Censorship in Israel

The Israeli Military Censor is a unit within the IDF Directorate of Military Intelligence that reviews material concerning specified security matters and strategic infrastructure before publication.[2] Its authority derives from the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, retained after Israel’s independence, while its exercise of that authority is constrained by judicial interpretation and agreements with participating media organizations.[1][6] The chief censor is traditionally a military officer, appointed by the defense minister to the professional position and by the chief of staff to command the censorship unit.[7]

A central distinction separates the obligation to submit material from the authority to prohibit its publication: compliance with a specific submission order may be required even where an editor believes that an item poses no security danger.[8] The Supreme Court has required an objectively assessed near certainty of real harm to state security, public safety, or public order before a journalistic report may be blocked.[4] Unrepealed Mandate regulations must also be interpreted in light of the basic principles of Israel’s democratic legal system.[1]

Military censorship is not the only mechanism restricting publication: courts issue gag orders concerning sensitive security information and ongoing investigations, and separate legislation permits restrictions on websites connected with specified criminal activity.[2][9] Hate-speech and incitement prohibitions, emergency powers affecting broadcasters, and requests to digital platforms for voluntary content removal operate alongside these mechanisms.[2][10] These routes differ in their legal basis, decision-maker, and procedures for review.[2][9]

The system’s scale includes both complete bans and partial intervention in submitted articles: in 2022, the censor received 5,916 articles, prohibited 159, and intervened in the content of another 990.[2] Media organizations can appeal censorship decisions to the Supreme Court, and the censor cannot appeal a court judgment against it.[2] Agreements with established outlets also provide a committee-based framework for handling disputes and violations.[6]

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 formed part of the British Mandate legislation inherited by Israel at its establishment in 1948.[11] Regulation 86 empowered the defense minister to appoint a censor, and subsequent Knesset initiatives to abolish the regulations were rejected with limited exceptions.[11] Press licensing had a separate Mandate foundation in the Press Ordinance of 1933, while the 1945 emergency framework supplied the basis for military censorship.[12]

Cooperation between editors and security authorities developed alongside these statutory powers.[6] The Editors’ Committee initiated an agreement with the IDF first signed in December 1949, followed by versions in May 1951 and July 1966.[6] The arrangement applied to most Zionist daily newspapers other than Haaretz and to the Israel Broadcasting Authority in the period described by the historical account.[6] Editors also received confidential briefings from senior government and defense officials on condition that information would not be published without prior agreement.[13]

An early dispute arose in 1952 after a shooting incident involving Arab citizens of Israel near Kafr Ara.[14] Mapam Knesset member Eliezer Be’eri prepared an account for al-Hamishmar that the censors barred; Be’eri maintained that witness accounts differed from the IDF spokesman’s version.[14] Arab witnesses and soldiers gave conflicting testimony about whether warnings had been issued, and a parliamentary committee proposed a compromise explanation for the discrepancy.[14]

Chief of Staff Yigael Yadin defended the ban on the grounds that the item undermined soldiers’ confidence and suggested that their orders contradicted instructions from competent authorities. Knesset member Yaakov Riftin, by contrast, accused the authorities of using censorship to prevent publication of the truth.[14]

Kol HaAm, an Arab Communist newspaper, was shut down for several days in a landmark press-freedom case during the 1950s. The Supreme Court held that the government had misused emergency regulations and that publication could be banned only where there was a clear and present danger to public safety.[15]

Security secrecy also shaped public knowledge of the Lavon Affair.[16] Strict censorship meant that few Israelis knew Egyptian authorities had uncovered Israeli underground cells in Egypt in 1954, and journalists were not permitted to interview two operatives released from Egyptian prison in 1962.[16] The public learned about the affair in 1971, when Golda Meir announced that she would attend the wedding of former prisoner Marcelle Ninio.[16] In the earlier press handling of the arrests, editors had been instructed to describe sabotage charges as unfounded despite knowing otherwise.[13]

The 1973 Yom Kippur War contributed to the development of a more open and adversarial Israeli press.[15] A major subsequent test of submission powers came in April 1984, when Hadashot published an unsubmitted report that Defense Minister Moshe Arens had established a commission headed by Major General Meir Zorea to investigate the Kav 300 affair.[8] Chief Military Censor Brigadier General Yitzhak Shani ordered the newspaper not to publish for five days.[8]

Hadashot argued before the High Court that a report about the commission was not security information and therefore fell outside the censor’s authority, but the court rejected the petition.[8] The ruling upheld compliance with the specific submission order while distinguishing prior submission from the separate substantive question of whether publication could be prohibited.[8] Justice Menachem Elon emphasized the need to balance freedom of expression and the rights to inform and know against protection of legitimate state secrets.[8]

A different limit emerged from the Supreme Court’s January 10, 1989, Schnitzer ruling, concerning a 1988 article criticizing Mossad chief Nahum Admoni.[4] The editor accepted removal of material that could identify Admoni, whose identity was then secret, but challenged suppression of criticism of his performance.[4] The court accepted the challenge and required an objectively assessed near certainty of real harm to state security, public safety, or public order before a journalistic report could be blocked.[4] The ruling established that criticism of a senior security official could not be suppressed without meeting that standard.[4]

A 1989 addition to the editors’ agreement incorporated the near-certainty principle associated with High Court case 680/88.[6] The agreement was last revised in 1996, when it adopted that test and limited censorship under the arrangement to security-related material posing a security danger.[5] The 1996 framework permitted appeals to the Supreme Court and prevented the censor from closing a newspaper for a censorship violation or appealing an adverse court judgment.[5]

The surrounding media system also changed: the early press combined a vibrant print market with licensing and close connections to the military and security establishment.[17] The licensing regime collapsed in the early 2000s and was replaced by a more concentrated press industry.[17] Broadcasting and cable, introduced gradually from the 1960s and 1990s respectively, remained subject to extensive regulation and agency oversight, including oversight of content, while online news and entertainment remained unlicensed within the framework examined in a 2022 academic chapter.[17]

An official Chief Censor notice requires listed material to be submitted before publication in any format, including text, photographs, digital files, video, audio, maps, and infographics, and on platforms including social media.[18] Previously approved material must be submitted again, while material originating with foreign media, official sources, or military sources is not exempt.[18] The notice also prohibits disclosure of changes made by the censor or the use of black bars to indicate rejected text.[18]

The submission list spans operational plans, troop movements, military technology, cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities, intelligence agencies, and security operations attributed to Israel.[19] It also covers hostages and captives, assessments of damage from attacks, national infrastructure, nuclear, chemical, and biological matters relating to Israel, and sensitive government or Knesset discussions.[19] Security-related foreign ties, court proceedings, and cases under gag orders also fall within its scope.[19]

Other accounts of the customary remit include force sizes, weapons descriptions, identities of secret officials, sensitive diplomatic maneuvers, movements of immigrants from dangerous locations, oil supplies, and energy consumption.[15] Journalists’ submission obligations have also included contacts with countries with which Israel has no relations, oil purchases, immigration, and information directly concerning security.[20] In practice, routine submission has been organized around security-related topics rather than every newspaper article.[12]

A general order issued in 1988 required prior submission of material concerning state security, public safety, public order, or Israel–Arab relations, including material intended for publication abroad and online.[7] Its geographic scope included Israel, the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza.[7] In 2016, the censor also directed Facebook-page operators and bloggers to submit relevant material; actual practice generally concentrated on publications principally concerning security.[7]

The legal requirement depends partly on publishers’ cooperation: prosecutions have been rare, and the censor cannot police every communication channel, including freely accessible internet and mobile-phone broadcasts.[20] Historical experience also differed between media sectors.[21] Davar editor-in-chief Hannah Zemer described opinion editorials as not being submitted, editors deciding which copy required review, and disagreements being discussed with the censor.[21] She expressly distinguished her experience from that of foreign correspondents and the Arabic press.[21]

Participating outlets under the Editors’ Committee arrangement could bring disputes to a three-person panel representing the press, military, and public.[21] A later description identified the Committee of Three as comprising a retired Supreme Court judge, a journalist representative, and a security-system representative, and noted that disputes could be taken through this mechanism or to court.[22]

The unit also monitors material already published rather than relying exclusively on submissions.[22] A January 2024 report described wartime checking volume as four to five times higher than before, with hundreds of thousands of publications monitored and approximately 14,000 identified for closer review.[22] The unit had around 80 personnel, including roughly 30 censors and a similar number of conscripts, while the proportion of items approved or rejected remained similar despite the increased volume.[22]

Operational assessments can consider timing, context, the intelligence picture, earlier publication, the report’s source, and whether information can still be concealed.[23] The censor assesses security risk rather than simply determining whether a report is true: even false information may be barred if it creates a potential security danger.[23] The framework therefore concerns the consequences of disclosure, not merely the accuracy of the submitted account.[23]

Missile-impact reporting has repeatedly received specific attention.[24][25] During preparations for the Iraq war in 2003, Chief Censor Brigadier General Rachel Dolev instructed outlets, including popular internet forums, to submit potentially harmful material and barred unapproved publication of precise impact locations, missile types, unofficial assessments, IDF operational assessments, foreign cooperation, and cabinet discussions.[24] The authority extended to any person publishing information, not only established news organizations.[24]

In 2026, restrictions included live broadcasts showing skylines during missile alerts and filming impacts at or near security sites.[25] Civilian damage could be covered provided exact locations were withheld, while military planning, preparations, air defenses, and impact locations remained restricted subjects.[25] The chief censor described the primary purpose as preventing assistance to the enemy during wartime where it constituted a tangible threat to state security.[25]

Court-issued gag orders provide a parallel route, applying to local media and foreign correspondents on matters involving sensitive security information or continuing investigations.[2] In the Ben Zygier case, a 2010 order barred publication of his identity, imprisonment, allegations against him, quotations from foreign sources, and even the existence of the order.[7] Zygier was later publicly identified as “Prisoner X.”[7]

The Anat Kam case illustrated how judicial restrictions and military approval could operate separately.[26] In 2010, the Tel Aviv District Court partially lifted a comprehensive gag order after extensive foreign coverage, while leaving some details restricted.[26] Uri Blau’s articles based on documents received from Kam had already been submitted to the military censor, and their published versions contained only approved material.[26]

Online access restrictions also have a distinct statutory basis.[9] The Knesset passed the Law on Authorities for the Prevention of Committing Crimes Through Use of an Internet Site on July 17, 2017.[9] On a prosecutor’s request, a designated district court judge may order full or partial access restrictions to prevent specified offenses, including ongoing crimes committed through a site or activity furthering a terrorist organization.[9]

The court must consider public access to information, effects on internet providers, and user privacy, and restrictions must not exceed what is necessary.[9] Orders may be reviewed or changed, and the law provides for their publication and annual reporting to the Knesset.[9] These judicial powers are separate from voluntary requests by the State Attorney’s Office Cyber Unit that platforms remove or restrict content and accounts.[2]

Israel did not restrict or disrupt internet access in 2023, but it regularly censored online content suspected of illegality and monitored electronic communications for security purposes.[2] Between October 7 and December 12, the Cyber Unit received more than 39,000 removal requests from security agencies and sought removal of more than 26,000 posts, accounts, pages, and groups.[2] The unit reported that platforms removed more than 90 percent of the requested content.[2]

Emergency regulations approved on November 6, 2023, empowered the communications minister to close media offices, confiscate broadcasting equipment, and block communications infrastructure for a broadcaster deemed an immediate security harm, subject to consultation with the defense minister and cabinet approval.[2] On November 13, orders blocked the website of Al-Mayadeen, a Lebanese Hizballah-affiliated network, and authorized seizure of its broadcasting equipment.[2]

Separate expression restrictions prohibit hate speech and content liable to incite violence, terrorism, or discrimination on grounds including race, origin, religion, nationality, and sex.[10] Israeli authorities have also occasionally ordered Palestinian radio stations in the West Bank closed on public-safety or public-order grounds, including conduct described as support for terrorism.[10] These measures concern a different geographic and regulatory setting from routine military review of Israeli news articles.[2][10]

Information-security failures during the 2006 Second Lebanon War demonstrated the operational importance of controlling real-time disclosures: reporting revealed rocket impacts, narrowly missed strategic targets, and emergency-service responses.[20] Senior officers’ media appearances sometimes bypassed the censor because they had not been briefed on what not to disclose.[20] The Winograd Commission judged information-security failures to have endangered lives and impeded the IDF’s freedom of action.[20] Former chief of staff Dan Halutz assessed the intelligence Hezbollah obtained from Israeli media as worth “hundreds of millions of dollars.”[20]

Publication decisions can remain significant long after an operation.[27] On March 21, 2018, the military censor authorized details about the destruction of the Syrian reactor in 2007.[27] Supporters of disclosure invoked the public’s right to know and the value of learning lessons, while opponents argued that publication could reveal when Israeli intelligence had identified the reactor.[27] Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman said some leaked information had caused substantive security damage.[27]

Digital circulation creates a different operational problem: during the 2025 campaign against Iran, footage from strike sites spread rapidly through social media while Israeli journalists waited for approval.[3] Foreign media covered the strike on the Bazan complex in Haifa shortly after it occurred, but the Israeli publication restriction was lifted only two days later.[3] The official submission notice nevertheless makes clear that prior foreign publication does not itself exempt material from review.[18]

Judicial oversight has given freedom of expression an important place within the security framework. The Kol HaAm case helped establish that publication could be banned only where there was a clear and present danger to public safety, while Schnitzer constrained censorship of criticism directed at senior security officials.[15][4] The Supreme Court expressed the relationship between security and democracy by stating: “Security is not an objective in itself,” and identifying the objective as democratic government securing individual freedoms.[1]

The system also rests on professional habits beyond formal sanctions, including a tradition of cooperation between Israeli media and security institutions and voluntary compliance with military censorship.[28] Army Radio has been described as refraining from violating censorship, and noncompliant outlets can face reputational costs.[28] These practices operate alongside formal submission obligations, committee procedures, and judicial challenges.[21][28]

Disputes concern both the scope of secrecy and its consistent application.[23][28] Participants in a discussion of secrecy questioned the subjectivity of the near-certainty test while distinguishing necessary protection of “core secrets” from information they considered unnecessarily withheld.[28] Wartime interpretation has also divided specialists: former chief censor Sima Vaknin-Gil favored a stricter emergency interpretation to protect soldiers, while media-law expert Elad Mann argued that the legal considerations should remain unchanged between war and peace.[22]

Allegations of unequal treatment have not always produced established findings.[23] Complaints in 2024 included differing decisions on similar reports and alleged preference for Channel 12; people close to the system disputed systematic favoritism, and regular data were unavailable to test the allegation empirically.[23] On November 28, 2023, the Union of Journalists in Israel requested an investigation of possible discrimination, while East Jerusalem editors and journalists reported self-censorship for fear of retribution.[2]

Other episodes raised questions about the duration or purpose of restrictions.[29][30] After a documentary about reactor construction was forwarded to the Defense Establishment’s security directorate, interviewees were pressured to withdraw, reportedly because the film was considered “too left wing”; Vaknin-Gil apologized and called the episode a serious mistake.[29] Following flooding that damaged eight F-16s at Hatzor Air Base in January 2020, with repairs estimated at NIS 30 million, the IDF acknowledged that a publication delay had lasted too long but denied an attempt to conceal the incident.[30]

Defense-contract reporting has generated a related tension between scrutiny and protection of sensitive relationships.[31] Restrictions on details of alleged bribery investigations drew criticism from Ministry of Defense officials, while the ministry argued that disclosure could expose commercial information and harm defense exports.[31] Broader concerns persisted in 2024: freedom of expression was generally respected for most Israelis, but NGOs and journalists reported restrictions involving criticism of the war or sympathy for Palestinians in Gaza, and the journalists’ union received reports of five journalist detentions and 13 physical attacks by security forces during the year.[10]