Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PIJ combines Palestinian nationalism with Sunni Islamic fundamentalism and revolutionary ideas associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolution.[8] Its objective encompasses present-day Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — rather than a Palestinian state existing alongside Israel.[4] The movement rejects a two-state solution and treats armed jihad as the means of establishing Islamic rule throughout the territory it claims.[9][4] Its religious doctrine presents Palestine as consecrated to Islam and frames the conflict with Israel in religious as well as political terms.[4]

The organization’s armed wing is the al-Quds Brigades, also called Saraya al-Quds or the Jerusalem Brigades.[4] Its activities include rocket launches from Gaza and attacks in the West Bank, while its organizational presence also extends to Israeli prisons and communities abroad.[4] PIJ is smaller than Hamas and is described as Gaza’s second-largest terrorist group.[4] In 2024, its membership was estimated at approximately 1,000, and its area of operations encompassed Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.[7]

Unlike Hamas, PIJ has generally concentrated on armed activity rather than building an electoral movement or assuming responsibility for governing Gaza.[8][10] It rejects the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and did not participate in the authority’s elections in 1996, 2005, or 2006.[9] Nevertheless, it has joined Palestinian unity discussions and ceasefire negotiations, and it sometimes coordinates with the armed wings of Hamas, Fatah, and other organizations.[9] Its rejection of negotiations with Israel has not prevented participation in broader Palestinian ceasefires mediated by Egypt.[4]

Iran is PIJ’s principal external sponsor, providing financial assistance, military training, and support for its weapons capabilities.[4][7] Hezbollah has supplied safe harbor in Lebanon and has partnered with PIJ in joint operations.[7] These external relationships coexist with an operational base in Gaza and an infrastructure in the West Bank, particularly around Jenin.[11] The United States designated PIJ a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, and Israel also designates it a terrorist organization.[7][2]

PIJ’s formative student circles developed among Palestinians studying at Zagazig University in Egypt during the mid-1970s.[5] Fathi Shaqaqi, a physician from Rafah, and Abd al-Aziz Awda, a preacher from the Jabalia refugee camp, became central founding figures.[6] Bashir Musa was also among the Palestinian students involved in the organization’s early formation in Egypt.[1] The founders sought to combine radical Islam with Palestinian nationalism, distinguishing their project from the Palestine Liberation Organization’s secular nationalism.[5]

The movement emerged during a period when pan-Arab activism had lost appeal for many Palestinians following the 1967 war and Egypt’s 1979 peace agreement with Israel.[9] Shaqaqi had previously been a leftist before joining the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood after becoming disillusioned with secular Palestinian movements.[3] By the mid-1970s, he rejected the Brotherhood’s position that confrontation with Israel should await religious reform and political unification across the Muslim world.[3] Shaqaqi and Awda instead argued that the liberation of Palestine was central to Muslim renewal, rather than a task to be deferred until after that renewal.[6]

Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution supplied an influential model for Shaqaqi and his followers.[1][3] Shaqaqi believed dramatic attacks against Israel could inspire a broader popular revolt.[3] Following his expulsion from Egypt in 1981, the movement established itself formally in Gaza, where returning founders recruited through mosques, universities, and other religious institutions and built an infrastructure of cells.[3][5] The organization’s early ideological synthesis drew on the Muslim Brotherhood, militant Islamist currents in Egypt, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s teachings.[6]

After securing Iranian funding, PIJ developed its military apparatus, and its Jerusalem Brigades began attacking Israeli soldiers in the mid-1980s.[3] In October 1986, operatives threw hand grenades at military recruits attending an induction ceremony near the Western Wall’s Gate of Moors, wounding 70 people and killing a soldier’s father.[3] PIJ subsequently became a prominent organization during the First Intifada of 1987–1993.[5] Israel outlawed the organization in 1988 following attacks on Israeli civilians and Israel Defense Forces personnel.[2]

Shaqaqi served two years in an Israeli prison for smuggling arms into Gaza before being deported to Lebanon in 1988.[3] He established a headquarters in Damascus the following year.[3] During the 1990s, PIJ’s overseas presence was concentrated in Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon, where its operatives trained in Hezbollah camps under the supervision of Iranian Revolutionary Guards.[3] PIJ and Hezbollah also conducted some joint operations against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon during that decade.[3] Awda was expelled in 1988, and Shaqaqi reorganized the faction in Lebanon while maintaining close contacts with Hezbollah and an Iranian Revolutionary Guards unit.[6]

PIJ opposed the PLO’s recognition of Israel in 1988 and rejected the 1993 Oslo Accords.[2] After the accords, it used suicide bombings in an effort to derail attempts at a negotiated settlement.[5] Although PIJ and Hamas had initially been rivals, both joined the Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces after Oslo.[3] By 1995, they were coordinating activities at Iran’s behest.[3] Their rivalry continued after the Palestinian Authority’s establishment in 1994, even as cooperation in attacks against Israeli targets increased.[6]

In January 1995, PIJ claimed responsibility for twin suicide bombings at Beit Lid, followed by an attack at Kfar Darom in April and a Jerusalem suicide bombing in August.[3] At Beit Lid, two bombers targeted soldiers and emergency responders, killing more than 20 Israelis.[5][2] Shaqaqi was killed in Malta on October 26, 1995, and founding member Ramadan Abdullah Shalah succeeded him.[5] PIJ’s attacks declined sharply after Shaqaqi’s death, leaving a substantial organizational gap.[3] The organization nevertheless carried out a March 1996 bombing at Tel Aviv’s Dizengoff shopping mall that killed 13 people.[12]

PIJ escalated its attacks during the Second Intifada, which began in 2000, and cooperated with Hamas in attacks.[2] It also began recruiting and training women to carry out attacks.[2] Among its deadliest operations were the June 2002 Megiddo Junction bombing, which killed 17 people and wounded 50, and the October 2003 suicide bombing at Haifa’s Maxim restaurant, which killed more than 20 people and wounded 60.[12] Six of those killed at Maxim belonged to three generations of one family.[5] A cumulative account published in 2007 attributed approximately 422 bombings, shootings, and stabbings to PIJ, with 134 Israelis killed and about 880 wounded.[2]

In 2005, PIJ carried out five of the seven suicide bombings recorded in an Israeli government review of that year; the five attacks attributed to it killed 23 Israelis and wounded approximately 160.[13] Its Damascus-based leadership, supported by Iran and Syria, sought to undermine the lull in violence and the Sharm el-Sheikh agreement.[13] Following Israel’s 2005 disengagement from Gaza, the organization also launched rockets against civilian targets in southern Israel.[12] Its activity and membership increased after the Second Intifada, and it established a hub in Jenin alongside its original Gaza base.[9]

After Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, PIJ expanded its presence there.[11] In 2012, it became the first Palestinian terrorist group to launch a rocket toward Tel Aviv, following the start of an Israeli air assault on Gaza; Hamas subsequently launched its own rocket toward the city.[9] Relations between the two organizations continued to alternate between coordination and tension, including clashes when Hamas attempted to enforce ceasefires that PIJ was unwilling to observe.[9][4]

Shalah remained secretary-general from 1995 until 2018, when Ziyad al-Nakhalah was elected to succeed him.[4] The election was announced on September 28, 2018, following voting across the organization’s arenas on September 27 and 28.[14] PIJ spokesman Da’ud Shehab announced a turnout of 99.3 percent and named Muhammad al-Hindi as deputy secretary-general.[14] Al-Nakhalah had previously helped establish the organization’s military wing and had served as deputy secretary-general after Shaqaqi’s death.[15][14]

On November 12, 2019, Israel killed senior Gaza commander Baha Abu al-Ata, after which PIJ launched hundreds of rockets.[6] More than 400 rockets were fired toward Israel between November 12 and 15, and a ceasefire took effect on November 15.[6] Hamas stayed out of that round of fighting, as it later did during the August 2022 confrontation between Israel and PIJ.[8]

Israel launched Operation Breaking Dawn on August 5, 2022, describing its strikes as preemptive action against an anticipated PIJ attack following the arrest of commander Bassam al-Saadi in the West Bank.[16] PIJ responded with extensive rocket fire, launching approximately 1,100 rockets during 56 hours of fighting; at least 200 malfunctioned and exploded within Gaza.[6] Al-Nakhalah said Cairo would work to secure al-Saadi’s release.[16] An Egyptian-mediated truce took effect at 23:30 on August 7.[16]

After PIJ hunger striker Khader Adnan died in Israeli custody, the organization fired 100 rockets into Israel on May 2, 2023.[6] Israel began Operation Shield and Arrow on May 9, targeting PIJ leaders.[6] During the operation, 1,469 rockets were launched toward Israel, while PIJ members were also arrested in the West Bank during the period.[6]

PIJ members participated in the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack on Israel.[7] The wider assault killed approximately 1,200 Israelis and resulted in more than 240 people being taken hostage.[17] PIJ took dozens of Israelis hostage, and its personnel reportedly held some of those captured during the attacks.[9][8] In August 2024, the organization claimed that it had seized more than 30 hostages on October 7 and that seven remained in its hands at that time.[18] It also claimed operations along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon in the days following the assault.[8]

After October 7, the United States and United Kingdom sanctioned PIJ deputy secretary-general Akram al-Ajouri and other individuals and entities supporting or acting on behalf of Hamas or PIJ.[6] The sanctions announcement stated that Iran had trained PIJ fighters to produce and develop missiles in Gaza and had funded groups supporting PIJ-affiliated fighters financially.[6] Throughout 2024, PIJ engaged in significant fighting against the Israeli military.[7]

PIJ’s leadership council represents members in Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons, and abroad.[4] Its reported 15-member political council consists of nine members elected by ballot, two appointed by the secretary-general, and four approved by the council.[4] Elections are reportedly held every four years, and the September 2018 vote elected nine new council members in the organization’s first international elections since 1980.[4] Alongside the political bureau, the organization maintains its armed wing, the al-Quds Brigades.[14]

Orders pass from the leadership through regional staff commanders who coordinate cells.[4] In Gaza, a military council has served as a local decision-making body.[10] Tayseer Jabari, for example, was identified as a council member responsible for PIJ activity in Gaza City and northern Gaza during the 2021 war.[10] Its armed units operate rocket launchers and mortars, while cells and supporting infrastructure extend into the West Bank, particularly the Jenin area.[11] Much of its weaponry is locally produced, with Iranian training, expertise, and money supporting its capabilities.[10]

The movement’s senior leadership has frequently operated abroad, including in Beirut and Damascus, while maintaining contact with leaders in Gaza.[10] In 2022, al-Nakhalah was in Tehran and senior military commander Akram al-Ajouri resided in Damascus, where PIJ maintained its military headquarters.[11] The organization also had ties to pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon.[11] A May 2025 leadership account identified al-Nakhalah as secretary-general, Muhammad al-Hindi as his deputy, and al-Ajouri as commander of the military wing, with senior leaders based abroad.[19]

Al-Nakhalah was born in Gaza in 1953 and received a life sentence in Israel in 1971.[14] He was released after fourteen years in the Jibril prisoner deal, detained again in April 1988 for involvement in the First Intifada and in establishing PIJ, and subsequently exiled to Lebanon.[14] The United States added him to its list of terrorist operatives on January 23, 2014, citing his claimed responsibility for rocket fire in 2008, 2009, and 2011 and his close relations with Iran’s government.[14] In a video commemorating Shaqaqi’s killing, he declared, “We will continue to resist until we destroy Israel.”[14]

Armed struggle occupies the center of PIJ’s organizational activity, rather than public electoral competition or a mass network of welfare institutions.[4][6] Its political abstention includes the Palestinian Authority elections of 1996, 2005, and 2006.[9] It has nevertheless maintained a newspaper, al-Istiqlal, which the Palestinian Authority closed in Gaza while arresting some lower-level activists.[6] Its participation in unity dialogues and ceasefire discussions demonstrates that it conducts political engagement without accepting the authority’s electoral framework.[9]

PIJ’s doctrine calls for all of Palestine to come under Islamic rule and rejects territorial division through a two-state settlement.[9] Leadership statements in 2018 endorsed a Sunni interpretation of Islam while affirming Muslim unity and the validity of Shi‘i, Salafi, and Sufi movements.[9] Those statements also affirmed Christian symbols and sites in Palestine while denying Jewish ties to the region.[9] Its charter presents jihad against Jewish presence in Palestine as an immediate obligation, independent of whether an Islamic state has first been established.[2]

Iranian support has included funding, weapons, training, and technical assistance for arms workshops in Gaza.[4][11] Hezbollah supplied training facilities and logistical assistance, while earlier financial support also included aid from Saudi Arabia.[6] In a 1993 interview, Shaqaqi acknowledged Iranian financial backing and said the organization supplied money and arms to operatives in the Palestinian territories.[3] Shalah similarly emphasized the ideological connection during a 2002 visit to Tehran, calling PIJ “another fruit of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s fructuous tree.”[2]

Coordination with Hamas does not eliminate PIJ’s capacity for independent action.[4] Its rocket attacks have sometimes created friction with Hamas over ceasefires, and Hamas abstained from the November 2019 and August 2022 confrontations.[4][8] PIJ also coordinates at times with the armed wings of Fatah and other Palestinian organizations.[9] The resulting pattern combines operational alliances, competition, and separate decisions about escalation rather than a single unified command across the factions.[9][4]

PIJ’s suicide bombings and rocket attacks have made it a consequential threat to Israeli civilians and military personnel despite its smaller size relative to Hamas.[8][12] Its attacks since 2000 have included suicide bombings that killed scores of Israelis, while its Gaza forces have sometimes taken the lead in launching rockets into Israel.[8] The organization’s ability to sustain separate rounds of fighting, including those in November 2019 and August 2022, illustrates its operational importance beyond campaigns involving Hamas directly.[8]

The movement’s institutional position differs from that of a governing organization: it has not assumed Hamas’s responsibility for administering Gaza.[10] Its attacks have sometimes put pressure on Hamas to respond or compete, while ceasefire enforcement has generated clashes between the organizations.[9] The combination of a Gaza base, a Jenin hub, and leaders abroad gives PIJ a presence spanning local terrorist networks and external support relationships.[9][10] Its participation in the October 7 assault and subsequent hostage-holding also placed it within the central events of the ensuing war.[9][7]

PIJ is an enduring link between Palestinian terrorist organizations and Iran’s regional network.[6][7] Iranian funding and training, Hezbollah safe harbor, and historical cooperation in southern Lebanon have supported the organization beyond its immediate Palestinian operational areas.[3][7] Its ideological affinity with Iran developed from the founders’ enthusiasm for the 1979 revolution, while its doctrine retained a Sunni identity.[9][1]

International counterterrorism measures have targeted both the organization and individual leaders.[7][14] In addition to its October 8, 1997 Foreign Terrorist Organization designation, PIJ has been designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist since 2001.[20] A 2007 account recorded terrorist listings by the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Australia, and Israel, reflecting the listings reported at that time.[2] Subsequent sanctions after October 7 targeted al-Ajouri and support networks connected to the organization’s financing and weapons development.[6]

Responsibility for the October 17, 2023 explosion at al-Ahli hospital in Gaza became a significant political dispute.[17] Western governments assessed that a failed PIJ rocket caused the explosion, while Hamas blamed Israel.[17] These were competing responsibility assessments rather than a finding accepted by all parties.[4][17] Responsibility for Palestinian deaths during the August 2022 fighting was likewise disputed: Israel said some deaths resulted from Palestinian rockets falling short, whereas Hamas attributed all Palestinian deaths to Israeli strikes.[16] Gaza officials reported 44 Palestinian deaths in that round, nearly half civilians and including children, and President Joe Biden called for investigation of civilian casualties and their causes.[16]

Descriptions of PIJ’s civilian role and organizational scale vary by date and definition.[9][8] Although it generally lacked Hamas’s broad welfare network, its social-service activity became more visible in Gaza during the 2010s, and a 2014 account described a small wing including schools, hospitals, and family mediation.[9][21] Membership estimates also vary: the 2024 estimate of about 1,000 contrasts with an earlier range of 1,000 to several thousand and a 2022 estimate of 20,000 activists.[7][11] These figures should not be treated as directly interchangeable measures of armed strength.[7][11]

The extent of Iranian direction, as distinct from substantial financial and military support, is also a matter of interpretation.[10][11] Reported annual budget estimates of $100 million and Iranian aid of approximately $70 million were estimates linked to intelligence reporting rather than independently verified totals.[11] Similarly, PIJ’s claims about the number of hostages it seized or continued to hold represent organizational statements, not independently established counts in those reports.[18]