Operation Pleshet

Egyptian forces crossed the Israel–Egypt border in the early hours of May 15, 1948, with one column advancing north along the coastal road and another southeast toward Beersheba.[3] Their entry formed part of the invasion by five Arab armies on the day after Israel declared statehood.[4] The Egyptian campaign included an advance along the coastal plain threatening Tel Aviv from the south and a movement toward Jerusalem from the southwest.[5]

The Egyptian invasion force numbered roughly 10,000 soldiers and included hundreds of vehicles, artillery, and aircraft, with its heavier coastal thrust moving from Gaza northward.[6] Givati and Negev Brigade forces were assigned to disrupt the invasion by taking villages near the routes from Egypt, creating pockets of resistance, delaying the advance, and demolishing the bridge north of Isdud.[6] Givati, commanded by Shimon Avidan, blew up the Jisr Isdud bridge near Ashdod on May 12 in preparation for the invasion.[7]

The five-day battle at Yad Mordechai gave Israeli forces time to build a defensive line north of Ashdod before the Egyptians captured Yad Mordechai on May 24.[3] An Egyptian infantry brigade equipped with armored cars and field guns subsequently reached the demolished bridge over the Lakhish River and stopped there.[8] Egyptian engineers began assembling a replacement bridge.[6]

The bridge and Isdud became the focus of Israeli efforts to prevent a renewed northward advance.[1] The Egyptian column approaching the bridge comprised approximately 500 vehicles and was moving along the coastal road toward Tel Aviv.[9] By early June, Israeli defenses south of Tel Aviv had strengthened sufficiently to occupy Yibna and surround and check the Egyptian column based at Isdud, about 35 kilometers south of Tel Aviv.[4]

On May 29, four newly assembled Israeli fighter aircraft attacked the Egyptian column near Isdud in the Israeli Air Force’s first fighter mission.[9] The aircraft were Avia S-199s flown by Lou Lenart, Modi Alon, Eddie Cohen, and Ezer Weizman.[10] They had been shipped to Israel in parts aboard cargo aircraft owned by Al Schwimmer, in violation of a United States arms embargo, and were hastily assembled before being sent into combat.[11]

Each aircraft carried two 70-kilogram bombs, but the planes’ guns jammed quickly and the attack inflicted little material damage.[9] The pilots made repeated passes, bombing central Isdud and strafing Egyptian troops.[1] Despite its limited destructive effect, the raid had a strong psychological impact on Egyptian soldiers, who scattered for cover.[1][9] An intercepted Egyptian radio message reported: “We have been heavily attacked by enemy aircraft, we are dispersing.”[1]

Eddie Cohen was killed when his aircraft crashed and burned during the mission.[9] The sortie cost the squadron one-fourth of its aircraft and one-fifth of its pilots.[9] Givati forces, outnumbered by the Egyptian column, used the pause following the air attack to counterattack.[9]

Preparations for a larger ground assault followed.[1] On June 1, about 1,000 Givati soldiers assembled to block the Egyptian advance toward Isdud.[2] Uri Avnery recalled the mood among the fighters: “Our mood was not high, but it was certainly not depressed.”[2] Fearing that the Egyptians would resume their advance toward Tel Aviv, Israeli General Headquarters ordered the Givati and Negev Brigades to attack and “destroy” the Egyptian vanguard.[1]

Approximately 2,000 Israeli troops faced about 2,500 entrenched Egyptians belonging to the First, Second, and Ninth battalions.[1] The Israeli troops were dispersed among several objectives, increasing their numerical disadvantage at individual points of attack.[1] The ground operation targeted both Isdud and the Isdud, or Suqreir, Bridge.[1]

The attacks took place on June 2–3, with support from a 65 mm artillery battery and two 120 mm mortars.[1] Israeli troops briefly captured houses on the outskirts of Isdud but were driven back, while attacks on other positions were also repulsed.[1] The Egyptians retained their positions, and many Israeli troops were hit during the retreat.[1] Givati and Negev Brigade forces withdrew under Egyptian fire near Wadi Sukrir, in the area of the present-day Ad Halom Bridge.[12]

The operation did not achieve its objective of destroying the Egyptian force.[1] Israeli losses in the ground attacks amounted to approximately 50 killed or missing and another 50 wounded; Egyptian losses are unknown.[1]

The Egyptians held their positions at Isdud after repelling the Israeli ground attacks, but did not resume their northward advance.[1] Their command feared that forces north of Majdal were overstretched and vulnerable to being cut off, a concern reinforced by a Givati ambush of a supply column from Majdal.[1] Egyptian operations subsequently concentrated on severing the Negev from the rest of Israel rather than continuing toward Yavneh.[1]

The Egyptian column did not advance north of Isdud’s suburbs.[4] Egyptian forces nevertheless cut off the Negev settlements from the north, requiring supplies to be delivered by airlift.[4] Fighting continued against isolated settlements, including Nitzanim, which Egyptian forces captured on June 7 after a difficult battle ending in the defenders’ surrender.[2]

The retreat from Isdud left both immediate casualties and a prolonged task of locating and burying the dead.[12] Leon, or Nello, Solomonovitch, a Romanian-born company medic, had been called to join troops he did not previously know.[12] A Palmach staff document dated July 15 recorded that he had fallen in the Ashdod operations on June 3 while serving as a company medic and had been killed during the retreat.[12]

One account of the withdrawal records 15 soldiers killed by Egyptian fire, while a contemporary Palmach casualty report listed 14 dead; an IDF explanation associated the additional death with a wounded soldier who probably died in hospital.[12] Five soldiers found the day after the battle were buried at Nitzanim and later transferred to a mass grave at Nahalat Yitzhak.[12] Nine more bodies were reported found during a search in November 1949.[12]

A separate memorial account records the death of an Israeli soldier at Ashdod on June 3 after his platoon was ordered to cover a retreat.[13] He remained behind with a few others, was wounded in the leg, and was found dead the following day beside another wounded man.[13]

Egyptian forces remained in the Ashdod area until late October 1948, when Operation Yoav drove them southward.[8][14] That operation brought Ashdod and Ashkelon under Israeli control.[14] Isdud, the Palestinian village on whose site modern Ashdod was built, was demolished during the war; Operation Yoav drove out the Egyptian forces and the remaining Palestinian villagers.[15]

The fighting at Isdud combined a failed Israeli ground assault with the enduring halt of the Egyptian coastal advance.[1] Its place in the defense of Tel Aviv is reflected in the name subsequently given to the demolished bridge: Gesher Ad Halom, translated as “Until Here.”[9] Givati deputy commander Meir Davidson expressed the stakes in stark terms: “All of Givati knew that the Egyptians must not be allowed to reach Tel Aviv. Without Jerusalem there would be a state, but without Tel Aviv—there would be no state.”[7]

The operation’s boundaries and strategic effect receive differing treatment in historical accounts: some include the May 29 airstrike within Operation Pleshet, while others distinguish it from the June 2–3 ground offensive.[1][10] The Egyptian advance had already halted before the ground assault, although the attack heightened concern about the Egyptian force’s exposed position and influenced its subsequent plans.[1] Other explanations give greater weight to Egyptian operational orders, including a proposed advance toward Yavne intended to divert Israeli forces from Jerusalem, rather than treating the airstrike alone as decisive.[6] Casualty figures also cover different categories or actions: the estimate of about 50 killed or missing and 50 wounded cannot simply be combined with a separate report of 54 deaths near the bridge or the figures for a particular withdrawal.[1][8]

The surrender at nearby Nitzanim also left a painful legacy within the southern campaign.[2] Givati culture officer Abba Kovner initially accused the defenders of cowardice and unjustified surrender, but later sought to apologize for his hasty judgment.[2] The defenders refused to forgive him or hear his apology.[2]