October 22 Scud Missile Attack (1973)

The Yom Kippur War began on October 6, 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel.[4] The attacking forces penetrated Israeli defense lines and inflicted heavy early losses. Israel took several days to recover and mobilize its reserves before launching a counteroffensive; Israeli forces later crossed the Suez Canal and encircled the Egyptian Third Army.[5]

Egypt had acquired Scud-B missiles in 1973, and the weapons arrived with Soviet personnel who operated them.[6] On October 17, five days before the reported attack, a U.S. satellite detected two brigades of Soviet Scud missiles deployed in the Nile Delta. Israeli officials feared the missiles might carry nuclear warheads, and Chief of Staff David Elazar ordered a Jericho missile battery deployed in a deliberately visible counter-deployment.[7] Former Military Intelligence chief Aharon Yariv, speaking at an October 18 meeting, warned that the Egyptians might "target Tel Aviv with a Scud" as their military position deteriorated.[8]

Ynet's account says Israeli intelligence also interpreted Soviet Scud-unit movements and warhead assembly as possible preparations for an attack. Research by Dima Adamsky and Uri Bar-Joseph, as summarized by Ynet, later characterized those activities as routine training rather than preparations for an operational strike.[6]

Israel accepted a ceasefire scheduled to take effect at 18:50 Israel time on October 22, the same evening the Security Council adopted Resolution 338.[9] Fighting continued past that deadline, including what Prime Minister Golda Meir described as a massive Egyptian artillery bombardment of Israeli positions.[9]

On October 22, 1973, shortly before the ceasefire, Scud missiles were launched at Israeli forces in the Suez Canal area.[1] Israeli intelligence chief General Eliahu Zaira, in a January 1974 briefing with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, recalled firing "a few minutes before five o'clock on the 22nd of October." He described the target as "the Fayid area, not at cities," and Israeli Chief of Staff David Elazar added, "In the bridgehead area."[2]

Multiple sources report that three Scud missiles were launched in total: two landed east of the canal near the Israeli bridgehead, and one exploded near El-Arish.[10][1] All three carried conventional warheads rather than the chemical or nuclear payloads Israeli officials had feared.[8] One of the missiles landing near the bridgehead killed seven Israel Defense Forces soldiers.[10] A 1986 paper entered into the Congressional Record by analyst W. Seth Carus stated that Egypt fired "at least three SCUD-B missiles" at Israeli targets during the 1973 war, although it did not specify a date.[11]

The reported chain of authorization involved both Egyptian and Soviet officials. On October 22, President Anwar Sadat, describing the situation at the front as catastrophic, appealed to Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov for permission to use the Scuds.[6] Research by Adamsky and Bar-Joseph, as summarized by Ynet, describes a command error: Vinogradov contacted Moscow seeking Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, but Defense Minister Andrei Grechko took the call and authorized firing. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev subsequently ordered the launch canceled, but the cancellation did not reach the Soviet missile crew in Egypt before two missiles had been fired.[6]

Zaira told Kissinger that, according to Israeli information, Russians were the only personnel capable of firing Egypt's Scuds during the war and had carried out the launches.[2] He also reported that Israeli forces had recovered Scud fragments and sent them to the Pentagon for analysis.[2] Zaira said Egypt had 10 Scud launchers before the war and 20 afterward.[2] Ynet reports that the systems remained under full Soviet control during the conflict and that a transfer of operational control to Egyptian personnel was planned for a later date.[6]

The missile strike occurred on the day the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338, which called on the parties to cease firing and terminate military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the resolution's adoption.[3] The resolution also called for implementation of Resolution 242 and for negotiations to begin concurrently with the ceasefire.[12]

Contemporaneous archival notes record that Israel accepted a ceasefire to take effect at about 7:00 p.m. that evening, while Syria and Egypt had not yet formally accepted it.[13] The notes later state that it was unclear whether the ceasefire had taken effect and record Israel's position that the first ceasefire had not entered into force because Egypt continued firing.[13] The Security Council subsequently reiterated its ceasefire demand in Resolutions 339 and 340, and fighting continued for several days.[14]

A key primary-source record is the declassified memorandum of Zaira's January 1974 briefing to Kissinger. It records Zaira's later account of the time and target area and his statement that Israeli intelligence attributed the firing to Russians, but it does not independently establish Soviet responsibility or state a missile count or casualty figure.[2] The Jewish Virtual Library and Ynet report three missiles and seven Israeli soldiers killed.[1][10] Those numerical details do not appear in the Zaira transcript.

A direct chronological discrepancy concerns the missiles' operational status. Ahron Bregman's Israel's Wars, 1947–93 states that Scud missiles were delivered to Egypt around August 1973 but became operational only at the beginning of 1974.[15] By contrast, Ynet reports two missiles fired on October 22 while also noting that Israeli intelligence had assessed that the Scuds would not become operational before early 1974 and that the systems remained under Soviet control.[6] Zaira likewise said that only Russians could fire the Egyptian Scuds during the war.[2] One possible reconciliation is that Egyptian operational readiness referred to the ability of Egyptian crews to use the system rather than the Soviet crews' capability.[6][2] Bregman's broader wording nevertheless leaves the chronology unresolved.[15]

Sources also vary on the precise missile count. A 2013 Ynet account identifies two missiles fired at the bridgehead.[6] The Jewish Virtual Library and a 2023 Ynet report describe three missiles in total, adding a third that exploded near El-Arish.[1][10] These accounts can be read as compatible if the first counted only the bridgehead launches, but the exact sequence remains uncertain.

The attribution of political and operational responsibility is similarly layered. Ynet reports that Sadat sought authorization, Grechko granted it, Soviet crews carried out the firing, and a cancellation order from Brezhnev arrived too late.[6] Zaira's account to Kissinger attributed the firing itself to Russians while describing the weapons as Egyptian Scuds.[2]