January 2025 Gaza War Ceasefire

The January agreement followed approximately 15 months of war and months of negotiations over the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza and a cessation of hostilities.[1][6] Its diplomatic foundation was a three-stage proposal announced by United States President Joe Biden in May 2024.[1] The January framework added detailed implementation terms to that earlier proposal rather than establishing an entirely separate negotiating structure.[3]

In June 2024, Secretary of State Antony Blinken outlined the proposal’s intended progression: an initial six-week ceasefire, Israeli withdrawals from populated areas, hostage releases, expanded aid and civilian returns, followed by a permanent cessation of hostilities and the release of remaining living hostages, and finally large-scale reconstruction.[7] Negotiations during the initial stage were intended to bridge the gap between a temporary pause and a permanent settlement of the fighting.[7] This three-stage architecture remained central to the January arrangement.[3]

The United States, Qatar and Egypt mediated the negotiations, with officials from both the outgoing Biden administration and incoming Trump administration participating in the final diplomatic effort.[1][8] The central exchange involved Israeli hostages held by Hamas and Palestinian prisoners detained by Israel.[8] The remaining hostages beyond the initial group of 33 were to depend on agreement on a second phase.[6]

Biden announced the agreement on January 15, and Qatar’s prime minister said implementation would begin on January 19.[6][9] The framework was formally signed on January 16.[3] Israel’s government subsequently approved it by 24 votes to eight, with both the government and security cabinet endorsing the arrangement before implementation.[10]

Before the ceasefire began, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the first stage as temporary and said Israel would pursue the return of all hostages.[10] He also said Israel would retain control of the Philadelphi Corridor and could return to fighting with American backing if second-stage negotiations proved pointless.[10] The agreement therefore entered implementation with a defined initial exchange program, while a lasting end to hostilities remained dependent on further negotiations.[1]

The agreement specified an initial 42-day temporary cessation of military operations, during which Hamas was to release 33 Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and detainees.[3] Its stated wider objective was the return of all Israeli civilian and military hostages, living or dead, and the restoration of sustainable calm with the aim of a permanent ceasefire.[3] Alongside the exchanges, the framework addressed Israeli withdrawals, humanitarian relief, civilian movement, border crossings and reconstruction.[3]

The initial hostage group comprised humanitarian categories, including women, female soldiers, children, older people, and people who were ill or wounded.[3] Avera Mengistu and Hisham al-Sayed, who had been captured before October 7, were included in the planned first-stage releases.[3][11] Israeli estimates indicated that at least 25 of the 33 were alive, although the complete status of the group remained uncertain.[11] The planned sequence prioritized living hostages before the dead.[6]

The release schedule called for three hostages on the first day, four on day seven, then three at seven-day intervals for four weeks, followed by 14 in the final week.[11] The agreement used different prisoner-exchange ratios for different hostage categories: generally 30 Palestinian prisoners for each civilian and 50 for each female soldier.[3] For elderly male hostages over 50, the published framework specified three prisoners serving life sentences and 27 serving other sentences per hostage.[3]

Additional provisions called for nine ill or wounded hostages to be exchanged for 110 prisoners serving life sentences and for the release of 1,000 Gazan detainees detained from October 8, 2023, who had not been involved in the October 7 attack.[3] Separate terms addressed Mengistu, al-Sayed and 47 prisoners from the Shalit exchange who had been rearrested.[3] These category-specific arrangements made the overall prisoner total dependent on the hostages released and their condition.[6]

Israeli forces were to withdraw eastward from densely populated areas, including the Netzarim axis, into a deployment perimeter generally 700 meters from Gaza’s border.[3] Five specified points could extend that perimeter by up to another 400 meters, according to agreed maps.[3] In the Philadelphi Corridor, the framework provided for reduced Israeli forces during phase one, followed by withdrawal beginning after the final first-stage hostage release on day 42 and completion no later than day 50.[3] Daily pauses in Israeli military and surveillance aircraft activity were specified as 10 hours, increasing to 12 hours on exchange days.[3]

Displaced residents were to begin returning north on day seven, with additional withdrawals and return arrangements on day 22.[3] Unarmed pedestrians could use al-Rashid Street without inspection, while vehicles were to undergo inspection by a private company.[1][3] On day 22, pedestrians were also to be permitted to return through Salah al-Din Street without inspection.[3]

The humanitarian provisions specified 600 aid trucks daily, including 300 destined for northern Gaza and 50 carrying fuel.[3] They also covered fuel for the power plant, rubble-clearing equipment, and supplies for hospitals, medical centers and bakeries.[3] Infrastructure measures encompassed electricity, water, sewage, communications and roads, while shelter commitments included at least 60,000 temporary homes or caravans and 200,000 tents.[3] Comprehensive reconstruction planning was to involve supervision by countries and organizations including Egypt, Qatar and the United Nations.[3]

On January 15, the United States publicly expressed the hope that aid deliveries would rise above 500 trucks a day, while warning that the increase would not happen immediately.[9] Distribution beyond the entry points was identified as a major practical challenge, with the ceasefire expected to give humanitarian organizations greater freedom to transport and distribute supplies.[9] This statement described an operational aim rather than an achieved delivery total.

The ceasefire was scheduled to begin at 8:30 a.m. on January 19 but took effect at 11:15 a.m.[11] Hamas had not supplied the names of the three hostages due for release on time, delaying implementation, while Israeli forces continued strikes before the truce took effect.[11][12]

That afternoon, Romi Gonen, Emily Damari and Doron Steinbrecher became the first Israeli hostages released under the arrangement and were transferred through the International Committee of the Red Cross.[12] Israel subsequently released 90 Palestinian prisoners, most of them women.[12]

Aid supplies began entering Gaza after the ceasefire took effect.[11] On January 21, 897 aid trucks entered, exceeding the framework’s daily target of 600.[13] The reported daily arrangements included 50 fuel trucks and the routing of half the trucks toward northern Gaza.[13] During the first week, 4,200 inspected aid trucks entered Gaza.[14]

The second major exchange took place on January 25, when Hamas released four Israeli female soldiers and Israel released 200 Palestinian prisoners, including 121 serving life sentences.[14] Of those prisoners, 70 were deported to Egypt, 114 were released in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and 16 were transferred to Gaza.[14]

Israel accused Hamas of violating the agreed release order because a civilian woman hostage had not been freed before the four soldiers, and it delayed opening the Netzarim Corridor for northbound civilian returns.[14] Mediation produced an arrangement for the civilian, who was held by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to be released on January 30 with the last female soldier and another Israeli civilian, followed by three further Israeli civilians on February 1.[14]

At 7:00 a.m. on January 27, Israeli forces withdrew from parts of the Netzarim Corridor and pedestrians began traveling north through al-Rashid Street.[14] A parallel road opened to vehicles about two hours later, with electronic inspections under joint Qatari-Egyptian supervision.[14] Hamas’s government media office reported that more than 300,000 displaced people had returned to Gaza City and northern Gaza after the routes opened.[14]

On January 30, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad released three Israeli hostages and five Thai hostages.[15] The civilian handover in Khan Yunis, near the ruins of Yahya al-Sinwar’s house, was accompanied by public disturbances.[15] Israel postponed the release of 110 Palestinian prisoners for several hours, then proceeded after mediators promised that future handovers would be orderly.[15] Three more Israeli male hostages were released on February 1 in exchange for 183 Palestinian prisoners, including 18 serving life sentences.[15]

The Rafah Crossing opened on February 1 for Gazan patients and wounded people traveling to Egypt for medical treatment.[2][15] Palestinians unaffiliated with Hamas and European Union forces supervised the crossing, which was designated for medical evacuations under the agreement.[15] The framework provided for civilian and wounded-person transfers after the release of all women hostages and for 50 wounded military individuals a day to cross with three accompanying people each, subject to Israeli and Egyptian approval.[3]

Exchanges continued during February, while mediation addressed further implementation disputes.[16] On February 10, Hamas announced that it would postpone releases, alleging that Israel was not allowing the promised volume of aid into Gaza.[16] After mediators pledged to address obstacles to aid delivery, Hamas said exchanges would continue as planned.[16]

Negotiations on the second stage were supposed to begin no later than day 16 and conclude before the end of the fifth week.[3] The agreement stipulated that first-stage procedures—including the temporary cessation of military operations, relief and shelter measures, and withdrawals—would continue while second-stage negotiations were ongoing, with the guarantors working to keep the talks moving.[3] The anticipated second stage combined the release of remaining living hostages with further prisoner releases, a permanent cessation of hostilities and complete Israeli withdrawal.[3] A third stage was intended to address remaining hostage remains, reconstruction and border crossings.[3]

The parties did not conclude an agreement to implement the second stage.[4] A contemporaneous report said that by March 1 Israel had not begun the required indirect second-stage talks or the specified Philadelphi Corridor withdrawal.[17] Israel endorsed an American proposal to extend the initial arrangement through Ramadan and Passover, while Hamas rejected that extension and insisted on proceeding to the original next phase.[17]

On March 2, Israel halted humanitarian and commercial supplies entering Gaza.[2] Israel said Hamas had rejected an American proposal for an extension and additional hostage releases, while Hamas maintained that further releases required negotiations on the second stage and accused Israel of violating the agreement.[18] A separate account described an extension through April 19 in exchange for five living hostages and the remains of 10 deceased hostages.[4] An informal truce nevertheless continued into mid-March.[16]

Before dawn on March 18, Israeli forces resumed extensive strikes against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist targets in Gaza.[4][5] Israel said its decision followed Hamas’s repeated refusal to release hostages and rejection of proposals from American envoy Steve Witkoff and the mediators.[5] Hamas maintained that the original agreement should proceed, while Netanyahu insisted that the war would not end until Hamas’s governing and military capabilities had been destroyed.[19] An operation to retake the Netzarim Corridor began the following day.[16]

The exchanges secured the return of 33 Israeli hostages, eight of them deceased, during the first phase, while five Thai hostages were freed.[2][4] A March 21 accounting recorded the release of 25 living Israeli nationals, five Thai nationals and the remains of eight hostages, alongside 1,777 Palestinian prisoners and detainees.[2] The agreement did not secure the release of all remaining hostages or produce the permanent end to the war envisaged for its later stages.[4][5]

Humanitarian deliveries increased substantially during implementation: more than 57,000 metric tons of food entered in the first month, and more than 1.9 million people received food parcels.[2] Approximately 25,000 aid trucks entered during the 42-day first phase, carrying food, fruit and vegetables, fuel or gas, medicines, medical supplies, tents and tarpaulins.[20] About 93 percent of those supplies arrived through Egypt and Jordan, with the remainder arriving through Ashdod.[20]

The March 2 halt encompassed humanitarian and commercial supplies and severely affected humanitarian operations.[2] A subsequent electricity cutoff to a desalination plant in southern Gaza limited access to clean water for 600,000 people.[2] These restrictions followed the period of increased deliveries and civilian returns enabled by the ceasefire.[2][14]

The renewed March 18 bombardment killed hundreds of Palestinians, and large-scale military operations resumed.[21] The United States and Israel blamed Hamas’s refusal to release hostages and rejection of proposals for the breakdown, while several other Security Council representatives attributed the renewed fighting or breach to Israeli actions.[21] The Hostages and Missing Families Forum accused the Israeli government of abandoning the hostages who remained in Hamas captivity.[5]

Israeli public opinion during the ceasefire reflected strong support for prioritizing the captives’ return.[22] An early-March survey, conducted approximately a week before hostilities resumed, found that 66 percent favored releasing the hostages by any means over eliminating Hamas by any means.[22] Support for prioritizing hostage release was 54 percent among coalition voters and 87 percent among opposition voters.[22]

The transition from a temporary hostage-release arrangement to a permanent ceasefire became the central issue in assessments of the agreement.[23] Tamir Hayman’s analysis identified gradual implementation, especially the move from phase one to phase two, as its acute risk.[23] He warned that a cessation of Israeli operations and complete withdrawal could leave Hamas in de facto control and enable it to rebuild military capabilities.[23]

Another strategic analysis argued that the arrangement left Hamas in control without guaranteeing that it would not rebuild.[24] It assessed that the agreement did not prohibit rearmament and restricted Israel’s freedom to act against rebuilding by Gaza-based terrorist groups unless they breached the ceasefire.[24] These were judgments about the arrangement’s consequences, rather than independently established provisions of the framework.

One commentary characterized the deal as vulnerable and warned that obstacles along its roadmap could lead to renewed hostilities.[25] It also referred to opposition and the departure of several ministers without identifying them.[25] The formal approval vote, in which eight ministers opposed the agreement, separately demonstrated disagreement within the government.[10]

The hostage handovers also became a subject of academic analysis.[8] A study examined them as media events and developed the category “Coercion Event,” interpreting Hamas’s ceremonies as involving forced participation, psychological manipulation and the use of suffering for political propaganda.[8] The disturbances surrounding the January 30 civilian handover, and the resulting Israeli delay in releasing prisoners, were among the documented difficulties in carrying out the exchanges.[15]

Public documentation did not eliminate uncertainty about every operational term. The Congressional Research Service characterized several provisions as reported or drawn from a reputed text and recorded differing accounts of planned troop movements.[1] The published framework nevertheless set out specific exchange categories, withdrawal arrangements and deadlines that distinguish its obligations from later proposals to extend the first phase.[3][4]

The principal dispute concerned compliance and responsibility for the failure to reach phase two.[17] Israel accused Hamas of repeated violations and rejection of an American extension, while Hamas accused Israel of delaying the required talks and failing to implement the original agreement.[18][17] Security Council discussions likewise recorded sharply different national positions rather than a single agreed finding of responsibility.[21] The disagreement was substantive: the original second stage linked further hostage releases to a permanent cessation and full withdrawal, whereas extension proposals sought additional releases while prolonging the initial arrangement.[3][4]