Six-Day War

The crisis that produced the Six-Day War did not emerge overnight. Its roots lay in the instability of the arrangements established after the 1956 Suez War, an accelerating regional arms race, and recurring clashes along Israel's borders throughout the early 1960s.[4] Syria, in particular, subjected Israeli agricultural communities in the Jordan and Huleh Valleys to artillery fire from positions on the Golan Heights, interfered with Israeli fishermen on Lake Kinneret, and applied pressure against Israel's water projects; these bombardments grew progressively more intense during the decade.[5] At the same time, Palestinian infiltrations from multiple directions produced Israeli reprisals, and the November 13, 1966, Israeli raid on the West Bank village of Samua — mounted after three Israeli soldiers were killed by a Fatah-planted mine — killed fifteen Jordanian soldiers in subsequent fighting and contributed to Palestinian riots and increased regional tension.[6]

The precipitating sequence of events began in May 1967. A false Soviet intelligence report circulated on May 13 alleged that Israel had massed troops on the Syrian border; the report was inaccurate, but it prompted Egypt to respond as though it were true.[4] Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser moved large numbers of soldiers into Sinai — Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol reported on May 22 that Egyptian forces there had grown from 35,000 troops on May 14 to 80,000 troops — while Egypt simultaneously demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had been deployed in Sinai and at Sharm el-Sheikh after the 1956 campaign.[7][5]

On May 16, Egyptian Chief of Staff General Mahmoud Fawzi requested the immediate withdrawal of UNEF, stating that Egyptian forces were already concentrated in Sinai and prepared to act against Israel. UNEF began withdrawing on May 18; on May 19, Secretary-General U Thant announced the withdrawal to the General Assembly, and the UN flag was lowered in Gaza.[8] The removal of this buffer reopened conditions that had contributed to the 1956 breakdown. With UNEF gone, Nasser announced on May 22 that Egypt would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.[4] The closure threatened a recognized casus belli; the United States had pledged in 1957 to treat a renewed closure as an act of war.[4]

Arab military alliances tightened the pressure further. By the end of May, Egypt had more than 100,000 troops and approximately 1,000 tanks in Sinai, while Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were also mobilizing.[8] Egyptian Battle Order No. 3/67, dated May 18, 1967, stated: "An offensive operation is planned for the cutting off of the Southern Negev area and to conquer Eilat."[7] Cairo radio declared on May 16 that "the existence of Israel has continued too long" and that "the battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel."[7] Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin later testified that the combined Arab deployments created a very difficult military situation for Israel and emphasized the importance of Israeli air superiority to the outcome.[9]

The United Nations Security Council placed the Middle East situation on its agenda on May 24 at the initiative of Canada and Denmark, but the Council's discussions proved largely ineffective. By June 1, when Denmark assumed the Council presidency, it was no longer possible for the UN to defuse the crisis.[5] Diplomatic efforts continued at the Israeli cabinet level: a May 27 vote was split nine to nine between immediate military action and allowing additional time for diplomacy, with Eshkol supporting continued diplomatic efforts.[7] Those efforts ultimately failed. On June 2, the Israeli General Staff pressed Eshkol to authorize military action; on June 4, the Defense Ministerial Committee and the full government approved military action by a majority of 18, and the General Staff decided that the campaign would begin the following morning with an air attack on Egyptian military airfields.[10]

Israel's strategic plan assigned the main effort to destroying the Egyptian Air Force, holding defensive positions against Jordan and Syria in the interim, concentrating the principal ground army against Egypt in Sinai, and avoiding the initiation of hostilities with Jordan unless Jordan attacked first.[8] Prime Minister Eshkol communicated directly to King Hussein that Israel would not initiate action against Jordan but would respond if Jordan opened hostilities.[8] The initial operation was intended to last approximately forty-eight hours and aimed to eliminate Egypt's air force and neutralize Egypt's first defensive lines in Sinai before a broader campaign could be assessed.[6]

The Air Offensive

At 7:14 a.m. on June 5, almost the entire Israeli Air Force took off simultaneously, leaving only twelve Israeli fighters to defend Israeli airspace.[3] Operation Moked, also called Operation Focus, used low-level flying and runway-penetrating bombs to catch most Egyptian aircraft on the ground. By 10:35 a.m., the Egyptian Air Force had been effectively destroyed as a fighting force; by 11:05 a.m., 180 Egyptian aircraft had been destroyed.[8][3]

By the end of the first day, most of Egypt's air force and half of Syria's had been eliminated on the ground. Israeli claims put the toll at 302 Egyptian, 20 Jordanian, and 52 Syrian aircraft destroyed.[3] A separate account reported that 416 Egyptian aircraft, 393 of them on the ground, had been destroyed by the night of the second day.[8] The rapid achievement of Israeli air superiority facilitated ground operations in Sinai and the Gaza Strip.[11]

The Egyptian Front

The Egyptian front was the Israel Defense Forces' main effort. Southern Command, under chief Yeshayahu Gavish, operated in northern, central, and southern axes, with divisions commanded by Israel Tal, Ariel Sharon, and Avraham Joffe.[11] Israeli forces advanced through the Sinai Peninsula, blocking the western passes and ambushing Egyptian armored forces in the Gidi and Mitla passes. Israeli claims recorded 600 Egyptian tanks destroyed and 100 functioning tanks captured, approximately 10,000 Egyptian soldiers killed and 3,000 captured, and 275 Israeli soldiers killed and 800 wounded in the Sinai campaign.[12] By June 9, Israeli forces held the Sinai Peninsula as far as the Gulf of Suez.[11] Israeli forces also occupied Sharm el-Sheikh and reopened the Straits of Tiran and Israel's access to the Gulf of Aqaba.[8] Egypt accepted a ceasefire on June 8.[8]

The Jordanian Front and Jerusalem

Jordan's entry into the war was not inevitable. Israel had communicated that it would not attack Jordan unless Jordan initiated hostilities.[8] Nevertheless, Jordanian forces opened fire on Jerusalem and other Israeli communities on June 5. Jordanian artillery eventually fired nearly 6,000 shells onto Jewish neighborhoods in western Jerusalem and also shelled Netanya and the outskirts of Tel Aviv.[13][6] Israel then counterattacked. Despite Israel's warning, Jordanian aircraft also attacked Israel.[8]

Israel initially ordered its forces not to fire on Jordan because it did not want to open a front along its longest border. After the Jordanian shelling began, Israel moved against Jordanian positions around Jerusalem and Jenin.[6] The Israeli government sent the 55th Paratrooper Brigade, commanded by Mordechai Gur, into Jerusalem.[12] One of the fiercest engagements took place at Ammunition Hill, where 260 Israeli soldiers crossed minefields and razor-wire defenses in an improvised trench assault. Thirty-six Israeli soldiers were killed, and only 11 participants emerged without being killed or wounded; 71 Jordanian soldiers were killed.[3]

Once Israeli troops reached the entrance to Jerusalem's Old City, the government deliberated for twenty-four hours. After a proposed arrangement with Hussein produced no reply for two hours, Israeli forces entered through the Lions Gate on June 7 and gained control of the Temple Mount within the hour.[6] Gur transmitted the message that reverberated across the Jewish world: "The Temple Mt. is in Our Hands."[12] Israeli paratroopers also captured the Western Wall. Jordan accepted a ceasefire on June 7.[8] The Knesset subsequently passed legislation on June 27 incorporating the Old City into Israel.[8]

The Syrian Front and the Golan Heights

The final phase of the war unfolded on the Syrian front. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan had initially opposed opening a Syrian front because he feared Soviet intervention; he reversed course and ordered the Northern Command to attack after Egypt had agreed to a ceasefire.[12] Israeli forces, including the 8th Brigade and the Golani Brigade, breached Syrian defensive positions on June 9 after preparatory air attacks and captured positions including Tel Azaziat, Tel Faher, Banias, and significant portions of the Golan Heights.[12] A United Nations-brokered ceasefire took effect at 18:30 on June 10, ending the fighting.[12][14] A Golani Brigade force subsequently captured a Mount Hermon position on June 12, after the formal ceasefire.[12] On the Syrian front, Israeli forces suffered approximately 115 killed and 306 wounded.[8]

Casualty figures for the Six-Day War vary across sources and should not be presented as a single agreed total. The National Library of Israel reports 779 Israeli soldiers killed and more than 2,500 wounded.[15] The Jewish Virtual Library's overview lists 777 Israeli dead and 2,586 wounded, while My Jewish Learning lists 676 Israeli dead and more than 3,000 wounded.[3][16] The National Library estimates approximately 12,000 to 21,000 Arab soldiers killed and nearly 50,000 wounded across all fronts, while another account estimates 15,000 to 20,000 Egyptian soldiers killed on the Egyptian front.[15][8]

On June 8, the USS Liberty, an American intelligence vessel, was attacked off the Sinai coast, resulting in 34 American deaths and 75 wounded. Israel described the attack as accidental and apologized, though the incident remained a subject of controversy.[8]

Israeli-controlled territory expanded from approximately 8,000 to 26,000 square miles, more than tripling the area under Israeli control.[3] Israel now held the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Jerusalem was unified under Israeli control, and Jews regained access to the Western Wall and the Temple Mount.[3][12]

In the aftermath of the fighting, a major displacement of Palestinians occurred. The Jewish Virtual Library estimates that approximately 325,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank fled to other parts of Jordan, citing reasons that included fear of crossfire, rumors, expectations of a prolonged war, preference for Arab rule, fear of capture, and concerns about family income; Israeli forces also ordered some Palestinians to move for strategic or security reasons.[3] The same account notes that more than 9,000 families were reunited in 1967 and that ultimately more than 60,000 Palestinians were allowed to return.[3] A separate account estimated postwar refugee populations of approximately 300,000 in the West Bank and approximately 315,000 in the Gaza Strip.[8]

Israel established a military administration rather than immediately annexing the West Bank and Gaza, assuming responsibility for law, public services, and economic administration in the captured territories.[3] The Suez Canal was closed to all shipping and remained closed for years. Israel emerged as the dominant military power in the Middle East, while Egypt began rebuilding its armed forces with Soviet assistance and intermittent fighting continued across the new ceasefire lines.[8]

The political consequences of the war fell unevenly across the region. Egyptian President Nasser announced his resignation following the defeat, but withdrew it after mass demonstrations demanding that he remain in office.[16] Egypt, along with several other Arab states, broke diplomatic relations with the United States, accusing Washington of supporting Israel.[4] The war marked the failure of successive American administrations' efforts to prevent renewed Arab-Israeli conflict after the 1956 Suez War, transformed the American role in the conflict, and underscored the limits of UN diplomacy in the face of a rapid military crisis.[4]

During the fighting, the United States sought a ceasefire partly to prevent an Arab defeat severe enough to provoke Soviet intervention and partly to avoid alienating pro-Western Arab governments. After the war, U.S. officials declined to demand an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied territories, viewing the prewar armistice system as unstable and believing that withdrawal should be linked to peace settlements.[4]

Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban captured the paradox of the postwar situation when he described the conflict as "the first war in history which has ended with the victors suing for peace and the vanquished calling for unconditional surrender."[17]

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which became a central framework for subsequent Arab-Israeli diplomacy.[3][4] The resolution called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "territories occupied in the recent conflict," the termination of claims or states of belligerency, recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state in the area, and the right of states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. It also addressed freedom of navigation through international waterways, a just settlement of the refugee problem, territorial inviolability, and the appointment of a UN special representative; Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden was later designated to that post.[5]

President Lyndon B. Johnson reflected on the war's central trigger when he said on June 19, 1967: "If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations."[3]

The General Assembly also passed Resolution 2253 on July 4, 1967, and Resolution 2254 on July 21, 1967, calling on Israel to rescind or halt measures altering Jerusalem's status. Israel maintained that the reunification of Jerusalem restored physical protection and access to the Holy Places and freedom of worship and conscience for all faiths, while the UN treated Israeli legislative and administrative measures affecting Jerusalem's status as invalid.[5]

The Six-Day War produced consequences extending far beyond the six days of fighting itself. The Pew Research Center identifies among the subsequent developments the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Jewish settlement construction in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, the Lebanon War, the Palestinian uprisings, and the Israel-PLO peace accords.[1] The defeat of secular Arab nationalist governments and Israel's territorial gains also contributed to the rise of Islamist politics across the region.[1]

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy characterizes the war as geographically limited but globally consequential, noting that the capture of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights shaped subsequent major events including the War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur War, Lebanon-related conflicts, the First Intifada, and the peace process.[6] The war effectively swept away the remaining armistice agreements of 1948 and 1949, replacing them with a new territorial reality that the international community has contested ever since.[5]

For Israel, the war was a major turning point that strengthened its physical security while simultaneously creating unresolved political, social, economic, moral, and religious challenges.[16] The question of whether the territories captured in 1967 were "liberated" or "occupied" divided Israeli society and has continued to shape Israeli political culture.[16]

The war's impact on American Jewish communal life was profound. American Jews organized major prayer and fundraising campaigns, surpassed United Jewish Appeal targets, and volunteered to replace Israeli civilians called into military service. American Jewry also spearheaded the "Let My People Go" campaign on behalf of Soviet Jewish emigration, helping make both Israel and Soviet Jewry central pillars of the American Jewish communal agenda.[18] Institutionally, the conflict intensified the Reform movement's connection to Israel. The Central Conference of American Rabbis established a Committee on Rabbinic Training in October 1967 and accepted its report about six months later. The Hebrew Union College–Jewish Institute of Religion's Board of Governors unanimously approved a mandatory first year of study in Israel on October 23, 1969, and the inaugural mandatory program began in 1970–1971.[18]

U.S. officials recognized at the time the historic weight of what had occurred. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy recalled that U.S. officials initially "didn't really know anything about the situation on the ground," and that the atmosphere changed when it became clear that the Israeli Air Force had won.[19]

Several aspects of the Six-Day War remain subjects of genuine historical and political dispute, and primary sources preserve competing accounts.

The legal and moral characterization of Israel's June 5 air strike remains disputed. Israeli government and military sources describe it as a preemptive strike justified by Egyptian mobilization, the closure of the Straits of Tiran, and explicit Arab statements of intent to destroy Israel. The U.S. Department of State's historical overview also calls the action preemption, while contemporary diplomatic records preserve uncertainty about Israel's account of the immediate trigger. After reviewing an Israeli explanation citing artillery fire and Egyptian air incursions, Walt Rostow added, "At least that's his story."[4][19]

Casualty figures are another area of uncertainty. Published Israeli totals include 779 soldiers in the National Library of Israel's account, 777 in the Jewish Virtual Library, and 676 in My Jewish Learning.[15][3] Arab military losses are likewise estimates rather than verified tallies.[8] The causes and scale of Palestinian displacement are also contested; sources cite flight from combat, rumors and political pressure, Israeli security orders, and limited relocations as contributing factors in varying combinations.[3]

The most durable controversy arising from the war concerns the interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 242. Arab states interpreted the resolution as requiring total Israeli withdrawal from all territories captured in 1967, while Israel and British and American officials emphasized that the English text reads "withdrawal from territories" rather than "withdrawal from the territories" or "withdrawal from all territories." They described the omission as deliberate and connected it to the resolution's call for secure and recognized boundaries.[20][21] Israel understood withdrawal as connected to a formal and comprehensive peace, agreed lines, termination of belligerency, recognition, and secure boundaries; Arab states demanded total withdrawal before negotiations on an overall settlement.[5] This interpretive gap remained unresolved and defined the terms of Arab-Israeli diplomacy for decades.