Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: January–June 2015

The period opened with a series of rapid Palestinian legal moves at the International Criminal Court. On January 1, 2015, the Palestinian leadership lodged a declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting ICC jurisdiction over alleged crimes in the occupied Palestinian territory — including East Jerusalem — dating from June 13, 2014, before Operation Protective Edge began.[1] The following day, January 2, Palestinian officials deposited an instrument of accession to the Rome Statute with the UN Secretary-General.[2] On January 6, the Secretary-General issued depositary notifications stating that the Rome Statute would enter into force for Palestine on April 1.[1]

On January 16, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced a preliminary examination into the "situation in Palestine" to determine whether there was a reasonable basis to proceed with a full investigation.[3] She emphasized that a preliminary examination was not itself an investigation: in a May 13 interview, she described it as a process of collecting information from both sides and other sources, with her office assessing jurisdiction, national proceedings, gravity, and the interests of justice before deciding whether to investigate, seek more information, or decline.[4] She said the examination might cover alleged crimes related to the 2014 Gaza conflict, settlement construction, and Hamas rocket fire.[4] Palestinian leaders anticipated submitting information concerning alleged Israeli crimes during the 2014 conflict and Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[3]

On April 1, Palestine became the 123rd State Party to the Rome Statute and gained the ability to participate in the Court's decision-making process.[1] An ICC ruling later confirmed that the Court's territorial jurisdiction in the Situation in Palestine extended to Gaza and Judea and Samaria, including East Jerusalem, while cautioning that the ruling did not adjudicate an international border dispute or determine future borders.[1] Canada objected to Palestine's accession, though the Chamber found that the accession had followed the procedure established by the Statute.[1] Israeli officials continued to dispute the Court's jurisdiction.

Israel responded to the Palestinian ICC bid with an immediate economic measure. On January 3, Israel froze NIS 500 million, approximately $127 million, in Palestinian tax revenues collected on the Palestinian Authority's behalf, describing the step as a response to the PA's request to join the ICC.[5] A Palestinian official called the freeze "Israeli piracy," while the United States condemned it as an impediment to Israeli–Palestinian peace efforts.[5] Israel withheld two tax-revenue payments totaling more than $200 million during the first two months of 2015.[6] On February 24, the Palestinian Authority imposed a boycott on products from five Israeli food companies — Strauss, Tnuva, Osem, Prigat, and Jafora — with enforcement teams searching shops in Ramallah. A Fatah official described it as a first step toward a wider boycott and as retaliation for the tax freeze.[7]

On March 27, Israel announced that it would transfer the withheld funds, citing humanitarian considerations and international pressure.[6] On April 20, Israel unblocked NIS 1.8 billion, approximately $450 million, in withheld Palestinian tax revenues. The Palestinian Finance Ministry said the transfer would enable payment of December and January salaries to approximately 180,000 civil servants who had been receiving only 60 percent of their pay.[8] A compromise reached on April 18 between Palestinian Authority officials and Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories provided for an initial transfer of 1.5 billion shekels, of which 500 million would cover the PA's electricity debt, with approximately 850 million additional shekels agreed for later transfer.[6]

January brought an immediate series of terrorist attacks. On January 8, an unknown assailant stabbed and injured an Israeli man near the Old City's Damascus Gate in Jerusalem.[9] Thirteen days later, on January 21, a Palestinian national who had entered Israel illegally boarded a municipal bus — reportedly Route 40 — in central Tel Aviv near the Maariv Bridge shortly before 7:30 a.m. and stabbed the driver and nine passengers.[10] A passenger opened the emergency doors, allowing people to flee; Prison Service officers traveling behind the bus in a separate vehicle noticed the attack, chased the attacker, and shot him in the leg before arresting him.[11] Twelve people were injured — four seriously, three moderately, and five lightly — while another 12 were treated for shock.[10][11] The Shin Bet identified the attacker as Hamza Muhammad Hassan Matruch from Tulkarm and said he told interrogators that he had been motivated by the previous summer's Gaza conflict, unrest on the Temple Mount, and extremist Islamist material.[10] Hamas praised the attack as a "bold and heroic act."[12]

Violence continued through February and March. Israel Security Agency data recorded 124 attacks in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem in January, falling to 96 in February — 84 in Judea and Samaria and 12 in Jerusalem — with the figures excluding stone-throwing incidents.[13] In March, 89 attacks were recorded. Although the overall total declined slightly from February, attacks in Jerusalem rose from 12 to 31 while those in Judea and Samaria fell from 84 to 58; 78 of the March incidents involved Molotov cocktails.[14]

On March 6, a Palestinian drove into five people near a Border Police base in northern Jerusalem, four of them members of the Israeli security forces.[13] The attacker, identified as Muhammad Salaimeh, 22, from east Jerusalem, left the vehicle carrying a meat cleaver before being shot and subdued. Five people were injured, and the attacker was hospitalized in critical condition.[13] Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures praised the attack. In March, the IDF and Israel Security Agency also arrested members of suspected terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria, including Hamas members said to be planning attacks against Israeli targets during the Jewish holiday of Purim.[12]

On April 25 in Hebron, a Palestinian stabbed and seriously injured an Israeli border guard; Israeli border guards shot and killed the attacker.[9] On May 20, two Israeli police officers were lightly wounded in a suspected terrorist attack in East Jerusalem.[3]

June brought the period's deadliest individual attacks. On June 19, near the Ein Bubin spring between Dolev and the Palestinian village of Deir Ebzea', 25-year-old Danny Gonen and a friend stopped after a young Palestinian man appeared to need assistance.[15] The man reportedly asked whether there was water at the spring — apparently to establish that the visitors were Jewish — before pulling a pistol from a bag and firing at least ten rounds through the car's windshield. Gonen was killed and his friend was lightly wounded.[15] Hamas officials praised the shooting without initially claiming responsibility, and a group identifying itself with Hamas's military wing later claimed the attack; the initial military assessment had described a possible lone attacker.[15] Security forces arrested the attacker approximately three weeks later.[16]

On June 21, a Palestinian stabbed Israeli border guards near Jerusalem's Nablus Gate, also known as Damascus Gate, seriously wounding one and slightly injuring another. Police shot and injured the attacker.[9] That evening, stone-throwing and Molotov-cocktail incidents in Jerusalem included an attack on a bus on the Hizma road that wounded its driver.[17] On the evening of June 29, gunfire from a passing vehicle struck a car near the Shvut Rachel junction in the Binyamin region carrying four Israelis. Malachi Rosenfeld, 26, was critically wounded and died at Shaare Zedek Hospital the following afternoon, while the three other occupants were injured.[18] The attackers fled; a subsequent investigation identified a Hamas member as responsible, and suspects were arrested on July 19.[16]

February also saw attacks attributed to Israeli extremists. On February 25, suspected Israeli settlers on motorcycles from the settlement of Beitar Illit in Judea and Samaria fired at Palestinian residences in Nahalin; no injuries were reported.[9] On the same date, suspected settlers vandalized and set fire to the Al-Huda mosque in Jab'a village near Bethlehem, writing the Hebrew phrases "Revenge for the Land of Zion" and "Price Tag" on its walls.[9] Palestinian Authority and Hamas statements blamed Israel or Israeli settlers for the arson; no casualties were reported.[19]

In February, local press also suspected Jewish residents in a separate "price tag" attack involving arson at an annex of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate near Jerusalem's Old City, accompanied by anti-Christian graffiti.[20] Israeli police maintained a unit specializing in investigating such attacks, though NGOs, religious institutions, and media reported that arrests rarely led to successful prosecutions.[20]

Israel held its 20th Knesset election on March 17, with voter turnout of 71.8 percent — the highest since 1999.[21] Likud won 30 of 120 seats, giving it a decisive advantage over the center-left Zionist Union, which won 24. The Joint List, formed after the four Arab-majority parties united, won 13 seats and became the third-largest faction in the Knesset.[21][22] The final vote count was reported on the morning of March 18.[21]

The election campaign was shaped significantly by the Palestinian issue. The day before the vote, Netanyahu said there was no chance of establishing a Palestinian state while he was prime minister. He told an interviewer that establishing such a state or withdrawing from territory meant yielding territory to "radical Islamic terrorist attacks against Israel" and, when asked directly whether there would be no Palestinian state during his premiership, answered, "Indeed."[23] Those remarks drew criticism from the Obama administration.[23] After the election, Netanyahu qualified his position, saying he had not changed the policy from his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech and remained committed to Palestinian statehood only if conditions in the Middle East improved. He conditioned such a solution on Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and limits on Hamas's role in governance.[3] Palestinians responded to his election victory by vowing to intensify diplomatic efforts for statehood recognition through UN avenues.[23]

On May 6, Netanyahu announced a coalition government holding a narrow 61–59 Knesset majority.[3] The coalition was considered structurally vulnerable given its members' differing priorities. Naftali Bennett's Ha'bayit Ha'Yehudi party controlled the ministries of justice, education, and agriculture, as well as the military's civil administration in Judea and Samaria; the government's agenda included proposals to "regularize" settlement outposts that were unauthorized under Israeli law.[3] The new government's policy guidelines included a commitment to advance peace negotiations with the Palestinians but made no official mention of a two-state solution.[24]

Diplomatic activity around the peace process was largely inconclusive during this period. On March 5, the PLO Central Council recommended ending all aspects of security coordination with Israel and limiting relations, citing Israel's noncompliance with bilateral agreements. The recommendation set no implementation date or method and left the final decision to the PLO Executive Committee; senior Palestinian figures said Abbas would not act before Israel's March 17 election.[25] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis interpreted the step as pressure on Israel to release tax revenues frozen following the PA's ICC and UN Security Council moves at the end of 2014.[25]

In March, UN Middle East Envoy Robert Serry urged the Security Council to establish a lasting framework for Israeli–Palestinian peace, saying such a framework "may be the only way to preserve the goal of the two-state solution."[26] French officials signaled readiness to pursue a UN-backed parameters resolution: on March 27, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said officials would begin talks on a proposed "parameters resolution."[26]

On May 16, Netanyahu told EU foreign-policy chief Federica Mogherini that he wanted to renew negotiations with the Palestinians on understandings about the borders of settlement blocs that Israel would annex in a future peace agreement.[27] Palestinian officials rejected that basis: Nabil Abu Rudeina called for negotiations based on the 1967 borders, a settlement freeze, and other conditions, while Saeb Erekat said settlement borders could not determine Palestine's borders.[27] On May 18, Erekat said there was not "a single chance" of renewing meaningful peace negotiations with Netanyahu's newly elected government.[26] International diplomats reported that Israeli and Hamas officials had met in Europe and Jerusalem around the same time to discuss a possible floating port for Gaza and a proposal to expand Gaza's borders into Sinai, though neither Israel nor Hamas confirmed the reported meetings.[26]

On April 30, media reports speculated that Israel and Hamas might be discussing a long-term Gaza ceasefire indirectly through Qatari officials, as Israel eased some restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza.[3] The status quo around Gaza had not significantly changed, however, with Israel concerned that Hamas could divert reconstruction materials to rebuild military infrastructure and tunnels, while Hamas appeared unwilling to transfer meaningful security control in Gaza to the Palestinian Authority.[3]

In May, the Vatican signed a treaty with Palestinian representatives referring to them as representatives of "the State of Palestine," which the Jewish Virtual Library described as the Vatican's official recognition of Palestine.[28] On June 28, Israeli Foreign Ministry Director-General Dore Gold made a discreet trip to Egypt; Egyptian news agencies reported that he met Egyptian officials to discuss "how to push the peace process forward."[26] In June, the Palestinian unity government resigned after President Mahmoud Abbas declared that it could not function in the Gaza Strip, a development linked to the continuing division between Fatah and Hamas, with Hamas controlling Gaza.[29]

Gaza remained relatively quiet in the early months of 2015 before rocket fire resumed later in the period. On April 23, Israel's Independence Day, Hamas terrorists fired a rocket that triggered warning sirens but caused no casualties or damage; the IDF shelled a base used by the group, also without casualties.[30]

On May 26, at least one rocket was fired from Gaza, landing near Gan Yavne, east of Ashdod — the third rocket fired from Gaza since the start of 2015 and the longest-range launch since Operation Protective Edge.[27] No casualties or damage were reported. Israeli and Palestinian media attributed the launch to Palestinian Islamic Jihad amid internal disputes over an appointment, while Israeli officials also blamed Hamas as Gaza's ruling authority; no group claimed responsibility.[27] Israeli aircraft bombed four sites in Gaza the following day, described as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad training areas.[30]

In early June, rocket attacks escalated. Two rockets fired on June 3 struck near Ashkelon and Netivot, causing no reported injuries or damage; a rocket fired on June 6 landed in an open area south of Ashkelon.[31] The Omar Brigades, a small Salafist group that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, claimed the June attacks, stating that its campaign was "jihad against the Jews, the enemies of God."[20] The group said it had acted in response to Hamas police killing an Islamic State supporter.[30] Israeli aircraft struck targets in Gaza after the attacks; Israel deployed Iron Dome batteries in the south and temporarily closed the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings except for humanitarian cases.[31] On June 23, a further rocket from Gaza landed in an open area near Kibbutz Yad Mordechai; Israeli aircraft struck the rocket launcher in northern Gaza identified as the one used in the attack.[32] Israel maintained throughout the period that Hamas, as Gaza's de facto ruler, bore responsibility for all rocket attacks launched from the territory regardless of which terrorist organization fired them.[32]

On January 31, an Egyptian Court of Urgent Matters issued a ruling concerning Hamas's military wing, followed by a February 28 ruling designating Hamas as a terrorist organization as a movement.[19] Hamas condemned the decisions as political and held protests in Gaza.[19] The Egyptian rulings applied within Egyptian legal proceedings and did not constitute a uniform international designation.

Several additional incidents and fatalities were recorded during the period without being connected to broader organized attacks. In March, Israeli forces shot 11-year-old Muhammad Hamad in the stomach during a weekly protest march in Silwad, in Judea and Samaria; the report did not state the exact date within March or whether the shooting was intentional.[9] On March 18, Israeli soldiers shot Ali Mahmoud Abd a-Rahman Safi, age 20, during a violent demonstration at al-Jalazun Refugee Camp in the Ramallah Governorate; he later died of his injuries.[9]

On April 29, Hamas security officers beat journalists covering a peaceful rally in Gaza calling for an end to the internal Palestinian division and briefly detained some of them.[9] The Foreign Press Association also reported Hamas efforts to establish reporter "vetting procedures" that could blacklist journalists, as well as intimidating text messages sent to journalists in Gaza.[9]

On June 10, Israeli soldiers shot and killed 'Iz a-Din Walid Hassan Bani Gharrah, age 22, during a security operation in Jenin Refugee Camp; accounts of the circumstances of his death differed.[9]

On June 22, a UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry released its report on the 2014 Gaza war.[33] The commission reported gathering significant information indicating possible war crimes by both Israel and Palestinian armed organizations. Its figures included 1,462 Palestinian civilians killed — one-third of them children — more than 6,000 Israeli airstrikes, and over 50,000 tank and artillery shells fired. Palestinian armed groups had fired 4,881 rockets and missiles and 1,753 mortar shells toward Israel, killing six Israeli civilians and wounding at least 1,600.[33]

The commission criticized Israeli military operations and expressed concern about possible war crimes while also addressing Palestinian armed groups' conduct, including indiscriminate rocket fire at Israeli civilians.[34] Among its recommendations to Israel were reassessing the use of wide-impact explosives in densely populated areas, lifting the Gaza blockade, and stopping settlement construction; it called on Hamas and other organizations to stop attacks on Israeli civilians.[33] The commission also recommended that Palestinian authorities investigate and prosecute violations by Palestinian authorities and armed groups, and it recommended practical international support for the ICC's work concerning the occupied Palestinian territories.[33]

The commission conducted more than 280 confidential interviews and received approximately 500 written submissions.[33] Israel did not cooperate with the inquiry or permit it to enter Israel; Israeli civilians, associations, and human-rights organizations submitted testimony or documents independently.[33] Palestinian authorities responded to the commission's questions, while Israel and Hamas did not.[33] Before the report's publication, the Israeli military advocate general announced expanded criminal investigations into three additional incidents involving suspected unlawful use of weapons against Palestinians.[33]

Prime Minister Netanyahu called the report biased. Its legal conclusions and casualty figures remained contested, and an Institute for National Security Studies analysis criticized the commission's methodology and application of the laws of armed conflict.[33][34]

The humanitarian aftermath of the 2014 war continued to shape conditions in Gaza throughout the first half of 2015. On April 27, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon transmitted to the Security Council a summary of a board of inquiry's findings about UNRWA facilities in Gaza that had been damaged by Israeli military actions or used by Palestinian terrorists to store weapons.[3] Ban reported that at least 44 Palestinians had been killed and at least 227 injured as a result of Israeli actions at UN premises used as emergency shelters, and that Palestinian terrorist groups had used some empty UN schools to store weapons and had probably used two to fire from them.[3]

On June 17, UNRWA closed its last remaining emergency shelters for people displaced during the 2014 conflict, stating that it had provided transitional shelter to those who needed it.[9] The UN reported that the fighting had damaged or destroyed more than 143,000 Palestinian refugee dwellings.[9] Israel's Foreign Ministry said that by June, more than 1.2 million tons of construction materials had entered Gaza since the 2014 conflict and that more than 83,000 households had completed at least half the reconstruction of their homes under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism. The ministry attributed reconstruction delays primarily to Hamas's actions and its conflict with the Palestinian Authority.[35]

Several factual and legal matters in this period rested on disputed or unverified foundations. The Palestinian Authority's ICC accession and the scope of the Court's jurisdiction were contested by Israeli officials throughout; one legal scholar argued that the UN Secretary-General lacked authority to accept the accession, though the ICC Chamber later found that the procedure established by the Statute had been followed.[36][1] Responsibility for the May 26 Gaza rocket launch was reported differently by different sources — some attributed it to Palestinian Islamic Jihad amid internal disputes, while no organization publicly claimed responsibility and Israeli authorities held Hamas responsible as Gaza's ruler.[27][30] In the June 19 Dolev-area shooting, Hamas praised the attack and a group identifying itself with Hamas's military wing later claimed responsibility, while the initial military assessment described a possible lone attacker.[15] The UN Commission of Inquiry's casualty figures, methodology, and legal conclusions concerning Operation Protective Edge were contested, and Netanyahu called the report biased.[33][34]