United States–Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014

The act combines congressional findings and policy declarations with amendments, authorizations, and reporting requirements covering multiple areas of the U.S.–Israel relationship. Its provisions range from defense stockpiles and export controls to cooperative research, cybersecurity, visa-waiver policy, oversight of Israel’s qualitative military edge, and energy and water technologies.[1]

Although Section 4 uses the phrase “major strategic partner,” it does so as a sense-of-Congress statement. The statute also directs or authorizes specified executive-branch actions, many of which remain subject to existing law, international commitments, available appropriations, or separate statutory eligibility requirements.[1]

The measure that became the United States–Israel Strategic Partnership Act of 2014 had roots in two parallel bills moving through the 113th Congress. H.R.938 was introduced on March 4, 2013, by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and passed the House on March 5, 2014, by 410–1.[3] It was then received in the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but S.2673 was the measure that ultimately became law.[3]

Senator Barbara Boxer introduced S.2673 on July 28, 2014.[2] The Senate passed it with an amendment by unanimous consent on September 18, and the House passed it by voice vote on December 3.[2] It was presented to the President on December 10 and became Public Law 113-296 in December 2014; S.2673 had 80 listed cosponsors.[2]

The act encouraged continued and expanded cooperation in defense, homeland security, cyber issues, energy, and trade. Its policy and cooperation provisions were distinct from later appropriations: Congress separately provided, for example, $1 billion in supplemental Iron Dome funding in March 2022.[4]

The act’s stated purpose is “to enhance the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel.”[1] Its congressional findings describe the relationship as a bond built on more than 60 years of shared interests and values and characterize it as a “deep and unbreakable bond.”[1] Congress cited a rapidly changing security environment in the Middle East and North Africa as necessitating deeper cooperation on defense, security, and intelligence.[1]

The findings characterize Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran as presenting security challenges to Israel and the region, citing Hamas rocket fire from Gaza, Hezbollah’s rocket stockpiles and support from Iran, and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.[1] These are geopolitical assessments made by Congress in 2014, rather than independently established findings. The act separately states as U.S. policy support for Israel’s efforts toward a negotiated settlement resulting in two states living side by side in peace and security.[1]

Section 3 enumerates U.S. policy objectives toward Israel. These include reaffirming support for Israel’s security as a Jewish state, reaffirming the principles and objectives of the United States–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012, and reaffirming the importance of the 2007 assistance memorandum of understanding and the semi-annual Strategic Dialogue.[1] The section also calls for deeper cooperation on defense, homeland security, energy, and cybersecurity and for continued robust security assistance, including procurement assistance for the Iron Dome Missile Defense System.[1] Its support for a negotiated two-state settlement is a prospective policy statement, not a description of an achieved outcome.[1]

Section 4 expresses the sense of Congress that Israel is “a major strategic partner of the United States.”[1] The meaning of that designation “has not been further defined in U.S. law or by the executive branch,” and the statutory wording does not expressly establish a separate legal classification.[4] Contemporaneous coverage nevertheless described the legislation as designating or elevating Israel to major-strategic-partner status.[5]

Section 5 amended existing authorities governing two categories of defense cooperation with Israel. First, it amended the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2005 by changing the relevant period from “more than 10 years after” to “more than 11 years after,” extending authority concerning transfers of certain obsolete or surplus Department of Defense items.[1] Second, it amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to add fiscal year 2015 to the years covered by authority for additions to foreign-based defense stockpiles designated as war reserve stocks for Israel.[1]

Contemporaneous reporting described the provision as authorizing a $200 million increase in the value of U.S. weapons held in forward stockpiles in Israel, bringing the total to approximately $1.8 billion. The same reporting said Israel could access the stockpiles in an emergency, subject to reimbursing the United States for weapons used.[5]

Section 6 directs the President, consistent with U.S. commitments under international arrangements, to take steps so that Israel may be included among countries eligible for the Strategic Trade Authorization exception to licensing requirements for specified exports, reexports, and in-country transfers.[1] The provision does not itself place Israel on the eligibility list; it directs executive action toward possible inclusion under the existing regulatory framework.[1]

The act’s findings cite Israel’s export-control standards, its declared unilateral adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and its participation in three specified international conventions.[1] These findings provide Congress’s stated grounds for directing the President to take the prescribed steps.

Section 7 authorizes the President, subject to existing law, to undertake cooperative activities and provide assistance for U.S.–Israel cooperation in energy, water, agriculture, and alternative-fuel technologies.[1] It also authorizes sharing and exchanging “research, technology, intelligence, information, equipment, and personnel,” including through sales, leases, or exchanges in kind, when the President determines that doing so advances U.S. national-security interests and complies with the Strategic Dialogue and applicable law.[1] Enhanced scientific cooperation is separately authorized.

The section also authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency and with the Secretary of State’s concurrence, to enter cooperative research pilot programs with Israel.[1] The specified areas are border, maritime, and aviation security; explosives detection; and emergency services.[1] The provision therefore links bilateral research authority to defined operational security fields.

Section 8 required the President, within 180 days of enactment, to report to Congress on the feasibility and advisability of expanding U.S.–Israel cooperation on cyber issues.[1] The report was to address cooperation involving the sharing and advancement of technologies related to preventing cybercrimes.[1] The law required submission “in a classified format or including a classified annex, as appropriate.”[1]

The provision combined a specific reporting deadline and defined subject matter with flexibility to protect classified information. It required an assessment of possible expanded cooperation rather than directly establishing a new operational cybersecurity program.[1]

Section 9 states that it is U.S. policy to include Israel in the Visa Waiver Program when Israel satisfies, and for as long as it continues to satisfy, the program’s statutory requirements.[1] The act makes inclusion conditional on those requirements and does not itself grant Israel visa-waiver status.[1] Contemporaneous reporting noted that a proposed special exemption for Israel had been replaced during the legislative process by this conditional language.[5] The provision therefore established a policy objective while leaving eligibility subject to the governing statutory criteria.

Two additional provisions addressed congressional oversight of the broader U.S.–Israel security relationship. Section 10 required the President, within 180 days of enactment and to the extent practicable, to update four committees—the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the House Armed Services Committee—on efforts to fulfill the objectives of Section 4 of the United States–Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012.[1]

Section 11 strengthened oversight of assessments concerning Israel’s qualitative military edge. It added biennial reevaluations two years after each quadrennial report, with the President directed to inform and consult the appropriate congressional committees about the results.[1]

For determinations involving sales or exports of major defense equipment, the act requires a detailed explanation of Israel’s capacity to address the resulting improved capabilities; an evaluation of effects on the regional strategic and tactical balance and Israel’s capacity to respond; identification of any additional Israeli capabilities or training that may be needed; and a description of additional U.S. security assurances made or requested in connection with the sale or export.[1]

Section 12 substantially expanded the energy-cooperation program established under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. It broadened the program beyond renewable energy and energy efficiency to include natural-gas technologies and research and development concerning energy efficiency and water technologies.[1] Covered water fields include desalination, wastewater treatment and reclamation, and other water-treatment processes. The section also addresses offshore energy development, alternative fuels, cyber protection of energy infrastructure, and regional energy cooperation.[1]

The act authorized cooperative agreements between the Department of Energy—including its national laboratories—and Israeli government bodies, subject to available appropriations.[1] The Secretary of Energy may not pay more than 50 percent of the implementation costs of the international-partnership cooperative agreements. Annual reports to specified congressional committees are required if such agreements are entered into.[1]

Section 12 also authorized the Secretary of Energy to establish a joint U.S.–Israel Energy Center in the United States, drawing on higher-education and private-sector expertise.[1] Its purposes include advancing academic cooperation in energy innovation and engineering, water science, technology transfer, and analysis of the geopolitical implications of natural-resource development. The amended grant-program authorization was extended through September 30, 2024.[1]

Finally, the section directed the Secretary of State to continue diplomatic efforts supporting Israel’s energy security and promoting constructive regional energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.[1] The instruction expressly connected bilateral energy cooperation with energy security and wider regional engagement.

The act is significant for placing policy statements, cooperation authorities, statutory amendments, and reporting requirements covering several dimensions of the U.S.–Israel relationship within one law. Its provisions address defense, homeland security, cyber issues, energy, trade-related export controls, and congressional oversight.[1][4]

The phrase “major strategic partner of the United States” attracted particular attention, although its meaning was not further defined in law or by the executive branch.[4] Similarly, Section 6 did not automatically confer Strategic Trade Authorization eligibility; it required the President to take steps so that Israel might be included consistently with U.S. international commitments.[1]

The energy provisions extended cooperation into natural gas, water technologies, offshore energy, infrastructure cybersecurity, and Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy. The cybersecurity provision required an executive assessment of expanded cooperation, while Section 11 increased the frequency and detail of oversight concerning Israel’s qualitative military edge.[1]

The legislative history indicates broad congressional support. H.R.938 passed the House 410–1, while S.2673 passed the Senate by unanimous consent and the House by voice vote.[2][3] Later appropriations, including the $1 billion supplemental Iron Dome appropriation enacted in March 2022, remained separate from the act’s policy and authorization framework.[4]

Several politically sensitive passages in the act are legislative findings or policy declarations rather than independent determinations. Its characterizations of Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the regional security environment reflect assessments Congress made in 2014.[1] Likewise, support for Israel’s security as a Jewish state, maintenance of its qualitative military edge, and pursuit of a negotiated two-state settlement are statutory policies and oversight objectives.[1]

Section 4 also presents an interpretive question because it calls Israel a major strategic partner through a sense-of-Congress statement, while the designation has not been further defined in U.S. law or by the executive branch.[1][4]

The official record contains a minor date discrepancy. The public-law heading reads “Public Law 113–296—Dec. 19, 2014,” while its closing line says “Approved December 18, 2014.”[1] Congress.gov records the measure as becoming Public Law 113-296 on December 19, and contemporaneous reporting said President Barack Obama signed it that day.[2][5] The cited sources do not reconcile the two dates.