01In brief
United States foreign policy in the Middle East is the United States’ diplomatic, military, and economic engagement with the region, encompassing security partnerships, conflict mediation, energy interests, and responses to regional threats. Its commercial and maritime roots preceded the oil era: American ships traded with North Africa, while attacks by Barbary corsairs helped provoke debate over establishing a navy to defend maritime freedom. After World War II, Washington assumed a larger security role, seeking to contain Soviet influence through alliances, assistance, and military deployments. Support for Israel, relationships with Arab governments, the security of the Persian Gulf, and negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have subsequently become central elements of American engagement.
02Overview
After World War II, American strategy increasingly relied on regional security relationships intended to contain the Soviet Union and deter other powers from dominating the Middle East.[1][2] Regional partnerships, military bases, arms transfers, and assistance to local allies were intended to protect American interests while limiting the need for direct deployments.[5] Persistent instability nevertheless repeatedly drew American forces into regional operations.[5]
The relationship with Israel developed into a close political-military alliance after the Six-Day War, while Washington maintained important relationships with Arab states and pursued negotiated settlements to Arab-Israeli conflicts.[2] The 1973 oil embargo demonstrated the difficulty of combining strong support for Israel with close relations with Arab oil-producing monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia.[6] Subsequent diplomacy connected security assistance, disengagement agreements, and peace negotiations, most notably in the Egyptian-Israeli peace process.[2]
American policy has also employed instruments beyond military alliances, including sanctions, economic assistance, nuclear negotiations, and support for regional normalization.[2][7] The 2015 Iran nuclear agreement exchanged restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program for sanctions reductions, while the Abraham Accords established a framework for expanding Israel’s diplomatic and economic relations with participating Arab states.[4][7]
03Origins: Maritime and Commercial Engagement
Morocco recognized American independence in 1777, and the new United States government concluded one of its earliest treaties with the Bey of Morocco.[3] Relations with North African powers also involved coercion and captivity: more than one hundred American sailors were held by Algerian pirates in 1787.[3] Attacks on American shipping raised a choice between paying for protection and developing naval power to safeguard maritime freedom.[3] Commercial engagement was substantial before the oil boom, with one historical account placing the Middle East’s share of American trade at 20 percent.[3]
During World War I, Theodore Roosevelt advocated declaring war on the Ottoman Empire, but President Woodrow Wilson did not take that step.[3] In the immediate postwar settlement, Britain and France maintained more than one million troops in the Middle East, while the United States had no soldiers there and no comparable role in the new regional order.[3] Wilson endorsed Britain’s 1917 Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish National Home in Palestine.[3]
American political involvement remained limited during the interwar period, when policymakers generally treated the region as a British sphere.[1] Commercial activity nevertheless expanded through American oil investments in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.[1] World War II brought more direct operational engagement: the Persian Gulf Command transported lend-lease supplies through Iran to the Soviet Union, and by 1945 American air bases, supply depots, and transportation facilities operated in the region.[1]
04Postwar Strategy and Israel’s Establishment
The 1947 Truman Doctrine pledged assistance to Greece and Turkey in response to perceived Soviet pressure, and the United States provided the two countries with $400 million in aid.[1] Assistance also helped modernize Turkey’s armed forces as Washington became more directly involved in regional security.[1] Diminishing British commitments and confrontation with Soviet-backed movements and parties in Greece, Turkey, and Iran increased the Middle East’s importance in American strategic calculations.[8]
Oil supplies and concern about Soviet influence formed part of the strategic setting for postwar Palestine policy.[9] In 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told Saudi ruler Ibn Saud that no Allied decision on Palestine would be made without consultation with both Arab and Jewish sides.[9] During 1947–1948, the State Department and representatives of American oil interests opposed antagonizing Arab governments and questioned the viability of a Jewish state, while Jewish organizations, public sympathy, and electoral considerations also entered Washington’s deliberations.[8]
The United States supported partition in 1947, but escalating violence and difficulties implementing it led Washington to consider armed United Nations intervention and then temporary UN trusteeship.[8] An American arms embargo announced in December 1947 worked mainly against the Jews, although both sides ultimately obtained weapons elsewhere.[8] President Harry Truman recognized Israel shortly after its declaration of independence in 1948.[10]
A Jewish Review of Books review emphasizes that Truman supported the UN partition plan despite strong State Department objections, but kept American assistance very limited after recognition.[10] It also notes that the arms embargo applied to Israel and its adversaries during Israel’s War of Independence.[10] Recognition therefore preceded the extensive military assistance that later characterized the bilateral relationship.[10][2]
05Iran, Suez, and Cold War Alignments
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh moved to nationalize Iran’s oil industry in 1951.[11] The United States subsequently joined Britain in boycotting Iranian oil, and the CIA assisted the August 1953 coup that overthrew Mossadegh’s elected government and strengthened Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule.[2][11] A new oil consortium allocated American companies a 40 percent share, and Washington began providing military and economic assistance to Iran.[2]
Over the following quarter-century, the United States supplied the shah with hundreds of millions of dollars and helped establish Iran’s intelligence agency in 1957.[12] That agency became widely reviled in Iran for repression, while Washington continued publicly supporting the shah despite criticizing his government’s deteriorating human-rights record and suppression of democracy.[12] Iran’s oil exports expanded and its economy grew significantly during the same period.[12]
The 1956 Suez War exposed a major division between Washington and its European partners.[2] Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, but President Dwight D. Eisenhower opposed the invasion and joined the Soviet Union in demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal.[2] The crisis marked Britain’s eclipse by the United States as the leading external Middle Eastern power and helped the Soviet Union establish a foothold in Egypt.[2]
In an essay published by Mosaic, Michael Doran interprets Eisenhower’s earlier approach as an effort to gain Arab goodwill through an impartial posture and honest brokerage between Britain and Arab nationalists.[13] Doran argues that Eisenhower initially regarded Nasser as a possible Cold War partner, but that Suez strengthened Nasser politically and contributed to a later American emphasis on managing rival regional groupings.[13]
06Israel, Oil, and the Diplomacy of the 1970s
The aftermath of the June 1967 Six-Day War brought a major expansion of American support for Israel.[2] France had previously been Israel’s principal military supplier; the United States subsequently became its principal patron, increased military aid substantially, and sought to preserve Israel’s conventional-weapons advantage.[2] In November 1967, Washington cosponsored UN Security Council Resolution 242, whose land-for-peace formula linked withdrawal from territories occupied in the war with peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.[2] The later American-backed Rogers Plan proposed withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders with minor exceptions.[2]
Energy developments increased the stakes of regional conflict.[6] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary illustrates the changing production balance by placing the American share of world oil output at 64 percent in 1948 and 22 percent in 1972.[14] During the October 1973 war, the United States resupplied Israel, and Arab OPEC members imposed an embargo on countries they regarded as supporting Israel.[6] Export bans and production reductions accompanied oil prices that first doubled and then quadrupled, straining an American economy increasingly dependent on imported oil.[6]
President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pursued parallel negotiations with oil producers and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel.[6] Kissinger’s talks with Arab leaders began in November 1973 and produced the First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 1974.[6] The embargo ended in March following progress toward a negotiated end to Israeli-Syrian hostilities.[6] Further shuttle diplomacy produced disengagement agreements involving Israel, Egypt, and Syria in 1974 and 1975.[2]
A Jewish Review of Books account interprets Washington’s wartime pressure on Israel as partly motivated by fear that Egyptian collapse could trigger Soviet intervention.[15] It argues that American pressure helped halt the Israeli advance after Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal and contributed to the diplomatic sequence leading to Egyptian-Israeli peace.[15] American aid to both Israel and Egypt expanded sharply after the war, supporting Egypt’s realignment toward the West and providing incentives for subsequent agreements.[2]
The energy crisis also prompted domestic and international policy changes.[6] Nixon announced Project Independence on November 7, 1973, to promote domestic energy independence.[6] Later responses included the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a national 55-mile-per-hour highway speed limit, fuel-economy standards under President Gerald Ford, and the International Energy Agency proposed by Kissinger.[6]
07Camp David and the Persian Gulf
President Jimmy Carter initially sought to reconvene the Geneva Conference as part of intensive Arab-Israeli diplomacy.[16] Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s November 1977 announcement that he would go to Jerusalem opened direct Egyptian-Israeli talks, but their limited progress brought Carter back into a more prominent negotiating role in January 1978.[16] At the September 5–17 Camp David summit, Carter mediated between Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, producing frameworks for bilateral peace and Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank—known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[16][17]
The frameworks were not themselves a peace treaty, and disputes over withdrawal, settlements, and Palestinian autonomy prolonged negotiations.[16] Carter traveled to Israel in March 1979, and agreement on treaty text followed on March 13, including an American guarantee of Israel’s oil supply.[16] Egypt and Israel signed their treaty on March 26, ending open hostilities, providing for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and permitting Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal.[16][17] It was Israel’s first peace treaty with an Arab neighbor.[17]
The Iranian Revolution simultaneously removed a major American ally and brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power.[12] In November 1979, the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran resulted in 52 Americans being held for 444 days, while an American rescue operation failed.[12] Washington froze billions of dollars in Iranian assets, and diplomatic relations ended.[12]
The Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan contributed to the Carter Doctrine, which treated an outside attempt to control the Persian Gulf as an assault on vital American interests.[2][18] Washington established a Rapid Deployment Force that later developed into U.S. Central Command.[2] During the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, the Reagan administration assisted Iraq because it regarded Iran’s revolutionary government as the greater danger.[2] Tanker-protection operations expanded in 1986–1987, and the U.S. Navy fought Iranian forces in the tanker war in 1988, the year Iran accepted a cease-fire.[2]
In a 1990 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis, Steven L. Spiegel described Carter’s presidency as unusually concentrated on Middle Eastern affairs, encompassing Egyptian-Israeli peace, the shah’s fall, the hostage crisis, and Afghanistan.[19] Spiegel contrasted this with Reagan-era interventions in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, which he considered distinct from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and described strategic cooperation with Israel as becoming more institutionalized during the mid-1980s.[19]
08The Gulf War and Post-Cold War Diplomacy
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, prompted an American-led coalition deployment amid concern that Saudi Arabia might be attacked next.[20] More than 500,000 American troops deployed, and the coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in a campaign whose ground fighting lasted approximately one hundred hours.[20] American combat losses were 148 dead and 467 wounded.[20] The coalition’s UN mandate authorized Kuwait’s liberation rather than Saddam Hussein’s overthrow, and he remained in power.[2]
A Jewish Review of Books account presents American pressure on Israel during the war as an effort to preserve a coalition that included Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.[15] After Iraqi missiles struck Israeli civilian targets, Israel considered attacking Iraq but refrained following Washington’s warning that an Israeli operation could jeopardize the coalition.[15]
The war produced a more lasting American military presence in the Gulf, with defense agreements developing into major installations across the region.[18] Postwar sanctions sought to compel Iraq to relinquish unconventional weapons, while American and British policy also pursued regime change.[2] The presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia became one of Osama bin Laden’s grievances before the September 11 attacks.[18]
A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis identifies Soviet collapse, Iraq’s military defeat and subsequent sanctions, and Iran’s recovery from its war with Iraq as conditions favoring the peace process that began at Madrid in 1991 and accelerated with Oslo in 1993.[21] It interprets this period as one of American predominance in which regional conditions and American leadership facilitated diplomacy.[21]
Middle Eastern diplomacy remained prominent during President Bill Clinton’s first term: Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited the region more than twenty times, and Clinton made repeated visits between 1993 and 1996.[22] Iranian military activity, possible Iraqi rearmament, and the risk of another Arab-Israeli war continued to command American attention alongside the peace process.[22]
09Intervention and Reform After September 11
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W. Bush declared a war on terror, and the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan, whose Taliban government had harbored al-Qaeda.[2] The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, citing alleged weapons of mass destruction and other threats.[2] Claims that Iraq possessed those weapons or was linked to the September 11 attacks did not prove true, and the invasion attracted substantially less international support than the 1991 operation to liberate Kuwait.[2]
A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs analysis characterizes the Bush Doctrine as combining preventive or preemptive action, military dominance, and active democracy promotion, in contrast to an earlier emphasis on stability through friendly rulers.[23] It identifies the December 2002 Middle East Partnership Initiative as addressing economic, political, and educational reform, followed by Bush’s November 2003 call for a forward strategy of freedom.[23] The June 2004 Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, developed with G-8 partners, stated that reforms should not be imposed externally and that societies should determine their own pace and scope of change.[23]
The Jewish Review of Books interprets Bush’s June 2002 endorsement of a Palestinian state as conditional on democratic reform, confronting corruption, and rejecting terrorism.[10] Its account presents the policy as coupling statehood with political and security requirements rather than treating Israeli territorial concessions alone as sufficient.[10]
By 2016, American forces had undertaken three coalition campaigns in or against Iraq since 1990 and had fought in Afghanistan for fifteen years.[5] The experience exposed a distinction between battlefield achievements and the difficulty of producing durable political arrangements when local actors pursued their own objectives and American public support declined as casualties mounted.[5]
10Nuclear Diplomacy and Regional Normalization
In 2015, Iran and the P5+1—the United States, the other permanent UN Security Council members, and Germany—reached a nuclear agreement after more than a decade of negotiations.[4] It limited Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions reductions, required reductions in its nuclear stockpile over a ten-year period, and provided International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to nuclear facilities.[4] The Trump administration abandoned the agreement in 2018, while President Joe Biden later sought to revive it.[24]
President Donald Trump also changed several established American positions concerning Israel and the Palestinians.[25] In February 2017, he declined to endorse a particular statehood formula; on December 6, he recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announced that the American embassy would move there.[25] Palestinians subsequently broke off ties with the White House, arguing that Washington could no longer serve as an honest broker.[25] In March 2019, Trump recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.[25]
The administration withheld $65 million in UNRWA assistance in January 2018 and ended American funding seven months later, after annual contributions had exceeded $300 million.[25] Its 2019 Bahrain economic workshop, boycotted by the Palestinians, accompanied Jared Kushner’s proposed $50 billion investment fund for Palestinian and neighboring Arab economies.[25] The proposal included a $5 billion transportation corridor linking Gaza and the West Bank; these were proposed investments rather than completed projects.[25]
The Abraham Accords signing ceremony took place at the White House on September 15, 2020, under Trump, involving Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.[26] Agreements concluded during the latter half of 2020 also involved Morocco, while Sudan signed the general declaration.[7] The Israel-UAE treaty established peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization, with cooperation covering security, trade, finance, aviation, health, science, energy, water, and tourism.[7] It also proposed an American-joined Strategic Agenda for the Middle East to expand regional cooperation.[7]
The Israel-UAE agreement did not include a specific reference to Iran or address the two-state solution.[26] The accords brought Israeli-Arab relationships into the open and remained intact after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War in October 2023, although efforts toward Israeli-Saudi normalization were suspended during the war.[7] Discussions of expansion revived after the October 2025 ceasefire, and Kazakhstan announced the following month that it would accede despite already having maintained diplomatic relations with Israel for decades.[7]
11Recent Security and Commercial Priorities
Biden’s 2022 regional diplomacy combined efforts to revive the Iran nuclear agreement with engagement with Saudi Arabia amid high fuel prices.[24] He sought to stabilize oil markets while describing his objective as reorienting, rather than rupturing, the Saudi relationship and continuing to raise human-rights issues.[24] American concerns included Saudi ties with China and Russia, while Iran’s nuclear threat encouraged increased cooperation between Israel and Arab states.[24] Biden withdrew American forces from Afghanistan in 2021.[27]
During Trump’s May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, announced Saudi investment and procurement commitments totaled $600 billion, including an arms package valued at nearly $142 billion.[28] By November, announced investment commitments approached $1 trillion, and the two countries signed a strategic defense agreement.[28] These figures represented announced commitments, not confirmation that the entire sums had been invested or spent.[28]
A 2026 American-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement, signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Abdulaziz bin Salman, established a framework for American companies to participate in Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program.[28] Trump subsequently said it would not take effect unless Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords, and the agreement was to undergo a ninety-day congressional review.[28]
12Practice
Economic and military assistance has served strategic purposes alongside stated developmental and humanitarian objectives.[29] The Economic Support Fund was specifically linked to American foreign-policy interests, with Israel and Egypt dominating expenditures and Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco also receiving substantial support.[29] One historical accounting estimated that Israel and Egypt had received nearly 40 percent of all American aid since 1977, totaling more than $75 billion over the period it covered.[29]
American military engagement has combined standing facilities and partner support with repeated direct operations.[5] A 2016 assessment counted forty-one minor or major regional operations over the preceding seventy years, many of which achieved military objectives and sustained alliances.[5] The strategic framework sought to deter hostile regional dominance without assuming unlimited deployment commitments.[5]
Regional integration has provided another instrument of policy, linking diplomatic recognition with civilian cooperation and broader security relationships.[26][7] The Abraham Accords extended cooperation into agriculture, environmental protection, innovation, health, tourism, energy, and other fields.[26] Although presented as peace agreements, the Israeli agreements with the UAE and Bahrain normalized relations with countries against which Israel had not fought wars.[26]
13Strategic Significance
The region’s significance extends beyond direct American oil imports to energy supplies for allies, commerce through major maritime routes, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism.[2] Russian and Chinese regional activity has added a further dimension to American strategic calculations, including concern about partners developing closer relationships with those powers.[24]
14Controversies and Historical Interpretation
Historians differ over the relative importance of humanitarian sympathy, religion, domestic politics, advisers, oil, and Soviet influence in Truman’s Palestine policy.[30] Competing interpretations emphasize personal appeals by Chaim Weizmann and Eddie Jacobson, events in Palestine, or electoral considerations; Michael Oren instead stresses Truman’s religious and democratic sympathies.[30][3] A historical account links expanded assistance after 1973 to Egypt’s realignment toward the West, but the degree of causation remains interpretive.[2]
Camp David did not resolve the Palestinian issue, and Palestinians viewed the Egyptian-Israeli agreement as favoring Egypt.[17] Democracy promotion likewise drew objections from Arab governments and commentators who regarded it as interference and questioned American credibility because of Iraq, support for Israel, and Washington’s regional record.[23] The 2015 Iran agreement faced substantial Republican opposition, while the Abraham Accords prompted disagreement over whether normalization would increase Arab leverage for Palestinians or reduce attention to their cause.[4][7]
Other major disputes concern the civilian consequences of Iraqi sanctions, assistance that may strengthen repressive governments, and whether arms transfers promote stability or fuel regional arms races.[2][29] Assessments of post-September 11 intervention distinguish military success from failures to establish lasting political settlements.[5] More recent scrutiny has concerned the overlap between countries negotiating with Washington and Trump-family business ventures, although the cited reporting found no public evidence of a specific policy decision exchanged for a private business opportunity.[28]
Sources
- 1Encyclopedia.com, United States of America and the Middle East, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 2Encyclopedia.com, United States Policy Towards the Middle East, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 3The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 4Encyclopaedia Britannica, Barack Obama and the Iran Nuclear Agreement, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 5The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington Institute: Rethinking the U.S. Military Role, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 6Office of the Historian, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 7Encyclopaedia Britannica, Abraham Accords, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 8Yad Vashem, The Holocaust: Factor in the Birth of Israel?, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 9The American Jewish Archives, 2004, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 10Jewish Review of Books, Shifting Daylight, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 11The Times of Israel, (AP): The Legacy of the 1953 Iran Coup, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 12Ynetnews, US, Iran: Decades of complex, troubled relations, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 13Mosaic, American Presidents and the Jews, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 14Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Berlin Wall of Mideast oil comes down, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 15Jewish Review of Books, What the U.S. Can and Can't Do in the Middle East, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 16Office of the Historian, Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 17The Times of Israel, (AP): Camp David Accords Intelligence, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 18The Times of Israel, U.S. Deployments across the Middle East, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 19Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Israeli Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 20The Times of Israel, (AP): Echoes of the 1991 Gulf War, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 21Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The End of the Post-Gulf War Era, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 22Globes, US Middle East Policy Portends Benign Neglect - Almost, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 23Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Quest for Democratic Political Reforms in the Middle East and the Prevailing Arab Political Culture, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 24Israel Hayom, Biden seeks new chapter in troubled Middle East – www.israelhayom.com, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 25Ynet, Many sticks, few carrots: Trump's Palestinian policy, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 26Institute for National Security Studies, Behind the Scenes of the Abraham Accords: Insights from an INSS Cabinet, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 27Globes, Israel's unwitting role in US global detachment, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 28CTech by Calcalist, Weapons, AI and nuclear power: Trump's Middle East formula, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 29Encyclopedia.com, Economic and Military Aid, accessed on November 18, 2026.
- 30The American Jewish Archives, 1981, accessed on November 18, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What is United States foreign policy in the Middle East?
United States foreign policy in the Middle East is the country’s diplomatic, military, and economic engagement with the region. It includes security partnerships, conflict mediation, energy interests, and responses to regional threats. Since World War II, containing Soviet influence and maintaining regional security have been central goals, alongside support for Israel, relations with Arab governments, Persian Gulf security, and diplomacy over Iran’s nuclear program.
How did American engagement with the Middle East begin?
American commercial and maritime engagement with the Middle East began before the oil era. Morocco recognized American independence in 1777, and the United States concluded an early treaty with the Bey of Morocco. Attacks on American shipping and the capture of sailors by Algerian pirates prompted debate about paying for protection or building naval power. One historical account estimated that the Middle East represented 20 percent of American trade.
How did the United States become Israel’s principal military supporter?
American support for Israel expanded significantly after the June 1967 Six-Day War, when the United States became Israel’s principal military supplier and sought to preserve its conventional-weapons advantage. In November 1967, Washington cosponsored UN Security Council Resolution 242, linking withdrawal from territories occupied in the war with peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The 1973 war and subsequent diplomacy further connected American military assistance with negotiations involving Israel and Arab states.
What did the Camp David agreements lead to?
The Camp David summit of September 5–17, 1978, produced frameworks for Egyptian-Israeli peace and Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank. The frameworks were not a peace treaty, and negotiations continued over withdrawal, settlements, and Palestinian autonomy. Egypt and Israel signed their treaty on March 26, 1979; it ended open hostilities, provided for Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai, and permitted Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal.
Why did the United States go to war with Iraq in 2003?
The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, citing alleged weapons of mass destruction and other threats. Claims that Iraq possessed those weapons or was linked to the September 11 attacks did not prove true. The invasion received substantially less international support than the 1991 coalition operation to liberate Kuwait.
What did the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement require?
The 2015 agreement between Iran and the P5+1 limited Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions reductions. It required reductions in Iran’s nuclear stockpile over a ten-year period and gave International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to nuclear facilities. The Trump administration abandoned the agreement in 2018, and President Joe Biden later sought to revive it.
What are the Abraham Accords?
The Abraham Accords are agreements that expanded Israel’s diplomatic and economic relations with participating Arab states. The White House signing ceremony on September 15, 2020, involved Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain; agreements during the latter half of 2020 also involved Morocco, while Sudan signed the general declaration. The Israel-UAE treaty established peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization, with cooperation across fields including security, trade, health, energy, and tourism.