Lebanese Displacement During the Israel–Hezbollah Conflict (2023–Present)

On October 8, 2023, the day after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, Hezbollah began attacking Israel from Lebanon, opening a second front that it presented as support for Hamas.[1][5] Cross-border exchanges of fire along the Blue Line, initiated by Hezbollah on that date, continued throughout the following year and drew Israeli military responses that progressively escalated in scope and intensity.[1]

The first departures were concentrated in the Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun districts near the border, which together accounted for most of the displacement recorded in the initial IOM data.[6] Thousands of Lebanese civilians near the border moved north as the exchanges intensified.[5] The conflict generated displacement on both sides of the border: the State Department reported that approximately 68,500 Israelis were displaced from northern communities, while the November 2024 ceasefire agreement stated an aim of enabling civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely to their homes and lands.[1][7]

Displacement from south Lebanese border communities began almost immediately after October 8, 2023, and grew steadily as fighting intensified through the autumn. International Organization for Migration data collected through networks of emergency-operations rooms, the Lebanese Red Cross, and the Disaster Risk Management unit — drawing on more than 44 enumerators and 3,600 key informants — recorded 26,000 internally displaced people inside Lebanon by November 7, a figure that had surged 76% to 46,325 by November 14.[6] A later IOM update put the count at approximately 55,000 on November 21, with 73% of those displaced coming from districts in south Lebanon.[4]

Displacement was heavily concentrated in the southernmost districts. The Bint Jbeil and Marjayoun districts accounted for the majority of departures, and 71% of displaced people moved to a different district entirely, while 29% relocated to another location within their own district.[6] Leading destinations included Tyre (31% of displaced), Nabatieh (15%), Beirut (11%), Sidon (11%), and Aley (6%). The town of Rmeich became emblematic of the phenomenon: the head of its village council described it, after roughly 70% of its residents had evacuated, as having become a "ghost town."[4]

Accommodation during this phase was almost entirely informal. IOM data showed that 70% of displaced people moved in with host families, 25% rented apartments, 3% stayed in a second apartment they already owned, 2% used public shelters, and less than 1% occupied unfinished buildings.[6] A December 9 OCHA report registered 58,835 displaced residents of south Lebanon, of whom approximately 66% lived with relatives, about 30% rented apartments in more distant locations, and about 4% moved to public shelters or other housing.[4][4] In the Tyre area, housing shortages and sharply increased rents were reported alongside shortages of heaters, blankets, diapers, hygiene products, and generator fuel.[4]

A Ynet report from late January 2024 put the total of displaced people from southern Lebanese towns at 83,000 and noted that roughly 90% of residents from border communities in the Tyre area had left.[8] Schools in southern towns and villages were closed, with children studying remotely, and many displaced families found themselves having to move again when the towns where they had initially sought refuge became targets of attacks.[8] A brief pause in Hezbollah attacks from November 24 to December 1 brought some temporary returns, with the displaced count reportedly falling to about 16,000 during that window, before departures increased again when fighting resumed.[4] CRS figures for this early period put the total border-area evacuation at approximately 95,000 — a figure distinct from the broader IOM count of internally displaced people across Lebanon, which measured a different population and scope.[9]

Before the large-scale wave of strikes on September 23, 2024, more than 113,000 people had already been displaced, according to a UN figure quoted by Ynet; the report also cited an Arab-media estimate of approximately 110,000 displaced people in August.[10] The overall scale of the crisis shifted dramatically on September 23, when Israel began an expanded airstrike campaign targeting Hezbollah, including in southern Lebanon, the eastern Beqaa Valley, and Beirut's Dahiyeh district.[1][11]

The pace of displacement in this period was unprecedented. Lebanese authorities reported more than 1.2 million displaced people during the rapid escalation after September 23; the Lebanese Environment Minister also reported that more than 76,000 Lebanese had crossed into Syria between September 23 and 30.[12] Lebanese foreign ministry figures reported nearly half a million people displaced from southern Lebanon before the heaviest strikes of that weekend, while Prime Minister Najib Mikati raised the possibility that the total could reach one million.[13] UNHCR chief Filippo Grandi stated that more than 200,000 people had been displaced and more than 50,000 had fled from Lebanon into Syria by that point.[13] Lebanese officials acknowledged that exact counts were not yet available because many displaced people had not registered with authorities, who were simultaneously trying to open schools, places of worship, and other collection points for humanitarian assistance.[13]

Israeli military figures attributed to late September 2024 estimated that approximately 600,000 people had left southern Lebanon for the north and about 400,000 had fled neighborhoods in Beirut's Dahiyeh, for a combined estimate of roughly one million people outside their homes.[14] By October 10, Lebanese authorities and UN reports both cited figures exceeding one million, with Lebanese authorities reporting more than 1.2 million displaced people.[15] A UN report by early October counted 600,000 internally displaced people in Lebanon, more than 350,000 of them children; UN humanitarian coordinator Imran Riza described the country as facing "one of the deadliest periods" in its recent history.[16]

Israeli operations expanded further: an Israeli ground incursion in southern Lebanon began on October 1, 2024, following the airstrike campaign that had begun September 23.[1] Lebanese Ministry of Public Health data cited in the U.S. State Department report recorded 3,961 people killed and 16,520 injured between October 8, 2023, and November 28, 2024, though the report notes that this data did not distinguish civilians from Hezbollah terrorists.[1]

Figures for the broader conflict period through late November 2024 reflect the combined weight of the year-long border phase and the autumn escalation. The Times of Israel reported that nearly 1.2 million Lebanese were displaced over the two months before the November 2024 ceasefire alone.[17] UN figures cited by the Times of Israel, based on Lebanese government data, indicated that over 1.4 million people had fled their homes by that period — nearly a quarter of Lebanon's population — with approximately 560,000, primarily Syrian refugees, having fled into Syria and more than 875,000 internally displaced within Lebanon.[11] The Jerusalem Post estimated that between 1.2 million and 1.6 million Lebanese had been evacuated or displaced from October 8, 2023, through November 26, 2024, explicitly cautioning that its war statistics varied substantially.[2] Only about 20% of internally displaced people were sheltered in some 1,250 government-established facilities during this period; the remainder stayed with relatives or in rented housing, often at inflated prices.[11]

The overwhelming majority of the displacement reported during the 2023–2024 conflict occurred after September 2024, while approximately 110,000 Lebanese had evacuated over the preceding 11 months.[11]

Lebanon and Israel agreed to a cessation of hostilities on November 26, 2024, with the ceasefire taking effect at 4 a.m. on November 27.[7] The stated aims of the agreement included enabling civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely to their homes and lands; it also provided for phased Israeli withdrawal and the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces in the southern Litani area, with the process not to exceed 60 days.[7] Both countries alleged violations of the ceasefire's terms through the end of the year, and implementation continued at year's end.[1]

The response among displaced Lebanese was immediate. Vehicles began leaving Sidon for southern Lebanon within hours of the ceasefire taking effect, despite warnings from the IDF's Arabic-language spokesperson and the Lebanese army that residents should not yet return to villages where Israeli forces remained.[18] Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri urged people to return "even if [their land] is in ruins."[18] Those who did go back found varying degrees of destruction. One family displaced from Hanouiyeh to rented housing in Mount Lebanon returned to find its home, butcher shop, and other family businesses destroyed.[17]

The ceasefire proved fragile. Encyclopaedia Britannica describes it as tenuous, noting that its provisions remained unfulfilled and that Israeli forces continued striking targets in southern Lebanon almost daily.[3] By January 28, 2025, Lebanese military personnel and civilians were escorting residents attempting to return to villages in southern Lebanon along the Yaron–Maroun al-Ras road; Israeli fire injured one Lebanese soldier and three civilians on that occasion, according to the Lebanese Army.[19]

Despite the difficulties, return at scale did occur across the country. Citing Lebanese government and UNHCR reports, a Maariv account from August 2025 put returns to homes or localities by February 2025 at approximately 890,000 — meaning roughly 90% of those displaced during the 2024 fighting had returned by early 2025.[20] The remaining displaced population was concentrated mainly near the Israeli border, especially in the Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, Tyre, and Nabatieh districts, where extensive housing and infrastructure damage hindered return.[20] While about 88,000 people were formally registered as displaced, the same report estimated the actual number at between 110,000 and 120,000, noting that figures vary with registration and counting methods.[20]

For those who remained unable to return, conditions in 2025 were shaped by the scale of physical destruction and the financial weakness of the parties responsible for reconstruction. A May 2025 INSS assessment, citing UN data, found that 92,000 displaced civilians were still unable to return to their homes after the November 2024 ceasefire.[21] INSS connected the difficulty of recovery with damage to Hezbollah's financial resources and its limited ability to support reconstruction, while noting that Hezbollah placed responsibility for rebuilding on the Lebanese government.[21]

A September 2025 Lebanese Ministry of Health estimate cited in a subsequent report put the cumulative number of people displaced in Lebanon between October 8, 2023, and the November 27 ceasefire at approximately 300,000.[22] That report also put war-related housing damage at 51,000 units completely destroyed and 317,000 partially destroyed, figures attributed to the Lebanese government.[22] As of late 2025, a separate assessment cited 22 of 29 Shi'ite-majority villages along the border as razed, with more than 100,000 residents displaced and forced to seek refuge away from the border area.[23]

A December 2025 report found that about 100,000 Lebanese Shi'ites remained displaced more than a year after the ceasefire, with delayed reconstruction and fear of renewed fighting cited as the main reasons people had not gone home.[24] Of approximately 90,000 people who had left areas near the border, about half had moved to other south Lebanese towns and villages — including Tyre and Nabatieh — while others had gone to Dahiyeh al-Janoubia and elsewhere in Beirut.[24] About 10,000 residents of Dahiyeh al-Janoubia remained displaced, split evenly between Beirut and nearby areas including the Mount Lebanon suburbs.[24]

The Jerusalem Post reported that more than 64,000 people remained displaced almost a year after the ceasefire, per IOM data, including nearly 1,000 who had fled areas affected by Israeli strikes during that month alone.[19] Barriers to return included destroyed homes and infrastructure, limited prospects for rebuilding, continuing insecurity, and Israeli strikes that Israel said targeted Hezbollah efforts to re-establish military positions or train terrorists.[19]

Renewed war began in March 2026 after Hezbollah restarted hostilities against Israel in response to military operations against Iran.[25] A Congressional Research Service account dates the renewed fighting to the period after U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran began on February 28 and reports that Israeli ground operations subsequently expanded significantly.[26] CRS also reported that Israel established a buffer zone in southern Lebanon covering approximately 5% of Lebanon's territory.[26] The pace of displacement in this new phase was described by the UN as faster than during the 2024 conflict.[27]

Israel issued sweeping evacuation orders across southern Lebanon, and the military consequences unfolded rapidly. By early March 2026, IDF figures indicated that more than 420,000 people had left southern Lebanon and tens of thousands more had left Beirut's Dahiyeh within 18 hours of evacuation notices — a combined total described as approximately half a million people, out of more than one million residents who had received evacuation orders.[28] On March 10, 2026, the UN refugee agency's representative in Lebanon reported that more than 667,000 people had registered as displaced on the Lebanese government's online platform, an increase of 100,000 registrations in a single 24-hour period.[27] By the end of March, Encyclopaedia Britannica reported that Israeli evacuation orders had displaced more than 1.1 million people — nearly one-fifth of Lebanon's population.[3] A statement by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reported on March 24 indicated that hundreds of thousands of residents who had evacuated northward would not be permitted to return south of the Litani River until security for northern Israeli residents was ensured; the account also described bridges over the Litani as destroyed or under Israeli control, restricting movement and return.[5]

Humanitarian conditions during this phase were severe. An INSS article published in June 2026 reported that the Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs had registered approximately one million displaced people in the current war, which the article dates to March 2, 2026.[29] About 15% of displaced people were in state-run shelters, described as severely overcrowded.[29] The vast majority had to find their own arrangements: some rented apartments at high prices or stayed with relatives, while hundreds of thousands unable to secure alternative housing were described as effectively homeless, living in makeshift structures, unfinished buildings, or tents in public parks and along roadsides.[29] The INSS article noted that the registered number could rise further if Israeli operations expanded deeper into Lebanon.[29]

A March 23, 2026 report described hundreds of thousands displaced across Lebanon; it cited the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar for a ground-level account of approximately 1,000 displaced people from southern villages sleeping in the streets of Sidon — many under the open sky — because the city was close to their villages and they hoped to monitor developments and eventually return.[30] The municipality of Sidon was described as seeking shelter alternatives.[30] An earlier report described displaced families gathering overnight at Martyrs' Square in Beirut, where people waited in severe cold, warmed themselves around a fire, and lacked basic supplies including sheets.[28]

More than 700,000 people, including 238,000 children, were affected by disruptions to water systems during the 2026 war.[25] A Congressional Research Service report described questions persisting about the potential return of displaced people in both southern Lebanon and northern Israel to their homes.[26]

The 2026 phase of the conflict was punctuated by temporary ceasefires that produced partial — and often short-lived — return movements. During a 10-day ceasefire in April, residents who had returned to southern villages began heading back toward Beirut amid renewed security fears.[31] Ynet reported widespread housing destruction and shortages of water, electricity, internet connectivity, and operating shops, including food shops, in southern communities.[31]

Following a ceasefire associated with an Iran–United States agreement in June 2026, crowds were filmed driving back toward abandoned southern Lebanese communities, creating traffic congestion on some roads.[32] Local authorities, including in Qaqaiyat al-Jisr, told residents to remain in displacement locations until the security situation became clearer and an official notice had been issued.[32]

By July 30, 2026, OCHA reported that 821,077 people had begun returning to their areas of origin, while more than 360,000 remained displaced, including around 26,000 in government shelters.[33] A September 2026 Congressional Research Service report cited a United Nations report dated August 18, 2026, indicating that over 860,000 displaced people had returned home, with approximately 360,000 still unable to return as of August 2026.[34] Israeli operations had reportedly displaced more than one million people in Lebanon during the 2026 phase, equivalent to about 20% of Lebanon's population.[34] A UNICEF report from October 2026 cited by the Jerusalem Post put the peak number of displaced people during the 2026 war at 1.2 million, with roughly 340,000 still unable to return — one-third of them children.[25]

Across all phases of the conflict, displaced Lebanese relied primarily on informal support networks rather than state or international shelter infrastructure. In the December 2023 OCHA figures, approximately 66% of displaced south Lebanese lived with relatives, 30% rented apartments, and 4% moved into public shelters or other formal housing.[4][4] IOM field data from November 2023 showed a similar pattern: 70% with host families, 25% in rented apartments, with only 2% in public shelters.[6] During the later September–November 2024 escalation, the Times of Israel reported that only 20% of internally displaced people were housed in some 1,250 government-established facilities, while the remainder relied on relatives or rented housing at sharply inflated rates.[11]

The strain on host communities was significant from the earliest weeks. In the Tyre area, housing shortages and rising rents were documented alongside humanitarian supply shortages covering heaters, blankets, diapers, hygiene products, and generator fuel.[4] Families who initially fled to towns in south Lebanon sometimes had to move a second time when those locations came under attack.[8] Schools in affected southern districts closed, and children shifted to remote learning.[8]

By the time of the 2026 conflict, the humanitarian situation in formal shelters had deteriorated sharply. State-run shelters were described as severely overcrowded, housing approximately 15% of the displaced population; the majority had to find their own arrangements.[29] Hundreds of thousands unable to secure alternative housing ended up in makeshift structures, unfinished buildings, or tents in public parks and along roadsides.[29] Approximately 1,000 displaced residents from southern villages were reported to be sleeping in the streets of Sidon.[30] In Beirut's Martyrs' Square, people waited overnight in severe cold, warmed themselves around fires, and lacked basic supplies.[28] Disruptions to water systems affected more than 700,000 people, including 238,000 children.[25]

The displacement crisis defied resolution over successive ceasefires and negotiated arrangements. Even after the November 2024 ceasefire — which explicitly aimed to enable civilians on both sides of the Blue Line to return safely — tens of thousands remained unable to go home because of physical destruction, insecurity, and inadequate reconstruction resources.[7][21] INSS reported that Hezbollah's financial capacity to support rebuilding was severely limited and that the organization placed responsibility for reconstruction on the Lebanese government.[21]

Physical damage to housing was a principal barrier. Lebanese government estimates attributed to a September 2025 report put war-related destruction at 51,000 housing units completely destroyed and 317,000 partially destroyed.[22] In border villages, destruction was particularly concentrated: 22 of 29 predominantly Shi'ite villages along the border were reported as razed by a 2025 assessment.[23] One family returning to Hanouiyeh found its home, butcher shop, and other businesses destroyed, illustrating the losses encountered by some returnees.[17]

For the 2026 conflict, UNICEF figures reported in October placed the number of people still unable to return at roughly 340,000, one-third of them children.[25] A September 2026 CRS report, citing UN data from August 18, recorded over 860,000 displaced people who had returned home, alongside approximately 360,000 still displaced.[34] Questions about the conditions under which displaced Lebanese south of the Litani River could safely return — and the relationship between those returns and security guarantees for Israeli communities in the north — remained unresolved as of the reporting period.[26]

The displacement crisis generated an extensive body of numerical reporting, but figures from different sources, dates, and phases should not be treated as directly comparable. Counts varied depending on whether they measured cumulative displacement events over a period, the number of people displaced at a single point in time, residents evacuated from specific border areas, people who crossed international borders, or people formally registered with humanitarian organizations versus field estimates of the broader affected population.

For the October 2023–November 2024 phase, a key official figure comes from the U.S. State Department's 2024 Lebanon human rights report, which, citing IOM data, gives 899,725 people in Lebanon who became internally displaced between October 8, 2023, and November 25, 2024.[1] This is a flow measure — people who became displaced over the period — not a snapshot of how many were simultaneously displaced or had not returned at any given time. A Jerusalem Post estimate for approximately the same period placed the total of Lebanese evacuated or displaced between 1.2 million and 1.6 million, explicitly noting that statistics varied substantially.[2]

For the September–November 2024 escalation specifically, estimates ranged from over 200,000 according to the UNHCR chief in late September, through several hundred thousand according to Lebanese officials, to more than 1.2 million according to Lebanese authorities by October.[13][15] The Times of Israel reported nearly 1.2 million displaced over the final two months before the ceasefire alone.[17] The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs argued in a November 2024 article that more than 1.5 million inhabitants of southern Lebanon had been displaced and found refuge in Christian, Sunni, and Druze areas, and reported that Israeli operations had erased 29 Lebanese villages and destroyed almost 40,000 apartments — figures the article did not support with a stated methodology.[35]

IOM data from the initial autumn 2023 phase was collected through a documented network including emergency-operations rooms, the Lebanese Red Cross, the Disaster Risk Management unit, face-to-face and remote fieldwork, and more than 3,600 key informants.[6] Later figures frequently originated with Lebanese government statements, IDF communiqués, or UN rapid assessments, each carrying its own attribution and scope.

The distinction between measures also applies to the return process. Maariv reported approximately 890,000 returns by February 2025,[20] while IOM data cited by the Jerusalem Post counted more than 64,000 people remaining displaced almost a year after the ceasefire.[19] These figures measure different things: cumulative returnees versus the population remaining displaced at a given moment. Similarly, in the 2026 crisis, OCHA's July figure of more than 821,000 who had "begun returning" and an August count of over 860,000 returnees coexist with estimates of approximately 360,000 people still unable to return during the same period.[33][34]