UNRWA and Israel

UNRWA operates under a United Nations mandate separate from that of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, providing humanitarian assistance, protection, and education to registered Palestinian refugees in five operating areas: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[7] Its relationship with Israel has therefore involved both a regional refugee institution and the practical administration of services in areas where access, security, and movement require dealings with Israeli authorities.[1] The agency had 5.9 million registered refugees as of 2024, although that total covered all five operating areas rather than only the populations directly affected by Israeli restrictions.[8]

The relationship has combined cooperation with sustained Israeli criticism rather than following a single pattern of acceptance or rejection.[1] Israel’s commitments under the 1967 arrangement included facilitating agency operations, while UNRWA coordinated humanitarian matters with the Israeli military during fighting and its aftermath.[1][2] An INSS historical memorandum noted that Israel had regularly declared support for UNRWA’s humanitarian mission even as Israeli criticism focused on the agency’s political role and institutional structure.[1][4] Israeli objections have included allegations of corruption, concerns about educational content and neutrality, and opposition to the agency’s approach to refugee status and a claimed right of return.[4]

The restrictions adopted in 2024 addressed two different dimensions of this relationship: UNRWA’s activities inside Israel’s sovereign territory and Israeli public authorities’ contact with the agency.[9][3] Although those provisions were distinct, the prohibition on official contact also raised practical questions for operations in Gaza and the West Bank, where UNRWA depended on coordination over movement, supplies, and security.[5] The central policy question consequently extended beyond whether UNRWA could maintain a representative office in Israel to how its wider service network would function without the previous cooperation framework.[5]

Formal UN relief involvement in the Palestinian refugee question preceded UNRWA: General Assembly Resolution 212 (III), adopted on November 19, 1948, established the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees.[7] That temporary arrangement was replaced by UNRWA, which the General Assembly established through Resolution 302 (IV) in December 1949 following displacement during the War of Independence.[1][7] The new agency began operations in 1950, with an initial mandate encompassing direct relief and employment programs undertaken in cooperation with local governments.[1] Its original responsibilities also included consulting regional governments about preparations for a future in which international assistance would no longer be available.[1]

UNRWA’s earliest relief activities included people within Israel, both Jewish refugees displaced within the country and Arabs displaced from one part of Palestine to another.[7] In August 1950, approximately 27,000 people in Israel had claimed refugee status, and the Israeli government asked for relief distribution to stop because it was assuming responsibility for them.[7] These early contacts preceded the more extensive framework developed after the Six-Day War.

On June 14, 1967, Israel and UNRWA exchanged letters establishing a provisional agreement for the continuation of assistance to Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza at the Israeli government’s request.[2] Israel undertook to facilitate UNRWA’s humanitarian work, including provisions concerning staff and vehicle movement, personnel and property security, necessary documentation, and UN privileges and immunities.[2] Cooperation was expressly “subject only to regulations or arrangements which may be necessitated by considerations of military security.”[2] The letters provided that the agreement would remain in force until replaced or cancelled, while UNRWA specified that its humanitarian cooperation did not imply a position on the status of the areas concerned.[2]

After 1967, Israel pursued reconstruction initiatives in major refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, seeking permanent housing, improved infrastructure, better living conditions, and replacement of temporary shelters.[1] UNRWA opposed measures that it regarded as potentially leading to refugee resettlement.[1] The agency’s relations with Israel improved after the 1993 Oslo Agreement, but complaints and tensions increased again during the Second Intifada, which began in 2000.[1] The disagreement over housing thus formed part of a longer relationship in which service provision and the political meaning of refugee status repeatedly intersected.[1]

Proposals to transfer UNRWA responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority also emerged during the Oslo period.[1] A five-year transfer plan prepared after the 1995 Oslo II agreement was rejected by UNRWA’s Advisory Committee and later shelved during the Second Intifada.[1] A renewed Israeli initiative in 2005 did not succeed after Hamas won the January 2006 Palestinian elections.[1] Meanwhile, the General Assembly continued renewing UNRWA’s mandate every three years, allowing an agency originally intended to be temporary to develop a much broader institutional role.[4]

The agency expanded from relief and employment into education, health care, social services, infrastructure, microfinance, vocational training, and emergency assistance.[1][10] In 2019, its education network comprised 709 schools, 20,146 teachers, and 533,342 pupils across its operating areas.[1] A 2024 account placed its overall workforce at approximately 31,000, including about 13,000 in Gaza, and reported that its then-current mandate extended through June 2026.[8] These figures describe the agency at particular points in time rather than establishing its staffing or mandate position after those dates.[8]

A major rupture followed allegations made by Israel in January 2024 that 12 UNRWA employees had participated in the October 7, 2023 attacks.[11] Israel also alleged wider Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad links among agency staff.[4][12] Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini announced the dismissal of implicated employees and an investigation, while the United States temporarily suspended further funding pending its review of the allegations and the UN response.[11] Sixteen UN member states paused funding following the allegations, making the employee cases an issue for the agency’s international financing as well as its dealings with Israel.[12]

The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation ultimately examined 19 employees: the original 12 identified in January and seven additional employees about whom information was received in March and April.[6] In August 2024, the investigation concluded that evidence indicated nine employees may have been involved, and their employment was terminated; in the remaining ten cases, evidence was absent or insufficient to support involvement.[6][3] Those results concerned the particular individuals examined, not a finding about UNRWA staff generally.[3] Israel’s ambassador criticized the inquiry’s scope and conclusions.[6]

A separate review chaired by former French foreign minister Catherine Colonna examined UNRWA’s neutrality mechanisms rather than determining the individual October 7 allegations.[6][3] Its April 2024 findings recognized substantial neutrality frameworks while identifying continuing challenges involving staff conduct, educational materials, and politicized staff unions.[3][12] The review made 50 recommendations, including measures reported as promoting women, establishing a board, digitizing learning materials, and creating a hotline for problematic content.[6][13] Israeli officials rejected the review as insufficient.[4]

On October 28, 2024, the Knesset approved two laws restricting UNRWA, including a territorial prohibition that passed 92–10 and a companion measure ending official cooperation with the agency.[9][3] Israel subsequently notified the United Nations in November that it was withdrawing the request underlying the 1967 arrangement.[14] The principal prohibitions entered into force on January 30, 2025, ending the longstanding framework for agency activity inside Israel and formal contact with Israeli authorities.[3]

Restrictions were expanded by an amendment passed on December 29, 2025, and effective December 31.[15] On January 20, 2026, Israeli officials seized UNRWA’s Jerusalem headquarters and oversaw the demolition of some structures in its compound.[15] A petition sought an interim High Court of Justice order suspending implementation of the amendment ahead of a hearing scheduled for February 2, 2026; the petitioners argued that implementation was causing immediate and irreversible harm while the law’s constitutionality remained under review.[15] The available account does not establish the outcome of that hearing.[15]

UNRWA’s service footprint differed substantially between East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza.[5] In East Jerusalem, its work focused on Shuafat refugee camp and served approximately 16,000 residents in the estimates published in January 2025.[5] Shuafat camp was established in 1965 and had about 3,400 inhabitants in 1967; its services included education and sanitation administered by UNRWA.[16] The wider Shuafat neighborhood, described as lying beyond the security fence, had an approximate population of 60,000, a different geographic measure from the camp population or the number receiving agency services.[16]

In the West Bank, the January 2025 estimates described UNRWA as operating 19 camps, employing about 3,700 people, and maintaining one hospital, 43 clinics, and 96 schools.[5] Those schools served approximately 47,000 children, while agency payments reached more than 150,000 residents.[5] Before the war, UNRWA was also a major provider of education, health services, and food distribution in Gaza.[5] The resulting network linked long-term services, such as schooling and clinical care, with emergency assistance and household support.[1][5]

The first 2024 law prohibited UNRWA from maintaining a representative office, providing services, or conducting activities, directly or indirectly, within Israel’s sovereign territory.[9][3] Its territorial application included East Jerusalem, where the legislation was expected to have its most immediate effect.[4][9] The prohibition took effect on January 30, 2025.[3]

The companion law ended Israel’s invitation under the June 14, 1967 exchange of letters, required notice to the United Nations within seven days, and prohibited contact between UNRWA, or people acting on its behalf, and Israeli state authorities or others performing public duties.[9][3] The general contact prohibition also took effect on January 30, 2025.[3]

The distinction between the territorial prohibition and the contact prohibition mattered operationally because activities outside Israel could still depend on Israeli coordination.[5] Anticipated consequences included difficulties with entry and work permits, staff visas, vehicle registration, customs, imported goods, military deconfliction, and banking services.[4][5] Educational supplies had also entered through Ben Gurion Airport, and contemporary reporting anticipated a need for alternative supply routes and operating arrangements in the West Bank.[9] Potential disruption to students was identified as a risk, not established in that reporting as an outcome already experienced.[9]

Israel instructed UNRWA in January 2025 to cease operations in East Jerusalem and evacuate its premises by January 30, and the agency evacuated its East Jerusalem compound when the laws entered into force.[3] UNRWA reported that its international personnel were subsequently unable to enter the territory described in the advisory-opinion text as the Occupied Palestinian Territory, while approximately 12,000 locally recruited Palestinian employees continued providing services and assistance in Gaza.[3] The restrictions therefore did not amount to an immediate disappearance of every UNRWA service or employee from Gaza.[3]

Banking implementation initially remained uncertain.[17] At the end of January 2025, Israeli banks had not yet altered their practices regarding UNRWA accounts, stating that the law did not expressly instruct them to freeze accounts and that they wanted clear guidance because of legal risks.[17] The Bank of Israel said it was consulting government ministries about the law’s application to banks while taking Israel’s international obligations into account.[17] This early uncertainty preceded the more explicit financial-service restrictions enacted at the end of 2025.[15]

The December 2025 amendment prohibited authorized suppliers from providing electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, or financial services to UNRWA or people acting on its behalf.[15] It cancelled permits or benefits granted to the agency and authorized state or local authorities, under specified conditions, to take possession of land held by UNRWA or its representatives.[15] It also declared that the agency, its officials, employees, and assets were not entitled to certain privileges and protections previously extended under Israeli law.[15] These provisions extended the restrictions beyond official communication and agency activity to utilities, financial relationships, property, and legal protections.[15]

Commercial dealings had been another practical connection between UNRWA and Israel.[18] Contract data presented by Knesset member Yulia Malinovsky identified approximately $60 million in direct transactions involving 25 Israeli companies between 2020 and 2023, excluding the second quarter of 2023.[18] Some companies said contracts had not been finalized or payments had not been made, and some Israeli businesses stopped working with UNRWA after October 7.[18] The reported figure concerned direct transactions in that dataset; possible additional indirect dealings were estimates rather than a verified supplementary total.[18]

The 1967 agreement connected humanitarian access with an explicit recognition of military-security requirements, making it both a practical operating framework and a lasting reference point in Israel–UNRWA relations.[2] Its provisions dealt with concrete necessities—vehicles, documentation, personnel, property, movement, and immunities—rather than only a general declaration of cooperation.[2] Ending that arrangement consequently affected the administrative mechanisms through which services and supplies had been coordinated, as well as the political relationship between Israel and the agency.[5][3]

UNRWA’s extensive educational and medical infrastructure made the question of replacing its services especially consequential.[5] The West Bank network alone included tens of thousands of pupils, dozens of clinics, a hospital, and payments to more than 150,000 residents in the January 2025 estimates.[5] Its Gaza role likewise encompassed education, health care, and food distribution rather than a single relief function.[5] This breadth underlay warnings that withdrawal or replacement required consideration of personnel, facilities, supply chains, and continuity of care and schooling.[5][3]

Israeli officials argued that aid could continue through other organizations without compromising national security.[4] When the Foreign Ministry notified the United Nations of Israel’s withdrawal from the 1967 framework, it said Israel would continue working with international partners, including other UN agencies, to facilitate humanitarian aid to Gaza civilians without undermining Israel’s security.[14] Foreign Minister Israel Katz asserted that only 13 percent of humanitarian aid entering Gaza was being delivered through UNRWA, presenting that figure as part of his argument that assistance did not depend exclusively on the agency.[19]

UN officials emphasized the difficulty of replacing UNRWA’s integrated service network.[5] Secretary-General António Guterres stated: “UNRWA is the principal means by which essential assistance is supplied to Palestine refugees...There is no alternative to UNRWA.”[5]

The relationship also reflected an unresolved question about the duration and purpose of refugee assistance.[1] UNRWA director John Davis characterized the agency as “one of the costs—seemingly the cheapest one—that the international community is paying in order not to resolve the political problems of the refugees.”[1] INSS accounts noted that Israel had regularly supported UNRWA’s humanitarian mission while distinguishing such assistance from policies Israeli critics said prolonged the refugee issue.[1][4] Some Israeli politicians and officials, however, also viewed UNRWA’s relief services as helping prevent deeper poverty and, in turn, violence.[20]

The dispute acquired an additional international legal dimension when the General Assembly requested an International Court of Justice advisory opinion in 2024 on Israel’s obligations concerning humanitarian aid.[12] In its October 2025 non-binding opinion, the Court described UNRWA as deeply integrated into local infrastructure and concluded that it could not be replaced at short notice without a proper transition plan.[3] In the circumstances considered, it stated that Israel was obliged under international humanitarian law to agree to and facilitate UN relief schemes, including those provided by UNRWA, while the population remained inadequately supplied.[3] It also stated that Israel had an obligation to cooperate in good faith with the UN, including UNRWA, in and in relation to the territory addressed by the opinion.[3]

Israeli allegations about UNRWA encompassed several distinct issues: individual participation in the October 7 attacks, wider employee affiliations with Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, alleged use of agency facilities, educational content, and institutional neutrality.[4][12] The UN Office of Internal Oversight Services investigation addressed allegations involving 19 named employees and concluded that evidence indicated nine may have been involved in the attacks.[6][3] That finding did not establish the broader allegations about the organization or its staff as a whole.[3]

The Colonna review and the employee investigation had different mandates and cannot be treated as interchangeable findings.[6][3] The review identified persistent neutrality problems but also substantial safeguards, and reported that Israel had not supplied supporting evidence for its broader claim that a significant number of employees belonged to terrorist organizations.[3][12] The ICJ subsequently found the information before it insufficient to establish organizational non-neutrality or substantiate the allegation that a significant portion of employees belonged to Hamas or other terrorist factions.[3] Those assessments did not erase the separate findings concerning nine employees’ possible involvement.[3]

Refugee eligibility and descendants’ status remained another major political and legal disagreement.[4] Israel argued that passing refugee status to descendants perpetuated the issue and impeded peace.[4] In commentary, Rephael Ben-Ari and Shaul Sharf described eligibility and its relationship to a claimed right of return as central controversies, stating that the original definition covered people normally resident in Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 who lost homes and livelihoods during the War of Independence, and that eligibility was extended to descendants.[13]

The laws’ compatibility with international obligations and their humanitarian consequences also generated substantial disagreement.[9][3] UNRWA warned that the legislation conflicted with the UN Charter and Israel’s international obligations, while Israeli officials maintained that alternative aid arrangements could address civilian needs while protecting security.[14][9] The subsequent High Court petition challenged implementation of the expanded restrictions, but the available account establishes neither a final constitutional ruling nor the outcome of the scheduled hearing.[15]