Israel–Taiwan Relations

Israel and Taiwan maintain representative offices in Taipei and Tel Aviv rather than embassies or consulates, allowing practical cooperation without full diplomatic recognition.[1] Israel recognizes the People’s Republic of China and follows a One China policy, under which diplomatic relations with Beijing preclude simultaneous diplomatic relations with Taipei.[1] This arrangement places most bilateral activity below the diplomatic threshold, with contemporary contacts concentrated in economic affairs, innovation, agriculture, and culture and conducted mainly through mid-level channels.[1]

The relationship combines commercial interests with parliamentary, municipal, academic, and civil-society exchanges.[1] Israeli companies contribute technology and product development, while Taiwanese enterprises offer manufacturing and engineering capabilities that can help bring innovations into production.[3] Taiwan has also shown interest in Israeli civil resilience and emergency preparedness, while providing assistance to Israeli communities affected by war.[1]

The absence of formal diplomatic relations is not unique to Israel within its region: in 2023, no Middle Eastern or North African country maintained formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.[4] Nevertheless, Israel and Taiwan have developed an extensive network of offices, agreements, business links, and public exchanges within that limitation.[1] Their ties became more public after COVID-19 restrictions were lifted and strengthened further after the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war, although fighting in Israel hindered Taiwanese business visits and delayed agreed joint ventures.[1]

The Republic of China under the Guomindang established contacts with the founders of the Jewish state before the formation of the People’s Republic of China, and those contacts continued after Israel declared independence in 1948.[5] Nationalist China formally recognized Israel a few months after independence; Israel subsequently recognized the People’s Republic of China on January 9, 1950.[5] Thereafter, contacts with Taiwan were unofficial, nongovernmental, chiefly commercial, and often clandestine, partly because Taiwan sought to avoid harming its relations with Arab countries.[5]

A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs historical account dates the Republic of China’s recognition of Israel to March 1949, shortly before its government’s defeat on the mainland and relocation to Taiwan.[6] That account says Israel did not reciprocate recognition and that, after recognizing Beijing, the Israeli Foreign Ministry instructed its missions not to maintain official relations with Nationalist Chinese representatives.[6]

A separate Jerusalem Center historical paper recounts that Israel departed from its customary abstention on the United Nations China-seat question in 1965 and voted for the Republic of China.[7] It attributes the initiative to diplomat Mordechai Arbell, who proposed signaling disapproval after PRC leaders received PLO chairman Ahmad al-Shukeiri, and says Foreign Minister Golda Meir instructed the delegation to follow his recommendation.[7] The paper connects that vote with an invitation for Arbell to visit Taipei, where Taiwan proposed close but nondiplomatic relations rather than formal ties, partly because of Chiang Kai-shek’s relationship with Jordan’s King Hussein.[7]

The paper places these developments within the diplomatic changes culminating in UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971, which recognized the PRC as China’s sole legitimate representative and removed the ROC’s UN representation, including its Security Council seat.[7]

During the 1970s, Foreign Minister Abba Eban characterized Israel’s ties with Taiwan as economic and compatible with recognition of the PRC, a distinction subsequently maintained relatively strictly.[1] A July 1977 meeting record likewise describes Israeli officials explaining that Israel had economic relations with Taiwan but no diplomatic representation there, and emphasizing the importance of the trade relationship.[8] An INSS study also describes local Taiwanese production of Gabriel 2 anti-ship missiles and launchers under Israeli license during the late 1970s and early 1980s.[5]

Contacts increased during the 1980s and 1990s as regional changes eased Taiwanese concerns about damaging relations with Arab countries.[3] The January 24, 1992 agreement establishing full diplomatic relations between Israel and Beijing was followed by freer, more direct communication between Jerusalem and Taipei and exchanges of economic and cultural liaison bureaus.[5] Taiwan opened its Economic and Cultural Office in Tel Aviv in 1993, and Israel opened a corresponding office in Taipei several months later.[1] These were official representations, but their status remained below that of embassies or consulates.[1]

Israel’s office, the Israel Economic and Cultural Office, or ISECO, was established in response to growing business potential and performs functions similar to an embassy without possessing that diplomatic status.[9] One description of its staffing lists seven Israeli nationals and nine local employees.[9] Taiwan’s corresponding office developed into a bridge for science, investment, education, and trade, with representative Abby Lee promoting closer links through its activities.[10]

Bilateral trade first exceeded US$1 billion in 2004, reaching US$1.12 billion as Israeli exports to Taiwan rose 95 percent to US$559 million and imports increased 33 percent to US$561 million.[11] Israeli exports of medical devices and equipment rose 130 percent that year, while machinery and mechanical-equipment exports increased 95 percent.[11] Trade was approximately US$1.7 billion in 2020, representing moderate growth over the preceding five years.[12] A widely reported total for 2022 was US$2.67 billion, and Israel’s trade deficit with Taiwan had decreased since 2019 as trade expanded in both directions.[2]

Taiwanese trade representatives described substantial two-way commerce before the later growth in totals.[13] In 2015, Taiwan’s External Trade Development Council representative Ernest Lin put Taiwanese purchases of Israeli goods at about US$1 billion and Israeli purchases of Taiwanese goods at about US$700 million, while describing two or three Taiwanese business delegations visiting Israel annually.[13] Figures for 2017 similarly placed Taiwanese exports to Israel at roughly US$700 million and Israeli exports to Taiwan at about US$1 billion.[14] Taiwanese shipments included machinery, optical precision tools, car parts, and medical equipment; Israeli shipments included chemicals, medicines, diamonds, and electronic and machinery parts.[14]

Investment links developed alongside trade.[15] The IJT venture-capital fund, founded in 1995 by Japanese, Taiwanese, and Israeli investors, invested in 24 companies during its first three years, including RADWare and BackWeb, which subsequently had successful exits.[15] Taiwan’s Kuomintang-affiliated KMT fund later invested independently in Israeli startups, including US$2.5 million in SmartLink in 1998.[15] Taiwanese investors committed more than US$100 million in 2001 to a Tower Semiconductor fabrication plant in Migdal Ha’emek, and Winbond purchased an Israeli National Semiconductor division in 2005 to establish a research-and-development center.[13]

Institutional agreements have supported these commercial links.[16] A bilateral agreement signed in March 2008 to prevent double taxation followed an OECD model and established withholding-tax rates for payments including interest, dividends, and royalties.[16] During a 2018 visit led by Taiwan External Trade Development Council chairman James Huang, a 14-person business and technology delegation accompanied the signing of a memorandum between TAITRA and Israel’s Export Institute to promote trade, investment, delegations, and joint ventures.[14]

TAITRA opened its Trade and Innovation Center in Tel Aviv in 2019.[17] Unlike its other 63 branches, whose principal focus was promoting Taiwanese exports and trade, the Tel Aviv center was designed to foster technological collaboration between Taiwanese companies and Israel’s startup ecosystem.[17] Taiwan ranked nineteenth among destinations for Israeli exports in 2018, while companies including Foxconn, Wistron, and MediaTek had collaborations in Israel that remained limited at that stage.[17]

The thirteenth Israel–Taiwan Joint Business Council met online in October 2021 because of COVID-related restrictions, reaching cooperation agreements in water technologies and renewable energy.[12] Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs also operated programs to encourage technological cooperation and help Israeli high-tech companies enter its market, with participating firms using the Startup Terrace innovation park as a local base.[12] In December 2025, Israeli and Taiwanese chambers of commerce signed another memorandum intended to deepen commercial cooperation and expand joint economic activity.[18] The signing involved Israel Chamber of Commerce vice president Israela Stier and director general Gilit Rubinstein, in the presence of CIECA chairman Joseph J.-Cherng Liu and Taiwan’s representative Abby Ya-Ping Lee.[18]

Israel and Taiwan signed their first technological-cooperation agreement in 2006, identifying nanotechnology and biotechnology as key fields.[19] Taiwan’s representative office signed the document with Israeli officials early in January, followed later that month by signatures from ISECO director Ruth Kahanoff and Taiwanese National Science Council officials.[19] Other agreements included an e-government cooperation protocol in 2008 and a water-cooperation agreement in 2011; by 2020, more than 30 trade agreements had been signed.[3]

The high-tech relationship draws on Israel’s startup and product-development strengths and Taiwan’s hardware-manufacturing capabilities.[3] A 2020 account of this complementarity put Taiwan’s share of worldwide laptop production at more than 83 percent.[3] Israeli firms and skilled individuals work with Taiwanese enterprises, including semiconductor-industry supplier Orbotech, which provides testing equipment and services.[9] Israel seeks opportunities for its companies in Taiwan’s semiconductor value chain, while Taiwan has expressed interest in learning from Israeli capabilities in drones and robotics.[1]

By 2025, TSMC had invested in Israeli semiconductor startups, while Taiwanese companies including Winbond, ASUS, Merida, Vivotek, and Nuvoton maintained research-and-development or sales offices in Israel.[10] Israeli companies with offices in Taiwan included Nova, Radware, Taboola, and OurCrowd.[10] TAITRA’s Tel Aviv office connected startups with Taiwanese businesses and supported exhibitions and cooperation in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and medical technology.[10]

In March 2025, Abby Lee identified further opportunities in health-related artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biomedicine, and semiconductor equipment, and described Israeli startups looking to Taiwanese companies for mass production.[20] She also said the two governments had signed 34 cooperation agreements over three decades, including political, commercial, and technological arrangements.[20] Israeli firms already supply some technological solutions to Taiwanese companies, but broader access to the market has remained limited, partly because Israel restricts business initiatives perceived as military- or security-related.[1]

Israeli agricultural technology has supported Taiwan’s development of smart agriculture.[3] Taiwan’s limited suitable farmland and labor shortages associated with aging and urbanization have encouraged interest in these tools, while cooperation gives Israeli suppliers opportunities to gain clients and expand their market.[3] A Taiwanese government delegation led by Small and Medium Enterprise Administration director general Ho Chin-Tsang visited Israel in August 2022 to strengthen industry links; cooperation agreements covered health, agriculture, cybersecurity, environmental protection, energy, water, information technology, and communications.[21]

The two sides shared medical expertise, best practices, information, and technology during the COVID-19 pandemic.[22] Cybersecurity and disinformation have also featured in discussions: in a 2024 interview, Lee described exchanges of experience concerning information manipulation and efforts to undermine democratic institutions.[23] Taiwan’s foreign minister identified intelligence exchanges and technology cooperation, particularly in defense and security, as important interests, rather than announcing a specific agreement.[23] At a Taiwanese national-day reception in Jerusalem in October 2024, Lee said tourism and cultural cooperation agreements had been signed during the war and that possible agreements in green energy, communications, science, and technology were under discussion.[24]

Israeli parliamentary delegations visited Taiwan almost annually from 2007 through 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted the practice.[25] A five-member delegation drawn from both coalition and opposition parties visited in 2023 at Taiwan’s foreign ministry’s invitation and met President Tsai Ing-wen.[25] Tsai expressed interest in expanding cooperation, including security, while delegation leader Yorai Lahav-Hertzano called for increased Taiwanese investment in Israel.[25]

Boaz Toporovsky of Yesh Atid headed the Knesset’s Israel–Taiwan friendship group and led two delegations after the war began, neither classified as an official parliamentary visit.[1] In April 2025, he led a delegation that met Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim and other officials to discuss education, technology, trade, and security.[9] Hsiao praised Israel’s support for Taiwan’s international participation and innovation-driven resilience, while Toporovsky received Taiwan’s highest honor for a foreign citizen.[9] The visit coincided with Taiwan’s Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony.[9]

A separate bipartisan delegation led by MK Ohad Tal in 2025 met Taiwan’s vice president, foreign minister, and other officials.[26] Discussions covered potential cooperation in artificial intelligence, culture, information security, innovative industry, smart agriculture, technology, tourism, and the economy.[26] Delegates also praised Taiwan’s support after October 7, including a reported aid drive of NIS 1.8 million.[26]

Cultural and religious exchanges have accompanied parliamentary contacts.[9] In February 2023, a regional gathering of 30 rabbis at a Jewish center in Taiwan was attended by Israel’s Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi David Lau; the gathering promoted regional cultural exchange and celebrated the center’s opening.[9] That year, Taiwan’s representative announced a working-holiday arrangement offering 200 people from each side, aged 18 to 30, the opportunity to visit the other society and work legally for a year.[22] Application details were still being discussed when the arrangement was reported.[22]

Around midday on October 7, 2023, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Hamas’s terrorist attacks on Israelis, declaring solidarity with Israel and denouncing terrorism.[1] Public support continued through solidarity visits by Taiwanese representatives to Israeli sites struck by rockets during the Israel–Iran war.[1] Taiwan’s representative office, headed by Ya-Ping (Abby) Lee since January 2022, emphasized knowledge exchange, support for local nongovernmental organizations, parliamentary contacts, and public outreach.[1]

An account published by Ynet News reports that Taipei 101 was illuminated in blue and white in solidarity with Israel and that Taiwan’s representative office donated approximately US$70,000 to Pitchon-Lev in October 2023.[27] The same account describes a March 2024 donation of NT$15.9 million, approximately US$500,000, to Israeli local government agencies for needs including medical and communications supplies.[27]

Taiwan’s civil-society assistance extended to education, local government, emergency response, and rescue services.[1] Initiatives included collaborations with Reichman University and the Hebrew University, programs in peripheral communities and the Druze sector, a donation of about US$500,000 to the Federation of Local Authorities for municipal security, and the “adoption” of Kibbutz Kfar Aza.[1] Taiwan also donated to Magen David Adom during the Gaza war and ZAKA during the war with Iran.[1]

A November 2025 account described approximately NIS 550,000 donated to ZAKA for portable lighting equipment, cooperation with Pitchon-Lev, and a Peres Academic Center scholarship program for students affected by war.[28] Lee described work with IsraAID, local authorities, and kibbutzim to help affected families and communities.[28] In a 2024 interview, she likewise explained that her office had assisted evacuees from southern and northern Israel and that Taiwan had expressed support after both October 7 and the Iranian attack.[29]

Taiwanese interest in Israeli resilience has included direct study of community emergency arrangements.[1] In November 2024, a delegation from the Taiwanese civil organization Forward Alliance visited the Eshkol Regional Council, met community leaders, toured its emergency operations center, and studied support for western Negev residents, including displaced people.[1] A Tikvah Ideas commentary published in July 2025 also reported a Taiwanese pledge that month to donate to a hospital in the Binyamin region northeast of Jerusalem, presenting the gesture alongside Taipei’s interest in Israeli resilience.[30]

Taiwan has become one of Israel’s senior trading partners in Asia, with the US$2.67 billion bilateral trade total cited in a 2023 account exceeding Israel’s trade with Japan.[25] The relationship provides Israeli innovators with manufacturing and commercialization opportunities and Taiwanese enterprises with access to Israeli research, development, and specialized technologies.[3][17] Its practical scope reaches beyond commerce into municipal cooperation, academic institutions, cultural exchange, and assistance to communities affected by war.[1]

Greater institutional activity has not necessarily translated into broad Israeli public familiarity.[1] A May 2024 survey found that 56 percent of Israeli respondents could not assess their country’s ties with Taiwan.[1] At the same time, Taiwanese initiatives made the relationship more visible through public solidarity, donations, and parliamentary outreach, while constraints on senior-level dialogue and security cooperation continued.[1]

China has repeatedly objected to Israeli parliamentary engagement with Taiwan.[1][31] After five Knesset members visited in 2006, Israel’s Foreign Ministry reaffirmed strict adherence to One China while explaining that the executive could not direct legislators’ travel.[31] Later references to Taiwan as a “country” drew Chinese criticism, although Israel did not officially treat legislators’ remarks as a policy violation.[1] China’s ambassador protested Toporovsky’s visit and statements, and the Chinese diplomatic delegation walked out of a 2024 Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony in Haifa after Taiwan’s representative was invited to speak.[1]

Historical security dealings included growing military contacts in the late 1970s and early 1980s, sales of Shafrir missiles, and licenses for Gabriel 2 anti-ship missiles and launchers.[5] Claims that these arrangements indirectly transferred American technology remain allegations; such transfers drew Pentagon disapproval.[5] More recent accounts describe broad defense interests, including a previously undisclosed visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Francois Wu reported in December 2025 and Taiwanese interest in Israel’s layered air defenses, but provide limited agreement-level detail.[9] Taiwan independently studied the war after October 7 because restrictions prevented Israel from sharing operational experience, and tensions also followed Israel’s 2024 strike on Hezbollah leaders involving Taiwanese-branded devices.[1][9]

Five anti-Israel umbrella groups in Taiwan sought to end cooperation through weekly protests and pressure on lawmakers, public figures, and businesses, including criticism of Evergreen’s steel deliveries to Israel; they had not achieved their stated aim.[1] Published trade totals also differ: while several accounts give US$2.67 billion for 2022, a Ynet News commentary attributes a US$3.28 billion figure to Tsai Ing-wen, without reconciling the difference.[2][27]