2004 Ashdod Port Bombings

The attack took place during the second intifada, which intensified between 2002 and 2004.[4] Ashdod Port was a strategically important installation, and the security system had approximately forty general warnings of possible attacks, although there had been no specific warning of an attack on the port.[5]

Hamas and the al-Aqsa Brigades presented the operation as revenge for recent killings in Gaza and Jenin.[5] The bombing also occurred against the background of prospective Israeli withdrawal: its intended political message was that withdrawal would take place “under fire,” despite Fatah leaders’ intention to permit a calm withdrawal.[6] A meeting between Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian prime minister Ahmed Qurei had been planned before the attack.[6]

The two attackers arrived at Ashdod Port at 3:50 p.m. on March 14 inside a container shipped from Gaza through the Karni goods crossing.[2] They had concealed themselves in a prepared double partition together with explosive charges, hand grenades, and personal equipment.[2] They were Nabil Ibrahim Muhammad Mas’oud, a seventeen-year-old resident of Jebaliya affiliated with Fatah, and Muhammad Zuheir Mahmoud Salem al-Qassem, an eighteen-year-old resident of Beit Lahiya affiliated with Hamas.[2]

The explosions occurred at approximately 4:20 p.m., within several minutes of one another.[2][5] One bomber detonated inside the port, in a workshop or rear office building, while the other exploded near the perimeter fence or port entrance.[5] One used an explosive belt inside the port; the other detonated a bomb carried in a bag near the entrance.[7] Most of those killed were port workers.[5]

The bombs exploded near chemical storage tanks without damaging them.[1] The operation was intended to destroy a complex of chemical tanks, an explosion that could have devastated nearby communities.[8] A later account placed the blasts within a few yards of ammonia tanks, which remained intact.[9]

Hamas and the al-Aqsa Brigades jointly claimed responsibility.[3][5] A video released by Hamas showed one of the attackers wearing an Israeli army uniform with an officer’s rank.[5] Hassan Atiya Hassan Madhoun, a senior Gaza operative of Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, organized the attack.[2]

Ten people were killed: Gil Zilo Abitbul, 40; Avraham (Avi) Avraham, 33; Daniel (Danny) Assulin, 50; Zion Dahan, 30; Ofir Damari, 32; Moshe Yaakov (Moshiko) Hendler, 29; Pinchas Avraham (Pini) Zilberman, 46; Maurice Tubul, 29; Mazal Marciano Weizman, 30; and Avraham (Avi) Suissa, 56.[2] Abitbul, Avraham, Assulin, Dahan, Tubul, and Weizman were from Ashdod; Damari and Hendler were from Rehovot; Zilberman was from Tel Aviv; and Suissa was from Kiryat Malachi.[2]

Police raised the national alert level after the bombing, and the Israeli Air Force attacked two workshops in Gaza used by Hamas to manufacture weapons.[5] The planned Sharon–Qurei meeting was canceled, and the Israeli Cabinet approved an escalation of operations against leaders of the organizations involved in the violence.[6] The government subsequently authorized targeted killings of Hamas leaders, and the IDF targeted Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantisi.[9] Yassin was killed on March 22, 2004.[4]

In the days after the attack, investigators found a container at the port containing five grenades, other weapons, a mattress, food scraps, and a concealed compartment.[10] It had arrived from Gaza through the Karni crossing approximately half an hour before the explosions.[10] The investigation examined the container’s connection to the bombers and the security arrangements governing its passage.[10]

By June 2004, Israeli forces had arrested Muin Atallah, a Palestinian preventive-security officer who worked at the Karni crossing.[11] Israeli security officials alleged that his interrogation indicated he had helped smuggle the two bombers in a container.[11] He was also suspected of assisting preparations for another double bombing involving a double-bottomed container, and of helping Hamas acquire trucks and establish a container-transport company for smuggling attackers.[11]

Madhoun was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Jabalya on November 1, 2005.[2][12] He was a leader of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and had also been involved in other attacks.[12]

In 2006, relatives of the ten people killed filed a damages suit for approximately NIS 76 million against the Airports Authority, the police, and the Shomrim security company.[13] The plaintiffs alleged that negligent inspection of the container had enabled the attack, claiming that two inspectors examined it for only about one and a half to two minutes without equipment and failed to detect its double wall.[13] These were allegations in the lawsuit, not a reported court finding.[13]

The bombing entered international discussion of maritime security through a U.S. Senate hearing that examined the danger to port workers, infrastructure, and chemical facilities.[14] The hearing included discussion of the possibility that attackers could enter a port concealed in a cargo container, bringing the Ashdod attack into consideration of container-security risks.[14] Security forces subsequently developed methods to detect double walls and smuggling attempts.[15]

Later historical accounts also addressed coordination between Palestinian terrorist organizations.[16] Salem Thabit, leader of the Fatah-associated Jaysh al-Asifa, worked to coordinate and organize the joint Hamas–al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade bombing.[16]

Descriptions of organizational participation differ: the joint Hamas–al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claim is documented, while another account identifies a Palestinian Islamic Jihad–al-Aqsa cell encouraged by Hezbollah.[3][6] The death toll is generally given as ten, but an August 2004 government report gives fourteen.[1][17] Contemporary Ynet reported thirteen wounded, while the government backgrounder gave approximately twelve.[5][2] CRS reported sixteen, and the State Department reported at least fifteen.[1][3]

Early investigations treated the container route as a developing explanation and also examined possible entry by sea or through the main gate; later accounts presented concealment in the container as established.[10][2] The precise intended target was likewise uncertain in early reporting, which considered nearby chemical facilities, a power station, or a refinery.[5][14]