Ministry of Strategic Affairs

The ministry has served as a shifting strategic-policy portfolio rather than a body with one continuous remit. Earlier iterations concentrated on Iran and strategic threats; from 2015, the ministry led cross-government activity against boycotts and delegitimization. After its 2021 closure, those functions moved to the Foreign Ministry. The portfolio reappeared under Ron Dermer after the government formed in December 2022, with priorities centered on Iran, the Abraham Accords, and relations with the United States rather than BDS.[1][2]

The ministry originated in 2006 as the Ministry for Strategic Threats, a newly created post for Avigdor Lieberman after his Yisrael Beiteinu party joined Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s coalition. The coalition expansion followed the March 2006 election and the Lebanon war; Yisrael Beiteinu’s entry gave the government 78 of 120 Knesset seats, and Lieberman became deputy prime minister as well as minister. A Congressional Research Service report called the post previously nonexistent, while accounts render its title variously as “Minister for Strategic Threats” or “Minister of Strategic Affairs.”[3][4][5]

Yisrael Beiteinu left the government in January 2008 to protest concessions offered during negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.[4] The ministry was closed after Lieberman’s departure and reopened in 2009 under Benjamin Netanyahu, with its responsibilities and associated ministerial portfolios changing over time.[6] In its earlier iterations, it coordinated intelligence and diplomatic information concerning the Iranian threat.[1]

A later phase centered on boycotts and international delegitimization of Israel. One account places a broad assignment to address delegitimization after the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident, while government and research accounts identify a more formal cabinet assignment in 2015. These descriptions indicate successive stages in the ministry’s remit rather than a single clearly dated transition: its earlier strategic-threat role continued to evolve as the government gave it new coordination duties.[7][1]

The ministry’s leadership and listed portfolios changed across governments. A 2015 Congressional Research Service cabinet listing identifies Gilad Erdan as both public security and strategic affairs minister, and records him as a Likud member who had served four earlier Knesset terms.[8] Orit Farkash-Hacohen was appointed strategic affairs minister in May 2020.[9]

In December 2020, Strategic Affairs Minister Michael Biton was considering a proposal by Director-General Ronen Manelis to merge the ministry with other government ministries and executive bodies. The contemporaneous report emphasized that closure required government approval; the proposal was not itself a completed decision.[6]

On June 13, 2021, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett told the Knesset that the government would close the Ministry of Strategic Affairs “with immediate effect.”[10] In July 2021, the government approved the closure and the return of the ministry’s areas of activity to the Foreign Ministry.[11] A Jerusalem Post account described the ministry as ending its 15-year operation on July 19, with the Foreign Ministry taking over its responsibilities.[12]

The transferred work included efforts against online delegitimization. Former digital-strategy director Ido Daniel described bringing expertise in civil-society work, knowledge of malicious actors, and digital-diplomacy projects into the Foreign Ministry. Another report said Deputy Foreign Minister Idan Roll was responsible for incorporating the anti-delegitimization work, while former director-general Tzahi Gavrieli argued that it should remain coordinated rather than be scattered among ministries.[12][1]

The transfer also involved funding and organizational assets. A 2023 account reported that about NIS 120 million in budget accompanied the responsibilities transferred to the Foreign Ministry, with roughly another NIS 100 million for the public-diplomacy project Concert to be transferred over about four years. These were reported allocations associated with the transfer and should not be conflated with figures for different years or purposes, such as the ministry’s earlier grant allocation or reported anti-BDS spending.[11]

The ministry returned under Ron Dermer in the government formed at the end of 2022, but its new remit differed from the previous anti-BDS iteration. A January 2023 report said its intended priorities were the Abraham Accords, Iran, and relations with the United States; it said BDS and antisemitism would not be handled by the ministry, with relevant responsibilities and staff placed elsewhere. At the time of a December 2022 report, the ministry’s powers had not yet been determined, and some responsibilities were expected to return from the Foreign Ministry. The report listed 20 positions, about 13 associated with combating boycotts, which were expected to come under Diaspora Affairs Minister Amichai Chikli.[2][13]

A government directory described the strategic portfolio as addressing the threat posed by Iran, deepening the Abraham Accords, expanding the circle of peace, and strengthening the alliance with the United States. It said the ministry coordinated with relevant government ministries and security services and listed Dermer as minister; the directory recorded an update date of March 10, 2025.[14]

The ministry’s later status is not entirely clear from the available records. Congressional Research Service material on the government formed in December 2022 lists Dermer as strategic affairs minister, and a 2025 Congressional Record tribute says he returned to government in 2022 in that role and as a member of the Security Cabinet. Those references establish use of the ministerial title but do not fully describe the ministry’s organizational structure after the 2021 closure.[15][16]

In November 2025, ynet reported that Dermer had submitted his resignation after nearly three years as minister. His resignation letter said that he had first planned to serve for two years and then extended his tenure twice: initially to work with Benjamin Netanyahu on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and later to work toward ending the Gaza war on terms set by Israel. The available sources do not establish who subsequently held the portfolio or the ministry’s status after Dermer’s departure.[17]

In October 2015, the Political-Security Cabinet assigned the Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy overall responsibility for leading Israel’s campaign against boycotts and delegitimization. Its remit covered public diplomacy and public relations alongside academic, financial, cultural, and legal activity. The ministry was to guide and coordinate other government ministries, present the government’s position to nongovernmental organizations, cooperate with them, and support nongovernmental actors working in the field.[18]

The assignment also made the ministry a coordinating institution linking government bodies and outside organizations. An INSS account says its work addressed contemporary antisemitism as well as the boycott movement and delegitimization. It distinguishes this emphasis from the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs’ longstanding focus on what it calls classic antisemitism. The same account says the cabinet assigned the ministry responsibility for guiding and integrating government and civil-society efforts in 2015, and that it remained active in this area until 2021.[1]

A State Comptroller report, as reported by ynet, described disputes with the Foreign Ministry over authority, resources, and responsibility for the response to boycotts and delegitimization. Agreements reached in 2012 to divide responsibilities were not implemented. The report said that, despite broad powers from 2013, the ministry had not fully used its budget or carried out its operational plans by 2015, and lacked independent legal, accounting, procurement, and human-resources services.[19]

In October 2015, the cabinet authorized the ministry, then headed by Erdan, to manage and coordinate the campaign, including in “the visible and the covert spheres.” The State Comptroller’s findings said this decision did not resolve the ministry’s staffing and management deficiencies or its continuing disputes with the Foreign Ministry. The ministry responded that it had mainly dealt with Iran during the years examined and received authority over delegitimization and boycotts only in October 2015. It described its renewed role as coordinating government and civil-society actors in Israel and abroad, and said Erdan had obtained a dedicated NIS 128 million budget for the work.[19]

The ministry’s mandate also encompassed public-facing online activity. Its published 2018 criteria offered grants for websites, social-media pages, digital campaigns, and visual content supporting Israel. Applicants generally needed at least a year of online activity and either routine annual exposure above 100,000 people or a campaign reaching at least 50,000. The document set the total grant allocation at NIS 3 million, including NIS 1.2 million for Europe.[18]

The ministry framed its campaign as a broad strategic effort rather than a narrow public-relations operation. An INSS study describes a political directive to shift “from defense to offense” and a designated task force combining research with proactive and cognitive activity. It identifies three infrastructures: a global knowledge center; a worldwide civil-society network of hundreds of pro-Israel organizations; and a proactive cognitive framework aimed at relevant audiences. The task force received the Civil Service Commissioner’s Outstanding Staff Award in 2019.[20]

Another INSS study says the ministry developed the concept “Perception Shapes Reality” in March 2016. It presents the concept as a response to the ministry’s view that hostile groups used partial, biased, or fabricated accounts of Israeli actions to influence international audiences. The ministry sought to shift activity from university campuses to online information spaces, described in the study as moving “from the physical space of college and university campuses … to the virtual space of information,” where Israel could use cyber and intelligence capabilities.[7]

The study describes the ministry’s approach as combining public diplomacy with intelligence tools. Its stated aims included sowing doubt, weakening trust, dividing opposing organizations, and disrupting their activity. It groups the ministry’s methods under four headings: warning, deterrence, offense, and explanation. It also says the ministry used civilian organizations as contractors, both to preserve ambiguity about operations and to compensate for limited institutional capacity.[7]

The ministry built and supported networks of organizations and individuals. INSS says it initiated Concert, a nonprofit public-benefit corporation that supported civil-society projects, and founded the Global Community for Israel, a network of organizations and pro-Israel activists. It also developed specialized legal and digital networks. Digital-network participants included social-media influencers, online-media managers, and activists, who received materials and information from the ministry. An attempted network of pro-Israeli academics did not take shape.[1]

INSS identifies four areas in which the ministry believed it added value: connecting pro-Israel civil-society activists working against contemporary antisemitism worldwide; financially supporting network members; conducting research and using global data in reports and international advocacy; and monitoring funding sources of anti-Israeli entities, a task the account says required state-level technology and resources. In 2020, the ministry focused on anti-Israel activity on digital and social-media platforms. It also worked with the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs on a government policy paper, published in early 2021, concerning online antisemitic hate speech.[1]

The ministry’s digital emphasis was reflected in both its grant criteria and its campaign activity. A Congressional Research Service report said it had reportedly allocated about $100 million since 2016 to oppose BDS-related activity. The report described countermeasures in the United States as including public diplomacy, outreach to anti-BDS allies in the Jewish diaspora, and digital initiatives to gather information on and counter activist groups, including on college campuses and social media. The sum was reported by the CRS rather than established there as an independently verified total.[21]

The ministry ran public campaigns presenting its case against BDS and related activity. INSS says “Terrorists in Suits,” conducted in five languages, presented more than 100 alleged connections between BDS organizations and Palestinian organizations the campaign identified as terrorist groups. The same analysis says “Behind the Mask” presented more than 80 examples of antisemitic expressions by BDS leaders and organizations. These are figures and characterizations reported as campaign findings, not independent assessments of the underlying evidence.[20]

A separate study by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs says the ministry published “Terrorists in Suits” in February 2019. It attributes to the report claims of more than 100 links between leading BDS groups or activists and the PFLP and Hamas, including about 30 people described as current or former terrorist operatives and prominent in the BDS movement. The study also reports that the ministry’s September 2019 “Behind the Mask” report documented more than 100 examples of BDS antisemitism. The differing totals and descriptions reflect accounts of the ministry’s own reports; the sources do not independently audit their methodology or evidentiary basis.[22]

The ministry’s claims about alleged terrorist links were disputed. The Jerusalem Center study quotes BNC leader Salah Khawaja responding to the report’s naming of boycott activists. The available material therefore records the ministry’s accusations and a response to them without independently establishing the claims or resolving the dispute.[22]

The ministry also publicized alleged funding flows and sought action by financial institutions. INSS reports that the ministry said organizations associated with delegitimization and BDS raised tens of millions of dollars annually, and that it exposed about five million euros in European Union funding for organizations promoting BDS in 2019. The analysis further reports that more than 50 bank accounts and crowdfunding channels belonging to such organizations were closed. These figures are claims reported in the analysis, not independently verified totals.[20]

The Jerusalem Center study says research on alleged links between BDS organizations and terrorist groups was conveyed to banks, financial institutions, and payment platforms; it reports that more than two dozen BDS-affiliated accounts were subsequently closed in at least six countries. The passage does not identify all accounts, institutions, or countries. Its account describes the sequence and reported results but does not provide enough detail to independently assess the circumstances of the closures.[22]

The ministry’s work also included activity around the 2019 Eurovision Song Contest in Israel. INSS says it exposed fake social-media accounts, bots, and efforts to pressure artists to withdraw. Former director-general Tzahi Gavrieli later described identifying hundreds of accounts he said were designed to discourage contestants from performing in Israel, and said most were removed three weeks before the contest. These statements describe the ministry’s account of its work and its former director-general’s assessment rather than an independent evaluation of the operation or its effects.[20][1]

The broader method included public diplomacy, intelligence gathering, support for civil-society initiatives, and outreach to organizations and online audiences. A 2017 decision exempted the ministry from the Freedom of Information Act for activities connected with its government-assigned campaign against delegitimization and boycotting Israel. The INSS study says civilian contractors were used partly to maintain ambiguity around campaign activity, while the government’s own grants framework provided public support for specified online projects.[7][18]

The ministry’s changing assignments and its relationship with the Foreign Ministry generated continuing questions about coordination, accountability, staffing, and effectiveness. The State Comptroller findings reported by ynet criticized implementation and interdepartmental coordination, while the ministry defended its chronology and said it had received its anti-boycott mandate only in October 2015. The two accounts differ in emphasis: one highlights shortcomings and unresolved disputes, while the other stresses the ministry’s evolving remit and its efforts to secure dedicated resources.[19]

Assessments of the ministry’s political purpose and success also varied. NGO Monitor’s account says the government’s response to boycott and lawfare campaigns began slowly and inconsistently, received little initial attention in the Foreign Ministry, and grew after military officials raised concerns about possible consequences, including action in the United Nations and International Criminal Court. It assesses the ministry’s coordination as having had limited success. A Jerusalem Center study, by contrast, describes the 2015 Security Cabinet assignment as giving Erdan overall responsibility for leading Israel’s fight against BDS and delegitimization within a wider effort involving multiple actors.[23][24]

Former officials presented the ministry as developing tools beyond conventional public relations. Gavrieli said it had developed “technology, data, a civil society engine and digital assets” in response to perceived limits of conventional public diplomacy. His claims about online-account monitoring and campaign impact remain attributed assessments, not independent measures of results.[1]

Public debate also concerned the use of public funds and the role of civil-society organizations. A Maariv opinion article described the ministry as responsible for Kela Shlomo, a nonprofit established by government decision for work against BDS and antisemitism. It reported a three-year government commitment of NIS 128 million conditional on raising a similar amount from Jewish donors, and recorded criticism of the organization as well as a ministry representative’s denial that it was a “dark force” or engaged in smear campaigns. The article’s characterizations and assessments are commentary; the reported commitment should not be treated as directly comparable to budgets for other years or programs.[25]

Other reported figures likewise refer to different budget periods and categories. Maariv described the ministry in 2018 as having 25 employees and a budget of about NIS 50 million.[25] A 2023 report gave a budget of NIS 24 million for each of 2023 and 2024.[26] A 2024 report listed NIS 10 million.[27] These figures are not presented on a common basis, and the available material does not resolve differences in accounting scope or timing.

A further institutional ambiguity followed the 2021 closure. The government approved the closure and transfer of responsibilities, and the Foreign Ministry subsequently absorbed the ministry’s work.[11][12] Later reporting and congressional sources described a re-established ministry and used the title “Minister of Strategic Affairs” for Dermer, but they do not fully explain the later organizational structure or the precise relationship between the ministerial title and a standalone ministry.[2][15]