May 2023 Gaza–Israel Clashes

Khader Adnan’s death in Israeli custody after an 86-day hunger strike preceded the exchange of fire that led to Operation Shield and Arrow.[6][7] On May 2–3, PIJ launched a barrage from Gaza toward Israel, with some Hamas participation in that earlier round.[6] A contemporaneous accounting put the barrage at 104 rockets: 11 fell into the sea, 14 inside Gaza, 24 were intercepted, 48 landed in open areas, and the locations of seven were unclear.[6] Five Israelis were wounded in the attacks.[7]

Israel responded to the earlier barrage with approximately 16 airstrikes, mostly against Hamas positions and weapons-related facilities.[6] The larger operation began about a week later, on May 9, with strikes directed against PIJ’s senior military leadership.[1] Israel sought to limit this new confrontation to PIJ rather than fight Hamas, the terrorist organization governing Gaza.[4] It used Egypt as an intermediary to warn Hamas that its leaders and assets could become targets if the organization launched rockets.[3]

Shield and Arrow followed the pattern of Operation Black Belt in 2019 and Operation Breaking Dawn in 2022: Israel concentrated on PIJ, opened with targeted killings of commanders, and sought a short campaign without a direct confrontation with Hamas.[4] The operation therefore combined attacks on PIJ’s leadership with efforts to prevent a wider conflict involving Gaza’s other principal terrorist organization.[4][3]

The commanders selected for the opening strikes held responsibilities extending beyond local battlefield command.[8][3] Khalil Bahtini commanded PIJ in northern Gaza and had been responsible for recent rocket attacks; Jihad Ghanam was a senior military-council official with responsibilities involving weapons and money transfers between PIJ and Hamas.[8][3] Tariq Izzeldin directed PIJ activities from Gaza in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and coordinated links between the organization’s cadres in the two territories.[8][3]

A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs analysis presents Izzeldin’s killing as part of Israel’s efforts to disrupt PIJ’s military activity in northern Samaria.[9] Its account identifies him as a 49-year-old from Arraba who was arrested in 2002, sentenced to life imprisonment for directing a suicide attack in Hadera, and released and deported to Gaza in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange.[9] It also relays Israel Security Agency chief Ronen Bar’s May 9 statement that authorities had thwarted a Jenin-area squad producing rockets and a launcher, and that Izzeldin had been its handler.[9]

Israeli forces opened Operation Shield and Arrow shortly after 2 a.m. on May 9 with coordinated strikes that killed Bahtini, Ghanam, and Izzeldin.[8][3] The simultaneous strikes hit two locations in Gaza City and one in Rafah, and about 40 aircraft participated in the opening attack.[8][3] The operation was conducted jointly with the Shin Bet. PIJ confirmed the commanders’ deaths, and its military wing vowed to continue its response.[8]

Preparation for the attack emphasized secrecy and simultaneous action against all three commanders.[8][10] The Israeli cabinet had not convened before the operation, and ministers had not approved the resumption of targeted killings beforehand; the United States was informed before the operation began.[8] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said advance compartmentalization enabled the surprise attack.[8] The military later said it had tracked the commanders around the clock and delayed the strikes at least twice because of operational conditions, weather, family members near one target, and the aim of striking all three simultaneously during ordinary weekday routines.[10]

The opening attacks also killed civilians, including relatives of the targeted commanders and residents of nearby homes.[3][11] Those killed included Bahtini’s five-year-old daughter Hajar, members of Izzeldin’s family, and members of the Hatzoan family, including doctor Jamal Hatzoan, his wife Mereva, and their son Yusef.[11] Sisters Dania Ata and Iman Ala Adas were also among the reported civilian dead.[11] The military later stated that it had known noncombatants were near the commanders and had assessed that they might be harmed.[10]

Beyond the commanders’ residences, the initial operation struck weapons-production facilities, including rocket workshops in Khan Yunis and a site the military identified as producing concrete components for tunnels.[8] The military also reported attacks on six PIJ military compounds, mostly weapons-storage or logistical facilities, and a military post in southern Gaza.[8] During the following days, the IDF reported strikes against mortar and rocket positions, rocket-manufacturing locations, command centers, and other PIJ infrastructure.[12]

Israeli authorities anticipated retaliation lasting several days and imposed special civil-defense instructions in communities within approximately 40 kilometers of Gaza.[8] The restrictions covered gatherings and school activities, while Defense Minister Yoav Gallant authorized reserve call-ups as needed.[8]

Restrictions also affected transportation and border access.[8] Roads near Gaza closed, train service between Ashkelon and Sderot was suspended, and the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings closed to the movement of people and goods in both directions.[8] Thousands of Sderot residents were evacuated at the operation’s start, with many accommodated in hotels near the Dead Sea.[3] Rocket alerts and attacks ultimately sent approximately 1.5 million people in Israel to shelters.[2]

PIJ and allied terrorist groups subsequently launched repeated rocket and mortar barrages toward Israel.[13] A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs account places the retaliatory barrages about 36 hours after the opening killings and interprets the delay and subsequent attrition strategy as decisions of Gaza’s joint military command room.[13] The account describes a command structure, in its current form since 2018, incorporating the military wings of 12 Palestinian factions, and relays Hamas officials’ claim that Hamas had a representative there despite not directly joining the fighting.[13]

On May 10, rockets hit residential buildings in Sderot and Ashkelon without reported injuries at those sites.[3] A rocket struck an apartment building in Rehovot on May 11, killing 80-year-old Inga Avramyan and injuring other residents.[3] The strike caused extensive damage to the building. Longer-range launches also reached central Israel and the Beit Shemesh area, prompting interceptions by David’s Sling.[10][5]

Israel continued targeting PIJ’s senior leadership as the rocket fire persisted.[3] Ali Ghassan Ghali and Ahmad Abu Deka were killed on May 11, followed by Iyad al-Hassani on May 12.[3] Together with the three men killed at the outset, their deaths brought the number of senior PIJ figures killed during the operation to six.[3] The military’s post-operation account also listed 15 lower-ranking PIJ members killed.[12]

The air campaign included attacks intended to reduce both immediate firing capacity and the ability to manufacture or prepare additional weapons.[12] The military reported striking 63 mortar-related targets and estimated that these attacks reduced PIJ’s mortar-fire capability by half.[12] It also reported destroying 122 concealed rocket positions, which it estimated prevented another 800 rockets from being fired, and attacking 12 rocket-manufacturing locations and 19 command centers.[12] Its operational account listed 120 combat aircraft, 14 combat helicopters, 115 drone strikes, and ten land-force strikes.[12]

A later military account described the operation as lasting 116 hours and involving approximately 4,000 flight hours by remotely piloted aircraft and about 400 bombs dropped by the air force.[10] Israeli aircraft carried out repeated attacks rather than a ground campaign through Gaza; the military’s principal published summary recorded 422 strikes against 278 distinct targets.[12]

Israeli missile-defense systems intercepted rockets assessed as threatening populated areas.[3] One accounting recorded 437 Iron Dome interceptions and two interceptions of long-range rockets by David’s Sling.[3] The military reported an interception rate of approximately 95 percent for rockets that threatened Israelis, rather than for every projectile launched.[12] A separate operational account put Iron Dome’s success rate at 95.6 percent and recorded a David’s Sling interception against a threat toward the Beit Shemesh area.[10]

Israeli operations in Judea and Samaria continued alongside the Gaza fighting.[7] One account recorded the arrest of 35 terrorists during those operations, while another identified 25 PIJ members arrested in the West Bank.[7][3] The Gaza campaign thus coincided with continuing action against terrorist networks elsewhere rather than suspending those operations.[7]

On May 13, a rocket killed a Palestinian worker from Gaza near Shokeda in the western Negev and critically wounded his brother.[7][5] The attack brought the number of people killed by rocket fire inside Israel during the operation to two: the Rehovot resident and the worker from Gaza.[1][3]

Egypt pursued a ceasefire during the fighting, while Egypt, Qatar, the United Nations, and the United States participated in mediation efforts.[3] PIJ’s demands included an end to Israeli targeted killings and attacks in Gaza, cancellation of the Jerusalem Day Flag March, and the return of Adnan’s body; Israel rejected those conditions before the ceasefire took effect.[3]

On May 13, an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire was announced for 10 p.m. local time.[5] National Security Council head Tzachi Hanegbi thanked Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and stated that Israel would respond to quiet with quiet while retaining the right to act if attacked or threatened.[5]

The announced ceasefire did not immediately stop the exchanges.[5] Two launches were detected at 11:11 p.m.; Iron Dome intercepted one rocket, while the other landed in an open area.[5] Israeli forces struck PIJ targets shortly before midnight in response.[5]

The fighting killed two civilians inside Israel: Inga Avramyan in Rehovot and a Palestinian laborer from Gaza working near Shokeda.[3] An end-of-operation medical accounting recorded 77 people treated by Magen David Adom: 32 for physical injuries and 45 for anxiety.[5]

Palestinian fatalities included the six senior PIJ figures, other members of terrorist organizations, and civilians killed during the airstrikes or by rockets falling inside Gaza.[3][12] A humanitarian accounting recorded at least 34 Palestinians killed, including at least 12 civilians and six children, and 190 injured, including 64 children.[1] The opening attacks caused civilian losses within the commanders’ families and surrounding residential buildings.[11]

Damage in Gaza included 20 destroyed buildings and 940 damaged housing units, of which 49 were considered unfit for habitation.[14] An initial estimate placed overall damage at approximately $50 million.[14] In Israel, rocket strikes damaged homes, including the apartment building in Rehovot where Avramyan was killed and residential buildings in Sderot and Ashkelon.[3]

After the ceasefire, Home Front Command narrowed the restrictions, with schools remaining closed the next morning only in communities immediately adjoining Gaza.[5] During the fighting, restrictions had affected schools, gatherings, workplaces, transportation, and access to protected spaces.[8] Border-road closures and the suspension of rail service between Ashkelon and Sderot added to the disruption of ordinary movement around Gaza.[8]

A rocket alert sounded near Ashkelon the day after the ceasefire when another rocket was launched from Gaza.[15] The projectile landed in an open area without causing casualties or damage, and Israel subsequently struck northern Gaza.[15] A representative of Gaza’s joint operations room characterized the launch as the result of a technical fault and said the factions remained committed to the ceasefire.[15]

Hamas did not directly join the five-day fighting.[4] Israel’s campaign remained focused on PIJ, whose senior command and rocket infrastructure had been repeatedly attacked.[4][12] The ceasefire ended the main exchange without resolving the broader question of whether the operation’s military effects would produce a durable period without rocket attacks.[16]

Assessments of Shield and Arrow distinguished the immediate damage to PIJ from the longer-term prospects for deterrence.[4][16] A May 12 analysis judged the campaign a tactical success against PIJ but questioned whether it would bring lasting quiet, noting that earlier Israeli military dominance had not prevented renewed rocket fire.[16] It also treated keeping Hamas out of the fighting as a strategic gain because that avoided a wider conflict.[16]

A separate assessment situated the operation alongside the 2019 and 2022 rounds as a deterrence campaign without a political purpose, arguing that the effects of the earlier operations had been brief.[4] In this interpretation, Hamas benefited politically by supporting PIJ without bearing the costs of direct participation and remained able to influence the conflict’s rules and duration.[4] The assessment links PIJ’s acceptance of the Egyptian ceasefire formulation to the realization that Hamas would not join and identifies indications that Hamas encouraged an end to the fighting.[4]

The phrase “Quiet will be met with quiet” expressed Israel’s stated approach to ending the confrontation and responding to any renewed attacks.[5] PIJ secretary general Ziyad al-Nakhalah offered a different summation: “We suffered what we suffered so that our stance would remain unified, powerful, and stable.”[4] These statements emphasized different measures of the operation’s outcome: cessation of attacks in Israel’s formulation, and organizational cohesion in PIJ’s.[4][5]

Regional interpretations also considered the roles of Iran and the mediators.[17] A Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs analysis connects the fighting to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s May 2–3 visit to Syria, where he met PIJ leader Ziyad Nakhalah and senior Hamas member Khalil al-Hayya.[17] The author argues that Iran expected other groups, especially Hamas, to join PIJ’s missile attacks, and asserts that Iran pressured PIJ’s external leadership to continue fighting before Nakhalah accepted Egyptian mediation.[17] The same analysis notes that Hizbullah did not join the round.[17]

Published operational and casualty accounts do not constitute a single reconciled ledger.[1][12] A post-operation military accounting recorded 1,478 rockets and mortar shells, while the State Department, citing IDF data, listed 1,468 launches, with 1,139 crossing into Israel, 290 falling in Gaza, and 39 landing in the sea.[1][12] A Jewish Virtual Library summary listed 1,469 launches and 290 falling in Gaza.[3] An interim May 13 tally of 1,234 launches described an earlier reporting point rather than a final total.[5]

Reported target totals likewise reflected different operational accounts. One recorded 422 strikes against 278 distinct targets, while another reported approximately 289 targets.[10][12] The Jewish Virtual Library account gave 700 targets.[3] Palestinian casualty reports ranged from 33 deaths to at least 34, with differences in civilian classifications and wounded totals.[1][3] Responsibility for some Palestinian deaths also remained disputed: Israeli military accounts attributed three deaths to rockets falling inside Gaza, while BESA attributed four civilian deaths to malfunctioning PIJ rockets.[7][12]

Descriptions of the ceasefire’s terms also diverged.[5] Ynet reported an Al Jazeera description that both sides would refrain from attacks on civilians, destroying homes, and harming people, while PIJ representatives interpreted the text as an Israeli commitment to stop targeted killings.[5] Israel instead publicly emphasized its willingness to stop if attacks ceased and its continued right to act against attacks or threats.[5] These differing formulations accompanied an agreement that stopped the principal fighting but was followed by further launches and Israeli responses.[5][15]