Karni Crossing

Karni was a cargo terminal on the Gaza border near Kibbutz Nahal Oz, about three kilometres east of Gaza City. A 2007 working document placed the terminal in northeastern Gaza, on the Palestinian side of the Green Line and adjacent to the armistice line.[1][3] A 2001 report described it as a joint Israeli-Palestinian terminal where the two sides met to transfer goods.[4]

The crossing’s principal function was commercial freight rather than passenger movement. The 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage designated Karni for goods moving between Gaza and the West Bank.[2] An account of the 1995 Oslo II provisions described Erez as the crossing for people and cars and Karni as the crossing for goods.[5] Later arrangements likewise treated Karni as Gaza’s main commercial outlet and assigned it a central role in the movement of goods to and through Israel.[6][7]

Karni’s importance derived from its capacity and the range of goods handled there, but its operation was repeatedly affected by security restrictions, closures, and practical limits on cargo processing. The terminal’s history therefore links commercial exchange with the difficulties of maintaining a functioning border crossing amid attacks, competing security and access concerns, and changes in control and infrastructure.[6][8]

Reports differ on when Karni first began operating. Ynet gives 1994 as the start, describing the crossing as part of an effort to encourage economic normalization between Israel and Gaza; Globes, in contrast, says the Karny industrial zone was inaugurated in March 1999. The sources may refer to different milestones but do not explain the difference.[3][4]

The arrangements for movement between Gaza and the West Bank gave Karni a defined commercial role. The 1999 safe-passage protocol specified that goods traveling under those arrangements would enter or leave Gaza through Karni, with commercial vehicles branching toward the crossing at Yad Mordechai Junction and returning by the same routes.[2] In an account of the Oslo II provisions, Erez handled people and cars and Karni handled goods; passage was to take place during daylight hours, users required Israeli-issued permits, and Israeli law applied to those using the routes.[5]

The same account says Israel could temporarily halt a route or modify passage for safety or security while ensuring that one route remained open. It also describes possible restrictions on users who violated the provisions, including denial of access to Israeli territory or travel by escorted shuttle buses operating twice weekly. These provisions concerned the broader safe-passage system rather than Karni alone.[5]

The crossing was a major trade channel in the early 2000s. A 2001 Globes report listed construction materials, lumber and textile-industry inputs, and agricultural products such as animal feed, dairy products, and wheat among the cargo. It estimated that about two-thirds of cargo moved from Israel to Gaza and one-third from Gaza to Israel.[4] The report said 14,000 trucks passed through in July 2001 and gave a daily average of 600 trucks, alongside figures for cement, aggregate, and construction-iron shipments. Its monthly count and stated daily average do not appear to align, so both are best understood as reported figures rather than reconciled statistics.[4]

The Globes report described an adjoining industrial zone that had once included 18 plants and about 1,500 workers. Seven plants were Israeli-owned or jointly Israeli-Palestinian-owned, and one had Israeli, Palestinian, and Egyptian ownership. At the time of reporting, the zone had about 800 workers amid a worsening security and political situation. Globes also said a Palestinian agency managed Karni in cooperation with the Israel Airports Authority.[4]

A separate Ynet account described Karni as an important route for food, construction supplies, and industrial goods entering Gaza. It reported that international aid organizations, including UNRWA, sent about 15 containers of basic food—such as flour, semolina, and oil—into Gaza each day. That article gave a figure of 700–800 trucks passing through the terminal daily, from a different reporting period than the Globes account.[9]

The cargo-handling system involved distinct areas on the Israeli and Palestinian sides. A 2006 report described openings in a reinforced wall between Israeli and Palestinian traders: grain moved by conveyor belts, while fuel and other liquids were pumped through nozzles. Large X-ray machines screened Palestinian cargo. Israeli drivers unloaded goods into warehouses on their side, after which Palestinian laborers accessed cargo on the other side through remotely opened gates monitored by camera operators.[10]

A 2007 working document describes the terminal’s handling method as “back-to-back” transfer, in which goods were moved from one truck to another. It portrays Palestinian- and Israeli-controlled areas with distinct responsibilities: the Palestinian side handled security in its area and prioritized goods, while Israel managed overall terminal security, shipment scheduling and documentation, cargo inspection, administration, and maintenance.[1] Another report explains that back-to-back transfer was labor-intensive and time-consuming and could damage cargo when goods were placed on the ground during transfer.[5]

The 2007 working document also describes particular difficulties for agricultural exports. Produce was unloaded into a holding area without refrigeration and underwent Israeli security checks lasting five to seven hours before conveyor belts carried it to the Israeli side for loading onto Israeli trucks. It could then face further delays.[1]

In November 2005, the Agreement on Movement and Access set targets for improving freight processing at Karni. It called for continuous operation, a new high-tech scanner, capacity to process 150 export trucks per day initially, and a target of 400 per day by the end of 2006. It also emphasized speedy movement of agricultural produce to preserve quality and freshness and a common management system for the passages.[6][7] The Palestinian Authority undertook to protect its side of the passages and improve their management.[6]

December 2005 was described as a high point in operations: Karni was open for all scheduled hours, and exports doubled to 66 trucks per day.[8] Nevertheless, activity remained below the agreement’s target. In testimony to the U.S. Senate in March 2006, Quartet Special Envoy James D. Wolfensohn said exports in the last normal operating period in February averaged 62 truckloads per day, compared with the 150-truck target.[11]

Karni’s operation then became increasingly intermittent. The Washington Institute reported at least nine IDF-reported security incidents at the crossing in late 2005, a tunnel discovered beneath it in January 2006, an explosion nearby in February, and an attack on the terminal in April.[8] A 2006 Globes report described repeated security alerts and intermittent openings. It said the crossing was closed on August 16 after warnings about a tunnel dug from the outskirts of Gaza City’s Sajaiya neighborhood toward the terminal; officials assessed that the tunnel might have been intended for an attack there or an incursion into Israel.[12]

A U.S. State Department human-rights report called Karni/al-Mintar the main commercial crossing between Israel and Gaza and said it opened erratically and at significantly reduced capacity for much of 2006. UNRWA and other organizations reported that frequent closures made it harder to transport goods to Palestinian refugees in Gaza.[13] By March, the Washington Institute described Karni as the sole functioning passage for goods into or out of Gaza, despite extended closures.[14]

The reported closure dates in early 2006 vary somewhat across accounts. The Washington Institute listed closures from January 15 to February 4, February 22 to March 4, and March 14 to 20; it said the crossing was partially open for humanitarian imports from March 9 to 13 and reopened on March 21, with its status being decided day by day.[14] Wolfensohn’s March Senate testimony gave the second closure as lasting until March 8 and said the crossing closed again on March 14 until further notice. He calculated that it had been closed for 51 percent of the time it should have been open since the beginning of the year through March 14.[11]

Wolfensohn reported shortages in Gaza during the week of March 6 of dairy products, wheat, fruit, and chemicals. Although Karni reopened for imports from March 9 to 13, he said UNRWA reported that flour supplies remained insufficient.[11] The Washington Institute estimated that closures in 2006 caused at least $17 million in lost exports, roughly three percent of Palestinian exports in 2005. It attributed around 40 percent of the losses to perishable agricultural goods, including strawberries, flowers, and tomatoes, that spoiled in trucks while the crossing was closed. The account also said imports were disrupted, including humanitarian supplies used by UNRWA and the World Food Programme.[14]

The closures also affected a greenhouse project supported with U.S. and Palestinian funds. Wolfensohn said the project had raised approximately $14–15 million from Americans and received another $15–20 million from Palestinians, and that 3,000–4,000 people were involved in agricultural production. He testified that produce was being destroyed during closures and estimated the direct Palestinian cost at $6 million and the overall cost at $8 million “thus far.”[11]

Throughput estimates for 2006 and 2007 differ in their periods and measures. A Congressional Research Service report said Karni averaged 12 truckloads of goods per day in 2006, against the agreement’s 400-truck target, and cited an Israeli press report giving an average of 56 export truckloads per day in February 2007.[15] Wolfensohn gave 62 export truckloads per day for the last normal operating period in February 2006, while the State Department reported significantly reduced operations and fewer than 20 export truckloads per day on average in 2006.[11][13] These figures are not directly interchangeable because they refer to different periods and, in some cases, different categories of cargo.

After Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Karni remained closed, according to a later CRS report. It described Karni as Gaza’s main commercial outlet and warned, citing the World Bank, that suspension of Gaza trade threatened to worsen the Palestinian Authority’s fiscal crisis and could bring about the collapse of Gaza’s private sector.[16] A 2009 account said the Palestinian Authority could no longer monitor the crossings after the takeover and that fighting had damaged Gaza-side facilities. It reported that the crossings could not return to their pre-June 2007 operating level because movement required coordination on both sides and no alternative coordinating body had been found.[17]

Karni’s later operation was limited. A Jerusalem Post account said that after the 2007 takeover it reopened for wheat, animal feed, and gravel. It reported that Kerem Shalom could not process the grain volume needed for people and livestock in Gaza, so Israel opened Karni’s wheat chute, which could operate without much coordination on the other side. The report characterized Kerem Shalom’s system as handling less cargo than Karni and using slower, more expensive transfers.[17]

A 2010 report by Israel’s Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories said the Karni conveyor transferred grain and aggregates two days per week. It gave an average of 91 truckloads per day in 2010, compared with 82.5 before a June 20 cabinet decision and 98 afterward, and attributed the limited weekly schedule to security threats. The report said a conveyor at Kerem Shalom was planned as an alternative.[18]

A weekly summary for March 13–19, 2011, said Karni was closed after repeated attacks from the direction of Gaza and that Sufa reopened in its place for aggregate deliveries. It also reported 1,572 truckloads of goods entering Gaza that week and six truckloads of flowers exported.[19] A contemporaneous report said Israel announced that Karni’s activity would move to Kerem Shalom, citing repeated attacks at Karni.[20] Later reporting described Karni as closed in 2011, leaving Kerem Shalom as the remaining cargo crossing.[3]

The announced closure prompted objections about its economic and logistical consequences. Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum characterized the move as tightening the closure of Gaza, while economy minister Ziad al-Thatha called for international intervention. Import-committee chairman Ra’ed Fatuh and an UNRWA spokesman warned that transport costs could increase and that Kerem Shalom might not meet Gaza’s needs.[20] Gisha executive director Sari Bashi also questioned whether Kerem Shalom would adequately replace Karni, saying the change added 90 kilometres of travel and could harm economic activity and the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Security sources cited in the same report said Kerem Shalom’s capacity was being expanded to replace Karni.[21]

The site remained associated with violence after freight activity stopped. The Times of Israel reported that the closed crossing was a location for violent protests along the Gaza border in 2018 and that Palestinians had repeatedly thrown explosive devices at Israeli troops in the area.[22] In December 2022, the IDF and Israel’s Ministry of Defense began demolishing the terminal and clearing the site for a ground barrier intended to improve defenses in the border area.[3] The Times of Israel described the planned extension as adjoining a system that included an underground reinforced-concrete wall, tunnel-detection sensors, a steel fence, surveillance systems, and remote-controlled weaponry.[22]

The available sources do not provide population or demographic data for the immediate area around Karni. They do, however, describe the people and workers connected with the terminal and nearby economic activity. The 2001 report on the adjoining industrial zone recorded about 1,500 workers at its height and approximately 800 at the time of reporting, alongside plants with Israeli, Palestinian, or mixed ownership.[4]

The crossing’s operation also involved workers on both sides of the cargo barrier. A 2006 account described Israeli drivers unloading goods into warehouses and Palestinian laborers retrieving cargo through remotely opened gates.[10] A 2007 working document described separate management and security responsibilities in Palestinian- and Israeli-controlled terminal areas.[1] These are descriptions of the crossing’s workforce and administration, not a census of the surrounding population.

Karni’s economic role was primarily as a major route for commercial goods and humanitarian supplies. Reported cargo included agricultural produce, construction materials, inputs for lumber and textile industries, wheat, dairy products, animal feed, and aggregates.[4][9] The terminal carried cargo in both directions, and the 2001 Globes report estimated that roughly two-thirds of shipments moved from Israel to Gaza and one-third from Gaza to Israel.[4]

The crossing’s importance to perishable exports was reflected in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, which called for speedy movement of agricultural goods to preserve their quality and freshness.[6][7] Yet the 2007 technical document’s account of produce waiting without refrigeration during checks and transfer illustrates the practical challenges. The Washington Institute’s estimate that closures caused at least $17 million in lost exports in 2006, with around 40 percent of losses involving spoiled agricultural produce, likewise highlights the dependence of some exports on continuous passage.[1][14]

Goods moving into Gaza included food and supplies for humanitarian organizations. A Ynet account reported daily UNRWA shipments of basic food in containers, while the U.S. State Department described the difficulty that closures created for transporting goods to refugees.[9][13] Wolfensohn’s Senate testimony additionally identified shortages of dairy products, wheat, fruit, and chemicals during a period of closure and said flour supplies remained insufficient even after a short reopening for imports.[11]

The means of transfer shaped the cost and speed of trade. Back-to-back cargo handling required moving goods between trucks and was described as labor-intensive and time-consuming, with a risk of damage when cargo was placed on the ground.[5] Later reports contrasted Karni’s capacity with the slower and more expensive transfer system at Kerem Shalom, while the 2011 closure debate included warnings that the replacement route could add travel distance and transport costs.[17][21]

In a 2024 account, the American Jewish Committee reported that a convoy of 30 food trucks reached northern Gaza on February 28 and that close to 90 trucks had been transferred to the north since the start of that week. It presented the deliveries in connection with a route it described as opened at Karni to facilitate aid delivery.[23] Another AJC account also described Israel as opening Karni to facilitate additional aid into northern Gaza while noting that the crossing had previously closed after attacks in 2011.[24] These accounts postdate the 2022 demolition of the former terminal; the available sources do not establish whether the later aid route reactivated the former freight terminal or used a route at or near the site.[3][24]

The terminal complex was itself the site’s principal feature. The 2007 working document described an area of approximately 120 dunams containing a loading and unloading bay, administrative buildings, truck parking and inspection areas, warehouses, checkpoints, conveyor systems, access gates, and X-ray equipment. The Gaza Industrial Estate adjoined the terminal on its western side.[1]

The adjoining Karni Industrial Zone was intended to foster Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation and employment. At its height, Globes reported, it contained 18 plants and employed about 1,500 workers.[4] After the cargo terminal closed, the disused crossing structures remained until demolition work began in 2022 to clear the area for a defensive ground barrier.[3]

Accounts of Karni’s intermittent closures reflect competing security and access concerns. Israeli authorities and security sources cited explosions, smuggling tunnels, attacks, and other threats when explaining closures or restricted operation.[8][18] A Palestinian paper hosted by the Jewish Virtual Library argued that closures violated the Agreement on Movement and Access and alleged that Israel closed the crossing for punitive reasons.[25] That position differs from the COGAT report, which attributed the conveyor’s restricted schedule to security threats.[18]

U.S. official testimony and reporting documented substantial effects of closures on exports, agricultural production, and imports.[11][13] Other reporting emphasized security incidents and attacks at or near the terminal.[8][14] Estimates of losses and throughput vary across sources and periods, so figures such as truckloads per day and export-loss totals should be read in their stated context rather than as directly comparable measures.[14][15]

The 2011 transfer of freight activity to Kerem Shalom also drew opposing assessments. Israeli security sources said the alternative was being expanded to replace Karni, while Gaza officials, an UNRWA spokesman, and Gisha’s director raised concerns about capacity, cost, and access.[20][21] Finally, later descriptions of Karni as an aid route do not clarify how the account relates to the 2022 demolition of the former terminal infrastructure.[3][24]