01In brief
Palestinian right of armed resistance is a political and legal claim that Palestinians are entitled to use armed force in pursuit of liberation and self-determination, expressed in the programs of Palestinian organizations including the PLO and Hamas. The 1968 Palestinian National Charter called armed struggle an overall strategy, while Hamas’s 2017 policy document described armed resistance as the movement’s strategic choice. These organizational positions coexist with Palestinian commitments to diplomacy and peaceful resistance, and with international humanitarian law prohibiting attacks on civilians regardless of claims made in the name of resistance.
02Overview
Article 9 of the 1968 Palestinian National Charter declared: “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine,” describing it as an overall strategy rather than a tactical phase.[1] The Charter connected that strategy with liberation, return, self-determination, and sovereignty.[1] Its provisions expressed an organizational program rather than a single position shared by all Palestinians.[1][5]
Palestinian leaders and factions have subsequently advocated different combinations of armed action, negotiation, diplomacy, civil disobedience, and popular protest.[5] Mahmoud Abbas has supported negotiations and “legitimate peaceful resistance,” while Hamas leaders have insisted on retaining violence as an option; some Fatah Central Committee members have also supported preserving armed struggle as an option.[5] The PLO’s recognition of Israel and renunciation of terrorism form another important part of this political history.[5]
The relevant international texts address several distinct subjects: Palestinian national rights, struggles against foreign domination and occupation, and the rules governing the conduct of hostilities.[4][6][7] General Assembly Resolution 3236 affirmed Palestinian self-determination, independence, sovereignty, and return, while Resolution 37/43 included language concerning armed struggle in peoples’ struggles against colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation.[6][7] International humanitarian law separately binds Palestinian armed groups and prohibits attacks against Israeli civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and violence intended to spread terror among civilians.[4]
03Origins and History
Fatah’s armed campaign developed from the movement’s founding in 1959 and its first attack on Israel’s National Water Carrier on January 1, 1965.[8] Its early objective was a Palestinian state across the entirety of the Land of Israel, rejecting territorial compromise based on UN Security Council decisions.[8] Fatah commemorates the January 1965 attack as yom al-antalaka, or “breakout day.”[8] The 1968 Palestinian National Charter subsequently codified armed struggle as the overall strategy for liberation.[1]
Recognition of the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people at the 1974 Rabat summit contributed to a shift toward seeking statehood through political means alongside the earlier armed-struggle approach.[8] In 1988, Yasser Arafat declared an independent Palestinian state, and the PLO moved toward negotiations for a state based on the June 4, 1967 borders.[8] The declaration committed to the UN Charter and rejected threats or uses of force, violence, and intimidation against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, as well as terrorism in all forms.[9] It also accepted obligations under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Regulations.[9]
In December 1988, Arafat renounced violence, promised to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accepted the land-for-peace principle associated with Security Council Resolution 242.[5] During the Oslo process in 1993, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism.[5] These commitments marked a diplomatic direction distinct from the Charter’s original insistence that armed struggle was the only route to liberation.[1][5]
Hamas developed a different organizational approach.[5][10] It grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in December 1987, and published its charter in 1988.[10] Section 13 of that charter presented jihad as the only solution to the Palestinian question and rejected peaceful initiatives and conferences as contrary to the movement’s principles.[10] Hamas’s military wing was formed in 1992.[10]
At Fatah’s Sixth General Conference in 2009, senior officials combined support for peace and a two-state solution with retention of armed struggle as an option.[11] Nabil Sha’th described a range of methods encompassing popular action, political and diplomatic activity, negotiations, and armed struggle.[11] ‘Azzam Al-Ahmad said negotiations should be given a chance while hope for them remained.[11] At the same congress in Bethlehem, Abbas said Palestinians had chosen peace but maintained a right to launch armed resistance, which he characterized as legitimate under international law.[12]
Hamas leaders continued to emphasize armed action.[13][3] At the movement’s twenty-fifth-anniversary rally in Gaza City in December 2012, Politburo chief Khaled Mashaal called jihad and armed resistance the path to liberation.[13] Hamas’s 2017 “General Principles and Policies” document asserted that resisting occupation “with all means and methods” was a legitimate right and described armed resistance as its strategic choice.[3] Paragraph 26 rejected efforts to undermine resistance and its arms, stating that managing escalation or diversifying methods should not come at the expense of the principle of resistance.[3]
Abbas’s September 27, 2018 address to the General Assembly emphasized peaceful popular resistance as foremost among the means he considered legitimate.[14] He cited the Great March of Return in Gaza and protests elsewhere, and said Palestinians would not return to “violence and terror.”[14] Hamas, by contrast, asserted in January 2024 that resistance “with all means including the armed resistance” was legitimate under international law and related UN resolutions, invoking Resolution 3236 in support of its position.[15]
04Practice and Application
Palestinian armed groups operating inside or outside occupied territories are bound by international humanitarian law.[4] Only military objectives may be attacked; indiscriminate attacks, including bomb attacks against Israeli civilians, and acts intended to spread terror among civilians are prohibited.[4] Reprisals against civilians are also prohibited, and attacks on military objectives require feasible precautions to limit civilian harm.[4] These obligations apply independently of an organization’s political justification for resorting to force.[16]
The law governing hostilities does not depend on which side’s cause is considered just, and occupation law applies even where occupation meets no armed resistance.[16] Distinction between combatants and civilians is a central issue for guerrilla warfare.[16] The 1977 First Protocol requires combatants to distinguish themselves from civilians while attacking or preparing an attack, subject to its specified conditions.[16] Under customary international law, civilians may not be attacked and attacks must be directed solely against military objectives.[17]
Combatant status is a separate question from a claimed entitlement to resist.[17] Protected persons in occupied territory who are not members of armed forces do not acquire prisoner-of-war status simply by using force against occupying forces.[17] The First Protocol treats peoples fighting colonial domination and alien occupation in the exercise of self-determination as engaged in an international armed conflict rather than a civil war.[18] That classification concerns the legal framework of the conflict and does not remove civilian protections.[18]
The classification of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian armed organizations in Gaza has included debate over whether the conflict is international or non-international, and whether one or several conflicts exist.[19] Israel applies rules governing both types, including distinction, precautions, and proportionality.[19] Deliberately making civilians the object of attack is prohibited.[19] Legal analysis of the Gaza fighting likewise distinguishes claims about resistance from the rules on conducting hostilities, including the prohibition of deliberate attacks on civilians and protected objects and the problem of weapons incapable of being directed only at legitimate targets.[20]
Rocket and mortar attacks illustrate the practical importance of these distinctions.[21][22] In 2010, Diya al-Din al-Madhoun, a judge in the Hamas administration and head of its documentation committee, claimed that international law gave occupied peoples a right to resist and characterized Palestinian factions’ rocket and mortar attacks as legitimate.[21] He also acknowledged a requirement to avoid hitting civilians and civilian facilities.[21] Israel rejected that application of the claim, maintaining that rockets had been fired at cities and population centers without distinguishing military from civilian targets.[21]
The 2009 UN investigation led by Richard Goldstone found evidence that Palestinian armed groups committed war crimes, and possibly crimes against humanity, by firing rockets into southern Israel.[22] It concluded that launching rockets and mortars into civilian areas without an intended military target constituted a deliberate attack on civilians.[22] Figures reproduced from the investigation included approximately 8,000 rockets and mortars launched into southern Israel since 2001, three civilians in Israel and two in Gaza killed by rockets since June 18, 2008, and more than 1,000 civilians in Israel reportedly physically injured.[23]
Detailed findings issued on June 10, 2024 concluded on reasonable grounds that members of Hamas’s military wing and other Palestinian armed groups intentionally attacked civilians not participating in hostilities during attacks on and after October 7, 2023.[24] Those attacks constituted war crimes, and the armed groups failed to observe the principle of distinction.[24] These findings concern identified actors and conduct rather than a determination of every question concerning Palestinian self-determination.[24]
05Significance
Resolution 3236, adopted on November 22, 1974, reaffirmed Palestinian rights to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, and return.[6] It also recognized the Palestinian people’s right to regain its rights “by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” without expressly using the phrase “armed struggle.”[6] The General Assembly has reaffirmed the national rights identified in the resolution annually since 1974.[25]
Resolution 3246 (XXIX) reaffirmed the legitimacy of peoples’ struggle for liberation from alien subjugation “by all available means, including armed struggle.”[26] Resolution 37/43, dated December 3, 1982, similarly affirmed the legitimacy of struggles against colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation “by all available means, including armed struggle.”[7] It separately named Palestinians among peoples entitled to self-determination.[7]
Later General Assembly Resolution A/RES/78/192 reaffirmed Palestinian self-determination, including the right to an independent State of Palestine.[27] These texts establish the language used by the Assembly concerning national rights and liberation struggles; they do not specify permission for particular tactics or targets.[6][7] General Assembly resolutions are generally recommendations rather than binding law, although they can be influential and, in some circumstances, contribute to the development of customary international law.[28]
The distinction between political objectives and the conduct of hostilities is therefore central to applying these texts.[4][7] Recognition of self-determination does not displace rules protecting Israeli civilians, and organizational declarations favoring armed action do not relieve Palestinian armed groups of humanitarian-law obligations.[4][27]
06Controversies
The existence and scope of a general legal right of armed resistance remain disputed in the cited legal commentary.[29][30] Israeli legal officials Daniel Reisner and Alan Baker argue in a 2002 legal analysis that international law establishes no general right to resist occupation.[29] They also discuss a 1999 Organization of the Islamic Conference convention excluding certain liberation struggles from its definition of terrorist crime when conducted in accordance with international-law principles, and describe PLO commitments to peaceful resolution, combating terror, collecting illegal arms, and addressing incitement.[29] A Jerusalem Post opinion article separately argues that resistance claims should not be equated with a state’s Article 51 right of self-defense.[30]
UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese expressed a different legal view in December 2023, saying Palestinians deprived of self-determination had a right to resist in accordance with international law.[31] She nevertheless said that killing civilians and taking hostages on October 7 were crimes, not legitimate resistance, and that killing a soldier in armed conflict was not, by itself, an international crime.[31] A separate legal-policy analysis argues that invoking resistance creates no exception to Common Article 3’s prohibitions on murder, torture, hostage-taking, and humiliating or degrading treatment of people taking no active part in hostilities.[32]
Disagreement also concerns organizational documents.[5][33] A JCFA analysis of the Charter recounts the Palestine National Council’s 1996 vote to abrogate provisions conflicting with the PLO’s 1993 commitments and Arafat’s 1998 statement that Articles 6–10 and other provisions had been nullified, while noting later disagreement over the Charter’s status and the absence of a replacement text.[33] A separate analysis of Fatah’s congress distinguishes a Political Program favoring popular struggle from an Internal Order retaining stronger armed-revolution language.[34] These questions concern separate institutions and documents, not a single agreed Palestinian policy.[5][34]
The Goldstone investigation also generated political controversy: it reported alleged violations by Israel as well as Palestinian armed groups, while Israel refused to cooperate, citing alleged Human Rights Council bias.[22] Such disputes over investigations and political programs are distinct from the humanitarian-law prohibition on attacks against civilians.[4][22]
Sources
- 1Yale Law School Avalon Project, The Avalon Project : The Palestinian National Charter, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 2Counter Extremism Project, Hamas Document of General Principles & Policies, May 2017, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 3Jewish Virtual Library, Hamas: General Principles and Policies, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 4Library of Congress, ICRC, Statement Reproduced in the International Review of the Red Cross, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 5Congress.gov, Congressional Research Service, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 6Jewish Virtual Library, UN General Assembly Resolution 3236 (November 1974), accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 7Jewish Virtual Library, UN General Assembly Resolutions: Resolution 37/43, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 8Institute for National Security Studies, Game of Thrones: The Struggle between Fatah and Hamas for Political Hegemony in the Palestinian Authority, 2011-2022, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 9Institute for National Security Studies, PLO Legal Brief, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 10Ynet, Hamas, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 11MEMRI, Fatah: We Never Relinquished the Right to Armed Struggle, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 12Ynet, Abbas at Fatah congress: Jerusalem promised to us, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 13Ynet, Mashaal: Hamas won't recognize Israel, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 14Ynet, Mahmoud Abbas, September 2018 UN General Assembly Address, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 15Counter Extremism Project, Hamas statement, January 21, 2024, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 16Encyclopaedia Britannica, Law of War: Conducting Hostilities, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 17Encyclopaedia Britannica, Limits on the Methods and Means of War, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 18Encyclopaedia Britannica, International and Internal Conflicts, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 19Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2023 Legal Background, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 20Berman Jewish Policy Archive, International Law and the Fighting in Gaza, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 21Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Information Center, February 2010, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 22Ynet, UN probe: Evidence of war crimes in Gaza conflict, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 23Ynet, Listen to Goldstone, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 24United Nations Digital Library, UN Commission of Inquiry, Detailed Findings on Attacks on and after October 7, 2023, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 25Library of Congress, The Question of Palestine, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 26Congress.gov, U.S. Government Publishing Office, Congressional Hearing Transcript, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 27United Nations Digital Library, A/RES/78/192, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 28Encyclopaedia Britannica, Resolution, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 29Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Evolution of International Law and the War on Terrorism, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 30The Jerusalem Post, UN's bias against Israel is also incompetent - opinion, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 31Jewish News Syndicate, Not an international crime to kill soldiers, UN’s Francesca Albanese says of Oct. 7, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 32Foundation for Defense of Democracies, International Law Accepts No Excuses for Murder, Hostage-Taking, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 33Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, The Status of Settlements in International Law, accessed on October 31, 2026.
- 34Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, Will Fatah Give Up the Armed Struggle at Its Sixth General Congress?, accessed on October 31, 2026.
IsraelPedia Question & Answers
What is the Palestinian right of armed resistance?
The Palestinian right of armed resistance is a political and legal claim that Palestinians are entitled to use armed force in pursuit of liberation and self-determination. It has been expressed in the programs of organizations including the PLO and Hamas, although Palestinian leaders and factions have advocated different combinations of armed action, diplomacy, negotiation, and peaceful resistance. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on civilians regardless of claims made in the name of resistance.
What did the 1968 Palestinian National Charter say about armed struggle?
Article 9 of the 1968 Palestinian National Charter declared that “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine,” describing it as an overall strategy rather than a tactical phase. The Charter connected armed struggle with liberation, return, self-determination, and sovereignty. Its provisions expressed an organizational program, not a position shared by all Palestinians.
How did the PLO’s approach to armed struggle change?
The PLO moved toward seeking statehood through political means alongside the earlier armed-struggle approach. In 1988, the PLO moved toward negotiations for a state based on the June 4, 1967 borders, and Yasser Arafat renounced violence in December of that year. During the Oslo process in 1993, the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist and renounced terrorism.
What is Hamas’s position on armed resistance?
Hamas has maintained armed resistance as an option and described it as a strategic choice. Its 1988 charter presented jihad as the only solution to the Palestinian question and rejected peaceful initiatives and conferences. Hamas’s 2017 policy document said resisting occupation “with all means and methods” was a legitimate right and rejected efforts to undermine resistance and its arms.
What limits does international humanitarian law place on Palestinian armed groups?
International humanitarian law requires Palestinian armed groups to direct attacks only at military objectives and prohibits indiscriminate attacks, reprisals against civilians, and acts intended to spread terror among civilians. Groups must take feasible precautions to limit civilian harm. These obligations apply independently of an organization’s political justification for using force.
What have UN resolutions said about Palestinian self-determination and armed struggle?
General Assembly Resolution 3236 affirmed Palestinian rights to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty, and return. Resolutions 3246 (XXIX) and 37/43 affirmed the legitimacy of peoples’ struggles against alien subjugation, colonial and foreign domination, and foreign occupation “by all available means, including armed struggle.” These texts do not specify permission for particular tactics or targets, and General Assembly resolutions are generally recommendations rather than binding law.
Is there agreement that international law recognizes a general right to armed resistance?
The existence and scope of a general legal right to armed resistance remain disputed. Israeli legal officials Daniel Reisner and Alan Baker argue that international law establishes no general right to resist occupation, while UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese said in December 2023 that Palestinians deprived of self-determination had a right to resist in accordance with international law. Albanese also said that killing civilians and taking hostages on October 7 were crimes, not legitimate resistance.