01In brief
U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian National Authority (PA) is an American program providing training, nonlethal equipment, infrastructure, and advisory support to Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria. Its stated goals include professionalizing Palestinian security institutions, strengthening rule of law, and countering threats to Israeli security. The Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), created in 2005, coordinates much of this work with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. Primarily funded through the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, the program had trained nearly 29,000 personnel in Jordan and Jericho by 2017. It has continued despite funding reductions and disruptions associated with the Taylor Force Act and Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act.
02Overview
The program combines security-force assistance with support for justice, corrections, and Interior Ministry reform. The State Department has described the assistance as bilateral and nonlethal, with INL and the USSC working together to support West Bank-based PASF institutions.[5]
Its principal activities have included training and equipping security units, advising on personnel and logistical reform, supporting rule-of-law institutions, and serving as a coordination and confidence-building mechanism between Israeli and Palestinian security establishments.[2] The program's scope and effectiveness remain politically contested, particularly regarding counterterrorism performance, human-rights accountability, and the conduct of individual PASF members.
03Origins
American security engagement with the Palestinians predates the formal USSC structure by nearly a decade. After limited Palestinian self-rule was established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States periodically provided civil-security and counterterrorism assistance to the PA.[6] Until 1996, that support amounted to roughly $5 million for police salaries and some nonlethal equipment, mainly surplus trucks and boots.[6] Following Hamas attacks in Israel in March 1996, the Clinton administration reportedly began covert assistance to organizations personally tied to Yasser Arafat, aimed at improving Palestinian security-services professionalism and combating terrorism.[6]
The 2003 Quartet Roadmap gave formal international grounding to the concept of a rebuilt Palestinian security sector. The Roadmap called for a U.S. plan for rebuilding and training Palestinian security services and resuming security cooperation, overseen by a board comprising the United States, Egypt, and Jordan.[7] It envisioned consolidating Palestinian security organizations into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister, with restructured and retrained forces resuming cooperation progressively with the Israel Defense Forces under the Tenet work plan.[7] The intended Palestinian role included sustained operations against those engaged in terror, dismantling terrorist capabilities, and confiscating illegal weapons.[7]
The collapse of Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation during the second intifada provided the context for a more structured U.S. effort. After Mahmoud Abbas became PA president in early 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the USSC for Israel and the Palestinian Authority.[6] Lt.-Gen. William "Kip" Ward served as its first leader, and Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton succeeded him in December 2005.[2] The founding mandate included coordinating international donors, mobilizing resources, addressing Israeli concerns about the PASF, and advising the PA on force size, restructuring, training, rule-of-law responsibilities, and accountability.[1] The team was an international effort involving, among others, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Turkey.[1]
04Expansion After the Hamas Gaza Takeover
Hamas's election victory in 2006 and its forcible takeover of Gaza in June 2007 prompted a sharp expansion of U.S. security assistance, now concentrated on the Fatah-led PA in the West Bank.[8] The United States expanded assistance focused on security, economic development, self-governance, and humanitarian needs, with particular emphasis on strengthening the PA in the West Bank; the security component was nonlethal and funded through the INCLE account.[8] Working through the USSC and the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the assistance supported the PA's Security Sector Reform and Transformation program, including the Ministry of Interior, Presidential Guard, National Security Forces, criminal-justice reform, strategic planning, training, nonlethal equipment, and facilities.[6]
Approximately $395 million was reprogrammed or appropriated through INCLE for FY2007 through FY2010, including $100 million approved for FY2010.[6] A CRS table for FY2007-FY2009 lists approximately $295.4 million: $118.7 million for security-force training, $72.6 million for nonlethal equipment, $68 million for facility construction, $13.5 million for the Ministry of Interior, $2 million for criminal-justice reform, $3 million for Egypt border enhancement, and $17.6 million for program administration.[6] From 2007 through 2012, nine PA National Security Forces special battalions and two Presidential Guard battalions — more than 6,000 personnel — received initial training at the Jordan International Police Training Center. Hundreds of PA Civil Defense personnel were also trained in Amman.[9]
Annual INCLE nonlethal assistance for PA security forces and the West Bank criminal-justice sector typically ran around $100 million from FY2008 through FY2012.[10] A 2018 Washington Institute report records an average of $100 million annually from 2007 through 2013, followed by a steady decline to less than $50 million per year by publication.[2] For 2014, the report allocated 65 percent of the USSC budget to the PASF, 20 percent to rule of law, 14 percent to program development and support, and 1 percent to strategic development and capacity building.[2]
05Training Architecture and Curriculum
Training was the largest line item in the FY2007-FY2009 funding table and followed a layered structure intended to develop professional law-enforcement and counterterrorism capabilities while reducing factional influence. New recruits and newly formed battalions generally completed basic training in or near Jericho before proceeding to a 19-week course in Jordan covering crowd control, rapid response, patrol operations, human rights, command, logistics, and border security.[6] Training in Jordan provided distance from family, clan, and factional affiliations and from visible indicators of Israeli occupation. Trainees used Jordan-supplied firearms during training but did not bring them back to the West Bank.[6]
The Jordan International Police Training Center, staffed by U.S. and Jordanian personnel, served as the primary external training hub.[1] Its U.S.-developed curriculum covered human rights, proper use of force, riot control, civil disturbances, unit cohesion, and leadership.[1] After initial battalion training was completed, the USSC and INL shifted toward an "advise and assist" role, helping the PA develop its own readiness, training, and logistics capabilities.[10] In a 2011 congressional hearing, then-USSC Lieutenant General Michael Moeller described the change as moving toward "an increasingly direct 'advise and assist' role."[10]
A Jericho hub complemented the Jordan facility from 2012 onward, and the Palestinian Officers Academy in Jericho offered a nine-month course.[2] By 2017, nearly 19,000 PASF personnel had trained in Jordan over approximately a decade, with another 10,000 trained at the Jericho hub since 2012.[2] U.S. officials often described the training component as nearing completion, and tentative plans contemplated moving all training from Jordan to the West Bank by 2020 — a step the report said would require a significant Israeli political decision.[2]
During January-June 2025, INL and the USSC continued supporting training, professional development, force generation, instructor development, and SWAT capabilities.[11] U.S.-supported SWAT training included classroom and scenario-based human-rights instruction in Jericho following high-risk-operations training at JIPTC. Palestinian trainers delivered the instruction under observation by the USSC's Human Rights Directorate, and completion was required for PA certification of trained teams.[11] Construction of the INL-funded Central Training Institute in Jericho was ongoing and scheduled for completion in late 2025, barring unforeseen events; the completed facility was expected to accommodate up to 2,000 trainees at once.[11] The Palestinian College for Police Sciences had passed 53 of 54 international accreditation standards and was awaiting an on-site assessment.[11]
06Equipment, Infrastructure, and Vetting
The documented U.S.-provided equipment was nonlethal, and equipment provision generally required prior Israeli approval.[6] U.S.-provided property was subject to a letter of agreement permitting U.S. examination of equipment and related records, an automated inventory system, and annual end-use monitoring that included inventory and condition assessments.[6] The USSC also funded repair and construction of PASF infrastructure. By 2017, 135 facilities had been built by Palestinian contractors under USSC and PA supervision, representing about one-third of total PASF infrastructure in the West Bank.[2]
Specific transfers included Israeli approval in December 2016 of six light armored vehicles for the PASF. By September 2017, nearly 80 other vehicles, riot gear, communications equipment, and training equipment had been transferred.[2] A further anticipated shipment was expected to include nearly 100 vehicles, fire trucks, several watercraft, and 300 body-armor kits.[2] A 2018 account citing the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem's website said almost $55 million had been budgeted in 2016 for PA law-and-order support, covering security and police training and equipment, firefighter training, courtroom rehabilitation, and training for judges and lawyers.[12]
During January-June 2025, INL monitors conducted 14 inspections of U.S.-donated equipment and vehicles in the West Bank. The inspections were recorded in a logistics-management system and found proper use of U.S.-funded materiel and no irregularities.[11] Vetting included criminal, reputational, and counterterrorism checks. Recipients of U.S.-funded training or equipment were also subject to Leahy vetting, and ineligible candidates were excluded from U.S. support.[11] INL vetted 636 PASF members and other recipients during the reporting period.[11]
07Institutional Scope: Justice, Corrections, and Ministry Reform
U.S. assistance has not been limited to uniformed security forces. INL describes support across civilian security, justice, and corrections.[5] Civilian-security programs support PASF training, train-the-trainer initiatives, development of the Palestinian Civil Police, and gender-responsive law-enforcement services.[5] Justice programs support timely judicial services, criminal defense and legal aid, and the investigation and prosecution of complex crimes. Corrections programs support staff training, accountability systems, and prison infrastructure.[5]
The Obama administration's FY2013 INCLE request of $70 million included $40.8 million for training, nonlethal equipment, and garrisoning assistance to PA security forces and $29.2 million for the Ministry of Interior, justice institutions, and rule-of-law infrastructure.[10] For FY2017, the State Department requested $35 million in INCLE funds for the West Bank, with priorities including sustaining security-force capacity, improving Interior Ministry management and oversight, technical assistance and training, limited infrastructure support, replacement of worn equipment, and development of justice and corrections institutions.[9]
The USSC's lines of work included training and equipping PASF battalions; advising on personnel, chains of command, logistics, rule-of-law initiatives, and strategic planning; and engaging Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders as a confidence-building mechanism.[2] During January-June 2025, INL and the USSC continued to engage with the PA's Strategic Planning and Development Unit and the Security Sector Strategic Plan 2025-2027. The unit reduced the PASF Joint Priorities List from 12 objectives to 9, with intended reforms focused on a fiscally viable and capable force structure able to maintain law and order in the West Bank.[11]
08Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination
A defining USSC purpose is to serve as a coordination and confidence-building mechanism between Israeli and Palestinian security establishments. Its founding tasks included addressing Israeli concerns about the PASF, while the 2003 Roadmap envisioned resumed Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation.[1][6] Israeli security officials broadly supported the reconstituted PASF; Israeli army chief Gadi Eisenkot reportedly advised his cabinet to "strengthen" the forces.[3]
After a PASF battalion completed training in Jordan and deployed to Hebron in 2010, U.S.-trained forces reportedly arrested hundreds of Hamas members following an attack that killed four Israelis. The report also described increased coordination with the IDF and a subsequent scaling back of some Israeli operations in Palestinian cities.[13] The State Department reported that PA-Israel security coordination remained productive during January-June 2025, although Israeli movement restrictions imposed after the October 7, 2023 attacks periodically disrupted coordination and PASF movements, including in Area A and between Areas B and C.[11]
During the same period, a PA operation that began in December 2024 arrested more than 400 people whom the State Department characterized as Iran-backed terrorists and enablers, seized weapons and explosives, and employed U.S.-trained PASF SWAT units.[11] A March 2025 Washington Institute assessment reported that the USSC advised Palestinian commanders during operations in Tubas and Jenin and helped maintain Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation amid friction caused by Israeli operations.[14] The operations showed willingness to use force against terrorists and coordination among PASF branches, but also exposed intelligence and capability deficiencies; the Jenin operation did not achieve its objectives.[14]
A State Department report covering January-March 2026 said the Department was not aware of instances in which Hamas or other terrorist or violent extremist entities diverted or destroyed U.S. security assistance during that period. It also specified that no INCLE funds covered by the report were available for Gaza.[15]
09Legal Framework and Statutory Oversight
Provision of U.S. security assistance to the PA operates within a layered statutory framework. Under 22 U.S.C. § 2378b, assistance to a Hamas-controlled PA may be provided only while a specified presidential certification is in effect. PA assistance generally may not be provided until 15 days after the President notifies the appropriate congressional committees; a national-security waiver is available subject to consultation, written justification, certification concerning the recipient, and a report to Congress.[16]
Historical appropriations law discussed in a 2010 CRS report barred obligation of security-assistance funds until the Secretary of State reported to congressional appropriations committees on established benchmarks and Palestinian compliance.[6] Required descriptions included training, curriculum, equipment, force-performance assessments, other donors' assistance, and the PA security strategy.[6] Proposed benchmarks included coordination with Israel, dismantling terrorist infrastructure, accountable civilian control, rule of law, and transparency. These were historical requirements rather than a description of all current law.[6]
The Taylor Force Act, enacted in March 2018, suspended Economic Support Fund assistance directly benefiting the PA unless specified conditions were certified, including verifiable steps to end terrorism-related payments, repeal underlying laws, combat violence under PA jurisdiction, and publicly condemn and investigate terrorist attacks.[8][17] The cited accounts distinguish this ESF restriction from security-cooperation or INCLE funding.[8][17] A 2026 Washington Institute article said direct U.S. economic assistance to the PA was halted after the Act's passage and that the Act remained in effect in August 2026 because the State Department had not certified that terrorism-related payments had ended.[18]
The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, enacted in October 2018 and effective February 1, 2019, created a separate challenge because acceptance of U.S. aid could expose the PA to civil liability in U.S. courts. The PA disclaimed acceptance of assistance covered by the Act, disrupting a remaining $60 million tranche designated for the PASF and the USSC mission in Jerusalem.[3] Subsequent congressional amendments addressed the ATCA issue, and the Biden administration resumed security-assistance funding by April 2021.[4] Reporting in 2021 described the INCLE account as the security-assistance channel and distinguished it from ESF direct aid restricted by the Taylor Force Act.[4]
10Funding History and Amounts
The funding record shows substantial early investment followed by contraction. Approximately $395 million flowed through INCLE for FY2007-FY2010.[6] Annual assistance then averaged about $100 million through FY2012-FY2013, declining to less than $50 million annually by 2018.[2][10] A 2025 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs article reports that nearly $1 billion had been allocated through INCLE between 2007 and 2023 and that $46.5 million was allocated for FY2025, compared with $40 million in FY2024.[19] Its funding table gives a running total of approximately $1.319 billion allocated and about $993 million obligated or spent, figures based on the article's accounting and time periods.[19]
For FY2017, roughly $61 million in frozen assistance was released by the Trump administration in August 2018, covering INCLE security funding and Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs.[20] That month, the administration also redirected more than $200 million approved for West Bank and Gaza programs across all categories, though reporting did not specify the security-assistance share of the reduction.[21] The Biden administration announced $40 million for Palestinian law-enforcement and security programs in 2021. Some members of Congress argued the resumption conflicted with the Taylor Force Act, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the administration was complying with the law.[22] A Senate Appropriations Committee FY2022 bill proposed $40 million for the Palestinian security-assistance program within a broader $225 million package.[23]
The State Department's Summer 2025 report does not state a total dollar amount for January-June 2025, identifying INCLE as the relevant account without giving a program-wide annual figure.[11] A March 2025 Times of Israel report, citing U.S. and Palestinian officials, put the FY2025 INCLE amount at $47 million and said Washington had assured Ramallah that it would be released after the foreign-aid review.[24]
11Significance and Assessments
By most accounts cited in the historical record, trained PA forces became more professional and helped improve law and order while lowering the profile of terrorist organizations in West Bank cities.[9] Battalions trained at JIPTC reportedly deployed to Hebron, Jenin, Jericho, Nablus, and Bethlehem.[13] A 2026 Washington Institute article credited the USSC with progress over time in professionalizing and, to the extent possible, depoliticizing the PASF.[25] Israeli security officials broadly supported the reconstituted forces and continued coordination.[3]
At the same time, the goal of consolidating PA security services under unified civilian control accountable to law and human-rights norms remained largely unfulfilled as of the mid-2010s.[9] PA forces were criticized for politically targeting Hamas, including through charity closures and reportedly arbitrary detentions.[9] Some Palestinians and outside observers argued that Israeli restrictions and security operations undermined PA operations; Israel maintained that its operations were necessary to reduce terrorism.[9]
Human-rights accountability remains a documented concern. PA decrees issued on September 11, 2023 amended penal laws to align provisions with the Convention Against Torture, broaden punishable torture, criminalize mistreatment, and provide for prosecution, victim rehabilitation, and compensation.[11] Nevertheless, the State Department's Summer 2025 report relayed concerns from the Independent Commission for Human Rights and other groups about gaps in protections and accountability.[11] By the end of the January-June 2025 reporting period, the PASF had not opened an investigation into three civilian deaths during its December 2024 Jenin operation. The trial of 14 officers in the Nizar Banat case also remained postponed, with the defendants at liberty.[11]
12Controversies and Policy Debates
U.S. security assistance to the PA has been repeatedly disrupted by legal, political, and policy changes. During the first Trump administration, Washington ended direct aid to the PA broadly but continued funding training for its security services through the USSC.[26] In February 2019, USAID closed its West Bank and Gaza operations and wound down certain programs at the PA's request under ATCA. A $60 million security tranche was affected, with the PA citing concerns about legal exposure from accepting the funds.[27]
In February 2025, reporting said the second Trump administration's global foreign-aid freeze had halted U.S. security assistance to the PA.[26] A PA official said some training had been cut. A former Israeli official disputed the impact, saying the USSC had not been significantly affected and that other donors had pledged to fill the gap.[26] Subsequent reporting in March said CIA funding for PA security forces was continuing while the separate INCLE stream was held during review; officials said Washington had assured Ramallah that the INCLE funds would be released.[24]
Proponents of the program, including U.S. Security Coordinator Lt.-Gen. Sean M. Salene in October 2026, described it as nonlethal police training intended to develop a security partner capable of countering Hamas and other terrorist threats in accordance with international standards, human rights, and the rule of law.[28] Salene argued that the absence of PA-linked forces could leave a security gap filled by a terrorist organization or impose another responsibility on the IDF.[28] A reported Trump ceasefire plan for Gaza included PA police trained by the United States, Egypt, and Jordan, indicating continued strategic value attributed to the training model.[28]
Critics, including the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, allege that some PA security-force members participated in or facilitated attacks and argue that U.S. assistance failed to achieve its stated counterterrorism purpose. The organization attributes to the Regavim Institute a count of 78 PA security-force operatives involved in attacks between 2020 and 2024.[19] These are allegations and figures reported by that source, not independently established findings. The 2018 Washington Institute report recommended keeping security assistance distinct from broader U.S. aid while warning that cuts to civilian, development, or humanitarian assistance could make it politically harder for the PA to continue receiving U.S. security assistance.[2]
Sources
- 1The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Peace through Security: America's Role in the Development of the Palestinian Authority Security Services, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 2The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 154 (2018), accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 3The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Now Trump’s Shutdown Threatens Israel’s Security, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 4The Jerusalem Post, 5 things to know about US funding to Palestinians and terror payments, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 5U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: West Bank Summary, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 6EveryCRSReport, U.S. Security Assistance to the Palestinian Authority, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 7Globes, Roadmap text, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 8Jewish Virtual Library, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians: FY 2018, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 9Jewish Virtual Library, Palestinian Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Aid, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 10Jewish Virtual Library, Palestinian Foreign Aid: U.S. Foreign Aid, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 11U.S. Department of State, U.S. Dept. of State, Report to Congress on PASF Assistance, Summer 2025, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 12The Times of Israel, How Much Aid Does the U.S. Give Palestinians, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 13The Jerusalem Post, 6th Palestinian battalion to deploy in West Bank, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 14The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Resetting U.S. Relations with the Palestinian Authority?, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 15U.S. Department of State, U.S. Dept. of State, Report on Assistance for West Bank and Gaza, Jan–Mar 2026, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 16U.S. Code, 22 U.S.C. § 2378b, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 17American Jewish Committee, AJC Welcomes Congressional Adoption of Taylor Force Act, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 18The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Bridging the Verification Gap on PA Prisoner Payments, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 19Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Is U.S. Aid to the Palestinian Authority Fueling Terror?, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 20Jewish News Syndicate, Trump administration released tens of millions in aid to Palestinians, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 21Globes, US cuts $200m from Palestinian aid, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 22Jewish Virtual Library, Biden Resumes Aid to Palestinians, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 23Jewish News Syndicate, Senate proposes $225 million in assistance to Palestinians, echoing bill passed by House, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 24The Times of Israel, U.S. Funds for PA Security Forces Continue (2025), accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 25The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Fatah Meets in Ramallah, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 26Ynet, The internal document reveals: the new change in the Trump administration's approach toward Israel, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 27Jewish News Syndicate, Official: US security funds to PA cut off, USAID shutters West Bank, Gaza operations, accessed on October 16, 2026.
- 28The Jerusalem Post, US general softly goes after gov't for stalling Palestinian Authority police training of Donald Trump plan, accessed on October 16, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What is U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority?
U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority is an American program providing training, nonlethal equipment, infrastructure, and advisory support to Palestinian Authority Security Forces in the West Bank. Its stated goals include professionalizing Palestinian security institutions, strengthening rule of law, and countering threats to Israeli security. Much of the program is coordinated by the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator, created in 2005, and it is primarily funded through the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account.
How did U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority originate?
American security engagement with the Palestinians predates the formal U.S. Security Coordinator structure by nearly a decade. After limited Palestinian self-rule was established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s, the United States periodically provided civil-security and counterterrorism assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The program took on a more structured form after Mahmoud Abbas became PA president in early 2005, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice created the Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator. Its founding mandate included coordinating international donors, advising the PA on force size and restructuring, and addressing Israeli concerns about Palestinian security forces.
How were Palestinian Authority security forces trained under the U.S. program?
Training followed a layered structure in which new recruits generally completed basic training in or near Jericho before proceeding to a 19-week course in Jordan covering crowd control, rapid response, patrol operations, human rights, command, logistics, and border security. The Jordan International Police Training Center, staffed by U.S. and Jordanian personnel, served as the primary external training hub. A Jericho hub complemented the Jordan facility from 2012 onward. By 2017, nearly 19,000 Palestinian Authority Security Forces personnel had trained in Jordan over approximately a decade, with another 10,000 trained at the Jericho hub since 2012.
How much funding has the U.S. provided for Palestinian Authority security assistance?
Approximately $395 million flowed through the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account for fiscal years 2007 through 2010, with annual assistance averaging about $100 million through fiscal years 2012 and 2013 before declining to less than $50 million annually by 2018. A 2025 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs article reports that nearly $1 billion had been allocated through that account between 2007 and 2023, with $46.5 million allocated for fiscal year 2025. A funding table cited in the same article gives a running total of approximately $1.319 billion allocated and about $993 million obligated or spent.
How did the Taylor Force Act and the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act affect U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority?
The Taylor Force Act, enacted in March 2018, suspended Economic Support Fund assistance directly benefiting the Palestinian Authority unless specified conditions were certified, including verifiable steps to end terrorism-related payments. Direct U.S. economic assistance to the PA was halted after the Act's passage, and the Act remained in effect in August 2026 because the State Department had not certified that terrorism-related payments had ended. The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act, enacted in October 2018, created a separate disruption when the PA disclaimed acceptance of assistance covered by it, affecting a remaining $60 million tranche designated for Palestinian security forces. Subsequent congressional amendments addressed that issue, and the Biden administration resumed security-assistance funding by April 2021.
What role has U.S.-trained Palestinian Authority security forces played in Israeli-Palestinian security coordination?
A defining purpose of the U.S. Security Coordinator is to serve as a coordination and confidence-building mechanism between Israeli and Palestinian security establishments. After a Palestinian Authority Security Forces battalion completed training and deployed to Hebron in 2010, U.S.-trained forces reportedly arrested hundreds of Hamas members following an attack that killed four Israelis, with subsequent increased coordination with the Israel Defense Forces. Israeli security officials broadly supported the reconstituted forces, and Israeli army chief Gadi Eisenkot reportedly advised his cabinet to strengthen them. The State Department reported that PA-Israel security coordination remained productive during January-June 2025, though Israeli movement restrictions imposed after the October 7, 2023 attacks periodically disrupted coordination and Palestinian security force movements.
What are the main criticisms and unresolved concerns about U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority?
Critics, including the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, allege that some Palestinian Authority security-force members participated in or facilitated attacks and argue that U.S. assistance failed to achieve its stated counterterrorism purpose. The goal of consolidating PA security services under unified civilian control accountable to law and human-rights norms remained largely unfulfilled as of the mid-2010s. Human-rights accountability has also remained a documented concern; as of the end of the January-June 2025 reporting period, the Palestinian Authority Security Forces had not opened an investigation into three civilian deaths during a December 2024 operation in Jenin, and the trial of 14 officers in the Nizar Banat case remained postponed with the defendants at liberty.