Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism

The ministry’s remit connects Israel’s relationship with Jewish communities abroad to efforts to counter antisemitism and defend Israel’s standing internationally. Its work has included maintaining contact with diaspora communities, strengthening Jewish identity and connection to Israel, monitoring antisemitic incidents and online content, producing reports, and supporting education, security, and public-diplomacy initiatives.[1][2] Ministry materials present these functions as complementary parts of sustaining Jewish communal life and responding to antisemitism and delegitimization.[3]

Its activities have involved other government ministries, the Jewish Agency, civil-society organizations, Jewish communal bodies, and international partners. This network has enabled joint projects, but it has also raised questions about coordination, institutional capacity, and how work concerning antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and opposition to Israel should be distinguished or integrated.[1][3]

The portfolio has appeared under several titles. Earlier governments used titles combining diaspora affairs with welfare, society, information, or the fight against antisemitism.[8][9] The 36th government listed a Minister of Diaspora Affairs, while the 37th listed a Minister for Diaspora Affairs.[10][11] The combined title adopted in 2023 reflects a reassignment and expansion of responsibilities rather than a name used consistently throughout the ministry’s history.[4]

Government involvement in combating antisemitism through the diaspora-affairs portfolio dates at least to the 2010s. In April 2013, Government Resolution 74 authorized the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs to lead the struggle against antisemitism, including coordinating the Global Forum to Combat Antisemitism. The forum had been founded in 2003 by Minister Natan Sharansky as a coordinating body connecting Jewish leaders, intellectuals, and organizations.[1]

Ministries’ roles were not always consolidated. A 2016 account of State Comptroller findings described a period when the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs pursued parallel channels that had not produced notable results. The ministries had not shared their strategic plans by the end of the audit, and the Foreign Ministry’s Diaspora Division lacked staff and an operating plan. Those findings concern the earlier division of responsibilities, not the ministry’s later operations.[12] In early 2021, the Diaspora Affairs and Strategic Affairs ministries jointly published a policy document on combating antisemitic hate speech online.[1]

In 2020, the ministry presented a proposed long-term strategic framework for Jewish continuity in the Diaspora. Minister Omer Yankelevitch submitted it for government approval, drawing on recommendations from the Fassberg–Kandel Committee, chaired by Maxine Fassberg and Eugene Kandel. The recommendations called for stronger ties with Jewish communities, investment in formal and informal Jewish education, and reinforcement of Jewish identity and connection to Israel, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, national institutions, philanthropists, and communities.[13]

That year, the ministry and the Jewish Agency also convened a virtual forum with more than 30 leaders from major Jewish organizations to assess the effects of COVID-19 on Jewish communities. Discussion covered community rehabilitation, resources, morale and mutual responsibility, education, and preparation for possible outbreaks of antisemitism. The Jewish Agency’s chief executive and the ministry’s director-general were to run the forum and oversee its plans.[14] Jewish Agency Chairman Isaac Herzog called the forum a “paradigm shift.”[14]

A substantial reallocation of responsibilities occurred in 2023. On February 5, the government voted to rename the ministry the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism and transfer responsibility for combating boycotts, sanctions, and divestments from the Foreign Ministry.[4] The government decision also made the ministry responsible for leading the campaign against Israel’s delegitimization abroad and provided for relevant budget components to move.[5]

Reporting before the transfer was completed described disagreement within the government. Foreign Minister Eli Cohen opposed the reassignment, while Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu supported it. The projected transfer was reported as approximately NIS 120 million annually and 23 positions, but those figures were prospective. The Foreign Ministry was expected to continue providing services until the Diaspora Ministry completed administrative preparations.[15]

The portfolio’s leadership has likewise changed. Isaac Herzog was appointed in 2009 as Minister of Welfare and Social Services and Minister of the Diaspora, Society, and the Fight Against Antisemitism; he resigned from the cabinet in January 2011 after Ehud Barak left the Labor Party to establish the Independence Party.[16] Yuli Edelstein served as Minister of Information and Diaspora Affairs in the 32nd government, and Nachman Shai was listed as Minister of Diaspora Affairs in the 36th government.[9][10] Amichai Chikli was appointed Diaspora Affairs Minister in December 2022 and was listed as Minister for Diaspora Affairs in the 37th government.[11][17]

Monitoring antisemitism and reporting to the Israeli government have been central elements of the ministry’s mandate. Its 2020 annual report said the ministry began mapping antisemitism in 2015 and established the Antisemitic Cyber Monitoring System (ACMS) in 2017. The report described ACMS as using artificial intelligence and semantic analysis to identify, quantify, categorize, and locate online antisemitic content in real time under the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition.[18]

ACMS initially monitored English, French, German, and Arabic and later added Russian and Spanish. The ministry also established a research and information center relying on the system and its analysts. The annual report said ACMS recorded 2.3 million antisemitic posts by nearly 413,000 users during 2020. It attributed 94.5 percent of the posts to Twitter and 5.5 percent to alternative social networks; among the latter, it attributed 69 percent to 4chan and 24 percent to BitChute. These are the ministry’s own monitoring results.[18]

INSS describes the ministry as monitoring antisemitism globally, submitting an annual report to the government, and operating a team that tracks online content and incidents with particular attention to the United States and Western Europe. The institute also says the ministry uses the IHRA definition when classifying statements as antisemitic.[1]

The ministry’s 2024 report described a National Command Post, or Mashlat, that uses technological systems and multiple information sources to monitor and classify antisemitic discourse in digital environments. It presented the command post as a knowledge hub for government bodies, national institutions, and civil-society organizations, with a national situation room coordinating responses to emerging incidents.[3]

The report also described research and intelligence work supplying situational analyses for counter-antisemitism activity, public-awareness efforts, and security systems. Research priorities included organizations the ministry characterized as affiliated with terrorist entities while operating under the guise of human-rights advocacy. It listed research concerning UNRWA, Hamas- and Islamic Jihad-affiliated networks in Europe, incitement, and activity in several European and North American countries. These are the ministry’s reported characterizations and findings.[3]

A September 2024 report attributed to the ministry used open-source intelligence methods to analyze incidents, trends, online sentiment, and influential figures in Europe after October 7, 2023. Its archive summary reported an increase of more than 400 percent in hateful content and connected it primarily to heightened anti-Israel sentiment following Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks. It identified the United Kingdom, France, and Germany as areas of particular concern and described antisemitic stereotypes appearing alongside anti-Israel rhetoric.[19]

The ministry’s April 2025 report reviewing antisemitism during 2024 used the IHRA working definition as its stated standard. It covered global trends, regional and sectoral research, and the ministry’s activities. The report acknowledged limitations in collecting and analyzing global information and did not claim to cover the phenomenon in its entirety.[20]

Country-specific figures included a reported 477 percent increase in antisemitic incidents in U.S. higher education compared with 2023, a 108 percent increase in politically motivated antisemitic incidents in Germany during the first quarter of 2024, and a 35 percent increase in German online incidents. These figures are findings presented by the ministry rather than independently audited statistics.[20]

A January 2026 executive brief presented a global overview of antisemitism in 2025. It said the report drew on incidents documented in mainstream and Jewish media together with analysis of online discourse. The brief reported that activity was concentrated in a limited number of countries and increased sharply following major conflict-related events.[21] It highlighted harassment, vandalism, and severe violence, including lethal attacks, and included a case study of the Bondi Beach attack in Australia discussing small-cell terrorism, access to weapons, subsequent incidents, and online amplification.[21]

Alongside monitoring, the ministry has presented support for Jewish communities and the strengthening of Jewish identity as core responsibilities. In a 2023 interview, Director-General Avi Cohen Scali described the ministry’s earlier purpose as connecting Jewish communities to the Jewish people and Israel and strengthening Jewish identity worldwide, with an emphasis on North America. He identified preserving the Jewish people and ensuring its future as the ministry’s central task and said formal and informal Jewish education was a priority.[2]

The ministry’s education work has included cooperation with the Jewish Federations of North America on teacher supply and educational materials and with UnitEd on educator training and pedagogical resources. Cohen Scali also described a fund established with the Jewish Agency to help Jewish organizations secure their buildings, as well as work with other governments concerning antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israel activity.[2]

A Directorate of Jewish Renewal broadened the ministry’s work in Israel. The U.S. Department of State reported that the ministry launched the directorate on July 21, 2022, under a coalition agreement between Yesh Atid and Labor. It was intended to fund activities of Conservative and Reform Jewish organizations.[6] Then-Minister Nachman Shai said he wanted Israel to be open to every Jew, “no matter how one expresses Jewish identity,” associating that approach with freedom, equality, and diversity.[6]

After the outbreak of war in October 2023, a ministry presentation to the Knesset Education Committee identified three main work areas: combating antisemitism, strengthening Jewish identity and connection to Israel, and pro-Israel educational activity. It listed teacher-focused information and resilience resources, educational materials in relevant languages, briefings for Jewish communities, and campus and community programs.[22]

In November 2023, Cohen Scali said the ministry had directed its resources and efforts toward Jewish communities abroad since the war began. He described resilience workshops and practical guidance on whether and when to respond to or report antisemitic incidents, with Chabad, Hillel, and Olami among the campus organizations involved.[23] He also described ties with police forces in dozens of countries and delegations that received seminars on Jewish life, holidays, the Holocaust, and antisemitism, together with practical tools from Israel Police.[23]

The April 2024 Knesset presentation reported that, during the first five months after the war began, the ministry invested approximately $2 million in campus activity involving Jewish students, organized 12 solidarity delegations involving 350 mothers from 13 countries, initiated about 20 educational projects for Jewish schools, and brought 2,500 volunteers through the Shalom Corps initiative. It also reported more than four million views of digital content and more than 4,000 webinar participants.[22]

Programs have also addressed community preparedness and recovery. The Jewish Agency’s 2025 impact report identified JReady, a platform for Jewish-community preparedness and resilience, as a joint initiative with the ministry that was established in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.[24] After the December 2025 Bondi Beach attack, JReady sent Israeli experts in trauma response, community recovery, and long-term resilience to support the Australian Jewish community less than 48 hours after the attack and activated hotlines with NATAL.[24]

The ministry’s international work has combined training, community security, public events, funding, and cooperation with organizations outside government. INSS describes it as maintaining contact with diaspora communities and providing courses for emergency and security forces in other countries on hate crimes and the protection of Jewish communities. The ministry also funded a Yad Vashem-compiled Massive Open Online Course on antisemitism.[1]

The ministry’s 2024 report described support for international student organizations through partnerships, resources, coordination, and events, including efforts to create safe environments for Jewish students. It also reported ministry-supported public events, exhibitions, demonstrations, and solidarity rallies involving more than 50,000 participants across hundreds of international events.[3] Community-resilience work included facility security, security protocols, professional training and delegations, emergency preparedness, and first-aid instructor certification.[3]

Through the Voices of Israel platform, the report said the ministry distributed NIS 45 million among 56 organizations and initiatives working on public diplomacy and countering antisemitism. A separate mechanism offered up to NIS 200,000 per organization without matching funds; the report said 62 projects received approximately NIS 12 million.[3] It also claimed that government-sponsored campaigns reached more than one billion people worldwide.[3]

The report said that in 2025 the ministry formalized a partnership with Maccabi World Union to create an operational platform connecting civil-society organizations in Israel and the Diaspora, with NIS 50 million allocated to the initiative.[3] In January 2026, the partners held a seminar after a joint call for projects. Twenty-five projects were selected from applications submitted from North America, Europe, and Israel, covering digital activity, education, academia, and work with non-Jewish communities and ethnic groups.[25]

Public diplomacy became more prominent after the October 2023 attacks. A Globes report described a volunteer operations center established by the ministry that, according to the ministry, involved thousands of companies, businesses, and individuals. The center was later merged into the National Public Diplomacy Directorate’s center. The ministry also claimed to have produced hundreds of materials in five languages that received approximately 150 million views.[5]

In May 2025, the ministry invited local authorities in Judea and Samaria, the Jordan Valley, and the Golan Heights to submit proposals for international public-diplomacy programs opposing Israel’s delegitimization.[26] The estimated total budget was approximately NIS 3 million, conditional on the number of selected authorities and available funds. Participating authorities were to organize at least ten tours for foreign delegations, professional conferences, and social-media content; funding tracks allowed requests of up to NIS 1 million or NIS 250,000.[26]

A June 2024 policy roundtable involving Minister Amichai Chikli, experts, American Jewish leaders, and former U.S. officials addressed measures to tackle antisemitism on U.S. campuses, in Congress, and in American cities.[27] In 2025, Chikli hosted an international antisemitism conference in Jerusalem featuring President Isaac Herzog and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.[7] The conference’s guest list and organization became contentious.

The ministry is significant as an institutional bridge between Israel and Jewish communities abroad and as a governmental center for efforts against antisemitism and delegitimization. The 2023 reassignment brought responsibilities previously divided among government bodies into the diaspora-affairs portfolio.[4][5] Its monitoring systems, education and security partnerships, resilience programs, grants, and international training connect government policy with the daily needs of Jewish institutions and communities.[3][24]

This hybrid mandate also gives the ministry’s definitions and analytical judgments practical consequences for research, funding, public diplomacy, and international cooperation. Questions about methodology, coordination, and the relationship between antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israel activity are therefore consequential to both government policy and diaspora relations.[1][20]

Assessments of the ministry’s capacity and coordination have been mixed. INSS characterizes it as relatively small in personnel and resources and says many activities depend on joint projects with nongovernmental actors. The institute also found that an interministerial forum established by the ministry met when considered necessary but did not provide the overarching strategy and synchronization its researchers judged necessary. These are INSS assessments, not government findings.[1]

The relationship between antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and criticism or opposition directed at Israel is another contested aspect of the ministry’s remit. Ministry reports use the IHRA working definition and analyze anti-Israel rhetoric, antisemitic stereotypes, and delegitimization as related components of the problem.[1][20] Because the ministry’s 2024 report acknowledges limits to global data collection and does not claim comprehensive coverage, its figures and interpretations should be read as the ministry’s findings rather than independent adjudications.[19][20]

The Directorate of Jewish Renewal prompted disagreement over religious pluralism and state support for different Jewish movements. The U.S. Department of State reported that Knesset members from Shas, United Torah Judaism, and the Religious Zionist Party characterized funding for Conservative and Reform organizations as political and as contributing to the destruction of Judaism.[6] This criticism contrasted with Shai’s stated intention that Israel be open to Jews regardless of how they express Jewish identity.[6]

The 2025 Jerusalem conference also generated criticism. A SAPIR Journal account said the inclusion of far-right European politicians prompted several prominent Jewish speakers and Anti-Defamation League chief executive Jonathan Greenblatt to withdraw. The account criticized organizers for not consulting key Diaspora figures before adding the politicians. This is the author’s assessment of the controversy.[7]

A proposed U.S. legislative measure offered a separate, politically sensitive description of the ministry’s role. The proposed AWARE Act of 2026 states that, according to the ministry, nongovernmental organizations seeking to provide humanitarian assistance in Gaza must register and obtain approval from an interministerial team led by the ministry’s director-general.[28] It also lists the director-general and minister among officials it says can help ensure that aid reaches Palestinian civilians and attributes policy-changing authority to the minister, defense minister, and prime minister. These are claims in proposed legislation, not an independent description of the ministry’s general mandate.[28]

Earlier disputes over divided responsibility provide historical context for the later consolidation of the portfolio. The 2016 account of State Comptroller findings described parallel channels and shortcomings in planning and staffing at that time.[12] Reporting on the 2023 transfer described opposition from the foreign minister and projected changes in budget and staffing while noting that administrative arrangements remained incomplete.[15] Neither account constitutes a comprehensive evaluation of the ministry’s current performance.