] These contacts accompanied Japan’s continuing efforts to manage relations with Israel, Arab states, and the United States.[8]

Relations improved from the late 1980s amid the effects of the Israel–Egypt peace treaty, greater Japanese use of nuclear power, reduced reliance on Middle Eastern oil, and growing interest in Israel as a market for Japanese products, especially automobiles.[8] Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Japan in September 1985.[9] Business exchanges intensified in 1987, when an Israeli Manufacturers Association mission visited Japan and a Keidanren-led Japanese delegation visited Israel; economic conferences followed in both countries in 1988.[6]

President Chaim Herzog attended Emperor Hirohito’s funeral in February 1989, and Foreign Minister Moshe Arens also visited Japan that year.[8][9] Toyota lifted its prohibition on selling cars in Israel in April 1991.[8] Israel’s restraint after being struck by 39 Scud missiles during the First Gulf War also contributed to a more favorable Japanese attitude.[8] In 1992, Japan’s Foreign Ministry advised Japanese firms to stop cooperating with the Arab boycott and called on Arab countries to end it, after which bilateral trade increased.[6]

Japan joined the multilateral negotiations associated with the Oslo-era peace process, addressing water, refugees, arms control, environmental protection, and economic development.[8] Its search for a larger diplomatic role followed criticism of its limited role during the First Gulf War, despite contributing $13 billion toward the war’s costs.[8] Rabin visited Japan in December 1994, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama visited Israel in September 1995, and Netanyahu visited Japan in August 1997.[9] Japan also participated in Jordan River Basin development involving Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.[8]

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Israel in 2006, followed by Abe in 2015 and 2018.[8][10] Israeli prime ministers who visited Japan included Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak, and Benjamin Netanyahu.[8] In May 2014, Netanyahu’s five-day visit produced an agreement to increase defense cooperation and the Japan-Israel Joint Statement on Building a New Comprehensive Partnership.[4]

Japan’s traditional exports to Israel included steel, automobiles, processing machinery, and household electronics, while Israeli exports included diamonds, phosphates, citrus, and fashion goods.[6] Japanese purchases of diamonds sometimes helped Israel record a bilateral trade surplus.[6] Smaller Japanese companies cautiously expanded trade during the 1990s, although many major firms continued observing the Arab boycott.[6]

A JCFA historical commentary lists agreements concerning double taxation in 1993, scientific and technical cooperation in 1994, foreign-risk insurance in 1997, and air traffic in 1998, while noting that the air-traffic agreement initially went unused.[7] The commentary also describes Japanese investment in Israeli venture-capital funds and high technology, participation in infrastructure tenders, and other commercial ventures.[7]

The same commentary describes a sharp commercial interruption during the 1991 Gulf War: Japan’s banking association recommended against financing Israel-related trade, some banks refused Israeli letters of credit or halted payments, and the postal service stopped accepting mail to Israel on January 15.[7] It explains that firms subsequently arranged financing through American and European bank branches.[7] For the early 2000s, the commentary links weaker commerce to the Palestinian intifada, broader economic conditions, and the high-tech downturn, reporting a fall from approximately $2 billion in bilateral trade during the technology boom to $1.5 billion in 2003, followed by recovery beginning in 2004.[7]

Bilateral trade totaled $3.3 billion in 2011.[5] A separate report placed 2014 trade at $1.75 billion, up 9.3%, while 2015 figures showed approximately $770 million in Israeli exports and $1.3 billion in imports from Japan.[11][12] Israeli export sectors in 2015 included optics and laboratory equipment, electrical and mechanical machinery, and medical and pharmaceutical supplies.[12] A delegation of 30 officials and business representatives from Japan’s Kansai region signed a memorandum on trade and economic ties during a visit to Israel.[12]

In June 2014, Economy Minister Naftali Bennett and Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Toshimitsu Motegi signed Japan’s first Industrial R&D Collaboration Agreement, covering joint projects including homeland security and cybersecurity.[4] Israel’s January 2015 three-year cooperation plan committed tens of millions of shekels to strengthening ties, including a 50% increase in joint research grants during 2015, expanded space cooperation, and an additional trade office in Osaka.[13] That office opened in November 2015, supplementing the Tokyo office.[4]

The plan also addressed transport, health, agriculture, culture, sports, and alternative fuels, while proposing visits by 500 young Japanese leaders over three years and seeking a 45% increase in Japanese tourism by 2017.[13] Additional promotion of Israeli innovation in Japan received NIS 10 million over three years.[14]

The countries signed an investment treaty in February 2017 and established the Economic Innovation Policy Dialogue and Japan-Israel Innovation Network during Economy Minister Hiroshige Seko’s May visit.[15] The treaty remained in force in 2024.[16] Agreements signed by Seko and Israeli Economy Minister Eli Cohen also included cyber cooperation, with joint training, workshops, investment, and Israeli participation in a Japanese cyber center of excellence.[17] Their stated objectives included increasing bilateral exports by 50%, or $1.2 billion, and raising the number of exporting companies by 33% to 210.[17]

Goods trade in 2016 was approximately $3 billion, comprising about $700 million in Israeli exports and $2.3 billion in imports from Japan.[17] Israeli exports rose 42% to $1.16 billion in 2018, with medical and optical equipment and metal products among the leading categories.[14] By then, Japanese investors had made more than 200 venture-capital investments in Israel since 2014, and 70 Japanese firms had scouting activity there.[14] Mitsubishi Corporation announced plans for a Tel Aviv innovation center in May 2019.[4]

Japanese investment in Israel stood at approximately $20 million when Abe returned to office at the end of 2012 and exceeded $6 billion by 2019; 18 new investment deals added $853 million in 2020.[10] A separate technology-investment series recorded Japanese participation in deals worth $379 million in 2019 and investment of $152 million during the first half of 2020.[18] The number of Japanese companies in Israel rose from 26 in 2014 to more than 90 in 2019.[18]

In 2021, Japanese firms invested approximately $2.9 billion across 85 deals in Israeli companies, compared with $87 million in 2015.[19] Japan accounted for 15.8% of foreign investment in Israeli technology that year, compared with 1.8% in 2016.[19] Japanese investment in Israeli high technology totaled $1.558 billion in 2022, representing 12.8% of investment in the sector.[15] By the seventieth-anniversary celebrations, Japanese companies had invested a reported $13 billion in Israel since 2000.[20]

Japanese commercial interests included digital health, life sciences, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, big data, financial technology, and automotive technology, with participants including Toshiba, Canon, Toyota, NEC, Sony, Sumitomo, SBI Holdings, and SoftBank.[18] A 2018 JCFA analysis argues that Japan’s large corporate economy and Israel’s start-up sector offered complementary strengths, citing Panasonic, NEC, and Ricoh research partnerships and Toyota, Nissan, and Honda automotive collaborations.[21] It identifies artificial intelligence, big data, and health care as further opportunities rather than completed achievements.[21]

In May 2023, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida highlighted a tripling over ten years in the number of Japanese companies with Israeli offices, to nearly 90.[22] Economy Minister Yasutoshi Nishimura identified artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate change, and aging societies as possible cooperation fields and described the J-StarX program’s plan to send 1,000 young Japanese entrepreneurs for overseas training over five years.[15] Bilateral trade in 2021–22 was reported at $3.5 billion, and the countries began pursuing a free-trade agreement.[4]

A 2018 cybersecurity memorandum covered research and development, information exchange, and training programs.[1] The defense ministries signed a separate cooperation memorandum in 2019, and each country added a defense attaché to its embassy in the other.[1] The September 2019 security agreement followed discussions between Netanyahu and Abe and contacts between their national security advisers.[23]

On August 30, 2022, Defense Ministers Benny Gantz and Yasukazu Hamada signed an agreement expanding the 2019 framework.[4] It widened defense, strategic, and military exchanges and cooperation in military-equipment and technology development; the specific equipment or technologies were not disclosed.[4] Hamada linked closer relations with Israel to Japan’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific and emphasized the importance of Middle Eastern stability to Japan.[19] Gantz identified defense technology, information sharing, and military-to-military activity as means of strengthening both countries’ capabilities and supporting regional and global stability.[19]

A 2022 Mosaic commentary interprets the agreement as part of a wider strengthening of relations associated with Abe’s diplomacy, the Abraham Accords, the war in Ukraine, and China’s rise.[24]

Chiune Sugihara’s rescue of Jewish refugees forms an enduring connection between Japanese and Jewish history.[1] As Japan’s vice consul in Lithuania in 1940, he issued travel documents to Jews fleeing Europe; thousands received visas, and refugees arriving at Tsuruga were welcomed by local residents.[1][9] His assistance helped approximately 6,000 Jews escape German-occupied Poland and Lithuania.[10]

Yad Vashem recognized Sugihara as Righteous Among the Nations in 1985.[9] Japan’s Foreign Ministry hosted the unveiling of a commemorative plaque in 2000, the centennial of his birth, and a Sugihara Fellowship supported young Israeli researchers in Japanese studies.[9] Abe expressed his wish to “reiterate lasting and profound friendship between Japan and the Jewish people around the world.”[10]

Japanese students studied biblical Hebrew and Israeli archaeology, while Japanese studies entered the regular programs of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv University in 1965.[6] Exchanges included grants for students and researchers and a Japanese art pavilion in Haifa.[6] Tezuka Nobuyoshi founded the Kibbutz Society in 1963; it published a Japanese-language periodical and arranged visits by young Japanese people to Israeli kibbutzim.[6] Later exchanges included the Kakehashi program and visits by Japanese diplomats to Israel through Project Interchange.[1]

After the March 11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, an Israeli search-and-rescue team reached Tōhoku four days later.[3] Israel established a field hospital, and within 18 days a 53-member Home Front Command and IDF Medical Corps delegation was in Miyagi with 62 tons of medical supplies.[3] IsraAID subsequently maintained assistance in eight cities in Miyagi and Fukushima, supporting local economic and psychosocial capacities.[3] At the 2022 diplomatic-anniversary reception, Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi thanked Israel for its assistance and recalled its early medical response.[20]

Tourism increased substantially before the COVID-19 pandemic: more than 44,000 Israelis visited Japan in 2019, compared with 10,000 in 2011, while more than 26,000 Japanese visited Israel in 2019, compared with 10,000 in 2015.[1] A planned March 2020 launch of direct El Al service between Tel Aviv and Tokyo was postponed because of the pandemic; direct flights subsequently began.[1][4] In 2023, a work-vacation agreement allowed up to 200 Israelis aged 18–30 annually to obtain a year-long visa combining work and study in Japan.[4] Additional agreements addressed postal services, communications, and advanced technologies.[4]

The sixtieth anniversary in 2012 included cultural events, academic meetings, and senior official visits.[5] Around 500 politicians, businesspeople, ambassadors, and public figures attended the Tokyo embassy’s seventieth-anniversary event in November 2022, where Hayashi joined Israeli musician Gilad Segev onstage to play guitar.[20]

Japan’s Peace Corridor project included an agro-industrial park near Jericho involving Japan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Jordan.[5] Japanese forces also served within the UNDOF framework on the Golan Heights, while Japan provided financial support for the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.[5]

Japan strongly supported the post-Oslo peace process and sought to use its influence to advance it.[9] In May 2005, Koizumi announced a $100 million pledge to the Palestinian Authority during Mahmoud Abbas’s visit, bringing reported Japanese commitments since the Oslo Accords to $860 million.[9] By 2017, Japanese assistance to Palestinians exceeded $1.77 billion.[25]

Japan’s November 24, 2007 policy statement supported two independent states with borders along those of pre-1967 Israel, direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, a freeze on Israeli settlement construction in the occupied territories, and Quartet-led peace efforts and confidence-building measures.[8] In 2017, Japan voted for the UN General Assembly resolution criticizing US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital while continuing to expand economic relations with Israel.[25]

After the October 7, 2023 Hamas terrorist attack, Foreign Minister Yōko Kamikawa condemned Hamas, demanded the immediate release of hostages, affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself, and expressed concern about humanitarian conditions in Gaza.[26] By May 2025, Japan had imposed sanctions on senior Hamas officials and called for the immediate and unconditional release of Israeli hostages.[27]

Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar visited Japan in May 2025, the first visit by an Israeli foreign minister in 15 years, and met Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya.[27] Their discussions identified economic relations, defense, innovation, science, technology, and people-to-people connections as areas for further cooperation.[27] Sa’ar also recalled Israeli aid after the 2011 Fukushima disaster and the 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake.[27]

In January 2026, a cross-party delegation of 15 Japanese Diet members visited Israel before Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi’s visit.[28] The delegation met Israeli leaders, visited Yad Vashem and sites associated with the October 7 terrorist attack, and heard survivor testimony.[28] Motegi subsequently met Netanyahu and Sa’ar for discussions covering economic ties, Iran, and Japan’s possible role in Gaza.[29] Israel’s ambassador said free-trade talks frozen during the war were being renewed, that Israel had requested removal of Japan’s travel warning, and that possible Japanese participation in Gaza reconstruction remained under consideration rather than constituting a completed agreement.[29]

The growth of Japanese participation in Israeli technology—from 1.8% of foreign investment in 2016 to approximately 16% in 2021—illustrates the scale of the economic relationship’s transformation.[1] Corporate offices, venture-capital investments, joint research, and innovation networks gave that relationship multiple institutional and commercial channels.[14][18] Expanded defense agreements added a security dimension to ties previously dominated by diplomacy and trade.[4]

The relationship also links historical rescue, academic study, travel, and disaster relief: Sugihara’s legacy has been commemorated through honors and research support, while Israel’s response to the 2011 disaster remained prominent in Japanese anniversary diplomacy.[9][20] These connections accompanied the broader expansion of Israel’s engagement with Asian countries during the 1990s.[30]

Japan’s close economic relationship with Israel has coexisted with disagreements over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, settlement policy, and Jerusalem.[8][25] Historical explanations of Japanese policy place differing emphasis on oil dependence, Arab pressure, American diplomacy, and regional change.[7][8] Accounts of early Japanese support for Zionism also include exaggerated perceptions of Jewish influence; these describe Japanese policymakers’ assumptions, not evidence of such influence.[8]

A prominent public dispute arose when Nagasaki excluded Israel from its August 9, 2024 atomic-bombing anniversary ceremony amid concerns about protests related to the Gaza war.[4] The mayor said the decision sought to preserve a peaceful atmosphere and was not political, while US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel criticized it as politicizing the commemoration.[4] Ambassadors from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, and other countries declined to attend in protest; Israel’s ambassador disputed the security rationale and criticized the inclusion of Iran and Syria.[31]