← All articles

Total current articles · 5,097

Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty

Published

01In brief

The Egypt–Israel peace treaty was a bilateral peace agreement signed in Washington, D.C., on March 26, 1979, by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter as witness. It followed a difficult diplomatic process in which Sadat threatened to leave the Camp David summit before agreement was reached on its final day. The treaty provided for the end of the state of war, Israel’s withdrawal of its armed forces and civilians from Sinai, Egyptian sovereignty over the peninsula, and normal diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations. Israel completed its Sinai evacuation by April 25, 1982, while the peace subsequently endured despite regional conflict and upheaval in Egypt.

02Background

The October 1973 war preceded the diplomatic initiative that eventually produced the treaty: Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel, and Egyptian forces initially held the upper hand before Israel recovered militarily.[6] A ceasefire and a series of diplomatic contacts followed, including the November 1973 agreement at Kilometer 101 on the Cairo–Suez road.[7] The eventual treaty therefore followed both military confrontation and an incremental process of negotiation rather than a single uninterrupted diplomatic effort.[7]

In November 1977, Sadat announced his willingness to travel to Jerusalem, and his subsequent visit opened the way to direct Egyptian–Israeli talks.[8] The visit was unprecedented, and Sadat addressed the Knesset.[9] His initiative preceded the formal negotiations that brought him together with Begin and Carter at Camp David in September 1978.[9]

The leaders entered the Camp David summit with different expectations: Begin wanted to establish an agenda for future meetings, whereas Sadat hoped to settle the disputed questions within a few days.[2] During twelve days of negotiations, the prospects appeared sufficiently bleak that Sadat threatened to leave.[2] Agreement came on the summit’s final day, with a compromise allowing the Knesset to decide the fate of Israeli settlements in Sinai.[2]

The summit ran from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and produced two framework documents rather than a final peace treaty.[8] One addressed bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel; the other addressed a broader Middle East settlement, including Palestinian self-government in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza.[8] The accords were based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and connected the Egyptian–Israeli negotiations with a wider regional agenda.[9] Their distinction from the March 1979 treaty is essential: Camp David established a basis for further negotiations, but it did not itself terminate the state of war.[8][3]

Begin and Sadat received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for the achievement associated with the Camp David process, before the final treaty was signed.[7] Nevertheless, translating the frameworks into a binding agreement required more than six additional months of negotiations.[8] The talks stalled over issues including the timing of Israel’s withdrawal and Egypt’s concerns about its obligations to other Arab states.[8] These difficulties demonstrated that agreement on a framework had not eliminated the practical and political obstacles to bilateral peace.[8]

03Course of Events

Carter’s March 1979 visit to Israel helped resolve the remaining obstacles to an agreed treaty text.[8] On March 13, the American and Israeli delegations reached agreement following compromises that included a U.S. guarantee of Israel’s oil supply, omission of references to a special Egyptian role in Gaza, and Israeli agreement to make unilateral gestures to Palestinians; Sadat then assented.[8] The Knesset approved the peace treaty on March 22 by 95 votes to 18, in a vote separate from its earlier consideration of the Camp David frameworks.[10]

The signing took place on the White House North Lawn on March 26, 1979, with Sadat, Begin, and Carter participating in the ceremony.[11] Sadat and Begin signed for their countries, and Carter witnessed the agreement.[1] The treaty was concluded between the governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel.[3] Its preamble described the purpose as bringing “to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security.”[3]

The agreement package contained a preamble and nine articles, annexes governing withdrawal and post-treaty security arrangements, agreed minutes, and letters concerning negotiations over the West Bank and Gaza.[11] The preamble linked the bilateral agreement to Resolutions 242 and 338 and the September 17, 1978, Camp David framework.[1] It presented Egyptian–Israeli peace as a step toward a wider Middle East settlement rather than as a settlement of every regional issue.[1]

Article I provided that the state of war would end and peace would be established upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.[3] Israel undertook to withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from Sinai behind the international boundary, while Egypt would resume full sovereignty over the peninsula.[3] Normal and friendly relations were linked to completion of the interim withdrawal specified in Annex I.[3] Article IX likewise made entry into force dependent on the exchange of ratification instruments and treated the attached protocols, annexes, and maps as integral parts of the agreement.[3]

The withdrawal timetable combined an initial territorial transfer with a longer period for completing Israel’s evacuation.[12] Israel was to withdraw behind an interim line running from east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed within nine months of ratification and behind the international boundary within three years.[12] Five interim subphases had deadlines of two, three, five, seven, and nine months.[12] Egyptian sovereignty over each evacuated area was to resume as Israeli withdrawal from that area occurred.[12]

The attached protocol also specified the sequence of military movements and the transfer of infrastructure.[1] Israeli forces were to leave designated areas in stages, United Nations forces were to enter evacuated areas to establish buffer zones, and Egyptian forces and police were to deploy according to the agreed schedule.[1] Israel undertook to transfer agreed facilities—including airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports—intact and to supply information needed for their operation.[1]

Article II identified the permanent border as the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated Territory of Palestine, as shown on the annexed map.[3] Both parties recognized the boundary as inviolable and undertook to respect each other’s territorial integrity, territorial waters, and airspace.[3] The article expressly left the status of the Gaza Strip unaffected by this boundary provision.[3]

Under Article III, both countries committed themselves to respect the other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.[3] They agreed to refrain from threats or use of force and to resolve disputes peacefully.[3] Each also undertook to prevent acts or threats of hostility originating from its territory or forces under its control and to bring perpetrators to justice.[3] These obligations accompanied the treaty’s provisions for full recognition and diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations.[3]

Normalization was given both substantive requirements and an implementation timetable.[12] Diplomatic and consular relations, including the exchange of ambassadors, were to follow completion of the interim withdrawal.[12] Economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations were to end at the same point.[12] Trade negotiations were to begin as soon as possible and no later than six months after the interim withdrawal, with a similar timetable for negotiations toward a cultural agreement.[12]

The normalization provisions also addressed the movement of people and access to places of religious and historical importance.[1] The parties undertook to allow the movement of each other’s nationals and vehicles under generally applicable rules and to provide nondiscriminatory access to religious and historical sites.[1] Article III included mutual due-process protections for citizens.[3] Agreed minutes clarified that normal economic relations included commercial Egyptian oil sales to Israel and permitted Israel to bid for Egyptian-origin oil not required for Egyptian domestic consumption.[12]

Article IV established reciprocal security arrangements involving limited-force zones on both sides of the border, monitoring personnel, and a joint commission to facilitate implementation.[3] The annex divided the arrangements into three Egyptian zones in Sinai and a fourth zone on the Israeli side.[3] Zone A permitted an Egyptian mechanized infantry division with specified equipment, including a maximum of 230 tanks and 22,000 personnel.[3] Zone B permitted four Egyptian border battalions with light weapons and up to 4,000 personnel.[3]

Zone C permitted only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police.[3] In Zone D, Israel could station a limited force of four infantry battalions, up to 180 armored vehicles, and 4,000 personnel, subject to restrictions on tanks, artillery, and antiaircraft missiles.[3] The arrangements could be reviewed at either party’s request, but amendments required mutual agreement.[3]

Monitoring provisions called for checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, observation posts, and verification at least twice each month, with additional verification within 48 hours of a request by either party.[3] The annex also assigned a role in ensuring navigation through the Strait of Tiran.[3] Egyptian and Israeli liaison offices were to operate in El-Arish and Beer-Sheba respectively, connected by a direct telephone line.[3] Each country was required to preserve the other’s war memorials and permit access to them.[3]

The treaty specified that United Nations personnel would not be removed without Security Council approval, including affirmative votes from all five permanent members, unless Egypt and Israel otherwise agreed.[3] A separate Carter letter said the United States would seek Security Council arrangements for the force and observers and, if necessary, help establish an acceptable alternative multinational force.[13] It also offered requested aerial monitoring and consultation and other action deemed appropriate by the United States in the event of an actual or imminent treaty violation.[13]

Article V secured free passage for Israeli ships and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel through the Suez Canal and its approaches, with nondiscriminatory treatment.[3] It identified the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable navigation and overflight.[3] Both parties undertook to respect each other’s access through those waterways.[3]

Disputes over interpretation or application were to be addressed first through negotiations and, if unresolved, through conciliation or arbitration.[12] Article VIII provided for a commission to settle mutual financial claims.[3] Article IX superseded the September 1975 Egyptian–Israeli agreement and required registration of the treaty with the United Nations secretary-general.[12]

American assurances accompanied the bilateral obligations.[11] Carter sent identical letters to Sadat and Begin concerning the American role in ensuring compliance, while a separate U.S.–Israeli memorandum pledged American support for Israel in the event of treaty violations.[11] The memorandum extended U.S. oil-supply commitments from five to fifteen years.[11] American financial assistance to both countries also helped pay for the relocation of Israeli military installations.[14]

A joint letter from Sadat and Begin, dated March 26, set out commitments concerning the separate Palestinian-autonomy negotiations.[13] Talks on the West Bank and Gaza provisions were to begin within a month after ratification, and Jordan was invited to participate.[13] Palestinians could be included in the delegations by mutual agreement.[13] The stated objective was an elected self-governing authority providing full autonomy to the inhabitants, with a goal of completing negotiations within a year and beginning a five-year transition after the authority’s election and inauguration.[13]

04Aftermath

Israel completed the evacuation of its military forces, installations, and civilian settlements from Sinai by April 25, 1982, withdrew to the international boundary, and transferred sovereignty over the evacuated territory to Egypt.[15][4] Normalization agreements were developed through a joint committee, with negotiations on most continuing until the withdrawal was complete.[15] The withdrawal involved not only military redeployment but the removal of Israeli communities and installations established in the peninsula.[4]

Evacuation of northern Sinai settlements, particularly Yamit, encountered resistance.[4] Residents sought compensation, while opponents of withdrawal urged the government to abandon the agreement.[4] Israeli forces removed withdrawal resisters, and Yamit was razed before the area reverted to Egyptian control.[4] The evacuation proceeded through areas including El-Arish and Santa Catarina, and the withdrawal was accompanied by repeated confrontations between residents and soldiers.[7]

Taba, just south of Eilat, remained an unresolved territorial question during the 1982 withdrawal period.[4] Negotiations had failed at that stage, and the parties were discussing conciliation and arbitration while implementation of other treaty provisions continued.[4] Arbitration settled the Taba boundary question in 1988, followed by agreements in 1989 concerning the coastal boundary and arrangements for Israeli tourists entering through the Taba terminal.[15]

The proposed United Nations peacekeeping arrangements did not take effect as originally envisaged because the UN declined to recognize them.[15] A multinational observer force was subsequently established with American backing.[15] This development followed the contingency anticipated in Carter’s letter offering American assistance in creating an acceptable alternative force if Security Council arrangements could not be secured.[13]

The signing provoked an immediate regional response.[16] Foreign ministers from eighteen Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization met in Baghdad on March 27, 1979.[16] After disagreement over sanctions, the conference unanimously adopted resolutions on March 31 calling for suspension of diplomatic relations with Egypt, suspension of its Arab League membership and membership in associated bodies, transfer of the League’s headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, and a halt to financial and technical aid programs.[16]

Individual governments did not respond identically.[16] Jordan said it would recall its ambassador without breaking relations, while Oman boycotted the conference and praised the treaty for returning Sinai to Egypt.[16] Most Arab League members broke ties with Egypt, beginning nearly a decade of regional isolation.[17] Egypt resumed its seat at the 1989 Casablanca summit.[18]

The associated autonomy negotiations did not produce an agreement.[8] Palestinian representatives refused to participate, while Egyptian and Israeli positions remained far apart on self-government, settlements, and the legal status of East Jerusalem.[8] The attached letter had envisaged negotiations toward an elected self-governing authority and a five-year transitional period, but those commitments did not become an agreed autonomy settlement.[13]

Opposition to the peace also existed within Egypt.[17] Sadat was assassinated by Islamic radicals on October 6, 1981; the assassins were already opposed to his economic and social programs as well.[17] The treaty nevertheless survived, and Egypt and Israel did not return to war.[15][5]

By its fortieth anniversary in 2019, the treaty had survived the Morsi presidency, the September 2011 storming of Israel’s embassy in Cairo, wars in Lebanon, and repeated conflicts in Gaza.[5] Security cooperation continued alongside treaty limits on Egyptian military deployments in Sinai; Israel approved an increased Egyptian military presence there for operations against Islamic State, and el-Sissi publicly acknowledged cooperation with Israel.[5]

An earlier example of agreed flexibility occurred in January 2011, when Israel authorized the movement of two Egyptian battalions, approximately 800 soldiers, into the Sharm el-Sheikh area.[19] Israeli officials connected the deployment with efforts to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza amid unrest in Egypt.[19] The authorization was an exception to the demilitarized arrangements, not a permanent treaty amendment.[19]

American assistance remained a substantial feature of the post-treaty relationship.[20] By 2019, Egypt had received more than $40 billion in U.S. military aid and $30 billion in economic assistance since 1980.[20] Assistance was partially suspended between 2013 and 2015 after Morsi’s removal and then restored.[20]

Commercial relations also developed, although their expansion did not erase the limitations on public normalization.[5] A 2019 report gave Israeli imports from Egypt as rising from $220 million to $650 million in 2018 and Israeli exports to Egypt as rising from $84 million to $110 million.[5] A gas-export agreement worth $15 billion had also been signed.[5]

05Historiography and Legacy

The treaty was Israel’s first peace agreement with an Arab state.[9] It combined an end to belligerency and formal recognition with the phased return of Sinai, which Israel had captured in the 1967 war.[17] Its practical scope extended beyond a cease-fire to diplomatic representation, commercial relations, navigation rights, security limits, verification procedures, and mechanisms for resolving disputes.[3] Israel’s evacuation of military installations and civilian settlements made territorial withdrawal a concrete component of the agreement rather than solely a diplomatic commitment.[4]

The agreement joined Egyptian recovery of sovereignty in Sinai with Israel’s achievement of formal peace and recognition.[3] Its preamble situated that bilateral exchange within the aspiration for a comprehensive regional settlement.[1] The treaty therefore had both a defined legal scope—relations between two states—and an explicitly broader diplomatic ambition.[1] The attached autonomy letter preserved a parallel negotiating agenda without making the settlement of Palestinian final status a completed treaty achievement.[13]

A lasting distinction developed between the maintenance of peace and the extent of social normalization.[21] Diplomatic and security channels operated alongside Suez Canal passage, air, sea, and land connections, and some supervised trade and tourism.[21] Civic, cultural, and other people-to-people relationships remained limited.[21] The description “cold peace” refers to this combination of maintained formal relations and restricted social interaction; it was not a term of the treaty itself.[15][21]

The endurance of the agreement through political and regional crises and continuing security cooperation illustrates the durability of the bilateral framework.[5] At the same time, civilian and popular ties remained limited, and official relations coexisted with substantial public hostility.[21] The treaty’s record thus includes both the prevention of renewed interstate war and the failure to produce the broad social rapprochement anticipated in its normalization provisions.[15][21]

The principal political dispute surrounding the agreement concerned its separate bilateral character and its relationship to Palestinian aspirations.[8][17] Other Arab states and the Palestinians rejected the Camp David process, and the Arab League moved its headquarters from Cairo as most members broke relations with Egypt.[17] The subsequent failure of autonomy talks left the broader Camp David agenda unfulfilled, while Article II had expressly refrained from determining Gaza’s status.[8][3]

Implementation of the security provisions has also generated later disputes.[22] During discussion of the proposed transfer of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia in 2016, Israeli officials gave differing accounts of whether the military appendix needed to be reopened: Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said it did, while the Justice Ministry said the treaty and appendices had not been opened and existing commitments were being preserved.[22] A 2025 report relayed allegations about Egyptian troop deployments and infrastructure in Sinai alongside competing Israeli and Egyptian explanations; those allegations were reported claims rather than an uncontested finding of treaty violations.[23]

Sources

  1. 1Jewish Virtual Library, Israel-Egypt Relations: Peace Treaty Between Israel & Egypt, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  2. 2World Jewish Congress, This week in Jewish history | Israel and Egypt sign Camp David Accords, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  3. 3Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  4. 4Berman Jewish Policy Archive, American Jewish Year Book, Israel in 1982: The War in Lebanon, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  5. 5Ynet, 40 Years of Peace with Egypt: “It Has Survived Difficult Tests”, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  6. 6Ynet, Egypt, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  7. 7Ynet, Days of Peace, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  8. 8Office of the Historian, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  9. 9Anti-Defamation League, Camp David Accords/Israel-Egypt Peace Agreement 1978-1979, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  10. 10Ynet, “We Are Ready and Prepared to Establish Normal Relations with You, Such as Those Between Good Neighbors”, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  11. 11Office of the Historian, Historical Documents, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  12. 12Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  13. 13Jewish Virtual Library, Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty--Attached Letters, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  14. 14Encyclopaedia Britannica, The Beginning of the Peace Process, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  15. 15Jewish Virtual Library, Overview of Israel-Jordan Cooperation, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  16. 16Office of the Historian, Historical Documents, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  17. 17Encyclopedia.com, Egyptian–Israeli Peace Treaty (1979), accessed on November 19, 2026.
  18. 18The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Arab League Summit Conferences, 1964–2000, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  19. 19Ynet, Israel agrees to some Egyptian troops in Sinai, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  20. 20The Times of Israel, Peace Treaty Endures in Troubled Region, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  21. 21Institute for National Security Studies, Egypt and Israel, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  22. 22Ynet, Ya'alon: Israel signed off on Egypt-Saudi deal over islands, accessed on November 19, 2026.
  23. 23Globes, Egyptian military violations in Sinai concern Israel, accessed on November 19, 2026.

IsraelPedia Question & Answers

  • What was the Egypt–Israel peace treaty?

    The Egypt–Israel peace treaty was a bilateral agreement signed in Washington, D.C., on March 26, 1979, by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with U.S. President Jimmy Carter as witness. It ended the state of war, provided for Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai and the return of Egyptian sovereignty there, and established normal diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations.

  • What happened at the Camp David summit before the Egypt–Israel peace treaty was signed?

    The Camp David summit, held from September 5 to September 17, 1978, produced two framework documents for further negotiations, not a final peace treaty. During the twelve days of talks, Sadat threatened to leave, and agreement came on the final day. The frameworks addressed bilateral peace and a broader Middle East settlement, including proposed Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza.

  • What did the Egypt–Israel peace treaty require Israel and Egypt to do in Sinai?

    The treaty required Israel to withdraw its armed forces and civilians from Sinai and Egypt to resume full sovereignty over the peninsula. Israel was to withdraw behind an interim line within nine months of ratification and behind the international boundary within three years. The withdrawal proceeded in stages, with Egyptian sovereignty resuming in each area as Israeli forces left.

  • What security arrangements did the Egypt–Israel peace treaty establish?

    The treaty established limited-force zones on both sides of the border, monitoring procedures, and a joint commission to facilitate implementation. Its annex specified permitted forces and equipment in four zones, with United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police allowed in one Sinai zone. Monitoring included checkpoints, patrols, observation posts, and regular verification.

  • What happened to the Egypt–Israel treaty’s proposed Palestinian-autonomy negotiations?

    The proposed autonomy negotiations did not produce an agreement. Palestinian representatives refused to participate, and Egypt and Israel remained far apart on self-government, settlements, and the legal status of East Jerusalem. The treaty’s accompanying letter had envisaged an elected self-governing authority and a five-year transitional period, but these plans did not become an agreed autonomy settlement.

  • How did other Arab states respond to the Egypt–Israel peace treaty?

    Most Arab League members broke relations with Egypt after the treaty, beginning nearly a decade of regional isolation. At a conference in Baghdad in March 1979, Arab foreign ministers and the Palestine Liberation Organization adopted resolutions calling for Egypt’s diplomatic isolation, suspension of its Arab League membership, and relocation of the League’s headquarters from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt resumed its seat at the 1989 Casablanca summit.

  • Why is the Egypt–Israel peace sometimes called a “cold peace”?

    The term “cold peace” describes the combination of maintained formal relations and limited social interaction between Egypt and Israel; it was not a term used in the treaty. Diplomatic and security channels continued, alongside navigation, some trade, and tourism, while civic, cultural, and other people-to-people relationships remained limited. The treaty endured, but broad social rapprochement did not follow.