Operation Uvda

The southern Negev had been allocated to the proposed Jewish state under the United Nations Partition Plan of November 1947, but Israel did not exercise effective control throughout the region before Operation Uvda.[1][3] The area involved extended from Ein Hatzov, now Hatzeva, and the Ramon Crater southward to Umm Rashrash on the Gulf of Eilat.[3] In late 1948, Jordanian Arab Legion forces maintained a presence there, while most of the territory was uninhabited apart from nomadic Bedouin tribes.[3] Meir Amit, who commanded Golani’s Battalion 19 during the campaign, recalled that preparations to bring the southern Negev under Israeli control began in late 1948 and became practical operational preparations in early 1949.[3]

Military preparations unfolded alongside negotiations intended to end the War of Independence.[3][4] Egypt and Israel signed an armistice agreement on February 24, 1949, and negotiations with Transjordan proceeded while the southern campaign was being prepared.[4] Jordan claimed the southern Negev during the negotiations, making actual possession of the area an immediate military and diplomatic issue.[1] The decision to advance south was directed toward establishing Israeli control in the face of those claims.[5] The campaign therefore took place after the Egyptian armistice but before the completion of the wider armistice process.[4]

Before permanent positions were established at the southern tip, Israel maintained its claim to control through standing patrols rather than a permanent force stationed at Umm Rashrash.[4] The replacement of these patrols by fixed positions was conceived as a response to a perceived threat of combined British and Arab Legion action.[4] Reports of Transjordanian patrol movements near the Gulf of Aqaba and British use of a track between Aqaba and Ras el Naqib formed part of this security concern.[4] The immediate operational problem was thus not simply reaching the coast, but replacing a limited patrol presence with positions that could sustain Israeli control.[4]

The plan assigned the Negev Brigade a route through the central Negev, supported by motorized forces and aircraft, while Golani was to descend through the Arava toward Umm Rashrash.[3] Because the operation coincided with negotiations at Rhodes, the forces were instructed to remain within the territory of the former British Mandate.[3] The southern advance required crossing a region that was then largely roadless: the distance from rear bases at Beersheba to the Red Sea coast exceeded 150 miles, or 240 kilometers.[6] These distances and terrain conditions made transport, reconnaissance, fuel, and the preparation of an airfield important elements of the campaign.[1][6]

Yigal Allon was commander of the Southern Front when Operation Uvda was completed.[7] Yitzhak Rabin served as an operations officer in Uvda, as he had in Operations Yoav and Horev; together, those operations liberated the Negev and brought Israeli forces to the Red Sea at Eilat.[8] Nahum Sarig commanded the Negev Brigade, while Nachum Golan commanded Golani.[9][10] The name uvda, meaning “fact,” expressed the intention of establishing Israeli control on the ground; naval officer Shlomo Erel later recalled its message as “We are here.”[1][11]

On March 5, 1949, Negev Brigade forces left Beersheba and moved toward the Ramon Crater by way of Bir ‘Asluj, while Golani forces departed Mamshit for Ein Husub.[1] The two columns followed different approaches to the same southern destination: the Negev Brigade crossed the central highlands, whereas Golani advanced along the Arava.[3][5] The Negev column’s principal difficulty was the terrain, while Golani also had to deal with Arab Legion positions and roadblocks along its route.[3] The campaign combined these overland movements with aerial supply and reconnaissance, and with a separate movement toward the western shore of the Dead Sea.[1]

On March 6, Negev Brigade troops reached Sde Avraham and began clearing ground for an airfield.[1] That night, reinforcements from the 7th Brigade’s Gahal platoon arrived by air, bringing supplies and fuel.[1] The airfield preparation and nighttime delivery supported the brigade’s advance through the central Negev, where the difficulties of moving across the landscape were a defining feature of its route.[1][3] The Negev Brigade encountered no resistance on its advance in the account of the two-column operation, although the journey itself remained demanding.[5]

Golani’s progress followed a succession of points along the Arava.[1] Its troops took Ein Harouf on March 7 and Ein Ghamr on March 8 as Jordanian forces withdrew.[1] On March 9, Golani captured Gharandal and continued to Ein Ghadyan, now Yotvata.[1] One account describes Golani encountering an Arab Legion unit, outflanking it, and continuing south.[5] Amit’s recollections place greater emphasis on Legion roadblocks and fighting along this route, followed by an order for Jordanian forces to withdraw to Aqaba.[3] The withdrawal opened the way for the final movement to Umm Rashrash.[3]

Meanwhile, Negev Brigade forces moved toward Umm Rashrash through the Valley of Fingers.[1] They paused there for two days while seeking a roundabout approach to Ras al-Naqb.[1] The separate routes meant that the two brigades approached the coast under different conditions: Negev troops had to negotiate difficult terrain, while Golani’s movement followed the Arava and the retreat of Legion forces.[1][3] The final approach developed into a race between the brigades to arrive at the coast first.[9]

A parallel Alexandroni Brigade movement began on March 7, traveling from Beersheba through Mamshit toward Sodom.[1] This operation, called Itzuv or Yitzuv, meaning “Stabilization,” included an amphibious landing near Ein Gedi by way of the Dead Sea.[1] During March 8–9, the force divided into three groups; one captured Ein Gedi and the southern group captured Masada.[1] Together with the southern advance, these movements brought the Arava, the Ein Gedi area, and Umm Rashrash under Israeli control during the final operations of the war.[1]

The Dead Sea landing required preparations very different from the vehicle movements across the Negev.[11] Erel recalled that it was organized from Sodom and had to remain secret because Arab Legion forces observed the area from the opposite shore.[11] The Legion had a base at Safi, across an expanse he estimated at about four kilometers, and its patrols also operated along the Lisan peninsula.[11] Boats and other equipment already kept on the Dead Sea were used to prepare the landing without revealing the movement before the troops and their supplies were in place.[11]

On the first night of preparations, two tugboats and a motorboat were brought to the landing place, where work began on arrangements for a pier.[11] The vessels returned to their previous positions before dawn so that the Legion would not notice their movement.[11] On the second night, barges were used to move equipment, and ten mules were employed to carry fortification supplies up the cliffs west of Ein Gedi.[11] The undertaking therefore required both water transport to the shore and a means of moving heavy material from the landing point to the positions above it.[11]

Erel described the landing force as approximately 200 Alexandroni Brigade men, organized as two companies.[11] The barges carried around 70 tons of equipment, including fortification material, mines, and concertina wire.[11] During the passage through the Lisan Strait, a motorboat also put a squad ashore to provide security in case a Legion patrol appeared.[11] The force erected a small pier at Ein Gedi, establishing a landing point that continued to serve the position after the immediate operation had ended.[11]

At the southern end of the campaign, aerial reconnaissance on the morning of March 10 found the police station guarding Ras al-Naqb abandoned.[1] Negev Brigade forces then continued through Ras al-Naqb toward Umm Rashrash.[1] The Legion had withdrawn to Aqaba, leaving the destination undefended.[1] Israeli forces reached the Red Sea coast that day after advancing more than 240 kilometers from their Beersheba rear bases across the Negev.[6] The Negev Brigade’s advance party arrived at the abandoned Umm Rashrash police station at approximately 3 p.m., with Golani reaching it around two hours later.[1]

The police post consisted of five clay huts and stood at the site where Eilat was subsequently built.[3] The first arrivals were a Palmach jeep unit, followed later by Golani forces completing their descent through the Arava.[3] The troops took possession of an abandoned post rather than fighting a final battle for the coast.[1] Veteran Yohanan Elyashuv recalled the arrival as taking place “without a single gun shot fired.”[9] A later account of the operation reports that no Israeli soldiers were killed during the campaign.[12]

Elyashuv also recalled an encounter with an Egyptian police station and border-control post during the journey south.[9] In his recollection, the Egyptian officers allowed the Israeli soldiers to pass after receiving cans of sardines.[9] His account of passage by agreement and the abandoned condition of Umm Rashrash illustrate the circumstances encountered by the Negev troops on their approach to the coast.[9] Golani’s experience farther east included the separate problem of Legion roadblocks, before the Jordanian withdrawal cleared its route south.[3]

At Umm Rashrash, Sarig discovered that the soldiers had no Israeli flag available and ordered them to improvise one.[9] Brigade secretary Pua Arel found a white bedsheet and used ink to create the flag.[2] Descriptions of its construction also identify two ink stripes and a Star of David taken from a first-aid kit and sewn onto the cloth.[1] The resulting makeshift banner became known as the Ink Flag.[2]

Avraham Adan, a Negev Brigade company commander, climbed the flagpole and raised the improvised flag above the police post.[2] Photographer Micha Perry photographed the event.[2] When Golani soldiers arrived approximately two hours later, they replaced the improvised banner with a standard Israeli flag.[9][2] The temporary flag’s brief use nevertheless produced an image that became closely associated with the conclusion of the campaign and the end of the War of Independence.[1][2]

The two brigades’ achievement was announced in a telegram: “On Haganah day, the 11th of Adar, the Palmach Negev brigade and the Golani brigade present the Gulf of Eilat to the State of Israel.”[1] The message preserved the joint role of the two brigades in reaching the gulf.[1]

Operation Uvda extended Israeli control through the southern Negev and Arava to the Red Sea.[1] Umm Rashrash became the site of Eilat, giving the campaign a lasting geographical consequence beyond the occupation of the police station itself.[1] The capture of the southern Negev was intended to secure a Red Sea foothold for settlement and links with neighboring countries.[3] The operation was successfully completed in March 1949, while the broader diplomatic process continued.[7]

At Ein Gedi, the landing arrangements remained useful after the troops had established their position.[11] The small pier erected during the operation served for two or three years as a point for bringing in supplies by water.[11] Sea supply ended after a road between Ein Gedi and Sodom opened and the position began receiving supplies overland.[11] Erel recalled that secrecy was no longer necessary once the armistice agreement had been signed.[11] The landing thus left behind a practical supply installation whose use outlasted the immediate military movement.[11]

The completion of the military campaign did not mean that every diplomatic question concerning the south had been settled.[13] In spring 1949, United States-sponsored Israeli-Egyptian discussions concerning Gaza and Palestinian Arab refugees included a proposed territorial exchange under which Israel might cede Negev territory that included Eilat.[13] Israeli ambassador Abba Eban insisted that any adjustment along the Sinai-Israel boundary must exclude Eilat.[13] Walter Eytan summarized the dilemma facing the Israeli delegation: “If Israel declines American good offices, then we are the ones who don’t want peace. If we say yes, we lose Eilat.”[13]

These discussions concerned the diplomatic future of Eilat after Israeli forces had reached the coast, rather than another stage in the operational advance.[13] They show that the possession of the southern tip remained relevant to negotiations over territorial arrangements, even after the Negev and Golani brigades had completed their movement.[13] Israel’s insistence on excluding Eilat from a possible exchange reflected the importance attached to retaining the Red Sea position.[13]

The armistice process continued beyond Operation Uvda.[4] Egypt signed an agreement on February 24, Transjordan signed on April 3, and the final agreement, with Syria, was reached on July 20, 1949.[4] By that date Israel had concluded armistice agreements with each neighboring state involved in the war.[4] The Ink Flag raising therefore represents the symbolic conclusion of the war’s military operations, rather than the final date of the overall armistice process.[1][4]

The completion of Uvda also preceded discussion within Israel about whether military advances should continue elsewhere.[7] Several months after the operation, Allon sent David Ben-Gurion a personal letter recommending a further offensive into the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[7] Allon argued that Israel needed defensible strategic depth against stronger hostile forces.[7] His recommendation concerned a proposed continuation beyond Uvda’s completed southern campaign, not an additional objective carried out by the forces that had reached Eilat.[7]

The Ink Flag became the campaign’s enduring emblem.[1][2] Its association with Operation Uvda rests on the moment when soldiers who had reached the country’s southern tip improvised a national flag and raised it over the abandoned police station.[9][2] Although a standard flag replaced it after Golani’s arrival, the makeshift banner remained closely associated with the event.[1][2] Micha Perry’s photograph preserved the flag-raising that later accounts identify with the conclusion of the military campaign.[2]

Modern commemoration centers on the Ink Flag and the arrival at Umm Rashrash. A retrospective published for the operation’s 66th anniversary described the flag raising as the climax of Uvda.[2] The site of the former police station was declared a national historical site; a 2001 description reported that only one of its original five clay huts remained.[3]

Sources differ over the operation’s precise chronology. The Jewish Virtual Library and Globes place the brigades’ departure on March 5, 1949.[1][3] A later Ynet retrospective instead dates Operation Uvda to March 6–10.[12] The Jewish Virtual Library and Ynet place the arrival and flag raising at Umm Rashrash on March 10.[1][2] The Israel Yearbook 1950/51 says the flag was raised on March 11, while Encyclopedia.com dates the Israeli occupation of Umm Rashrash to March 13.[4][14] The consulted sources do not resolve whether these differences reflect errors or distinct milestones in the operation.

The campaign also occupies a place in the histories of its participants.[3][8] Golani confronted Arab Legion roadblocks along the Arava and reached Umm Rashrash about two hours after the Palmach jeep unit.[3] The concluding telegram preserved the joint role of Golani and the Negev Brigade.[1] Rabin’s military record places Uvda alongside Yoav and Horev among the operations through which Israeli forces liberated the Negev and reached Eilat.[8]

The associated Dead Sea operation broadens the campaign’s history beyond the familiar image from Umm Rashrash.[1][11] Erel’s recollections describe a force moving by tugboats, motorboat, and barges, transferring substantial fortification supplies and using mules to carry equipment onto the cliffs above Ein Gedi.[11] His account places that landing at the same time as the descent of two brigades toward Eilat.[11] The capture of Ein Gedi and Masada, described under the name Itzuv, belongs to the same final phase of operations but involved a distinct route and method.[1]

Contemporary diplomatic assessments differed over the legality and territorial meaning of the advance.[15] The United States consul in Jerusalem argued that it appeared to violate the Security Council’s July 15 truce resolution, described Transjordanian outposts and patrols in the southern Negev, and warned that an Israeli fait accompli could jeopardize the Rhodes negotiations.[15] Israel’s delegation presented the opposite position: a March 9 message to Acting Mediator Ralph Bunche declared that Israeli land and air forces were nowhere operating outside Israel’s borders and demanded the withdrawal of Transjordanian forces alleged to have crossed into Israeli territory.[15] These were competing diplomatic positions, not an agreed adjudication of the territorial claims.[15]

Erel’s later oral history adds a separate recollection about the relationship between operations and negotiation.[11] He said Israeli representatives at Rhodes stated that Israeli troops were already at Eilat and Ein Gedi before, in his recollection, that presence had actually been established.[11] This remains a participant’s retrospective account rather than an independently resolved chronology of what negotiators knew at each stage.[11] The operation’s lasting significance rests on its documented military outcome: Israeli control reached the southern Negev and the Red Sea, and the Ink Flag became the enduring symbol of the campaign’s conclusion.[1][2]