National Security Council (Israel)

The National Security Council, also called the National Security Staff, brings together policy planning, integrated assessments, and coordination for Israel’s political leadership.[1][2] Its statutory position is within the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem, and the prime minister directs and activates its work.[1] The head is appointed by the prime minister with government approval, is subordinate to the prime minister, and serves as national security adviser.[1]

The council’s mandate encompasses more than the preparation of advice on individual security questions: it includes annual and multiyear assessments, examination of security concepts and significant defense projects, budget-related staff work, and operation of the National Crisis Management Center.[1] For government and ministerial-committee deliberations, it is required to present examined alternatives, explain their differences and implications, and provide a reasoned recommendation.[1] Its coordinating role connects the prime minister and cabinet with ministries, the military, security organizations, and other relevant bodies.[1][2]

The institution’s development has involved successive efforts to establish a standing professional staff for national-security decision-making: formal establishment in 1999, a revised government resolution in 2007, and statutory regulation in 2008.[2] The 2025 National Security Strategy Law added a recurring strategy-development process linked to the formation of each new government, including consultation, government approval, parliamentary presentation, and publication of an unclassified summary.[3]

A separate effort to update Israel’s defense and security concept began in 1998, when Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai assigned David Ivry to lead a taskforce.[4] Its five subcommittees addressed deterrence, decisive victory and early warning; military-civilian relations; military policy and community relations; strategic issues; and technology.[4] The effort ended without an integrated concept when Mordechai left office.[4] Before the 2008 statute, clause 7 of the 2001 Government Law also provided for a team, established by the prime minister, to give ongoing professional advice on national security.[2]

On March 7, 1999, the cabinet unanimously approved the prime minister’s proposal to create the National Security Council within the Prime Minister’s Office as a coordinating, integrative, deliberative, and supervisory body on national policy.[5] Government Resolution 4889 established the council, and retired Major General David Ivry became its first head and national security adviser.[2][5] Its initial responsibilities included integrating assessments of expected trends, coordinating work among government bodies responsible for national security, preparing matters for cabinet consideration, and making policy recommendations.[5]

Long-range planning was part of the original remit, alongside monitoring national-security activity and implementation of government decisions.[5] The council was also assigned coordination with counterparts in selected countries, in cooperation with the Foreign Ministry, and could brief Knesset committees when directed by the prime minister.[5] At its establishment, the prime minister identified non-conventional weapons and ballistic-missile threats as an immediate priority.[5]

The council’s early work also extended to national resilience and Jerusalem.[6] Ehud Prawer was appointed deputy head in 2004 and coordinated those areas; in 2006, a unit under his authority moved from the council into a department within the Prime Minister’s Office, where he became head of policy planning.[6] A historical organizational description published in 2009 listed foreign-policy, security-policy, and strategic-issues divisions and a counterterrorism bureau, together with organizational, economic, legal, and senior-adviser functions.[2] Personnel worked with ministries, security organizations, the intelligence community, academics, and other experts.[2]

Government Resolution 2438 of October 14, 2007 replaced the original establishment resolution and defined the council’s designation, functions, and operating methods.[2] The Knesset enacted the governing law on July 29, 2008, giving the institution statutory functions and making the prime minister responsible for implementing the law.[7] The legislation formalized the designation National Security Staff, although National Security Council continued to be used for the body.[2][8]

Tzachi Hanegbi headed the council during Benjamin Netanyahu’s sixth government; a 2023 commentary identified him, alongside Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, as a close aide on Iran policy.[9] Hanegbi departed in October 2025, after which the institution remained without a permanent head until Netanyahu announced Shmuel Ben Ezra’s appointment on May 31, 2026.[10] Ben Ezra’s reported background included more than 30 years in national defense, leadership of development of the Arrow 3 interceptor project, and service as head of the Shin Bet’s technology, operations, and cyber division.[10]

The 2008 law assigns the council responsibility for coordinating staff work for the government and ministerial committees dealing with foreign and security affairs.[1] It prepares deliberations, presents policy alternatives and their implications, and tracks implementation of decisions, reporting to the prime minister.[1] Its preparatory responsibilities include proposing discussion topics and participants and conducting interorganizational and interministerial work on the prime minister’s behalf.[2] In examining significant security projects, it is to offer an overall perspective and, when relevant, alternatives ranked by reasoned priorities unless the prime minister directs otherwise.[1]

The information provisions are designed to support that work across institutional boundaries: foreign- and security-affairs information submitted to the prime minister must also be provided to the council’s head.[1] The head may request relevant documents and information from ministries, the Israel Defense Forces, security bodies under the prime minister, and the police, with disclosure disputes referred to the prime minister.[1] The head is also to be invited regularly to government and relevant ministerial-committee meetings and to meetings of the heads of the intelligence services.[1] Relevant bodies may be summoned to hearings, with attendance required unless the head determines that circumstances make it impossible.[2]

Annual and multiyear political-security assessments form another statutory responsibility, alongside related situational assessments and examination of significant diplomatic-security initiatives.[1][2] The council also prepares staff work on specified defense, foreign-affairs, and security-agency budgets, reviews Israel’s security concept, and proposes updates.[2] These duties combine preparation for immediate decisions with consideration of longer-term policy, resources, and strategic assumptions.[1][2]

The government’s description of the Division for Intelligence, Integration and Ministerial Committees assigns it preparation of integrated national situation reports for the council and political leadership.[11] It draws on intelligence-community information and coordination with foreign-affairs, security, and council policy and planning bodies.[11] Its listed responsibilities include operating the national situation room around the clock, organizing Security Cabinet and other ministerial-committee meetings, briefing ministers, and monitoring implementation of committee decisions.[11]

The Division for Strategic Defense Policy coordinates with the defense establishment on preparedness, force buildup, war plans, and economic-security matters.[12] Its work includes examining security concepts and operational plans, preparing material on defense budgets and multiyear plans, developing alternatives and recommendations, reviewing major defense projects, and conducting long-term strategic planning.[12] These published divisional responsibilities give practical expression to the council’s statutory duties in planning, assessment, and cabinet support.[1][12]

Cabinet preparation also includes the provision of professional background material to ministers.[13] In the arrangements described in 2016, the council prepared cabinet deliberations, net assessments, and operational alternatives, including intelligence analyses, with the prime minister’s approval.[13] It supplied daily briefs based on intelligence- and security-community summaries and submitted intelligence surveys.[13] Proposed study programs for ministers in 2013 and 2015 were only partially adopted or attracted limited participation.[13]

The National Crisis Management Center supplies another channel of support to the political leadership.[1] During the July 2010–June 2011 audit period, it had been established and was operating as a crisis-support center for the prime minister and government and as a routine situation room distributing information to the prime minister.[7] The same period saw increased council involvement in senior foreign- and security-policy decisions, coordination of some ministerial-committee discussions and diplomatic preparations, and examination of some defense projects.[7]

One early coordination assignment concerned preventing Palestinian infiltration through the seam zone.[14] In 2001, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered a steering committee under council head Uzi Dayan to coordinate and supervise a plan, which the council developed with the IDF and Israel Police.[14] The Security Cabinet approved it on July 18, 2001 and assigned the council coordination of planning and identification of matters requiring political-level decisions.[14] A subsequent April 14, 2002 decision called for a permanent obstacle in the seam zone and temporary obstacles east of Umm al-Fahm, around Tul Karm, and in Jerusalem.[14] The government approved the first sections on June 23, following a surge of attacks that claimed 131 Israeli lives in March 2002 alone.[14]

Economic-security work included developing a mechanism to review foreign investment with possible national-security implications. The council worked with security, economic, and government bodies on the issue, and an October 2019 cabinet decision created an advisory committee with council representation. The comptroller later warned that leaving consultation to regulators’ discretion could weaken the mechanism.[15]

The council has also been involved in reviews of security for foreign civil aviation to Israel.[16] In October 2026, Netanyahu instructed Ben Ezra to appoint an examiner for a comprehensive review.[16] Earlier recommendations had called for council-led work with the Transport and Finance ministries, Airports Authority, Shin Bet, and police, and discussions had taken place within the council before that instruction.[16]

Administrative changes in 2026 addressed intelligence access and the institution’s policy scope.[17][18] At Ben Ezra’s request, the Shin Bet chief approved advancing a requirement for polygraph examinations for all council positions; the report said some staff had been unable to access intelligence material because they lacked continuing security vetting.[17] Climate-related work was reduced, with much of the responsibility transferred to the National Emergency Management Authority.[18] The council had maintained a dedicated climate department under deputy head Itzik Bar; the climate-and-national-security forum’s work ended, while the emergency authority was to take on work concerning climate effects on infrastructure and continuity of essential functions.[18]

Reviewing Israel’s security concept is an explicit statutory function of the council, and successive initiatives have sought to formulate broader strategic guidance.[1][4] In 2004, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz appointed Dan Meridor to head a committee of more than 15 experts and security personnel drawn from the military, government, bureaucracy, academia, and other fields.[4] Meridor submitted a classified, 250-page report to senior government and security bodies in 2006, but it was not adopted or approved.[4]

The council prepared a draft concept during 2011–2015 and circulated it among security bodies.[19] The 2015 draft was led by retired Colonel Gur Layish, head of its defense-and-security-concept division, and addressed routine and emergency conditions, early warning, deterring terrorism, decisive victory, and prolonging calm while preparing for a clear victory if hostilities began.[4] It circulated within the defense bureaucracy but was not approved for publication.[4] Netanyahu presented a separate “National Security Concept 2030” to the cabinet in 2018, without its receiving approval or official status.[19]

The National Security Strategy Law, enacted on June 10, 2025, established a recurring process rather than leaving strategy formulation solely to individual initiatives.[3] Whenever a new government is formed, the council must prepare a proposed political-security strategy intended to advance Israel’s political and security interests and strengthen national resilience.[3][20] The proposal must identify its core assumptions about challenges and opportunities, describe and rank threats and challenges, set out possible responses and alternatives, and articulate objectives for safeguarding Israel’s existence, strength, and security.[20]

The required analysis includes annual and multiyear perspectives and consideration of domestic, regional, and cyber arenas.[20] Preparation requires consultation with the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and National Security, security bodies, and other relevant institutions.[3] The proposal must record alternatives offered by consulted bodies and explain why the council recommends its preferred alternative.[20] The process therefore requires both an integrated recommendation and documentation of options developed elsewhere in government.[20]

The government must approve the strategy within five months of its formation and may authorize the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs to approve it; amendments may be made during approval.[3][20] The approved document must be presented to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee within 14 days, with the prime minister or council head presenting it at a dedicated session.[20] The strategy itself is confidential, but a summary must be published in the official gazette and on the government website soon after the parliamentary presentation.[3][20]

The bill’s explanatory rationale presented a national strategy as a “compass” for defining objectives, guiding agency work plans, and coordinating activity.[20] It emphasized long-term vision, interagency coordination, flexibility in building and deploying forces, and periodic examination of decision-makers’ assumptions in responding to challenges to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the security of citizens and residents.[20]

The council’s statutory requirement to present alternatives places comparative policy analysis within the preparation of decisions at the highest political level.[1] Its responsibilities connect diplomatic and security assessments with budgets, major projects, long-term planning, crisis information, and implementation monitoring.[1] The 2025 strategy process adds an explicit timetable for aligning that work with the priorities of a newly formed government and for presenting the approved result to a parliamentary committee.[3]

The expectations attached to the 2008 legislation were substantial: MK Amira Dotan, one of its initiators, said the National Security Staff would improve foreign- and security-policy decision-making “beyond measure” and constitute “a considerable strategic change in Israel.”[2] The law supplied formal information-access rights and regular participation arrangements alongside the institution’s advisory and coordinating duties.[1] Its subsequent operation included greater involvement in senior decision-making and establishment of a functioning crisis-management center during the period reviewed in 2010–2011.[7]

The council’s relationship to intelligence coordination has also featured in proposals for institutional reform.[8] Former deputy national-security adviser Chuck Freilich characterizes it as a support staff for the prime minister and cabinet rather than a separate national intelligence-coordination agency.[8] He writes that it received new intelligence responsibilities after the 2006 war with Hezbollah and discusses proposals for clearer intelligence oversight, while questioning whether Israel’s smaller intelligence community needs another bureaucratic layer between agency heads and the prime minister.[8]

Freilich also describes the interagency forum known as Varash, bringing together the heads of Military Intelligence, Mossad, and Shin Bet.[8] In his account, its participants in recent years also included the council head and prime minister’s military secretary, and sometimes the prime minister; it met regularly but had not been institutionalized in statute when he wrote.[8] Other commentary has proposed integrating information and public relations into national-security strategy under council responsibility, illustrating proposals to apply its coordinating role beyond conventional defense planning.[21]

The principal disputes concern the gap between statutory responsibilities and practical influence.[2][7] A review of August 2005–April 2006 found limited involvement in major decisions, including the Lebanon withdrawal, disengagement, military multiyear planning, defense budgets, and major security projects.[2] The Winograd inquiry into the Second Lebanon War recommended stronger staff work, fuller Foreign Ministry involvement, and improved council functioning; a subsequent implementation team was led by retired Lieutenant General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak.[2] A later audit covering July 2010–June 2011 recorded progress but also incomplete information-sharing, discussions coordinated elsewhere, and unfulfilled budget and security-concept duties.[7]

Overlapping responsibilities have produced recurring friction.[14][22] The council withdrew from the seam-zone plan in August 2002 on the ground that it was not an operational body, prompting criticism of unclear project responsibility.[14] A 2011 regulation allowed work to be assigned outside the council, including to the military secretary; former council head Uzi Arad recalled conflicts and duplicate discussions.[22] Other audits identified Defense Ministry exclusion from 2013–2014 infrastructure-related staff work, delayed reporting on an uncompleted committee matter, and concerns about discretionary consultation under the foreign-investment review mechanism.[15]

A 2025 audit found no officially approved, binding national security concept and no evidence that the 2011–2015 draft had subsequently been updated or presented for political approval.[19] The Prime Minister’s Office responded that the council had fulfilled its review role and that the law did not expressly require submission for approval.[19] During the Gaza war, another audit criticized the crisis center’s predominantly political-security picture and missing civilian-ministry information; the council disputed an obligation to provide economic and social reporting.[23]

More recent disagreements concerned foreign-flight security responsibilities, the scope of climate work, and resource constraints surrounding universal polygraph examinations.[16][17][18] These findings and disputes concern particular periods and assignments rather than a single, unchanging account of the council’s performance.[7][19]