01In brief
Road Map for Peace is a three-phase diplomatic plan issued by the Quartet in 2003 to achieve a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Describing itself as “performance-based and goal-driven,” it combined reciprocal security, political, humanitarian, economic, and institution-building steps with a target of a comprehensive settlement by 2005. The Quartet—the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia—was to evaluate implementation and assist the parties in advancing toward an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state alongside Israel in peace and security. Israel accepted the plan with implementation reservations, and the UN Security Council endorsed it, but its scheduled progression to a permanent settlement was not achieved; the framework nevertheless remained part of subsequent diplomacy, including the 2007 Annapolis commitments.
02Overview
The Roadmap linked the prospect of Palestinian statehood to an end to terrorism and violence, the creation of functioning democratic institutions, reciprocal Israeli measures, and negotiations on a permanent peace agreement.[1] Its formal title was “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” and its provisions extended beyond negotiations to the practical security, administrative, economic, and humanitarian conditions envisaged for a settlement.[1] The intended outcome was an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living alongside Israel and its other neighbors in peace and security.[1]
The document organized the process into three phases: initial security and reform measures through May 2003, a transitional stage from June through December 2003, and permanent-status negotiations during 2004–2005.[1] These dates were targets rather than automatic triggers for advancement: progress depended on the parties’ performance and on the Quartet’s evaluation of conditions.[1] The plan explicitly allowed faster compliance to produce faster progress, while warning that noncompliance would impede movement toward its objectives.[4]
Reciprocity was a central organizing principle, expressed in the instruction that the parties should generally fulfill their obligations in parallel unless otherwise indicated.[4] Some provisions nevertheless contained specific performance-related connections, including progressive Israeli withdrawals as Palestinian security performance and cooperation advanced.[1] The Quartet was to assist implementation, facilitate direct discussions where necessary, and meet regularly at senior levels to assess compliance.[4] Thus, the framework combined an announced timetable with benchmarks and continuing international evaluation rather than treating the calendar alone as sufficient for implementation.[1]
03Origins and Diplomatic History
The Roadmap followed the Bush administration’s June 2002 initiative for reform of the Palestinian Authority, which had made reform a condition for renewing the political process.[5] The Quartet reached agreement on the Roadmap’s text in December 2002 and officially presented it to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003.[6] Its sponsors were the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia, acting collectively as the Quartet.[1] UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan transmitted the text to the Security Council in a letter dated May 7, 2003.[7]
The plan situated itself within an existing body of diplomatic principles and agreements rather than presenting a wholly separate basis for negotiations.[1] It referred to the Madrid Conference, the land-for-peace principle, UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, and agreements previously reached between the parties.[1] It also incorporated the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed at the 2002 Beirut Arab League Summit into its stated diplomatic foundations.[4] In the document’s formulation, a negotiated settlement would resolve the conflict and end the occupation that began in 1967.[1]
Although focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Roadmap placed that process within broader efforts toward peace on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks.[4] Its regional dimension also appeared in provisions for renewed Arab-state links with Israel during the transitional phase and full normal relations in the context of comprehensive peace at the final stage.[1] The projected Palestinian settlement and broader Arab-Israeli normalization were therefore both elements of the proposed diplomatic destination.[1]
On May 25, 2003, Israel’s government affirmed Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s announcement accepting the steps set out in the Roadmap, accompanied by implementation comments and reservations.[2] That decision followed a May 23 American statement promising to address Israel’s comments during implementation.[2] The Aqaba summit in Jordan in June 2003, involving President George W. Bush, Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas, and Sharon, served as the formal launch of the initiative.[8] On November 19, 2003, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1515, endorsing the Roadmap and calling on the parties to fulfill their obligations in cooperation with the Quartet.[6]
04Phase I: Security and Reciprocal Commitments
Phase I was titled “Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions” and was scheduled to run from the plan’s presentation through May 2003.[1] It called for an immediate and unconditional Palestinian cessation of violence, renewed Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, and political reform in preparation for statehood.[1] These requirements were accompanied by Israeli measures intended to normalize Palestinian life and by reciprocal leadership declarations against violence and incitement.[1]
Palestinian leaders were to affirm Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and call for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire.[4] Israeli leaders were to affirm their commitment to the two-state vision and a sovereign Palestinian state, while calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians.[4] Official institutions on both sides were to end incitement against the other.[4] These declarations were specified alongside operational obligations rather than offered as substitutes for security measures or institutional reform.[1]
The Palestinian security apparatus was to take sustained action to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting or planning attacks.[1] The plan specified dismantling terrorist capabilities and infrastructure, confiscating illegal weapons, and consolidating security authority.[4] Palestinian security organizations were to be reorganized into three services reporting to an empowered interior minister.[9] Security cooperation was to resume on the basis of the Tenet work plan, with rebuilding and training assistance involving the United States, Egypt, and Jordan.[4][10]
As security performance and cooperation advanced, Israel was to withdraw progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, with Palestinian forces redeploying into areas vacated by the Israel Defense Forces.[4] The document also called on Israel to avoid specified actions that it identified as undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians, punitive confiscation or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, and destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure.[10] The withdrawal provisions were therefore expressly connected to improving security performance, while other obligations were stated within the plan’s broader framework of parallel implementation.[1]
The security agenda extended beyond the two parties.[4] Arab states were to cut public and private funding and other support to groups engaging in violence and terrorism.[4] Quartet representatives were to begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties about establishing a formal monitoring mechanism.[9] Through these provisions, the first phase combined Palestinian action against terrorist organizations, renewed bilateral security cooperation, international assistance, and specified Israeli restraints and withdrawals.[1][4]
05Phase I: Institutions and Civilian Conditions
Palestinian constitutional and administrative reform formed a substantial part of Phase I, alongside its immediate security requirements.[1] The plan called for preparation of a draft constitution for public discussion based on parliamentary democracy and an empowered prime minister.[1] It also envisaged an interim prime minister or cabinet with effective executive authority, strengthened separation of powers, and performance against judicial, administrative, and economic reform benchmarks.[9] Statehood preparations thus included both the design of political institutions and changes in the operation of existing authority.[1]
An independent election commission was to be established, election law revised, and free, open, and fair elections held as early as possible following a free, multiparty process.[9] Israel was to facilitate Palestinian officials’ travel for legislative and cabinet sessions, electoral preparations, and reform activities.[9] The plan also called for the reopening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, subject to their operating in accordance with prior agreements.[4] Electoral preparations and institutional activity were therefore addressed through obligations assigned to both the Palestinian leadership and Israel.[4]
Humanitarian measures drew on the recommendations of the Bertini report.[1] They included lifting curfews, easing movement restrictions on people and goods, and ensuring safe and unfettered access for international and humanitarian personnel.[1] The Roadmap also provided for continued transfers of Palestinian revenues under an agreed monitoring arrangement.[9] Donor support was to continue, including assistance for civil-society and people-to-people programs, while donor budgetary support was to pass through a single treasury account.[4]
On settlements, Phase I called for the immediate dismantling of outposts erected since March 2001 and a freeze on all settlement activity.[1] The freeze expressly included the “natural growth” of settlements and was linked to the Mitchell report’s recommendations.[1] These requirements were distinct from the proposed later negotiations over settlements as a permanent-status issue.[1] Within the first phase, settlement measures appeared alongside security cooperation, humanitarian relief, political reform, and preparations for elections rather than being deferred entirely to the final negotiating stage.[1]
06Phase II: Transitional Statehood
Phase II, labeled “Transition” and scheduled for June–December 2003, centered on the possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty.[1] Such a state was envisaged as an intermediate step toward a permanent-status settlement, not as the final resolution of borders and other outstanding questions.[1] Movement into the phase depended on the Quartet’s consensus judgment that conditions were appropriate, taking account of both parties’ performance.[1] The phase was to begin after Palestinian elections.[1]
The transitional agenda required continued security cooperation, institution-building, and political reform.[1] It included approval of a democratic Palestinian constitution and formal establishment of the prime minister’s office.[4] The envisaged state was to be based on the new constitution, while the institutions and security arrangements developed in the first phase were to continue operating and improving.[1] The document therefore paired the possibility of provisional sovereignty with the continuation of the reform and security requirements that preceded it.[1]
A Quartet-convened international conference after successful Palestinian elections was intended to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch the process toward a state with provisional borders.[1] Creation of that state was to proceed through Israeli-Palestinian engagement, and Quartet members were to promote international recognition, including possible UN membership.[9] The conference and recognition provisions gave the transitional stage an international diplomatic dimension in addition to its bilateral and institutional components.[1][9]
The phase also called for renewed Arab-state links with Israel and revival of multilateral discussions on regional matters.[1] The listed subjects included water, refugees, and arms control.[1] These measures connected the proposed transition toward Palestinian statehood with wider regional contacts, while leaving permanent-status issues for the final negotiating phase.[1] Neither provisional statehood nor entry into the phase was presented as an automatic consequence of the arrival of June 2003; both depended on the process and performance conditions set out in the document.[1]
07Phase III: Permanent Settlement
Phase III covered 2004–2005 and aimed at a permanent-status agreement ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[1] Entry into this stage was to rest on a Quartet consensus judgment informed by the parties’ actions and monitoring of their performance.[7] Palestinian institutional reform and sustained security performance were to continue while the parties negotiated the final settlement.[1] A second international conference, proposed for the beginning of 2004, was intended to advance the permanent-status process.[1]
The negotiations were to address borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements.[1] The Roadmap envisaged an agreement in 2005 based on Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397, rather than leaving those core issues permanently unresolved under the provisional arrangements of Phase II.[1] Its refugee provision called for an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution.[7] The document set objectives and negotiating parameters on these subjects without itself supplying a completed final-status agreement.[1]
For Jerusalem, the proposed negotiated resolution was to take account of both sides’ political and religious concerns.[1] It was also to protect the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide.[1] This formulation placed the city’s political status and its religious significance within the same negotiating mandate, while assigning their resolution to an agreement between the parties.[1] The Jerusalem provisions belonged to the final stage rather than to the earlier creation of a possible state with provisional borders.[1]
The final phase also envisaged Arab states accepting full normal relations with Israel in the context of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.[1] The intended endpoint was consequently broader than a bilateral arrangement alone: a permanent Israeli-Palestinian agreement was linked to regional normalization and the wider peace efforts identified in the plan’s preamble.[1][4] The 2005 date remained the proposed deadline for that outcome, not evidence that the agreement or the associated normalization had been achieved.[1][11]
08Israel’s Acceptance and Implementation Reservations
Israel’s May 25, 2003 response attached 14 reservations to its acceptance of the Roadmap’s steps.[2] The government regarded its implementation comments as integral to the process and relied on an American commitment to address them during implementation.[2] Those reservations represented Israel’s stated positions and should be distinguished from the Quartet’s original text.[12] They addressed security requirements, progression between phases, monitoring, the powers of a provisional Palestinian state, and permanent-status questions.[12]
Israel emphasized that movement between phases should follow full implementation of the preceding phase and that the announced dates should function only as reference points.[12] It sought completion of Palestinian security measures against terrorist organizations before entry into Phase II.[12] It also called for American management of monitoring, rather than relying solely on the arrangements set out in the original Quartet document.[12] These positions placed particular weight on verifiable security performance and the conditions for moving from initial obligations toward provisional statehood.[12]
The reservations also set out Israeli positions concerning the demilitarization and powers of a provisional Palestinian state, refugees, final claims, and the UN resolutions to be referenced in a settlement.[12] The cabinet statement specifically said that resolving the refugee issue would not include refugees entering or settling in Israel.[2] These were implementation conditions and negotiating positions attached to Israel’s acceptance, not agreed additions to the Roadmap’s final-status provisions.[2][12]
The cabinet decision prompted sharply divided Israeli political reactions.[13] Labor and Meretz politicians welcomed approval while expressing skepticism about implementation, whereas religious and right-wing opponents denounced the decision.[13] Shas leader Eli Yishai declared, “The Israeli government founded a Palestinian state today,” expressing his opposition rather than describing an accomplished outcome.[13] Some Likud ministers abstained; Limor Livnat explained her uncertainty about whether the Palestinians would carry out all the plan’s requirements.[13] The reactions reflected disagreement over both the proposed diplomatic direction and the likelihood of compliance.[13]
09Implementation and Subsequent Diplomacy
In late June 2003, Mahmoud Abbas announced an agreement with major Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for a three-month hiatus in attacks against Israeli targets.[8] The arrangement, known as a hudna, was between the Palestinian Authority and those organizations rather than an agreement with Israel, and it did not require the groups to disarm.[8] Israel, meanwhile, agreed to withdrawals, removal of settlement outposts, and a freeze in new settlement activity as first-phase measures.[8]
For much of summer 2003, Phase I appeared to be moving forward, but disagreement persisted over compliance and the meaning of the ceasefire.[8] Israeli leaders objected that Abbas’s government had not directly confronted Hamas and Islamic Jihad.[8] Israeli forces also conducted arrests in towns in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — prompting Palestinian doubts about Israel’s commitment to the process.[8] The central operational disagreement concerned whether a temporary halt in attacks could satisfy the security agenda without dismantling the organizations’ armed capabilities.[8]
A suicide bombing on a Jerusalem bus that killed 21 people, many of them children, and was claimed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad further undermined the process.[8] Some Israeli leaders regarded the attack as evidence that the organizations’ infrastructure had to be dismantled for peace to advance.[8] Israel announced that it would pursue their leaders, and the groups declared the hudna over.[8] By the end of summer 2003, the Roadmap appeared blocked, and the proposed progression through its later phases did not occur on schedule.[8][11]
The framework nevertheless retained an international diplomatic role.[3] At the 2007 Annapolis conference, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization committed to implement their respective Roadmap obligations immediately and continue doing so until a peace treaty.[3] They agreed on an American-Palestinian-Israeli mechanism led by the United States, which was assigned responsibility for monitoring and judging both sides’ fulfillment.[3] Unless otherwise agreed, implementation of a future treaty was to be subject to Roadmap implementation as judged by the United States.[3]
Later assessments distinguished the framework’s continuing diplomatic use from its limited practical realization.[11][14] The plan was not enacted as a completed three-phase process, although it continued to serve as a working document.[14] An assessment dated June 2011 found that implementation had not progressed much by that point.[15] The Annapolis commitments therefore documented renewed obligations under the framework rather than completion of the original timetable or achievement of its proposed 2005 settlement.[3][11]
10Significance
Security, democratic reform, and provisional statehood were joined within a single internationally sponsored sequence in the Roadmap.[1] Its first phase required action against terrorist capabilities while also specifying changes to Palestinian governance, Israeli measures affecting civilian life, and restrictions on settlement activity.[1] The second phase offered the possibility of sovereignty with provisional borders, while the third reserved borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements for a permanent agreement.[1] This structure made the relationship between practical performance and diplomatic advancement central to the proposed process.[1]
Security Council Resolution 1515 gave the framework formal international endorsement and reaffirmed the vision of Israel and Palestine living side by side within secure and recognized borders.[6] The 2007 Annapolis commitments demonstrated its continued relevance after the original target dates had passed, while assigning the United States a specific monitoring and judgment role in that later undertaking.[3] The framework’s continuing use thus outlasted its initial calendar, even though the permanent settlement envisaged for 2005 was not achieved.[3][11]
A Jerusalem Institute analysis judged the Roadmap “less convenient for Israel” than the preceding reform initiative and suggested it could become an international diplomatic framework for resolving the conflict.[5] The same analysis interpreted Israel’s later unilateral withdrawal plan, involving settlements in Gaza and four in northern Samaria, as a departure from joint conflict management and an expression of despair about advancing political initiatives, especially the Bush plan and the Roadmap.[5]
Economic relations also attracted analytical attention.[16] A Globes commentary argued that the Roadmap conspicuously omitted the future economic relationship between Israel and a Palestinian state, notwithstanding its humanitarian and economic recovery provisions.[16] It advocated discussing economic cooperation at the outset of negotiations, rather than postponing it until after borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees, and argued for cooperation broader than a one-directional supply of labor.[16]
11Controversies
The sequencing of reciprocal obligations was a significant implementation dispute.[12][17] The original text generally expected parallel performance, while Israel’s reservations emphasized full completion of each phase before progression and stringent Palestinian security requirements.[4][12] A Ynet opinion article argued that Israel’s duties to dismantle outposts and freeze settlement activity were not conditional on prior Palestinian success against terrorism, contrasting that reading with the security-first position it attributed to Israeli officials.[17]
Responsibility for the failure to advance was likewise disputed. Israel’s reservations made progression conditional on full Palestinian performance, particularly the complete cessation of terrorism, violence, and incitement.[12] Accounts of the summer 2003 process also record Palestinian doubts arising from Israeli arrests and disagreement over whether the hudna satisfied the plan’s requirements.[8] These disputes concerned fulfillment and interpretation of the Roadmap, while the parties’ acceptance of a diplomatic framework did not itself constitute agreement on the final disposition of Jerusalem, refugees, borders, or settlements.[1][12]
Sources
- 1U.S. Department of State, A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 2Jewish Virtual Library, Israeli Cabinet Statement on Road Map and 14 Reservations, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 3U.S. Department of State, Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 4Jewish Virtual Library, The Middle East Road Map, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 5Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, The Israeli-Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000–2004, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 6Jewish Virtual Library, UN Security Council Resolution 1515 (November 2003), accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 7Internet Archive, UN Secretary-General, Letter of May 7, 2003, S/2003/529, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 8My Jewish Learning, Mideast Peace: A Road Map, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 9Institute for National Security Studies, Text of the Quartet Roadmap, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 10Globes, Roadmap text, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 11Ynetnews, Road Map for Peace, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 12Institute for National Security Studies, Israel’s Response to the Road Map, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 13Ynet, The left welcomes it, but the right is furious: “A Palestinian state has been founded”, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 14Anti-Defamation League, The Roadmap, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 15Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 16Globes, Put economy on the Map, accessed on November 5, 2026.
- 17Ynetnews, More than words needed, accessed on November 5, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What was the Road Map for Peace?
The Road Map for Peace was a three-phase diplomatic plan issued by the Quartet in 2003 to achieve a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It combined reciprocal security, political, humanitarian, economic, and institution-building measures, with a target of reaching a comprehensive settlement by 2005. The plan envisaged an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living alongside Israel in peace and security.
Who issued the Road Map for Peace, and when was it presented?
The Quartet—the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia—issued the Road Map for Peace. The Quartet officially presented it to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April 30, 2003, after agreeing on its text in December 2002.
What were the three phases of the Road Map for Peace?
The Road Map for Peace set out three phases: initial security and reform measures through May 2003, a transitional stage from June through December 2003, and permanent-status negotiations during 2004–2005. The dates were targets, not automatic triggers for progress; movement depended on the parties’ performance and the Quartet’s evaluation of conditions.
What did the Road Map for Peace call for in its first phase?
The first phase called for Palestinian action to stop violence, dismantle terrorist capabilities, and reform political and security institutions, alongside renewed Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. It also called for Israeli measures to normalize Palestinian life, including progressive withdrawals from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and a freeze on settlement activity, including “natural growth.” The phase included humanitarian steps, election preparations, and the immediate dismantling of outposts erected since March 2001.
What was proposed for the second phase of the Road Map for Peace?
The second phase proposed the possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty. It was to follow Palestinian elections and depend on the Quartet’s judgment that conditions were appropriate, taking both parties’ performance into account. A Quartet-convened international conference was intended to support Palestinian economic recovery and the process toward that state.
Did the Road Map for Peace achieve its proposed permanent settlement?
No. The Road Map for Peace did not progress through its scheduled phases to the proposed permanent settlement by 2005. The process appeared blocked by the end of summer 2003 amid disputes over security performance and reciprocal obligations, and a suicide bombing further undermined it. The framework remained part of subsequent diplomacy, including the 2007 Annapolis commitments.
What did Israel’s acceptance of the Road Map for Peace include?
On May 25, 2003, Israel affirmed its acceptance of the Road Map’s steps with 14 reservations concerning implementation. The reservations addressed security requirements, movement between phases, monitoring, the powers of a provisional Palestinian state, and permanent-status issues. Israel’s cabinet statement also said that resolving the refugee issue would not include refugees entering or settling in Israel.