Use of Torture in Israel Since 1948

The Supreme Court’s 1999 decision established a distinction between the authority to conduct an interrogation and a possible defense against criminal liability for an individual interrogator afterward.[2] General investigative powers did not authorize the physical methods challenged in the case, and necessity could not supply a standing permission to use them.[2] An investigator could nevertheless seek to invoke necessity in a subsequent criminal proceeding if the defense’s legal conditions were satisfied.[2]

The institutions central to this history include the General Security Service, subsequently called the Israel Security Agency and commonly known as the Shin Bet, the Supreme Court, the Justice Ministry, government commissions, and parliamentary oversight bodies.[3] The service was created in 1948 and expanded substantially after the 1967 war, becoming the leading civilian agency responsible for controlling Palestinians in the newly occupied territories.[5]

The terminology has differed across institutions. The Landau Commission permitted a “moderate measure of physical pressure,” while UN treaty bodies characterized specified practices as torture or prohibited ill-treatment.[3][6] Later State Department reporting said the government referred to some post-judgment practices as “exceptional measures.”[4] The legal history therefore includes both decisions about investigative authority and separate institutional assessments of whether particular practices met international definitions of torture.[2][6]

On February 10, 1948, David Ben-Gurion wrote to Yaakov Riftin, a member of the Security Committee, about allegations of lawlessness by some Palmach members, including torture of Arabs during interrogation.[1] He treated the reported conduct as a political and moral danger and called for harsh measures if the allegations were true.[1] Riftin subsequently investigated and submitted a report that raised questions about making complaint procedures clear and effective, investigating complaints promptly, and prosecuting where appropriate.[1]

The Shin Bet’s establishment in 1948 and its expansion after 1967 provided the institutional setting for later disputes over security interrogation.[5] A retrospective account drawing on former Shin Bet legal adviser Eli Bachar’s book describes Prime Minister Menachem Begin instructing the service’s head in the late 1970s not to use torture, followed by continued use despite that instruction.[7] The same account links later inquiries to a culture of lying and concealment within the service.[7]

The 1984 Bus 300 affair became a major public controversy over the conduct of the security service.[3] Four hijackers seized a bus; two were killed during the rescue, while two were captured alive.[3] A military inquiry found that the surviving captives had been severely beaten before and after removal from the bus, but could not determine when or by whom the fatal blows had been delivered.[3] Photographs showing the two men leaving the bus alive contradicted the initial account that they had died during the rescue, and the subsequent public account identified their deaths as killings by Shin Bet personnel in custody.[5]

The affair also exposed allegations that security personnel coordinated false testimony and concealed information from investigators.[3] Amid accusations of a cover-up, President Chaim Herzog pardoned Shin Bet head Avraham Shalom and eleven other officers.[5] The affair, dated 1984–1986 in the institutional history of the service, helped bring its interrogation procedures under public examination.[5]

The case of Izzat Nafsu, also rendered Azzat Nafsu, supplied another important impetus for an inquiry.[3][8] Nafsu, a Circassian IDF intelligence officer arrested in 1981, was convicted of treason largely on the basis of confessions he said had been obtained through violence, sleep deprivation, threats, and other coercive treatment.[3][8] The military court initially accepted the interrogators’ denials.[3]

During his Supreme Court appeal, the state disclosed new evidence supporting his account and requested acceptance of a plea bargain.[3] The Court replaced the treason conviction with a lesser offense and noted that Nafsu had spent seven and a half years imprisoned for a baseless treason conviction founded on investigators’ false and inadmissible testimony.[3] He was released after pleading guilty to the lesser charge; in 1988, the High Court denied his request to compel a police investigation of the interrogators.[8]

The Landau Commission of Inquiry was established in 1987 after controversies including the Nafsu case and Bus 300 affair, and submitted its report on October 30 that year.[3][9] It condemned systematic false testimony by General Security Service personnel while recommending a framework permitting physical pressure in specified circumstances.[3] Its preferred approach was vigorous, extensive interrogation using nonviolent psychological pressure; if that failed, it concluded that “the exertion of a moderate measure of physical pressure cannot be avoided.”[3]

The government approved the recommendations, whose detailed conditions appeared in a classified annex.[3] The commission also recommended strong legal counsel for the service.[9] Israel’s 1998 account of the framework described physical pressure as limited to circumstances in which vital information was needed to protect life, with psychological pressure preferred whenever possible.[10] The guidelines called for proportionality, advance limits, strict supervision, and disciplinary or criminal action when investigators exceeded their authority.[10]

Oversight arrangements changed during this period.[10] The GSS comptroller reviewed torture or maltreatment complaints from 1987 to 1994; responsibility for complaints against interrogators then moved to the Justice Ministry’s Department for Investigation of Police Misconduct, under the State Attorney.[10] For 1995, the state recorded 81 complaints concerning treatment during GSS investigations, four of which were found to involve deviations from lawful authority and were handled administratively, including through sanctions.[10]

An examination by State Comptroller Miriam Ben-Porat of interrogations in 1988–1992, including at the Gaza facility, found physical-pressure methods used without consistent compliance with rules or required authorization.[11] Records and reports were sometimes incomplete, and some reports were false.[11] The audit found knowing and systematic breaches of restrictions and failures by senior managers to prevent them; procedures were subsequently updated, oversight increased, and disciplinary measures taken.[11]

The security context included approximately 20,000 terrorist attacks in the territories and Israel during the period covered by the audit’s account, killing 123 Israeli civilians, 799 Arabs from the territories, and three tourists.[11] Thousands of people underwent interrogation at Shin Bet facilities.[11] A retrospective account of the Gaza facility describes investigators knowingly exceeding Landau rules, detainee deaths and complaints, and the imprisonment of two investigators, followed by an internal effort to prevent further deviations.[7] It also describes hooding for hours, sleep deprivation, loud music, and shaking becoming routine for most detainees during the period discussed, rather than remaining exceptional.[7]

By 1996, the framework still allowed the Shin Bet chief to authorize moderate physical and psychological pressure on Palestinian detainees, notwithstanding laws and administrative regulations prohibiting physical abuse.[12] Violent shaking was among the special measures used in cases described as ticking-bomb situations.[12] Courts reviewed challenges to shaking, sometimes requiring the service to demonstrate a direct connection between the information sought and public safety, and authorized the method in some cases.[12]

On September 6, 1999, an expanded panel of nine Supreme Court justices unanimously accepted petitions challenging physical interrogation practices.[2][3] The case, HCJ 5100/94, concerned seven petitions and addressed shaking, the Shabach position, frog crouching, painful or prolonged handcuffing, loud music, head coverings, and sleep deprivation.[2] The state did not deny using the methods, although it disputed some descriptions and defended the practices; the Court noted that the detailed accounts came from petitioners and had not been examined individually in every petition.[2]

The Court held that GSS investigators possessed the same interrogation powers and restrictions as ordinary police investigators.[2] Their general authority to investigate did not authorize shaking, frog crouching, the painful Shabach position and its components, or loud music in the circumstances described.[2] The judgment distinguished sleep loss incidental to a lengthy interrogation from deliberate, prolonged sleep deprivation intended to tire or “break” a suspect, which fell outside a fair and reasonable investigation.[2]

The judgment also separated criminal-law necessity from legal authority.[2] Necessity could not create general directives prospectively allowing physical methods, although an individual investigator might invoke it afterward in criminal proceedings if the relevant conditions were met.[2] Any authorization of physical means beyond ordinary investigative powers would require legislation.[2] The Court described lawful investigation as free of torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, and degrading conduct, thereby nullifying the Landau framework’s authorization of physical pressure.[3]

President Aharon Barak expressed the democratic constraint in the words, “A democracy must sometimes fight with one hand tied behind its back.”[3] The government subsequently chose not to seek legislation authorizing physical interrogation methods, and the ISA instructed personnel to comply with the ruling.[13] The service introduced training in proper investigative methods, and investigators found to have used physical pressure could face discipline or dismissal.[3] The 2002 General Security Service Law placed the ISA under government authority and provided for ministerial and parliamentary oversight.[3]

In 2001, human-rights organizations reported increased allegations that security forces used methods barred by the 1999 ruling, including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, extended sleep deprivation, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures.[14] The government maintained that security forces complied with the decision and that the Attorney General’s office investigated allegations.[14] Rights groups challenged the adequacy and independence of that process and pointed to the absence of recent criminal charges against GSS agents for torture or other ill-treatment.[14]

A former interrogator’s account of the August 2002 questioning of members of the Silwan cell described authorization for special means because officials believed detainees knew about a suicide bombing planned for that evening.[15] He said the interrogation revealed the location of an explosive belt and helped prevent the attack.[15] The cell had carried out attacks killing 35 Israelis, including those at Café Moment in Jerusalem and the Sheffield Club in Rishon LeZion.[15]

By 2019, rules governing physical pressure were not set out in clear, publicly known laws or regulations.[15] Former officials described authorizations as case-specific and rare in recent years, while security sources estimated their use in roughly one-thousandth of Shin Bet interrogations.[15] Former service head Ami Ayalon described external legal review during his tenure as occurring after authorization, contrasting it with a later process involving direct contact with prosecutors when the service head decided special measures were needed.[15]

The 2021 description of the legal framework identified general prohibitions on physical force, assault, or pressure by public officials, but no specifically defined prohibition on torture.[4] The state attorney’s position allowed possible exemption from prosecution for exceptional methods when an imminent threat was established afterward, and interrogation rules remained confidential for security reasons.[4] In 2024, the government acknowledged that Shin Bet and police used violent interrogation methods termed exceptional measures, while the Justice Ministry did not disclose either their frequency or the particular methods employed.[16]

Mustafa Dirani, a Lebanese citizen apprehended in Lebanon in 1994 and detained by Israel, filed a civil suit in 2000 seeking 6 million NIS over allegations that interrogators tortured, raped, and sodomized him.[17] On January 15, 2015, an expanded Supreme Court panel dismissed the claim under a common-law rule barring examination of an enemy’s claim during wartime, extending the rule to certain armed conflicts with terrorist organizations operating from foreign countries.[17]

Samer al-Arbid’s interrogation became another prominent case in 2019, when he was hospitalized unconscious two days after arrest with serious injuries, including broken ribs and kidney failure.[18] His wife and lawyers alleged severe beatings during arrest and torture after detention, while the Shin Bet did not officially confirm using special measures.[15] The Justice Ministry’s Inspector of Interrogee Complaints opened an investigation.[18] The attorney general closed the probe in 2021, citing insufficient evidence.[19]

Complaint-handling arrangements included a 2014 transfer of the Shin Bet complaints oversight unit to the Justice Ministry.[19] By 2021, PCATI alleged that more than 1,300 torture complaints had been submitted since 2001, producing one criminal investigation and no indictments.[4] The ministry separately stated that internal reviews had led to two investigations since 2018.[4] PCATI reported an average handling time of 56 months in 2021, compared with 44 months in 2020.[4]

Earlier reporting for 2020 recorded PCATI’s assessment that at least 15 people experienced physical torture during interrogations between August and November 2019.[20] A temporary law exempted security-offense interrogations from audio and video recording requirements, and the Justice Ministry declined to disclose the number of necessity interrogations.[20] In 2021, PCATI identified 60 alleged cases of physical torture through interviews and examination of Palestinians detained on suspected security offenses, with some complaints filed that year and others earlier.[4]

The alleged measures included beatings, prolonged stress positions, incommunicado detention, sexual harassment, threats, painful shackling, religious humiliation, sleep deprivation, extreme temperatures, and threats against detainees’ families.[4] During 2023, PCATI filed 12 complaints on behalf of people alleging torture by Shin Bet personnel and reported 33 cases pending at year’s end, including older cases.[21] It criticized exemptions from recording security interrogations as obstacles to accountability and judicial review.[21]

Following October 7, 2023, human-rights organizations raised concerns about physical and sexual violence, threats, deprivation of food and water, exposure to cold, and prolonged isolation affecting Palestinian detainees.[21] The reported accounts drew on NGO visits, detainee testimony, and local press coverage.[22] Six Palestinian deaths in Israeli custody were reported during the period.[21]

In the case of prisoner Thaer Abu Assab, an alleged cellmate claimed that guards had beaten him to death, and 19 prison guards were reportedly detained for questioning.[22] A final opinion on the cause of his death had not been received by the end of 2023.[22]

In 2024, former detainees and Israeli whistleblowers alleged beatings, prolonged restraints, medical neglect, and degrading treatment at Sde Teiman.[23] On May 27, the Military Advocate General announced 70 investigations into suspected criminal violations during the war, including allegations concerning the facility.[23] A reservist was indicted over five alleged incidents of beating bound and blindfolded detainees between February and June 2024, and the state committed to transferring detainees out of the facility following a court petition.[23]

During the UN Committee against Torture’s November 2025 review, the Committee expressed deep concern about reports of organized and widespread torture and ill-treatment, including beatings, dog attacks, electrocution, waterboarding, prolonged stress positions, sexual violence, and denial of medical care.[24] It called for an independent investigation into allegations during the armed conflict and prosecution of those responsible.[24] Israel’s ambassador rejected the allegations as “disinformation,” while the Israel Prison Service maintained that it operated lawfully under official oversight.[24]

In 1997, after reviewing information submitted by Israel, the UN Committee against Torture concluded that the described interrogation tactics violated Convention obligations and constituted torture under the Convention.[6] The practices included painful restraint, hooding, loud music, prolonged sleep deprivation, death threats and other threats, violent shaking, and chilling detainees with cold air.[6] In 1998, the UN Human Rights Committee separately found that acknowledged methods including handcuffing, hooding, shaking, and sleep deprivation, alone or in combination, violated Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[25]

The Human Rights Committee welcomed the 1999 judgment in its 2003 observations, while expressing concern over continuing reports of incompatible techniques and invocation of necessity to justify ISA actions.[25] It called for vigorous investigations through genuinely independent mechanisms and prosecution of those responsible.[25] In 2016, the Committee against Torture called for a specific domestic torture offense, an absolute prohibition including unequivocal rejection of necessity, and application of the Convention throughout territories within Israel’s jurisdiction, including the occupied territories.[26] Its recommendations also addressed oversight, legal counsel, medical care, investigation of complaints, and redress for victims.[26]

A 2018 commentary published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs recounts Israel’s response during Universal Periodic Review: that the ISA fulfilled its legal security responsibilities in accordance with the 1999 judgment and that conduct meeting the Convention’s torture definition was punishable under existing penal law despite the absence of a specific offense.[27] A 2017 commentary argues that the ethical principles governing interrogation remained unchanged after the ruling and describes Israel as prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[28] It also notes that the comprehensive 2016 Counter-Terrorism Law consolidated earlier arrangements and expanded coverage of support for terrorism without changing the fundamental principles it discusses.[28]

The available record does not establish continuous use of torture from 1948: the early material concerns allegations, while the detailed institutional and legal record is concentrated in later decades.[1][5] Complaint totals, civil allegations, indictments, and investigative announcements do not themselves establish that every alleged act occurred; Dirani’s dismissal, for example, rested on a wartime procedural rule rather than a determination of his allegations.[17]

The classification of practices also remains disputed.[6][13] Israel’s 2001 treaty report maintained that the methods did not constitute torture or prohibited ill-treatment and distinguished the Court’s finding of unlawfulness from a Convention-based finding of torture.[13] The author of Security and Liberty likewise characterizes the methods as proportional pressure rather than torture, an assessment separate from the Court’s ruling.[29] A 2007 legal commentary argues that the necessity defense left practical room for physical methods and reported more than 500 complaints since September 1999 without an independent criminal investigation or prosecution.[30]