Security Cabinet of Israel

The Security Cabinet’s responsibilities encompass Israel’s national security, the defense establishment and its policies, foreign relations, and approval of development and procurement plans for the defense establishment and intelligence agencies.[1] Its common names include the “political-security cabinet” and “Security Cabinet,” while its formal institutional basis is section 6 of the Government Law, 2001.[1] The prime minister may also bring another subject before the committee when circumstances warrant its consideration there.[1]

The committee operates within a broader system in which Israel’s government conducts some of its work through ministerial committees, which may be permanent or established for a particular purpose.[6] The reproduced 1992 Basic Law: The Government permits the prime minister to establish permanent or temporary ministerial committees and allows the government to conduct its operations through them.[7] General descriptions of ministerial committees explain that their decisions ordinarily become government decisions or become binding unless challenged before the full cabinet.[6] The Security Cabinet has a more specific arrangement: its decisions cannot be appealed to the government and, although not formally accorded the status of government decisions, are binding with the force of such decisions.[1]

The Security Cabinet is not interchangeable with every smaller group of ministers consulted on security affairs.[2] An informal “inner cabinet,” described in a 2012 account as an “octet,” was an advisory forum assembled at the prime minister’s discretion, and its membership did not necessarily coincide with that of the statutory committee.[2] The National Security Council is instead a staff and advisory institution serving the prime minister and government, while the War Management Cabinet established in 2023 was a separate, smaller ministerial forum.[4][5]

During the 1948 War of Independence, David Ben-Gurion opposed creating a ministerial committee to supervise the war, seeking to retain authority himself.[8] A security affairs committee nevertheless developed in practice, although it met rarely and lacked defined powers.[8] Its stature increased after Levi Eshkol became prime minister in 1963, when it began meeting more regularly and formally.[8]

An extended meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs on May 26, 1967, illustrates its role before the Six-Day War.[9] Held at the defense minister’s office in Tel Aviv and marked top secret, the meeting addressed Egypt’s military buildup in Sinai, possible military action, and whether allowing more time for diplomacy could improve support from the United States.[9][10] Ministers did not reach agreement on military action, and the decision was postponed.[9] Eshkol, then both prime minister and defense minister, also proposed a small standing committee and discussed including representatives of other parties.[10] The recorded decision authorized him to add representatives of the Gahal and Rafi Knesset factions to the security committee.[10]

Cabinet and Security Cabinet transcripts from the Six-Day War subsequently formed part of an archival collection whose records had remained classified for 50 years.[11] These records document the existence of security committee deliberations well before the later statutory framework.[9][11] Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Agranat Commission recommended establishing a statutory political-security cabinet and allowing a smaller team of up to five ministers, chaired by the prime minister, to decide urgent wartime matters.[8] A Knesset review reports that fundamental, long-term, and especially important questions were to remain with the full government.[12]

Major operations also supplied precedents for involving the entire cabinet.[2] Yehuda Ben-Meir recounted that Yitzhak Rabin explained his decision to seek full-government approval for the 1976 Entebbe rescue operation partly through the consequences of failure: if Rabin had to resign and bring down the government, he believed the decision should belong to all ministers.[2] In 1981, Begin submitted the attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor to the full cabinet for a vote after the aircraft had departed but while they could still be recalled.[2]

A March 1992 amendment to Basic Law: The Government called for a team, established and operated by the prime minister, to provide ongoing professional advice on national security; the cited INSS account says that team was not established.[13] A distinct development followed on March 7, 1999, when the government approved the establishment of the National Security Council as a staff and advisory forum.[4] Government Resolution 4889 established the council, and retired Major General David Ivri became its first head and national security adviser.[13][4] Its initial assignments included integrating assessments, coordinating ministries, preparing government and Security Cabinet discussions, recommending policy, supporting long-range planning, and monitoring implementation.[4] The prime minister initially directed it to prioritize non-conventional weapons and ballistic-missile threats.[4]

The Government Law, 2001, supplies the statutory basis identified for the Security Cabinet’s composition and institutional status.[1][3] The 2008 National Security Staff Law subsequently formalized the supporting staff body within the Prime Minister’s Office, under the prime minister’s direction.[14] This law assigned preparation, assessment, coordination, and implementation-monitoring functions to the staff rather than making it a substitute ministerial decision-making body.[14]

The Government Law names the prime minister as chair of the Security Cabinet and includes the deputy prime minister, if one is appointed, together with the ministers of defense, justice, foreign affairs, finance, and the minister responsible for internal or public security.[3] Additional ministers may be appointed by the government on the prime minister’s proposal, provided the committee does not exceed half the number of government members.[3] Membership therefore combines positions attached to particular offices with additional appointments.[3]

Historical membership figures describe particular governments rather than a permanent roster.[2] In 2012, the committee had 14 members drawn from a 29-member cabinet, with four additional ministers attending as non-voting observers.[2] The required portfolios listed at that time included public security, alongside the prime minister, defense, foreign affairs, finance, and justice.[2] That account also distinguished statutory membership from participation in the informal inner cabinet: a minister could belong to the latter without being a Security Cabinet member.[2]

The government’s committee page records the establishment of the committee for the government formed in 2023 through Government Decision 6 of January 3, 2023, and lists subsequent membership changes through January 2025.[1] Alongside six members holding seats by law, it names Avi Dichter, Ron Dermer, Miri Regev, Ze’ev Elkin, Eli Cohen, and Gila Gamliel as additional members.[1] Regular invitees include the national security adviser, the attorney general, the defense minister’s military secretary, and the head of the National Security Council division responsible for committee discussions.[1]

A January 21, 2026, report described 11 official members, in addition to ministers and other guests who regularly attended.[15] This is a different dated membership snapshot from the 12 names on the government page, whose recorded changes extend through January 2025.[1][15] Neither figure establishes an unchanging size for the committee.[1][3]

The Security Cabinet may exercise delegated authority to decide on going to war or undertaking significant military action highly likely to lead to war.[1] Under the government’s description of section 40 of Basic Law: The Government and section 6(b) of the Government Law, this substitution for the full government requires the prime minister to determine that circumstances make it necessary for reasons of state security or foreign relations, including associated confidentiality concerns.[1] The committee’s authority does not prevent the full government from discussing a subject when the prime minister brings it before that body.[1]

The older 1992 Basic Law text assigned the decision to begin a war to the government while preserving the ability to conduct military actions necessary for state defense and public security.[7] A 2017 legislative proposal sponsored by Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked sought to permit delegation to the Security Cabinet of decisions on military operations liable to escalate into war.[16] Drawing on a committee headed by former National Security Council head Yaakov Amidror, the proposal aimed to clarify authority, improve efficiency, and protect operational secrecy.[16]

A 2018 amendment formally enabled the smaller ministerial committee to take the country to war under delegated authority.[17] The arrangements initially included a quorum of half the committee for war-related decisions and an exception permitting the prime minister and defense minister to decide with a smaller quorum in extreme circumstances when urgency prevented assembling the required number.[18] A subsequent amendment removed both the reduced-quorum exception and the half-committee quorum requirement.[18] The earlier exceptional power for the two ministers consequently should not be read as an enduring feature of the later framework.[18][19]

Section 40 requires a government decision for war or significant military action highly likely to lead to war, while allowing the delegated Security Cabinet procedure.[1][20] Notification must be conveyed as soon as possible to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.[20] When the decision is made by the Security Cabinet, notification must also go as soon as possible to the government and the parliamentary committee’s subcommittee; the prime minister must announce the decision to the Knesset plenum as soon as possible.[20]

Rules adopted for the 31st government provided that the Security Cabinet would generally meet every two weeks, although the prime minister could alter the schedule or convene it whenever circumstances warranted.[21] Under those rules, subjects were selected by the prime minister, either independently or following a committee member’s request, and written preparatory material was distributed only with the prime minister’s authorization.[21] Meetings could proceed with any number of participants provided the chair or acting chair was present.[21] A proposal passed by a majority of those voting, abstentions were excluded, and a tie resulted in rejection.[21]

These arrangements differed from general historical descriptions of ordinary ministerial committees, including an account associated with the government formed after the 1999 elections in which committee decisions became government decisions unless a minister objected within two weeks.[22] The Security Cabinet’s more specific arrangement makes its decisions non-appealable to the government and binding with the force of a government decision.[1]

The National Security Staff prepares government and committee deliberations, presents policy alternatives and their assessed implications, monitors implementation of decisions, and proposes agendas for the Security Cabinet and other ministerial groups dealing with foreign and security affairs.[14] These statutory responsibilities place preparation and follow-through alongside the ministers’ decision-making role.[14] The staff operates within the Prime Minister’s Office under the prime minister’s direction.[14]

The cited rules for the 31st government assigned the National Security Council advance staff work and, where necessary, the development of proposed decisions in coordination with relevant institutions.[21] They directed it to prepare proposed agendas with the Government Secretariat and assemble briefings, reports, assessments, and other background material.[21] The rules also provided for quarterly recommendations concerning strategy and policy discussions, additional decision-oriented meetings when needed, and monitoring of policy implementation.[21]

The 2008 law requires the staff to prepare and present an annual and multi-year assessment of the diplomatic-security situation to the Ministerial Committee on National Security Affairs at least once a year.[14] With the prime minister’s approval, the assessment may include situation reports and intelligence-field analyses.[14] Assessments from relevant security bodies must also be presented to the prime minister and discussed by the committee at least annually.[14]

Other statutory functions include preparing staff work on defense and specified security-related budgets, operating the National Crisis Management Center in the Prime Minister’s Office, assessing Israel’s security concept and proposing updates, and assessing initiatives of diplomatic-security importance.[14] The staff head may convene hearings and invite representatives of security bodies, the Israel Defense Forces, the police, and government ministries.[14] Invitees are required to attend unless the head considers attendance impossible in the circumstances.[14]

Under the National Security Strategy Law adopted in 2025, the National Security Council must prepare a political-security strategy proposal when a new government is established.[23] The government, or the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs if authorized by the government, must approve the strategy within five months and may amend it.[23] The strategy remains confidential, but a summary must be published after presentation to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.[23]

A 2024 Sapir Journal commentary describes the staff as a support body for the prime minister and cabinet, says it acquired additional intelligence responsibilities after the 2006 war with Hezbollah, and discusses proposals to strengthen its intelligence oversight role.[24] Those proposals concern the supporting institution rather than changes to the Security Cabinet’s membership or legal powers.[24]

Rules adopted for the 31st government classified the Security Cabinet’s meeting times, deliberations, and decisions as secret and prohibited their disclosure or publication.[21] They required a verbatim transcript and a separate decisions protocol.[21] The transcript was classified “top secret,” while the decisions protocol was classified “top secret” or “secret” unless the prime minister determined otherwise.[21]

Under those rules, a minister could inspect the decisions protocol with the prime minister’s approval, and the Government Secretary issued media notices about meetings on the prime minister’s instructions.[21] The reproduced 1992 Basic Law similarly treats state-security debates and decisions of the government and ministerial committees as secret, subject to exceptions including authorized or legally required publication.[7]

Historical records can nevertheless become available after extended classification.[11] Cabinet and Security Cabinet transcripts from the 1967 Six-Day War were included in an archival release after 50 years.[11] The May 26 meeting record, itself marked top secret, preserves both discussion of military and diplomatic options and a decision concerning participation by additional political factions.[9][10]

On October 8, 2023, the Security Cabinet approved a declaration that Israel was at war and authorized significant military activities, giving the decision legal standing under section 40 of Basic Law: The Government.[25] The confirmed state of war took effect from 6:00 a.m. on October 7, the morning of the terrorist assault from the Gaza Strip.[20] This was a formal use of the war-decision framework rather than the creation of a new name for the existing committee.[20][25]

A national emergency government formed on October 11 established a separate War Management Cabinet consisting of Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Benny Gantz, with Ron Dermer and Gadi Eisenkot as observers.[5] The emergency arrangement required the smaller forum’s conclusions to be brought to the Security Cabinet for approval and assigned it war-management functions including discussion of an exit strategy and the issuing of operational directives.[5]

The emergency arrangement described the smaller body as a subcommittee handling operational implementation of the Security Cabinet’s decisions, including strategic and military objectives, operational instructions, and recommendations concerning captives and missing persons.[5] The expanded Security Cabinet was to have 15 members during the emergency period.[5] The smaller War Cabinet was dissolved after Gantz and Eisenkot left the government in June 2024.[12]

A January 2025 Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs commentary reported that the Security Cabinet convened to approve a hostage deal and adopted measures concerning IDF deployment in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[26] The commentary said the committee decided to maintain forces at their pre–October 7, 2023, level and require another cabinet decision before reducing them.[26]

The Security Cabinet provides a smaller ministerial forum within a system in which the full government remains the collective political authority to which the Israel Defense Forces are subordinate.[13] Its designated membership, authority over security and diplomatic questions, and ability to make binding decisions distinguish it from informal consultations among selected ministers.[1][2] The statutory cap of half the government preserves its character as a restricted committee rather than a second meeting of the entire cabinet.[3]

The committee’s remit joins operational decisions with longer-term responsibilities: defense policy, foreign relations, procurement and development plans, recurring strategic assessments, and potentially approval of a new government’s national-security strategy.[1][14] The 2025 strategy law adds a specific timetable for approving that strategy and combines confidentiality of the full document with parliamentary presentation and publication of a summary.[23]

The relationship between the committee and the full government also encompasses political responsibility for particularly consequential decisions.[2] The Entebbe and Iraqi reactor precedents show prime ministers bringing major operations before all ministers, while the committee’s present authority expressly leaves room for the prime minister to place a subject before the full government.[1][2] Staff preparation and classified deliberation are distinct parts of the institutional framework.[14][21] Binding ministerial decisions and parliamentary notification form additional components.[1][20]

Institutional disputes have concerned which matters require Security Cabinet approval and whether ministers receive sufficient information to exercise collective oversight.[12][16] A review of decision-making before and during Operation Protective Edge found that the committee’s authority and the matters requiring its decision had not been set out in writing, and that ministers lacked an established entitlement to essential information.[16] An INSS analysis of the 2008 staff law argued that it defined supporting functions without fully formalizing political decision-making processes or the responsibilities of political leaders.[14] A later INSS analysis likewise identified insufficiently established rules governing subjects, presentations by security agencies, and communication of directives.[27]

The boundary between war, action highly likely to lead to war, and other military operations has also generated legal disagreement.[19][28] Operation Shield and Arrow in May 2023 was launched on a decision by the prime minister and defense minister without Security Cabinet approval; the attorney general’s position made the approval requirement depend on circumstances and professional assessments of the likelihood of escalation, an approach also applied to Operation Breaking Dawn in 2022.[29] The exceptional 2018 provision permitting a restricted decision by the two ministers drew criticism and was subsequently repealed.[18]

Other reviews and commentary criticized irregular meetings, insufficient staff support, and reliance on informal forums.[12][30] The Winograd Commission found that the absence of regular and frequent Security Cabinet discussions negatively affected the conduct and results of the war it examined.[12] Criticism of an informal “top seven” during the flotilla affair similarly centered on its lack of binding legal standing and the failure to convene the statutory committee.[31] The 2023–2024 War Cabinet arrangement raised additional questions about its relationship to the Security Cabinet and collective government responsibility.[12]