Israel–Ukraine Relations

Visa-free travel, a free-trade agreement and institutions linking Ukrainian Jews with Israel form important parts of the bilateral relationship.[1][4] These connections extend beyond formal diplomacy through tourism, immigration, Jewish communal activity, educational programs and cultural exchange.[1][4] The Israeli Embassy, Jewish Agency programs including Taglit and MASA, and Israeli cultural institutions have provided channels through which Ukrainian Jews engage with Israeli institutions and contemporary Israeli culture.[4]

Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 brought humanitarian relief, evacuation and security policy to the forefront of relations.[3] Israel publicly supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, condemned the invasion through statements and international votes, and supplied humanitarian assistance while refraining from directly providing lethal assistance.[3] Israeli leaders explained their approach partly through the need to avoid Russian interference with Israeli operations in Syria, where Russian military forces and air-defense capabilities could affect Israeli action against Iranian personnel and equipment, including material connected to transfers to Hezbollah.[3]

The relationship consequently combines substantial cooperation with differing expectations about diplomatic and military support.[3] Alongside wartime aid, the countries have continued developing economic and cultural institutions, including their free-trade framework and cooperation between national archives.[5][6]

Pogroms and antisemitic policies in the 1880s prompted some Ukrainian Jews to emigrate to then-Palestine, creating connections that preceded formal bilateral diplomacy.[1] From the 1960s, Jewish and non-Jewish Ukrainian dissidents developed solidarity, while emigration to Israel and other destinations increased from the late 1980s and accelerated after the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991.[1]

Israel and Ukraine established diplomatic relations in December 1991, and Israel maintains an embassy in Kyiv.[7][8] Addressing the Knesset on January 12, 1993, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk described his visit as the first official Ukrainian delegation to Israel and thanked Israel for being among the first countries to recognize Ukrainian independence and establish diplomatic relations.[7] He also emphasized the historic presence of one of the world’s largest Jewish communities in Ukraine and described Ukrainian-Jewish culture as belonging to both peoples’ cultures.[7]

Institutional economic links developed through the creation of a Ukraine–Israel Chamber of Commerce in 1995 and the appointment of Israel’s first commercial attaché in Ukraine in 2008.[4] A Trade and Economic Department established in 2008 promoted cooperation, while regular “Days of Israel” events began in 2010.[4] The cancellation of visa requirements in 2011 provided an additional incentive for tourism and business, and visa-free travel substantially increased tourist flows.[1][4]

During the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman expressed “grave concern,” emphasized the safety of Ukrainians and voiced hope that conditions would not deteriorate.[9] Israel sought to remain as uninvolved as possible because of its interest in Russian cooperation concerning Syria and Iran, and did not join Western denunciations of Russia’s annexation of Crimea or the fighting in eastern Ukraine.[9] Ukraine’s ambassador in Tel Aviv refrained from assessing Israel’s position, which Ukraine accepted with understanding at the time.[9] Israel did not vote on the March 27, 2014 UN General Assembly resolution concerning Ukraine’s territorial integrity.[10]

Economic relations reached a new institutional stage when the countries signed their free-trade agreement in Jerusalem on January 21, 2019.[11] Ukraine ratified it in July 2019, and it entered into force on January 1, 2021.[5] During Benjamin Netanyahu’s August 2019 visit to Kyiv, he and President Volodymyr Zelensky agreed to expand investment and cooperation in technology, education, agriculture, culture and sports.[12] Zelensky announced plans for a special investment office in Jerusalem, while Netanyahu said Israel would establish a corresponding office in Kyiv and highlighted Ukrainian talent in mathematics and computer engineering.[12]

A Kyiv Jewish Forum in December 2021 marked the thirtieth anniversary of official diplomatic relations.[13] Zelensky said Israelis and Ukrainians valued freedom and that Israel often served as an example to Ukrainians, while Ukraine’s prime minister thanked Israel for supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[13]

Immediately before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Israeli officials emphasized different aspects of the crisis.[14] On February 23, 2022, the Foreign Ministry supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity without naming Russia; Prime Minister Naftali Bennett emphasized solidarity with Ukrainian civilians, while Foreign Minister Yair Lapid called the invasion “a grave violation of the international order.”[14] President Isaac Herzog likewise supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity without explicitly condemning Russia.[14]

Israel co-sponsored and supported the March 2, 2022 UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion and demanding Russian withdrawal, after declining a United States request to co-sponsor a similar Security Council resolution.[15] In a March 1 statement, Israel’s deputy ambassador called the attack a violation of the international order, supported Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and offered diplomatic assistance while citing Israel’s longstanding positive relations with both countries.[15] Israel subsequently voted for the October 12, 2022 resolution on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the February 23, 2023 resolution on principles for a just and lasting peace.[10]

Zelensky asked Bennett to contact Vladimir Putin and seek mediation after the invasion.[16] Bennett offered Israel’s help during a February 27 telephone conversation with Putin, citing its ability to speak with both sides; contemporaneous reporting relayed Russian media accounts that Putin declined the offer in favor of proposed negotiations in Belarus.[17] Bennett nevertheless travelled to Russia in March as part of a broader mediation effort.[18] A contemporaneous Mosaic account characterized him as the first foreign leader to meet Putin face-to-face since the invasion and described a diplomatic effort involving Washington, Moscow, Kyiv, Berlin and Paris.[18]

Foreign Minister Eli Cohen said in January 2023 that Israel would “talk less” about the war.[10] During a February visit to Ukraine, he pledged support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, discussed cooperation against Iran and promised $200 million in loan guarantees for Ukrainian health-care facilities.[10] Israel supported the following week’s General Assembly resolution calling for Russian withdrawal and an end to hostilities.[10]

The free-trade agreement established a free-trade area consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and set objectives of expanding economic cooperation, reducing barriers to trade in goods, facilitating their movement and promoting fair competition.[11] It also provides for negotiations on further liberalization of services and contains arrangements for administration, tariff-rate quotas and dispute settlement.[11] Its tariff schedules contain different reductions and exceptions rather than eliminating every tariff.[11]

The commercial relationship includes Israeli exports such as plastics, rubber, machinery, medical equipment, chemicals, fruit and vegetables, and Ukrainian exports including processed food, fish, agricultural products, oils, iron and steel.[19] Bilateral trade in 2017 totaled approximately $940 million, including about $130 million in Israeli exports to Ukraine.[19] At the 2021 Kyiv Jewish Forum, Confederation of Jews of Ukraine president Boris Lozhkin put annual bilateral trade at $800 million and identified agriculture, technology and information, culture and medicine as areas of partnership.[13]

Israel’s initial wartime humanitarian response included approximately 100 tons of supplies, among them water-purification kits, medical equipment, tents, blankets and sleeping bags, alongside plans to transfer more than $3 million for aid.[16] Israel worked to evacuate its citizens, its diplomats helped nationals of several other countries leave, and Israeli medical and relief teams operated in Ukraine and at nearby borders.[16] A field hospital staffed by professionals from Israeli hospitals and clinics opened near Lviv on March 22, 2022, and operated in western Ukraine for six weeks.[16][20]

By October 2022, the assistance inventory included more than 200 tons of medical supplies, winter equipment, medicines and basic necessities.[20] It also listed approximately 250,000 packaged meals, more than 1.6 million water containers, ten water-treatment kits and six large generators intended to supply six Ukrainian hospitals.[20] Israeli personnel assisted refugees at crossings with five neighboring countries, while medical programs offered rehabilitation and cancer care for Ukrainian children.[20] Training for Ukrainian professionals covered trauma care, first aid, responses to sexual violence and psychological first aid.[20]

In December 2022, Israel’s embassy opened a resilience center in a tent in central Kyiv, offering satellite internet, warmth, phone charging and hot drinks.[21] Its generator enabled it to accommodate up to fifteen people at once.[21] Israel also supplied approximately twenty powerful generators to the Kherson region, valued at more than $1 million, a generator for a Kyiv Jewish nursing home housing Holocaust survivors, and $1.2 million in operating-room and lifesaving equipment for a Kyiv children’s hospital.[21]

Aid continued beyond the initial emergency response.[16] Israel transferred three bulletproof ambulances to Ukrainian rescue forces in January 2023 and supplied hundreds of thousands of liters of water and more than ten tons of food to people displaced by flooding after the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam that year.[16] During his July 2025 visit to Kyiv, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar cited Israeli provision of generators, food and water equipment, psychological-resilience support, and treatment and recovery assistance for injured Ukrainians in Israel.[22] He also announced drinking-water systems for areas deprived of clean water after Russian attacks.[22]

Jewish communal organizations played a large role in evacuation and relief.[2] By September 2022, the Jewish Agency had organized 455 buses transporting 13,742 people from dangerous areas toward neighboring-country borders, received 130,000 emergency-hotline calls and distributed 23,000 supply boxes weighing 354 tons through its Torenu campaign.[2] Its operational update recorded 13,422 immigrants from Ukraine arriving in Israel since the war began.[2] A February 2023 account estimated that more than 40,000 people had immigrated from Ukraine, Russia and Belarus since the outbreak of war, including approximately 13,000 from Ukraine.[23] Many Jews seeking refuge could qualify for Israeli nationality under the Law of Return, and the “Home to Israel” initiative assisted Jewish immigrants from those countries.[23]

One CRS report said that approximately 50,000 Ukrainian refugees had entered Israel by March 2023, with about 14,000 remaining at that time; another CRS report gave a figure of around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish Ukrainian refugees admitted to Israel, without explaining whether the difference reflected reporting dates, definitions or another cause.[10][3] In February 2026, Israel’s Ministry for Diaspora Affairs and Combating Antisemitism announced four million shekels in assistance for Jewish communities facing winter power outages and damaged energy infrastructure.[24] The program supported heated accommodation and hot meals through cooperation involving Mosaic United, Jewish philanthropy, Chabad, the Jewish Agency and Jewish federations.[24]

Protective assistance developed separately from Israel’s policy against directly supplying lethal weapons.[3] In May 2022, Israel announced an initial shipment of 2,000 helmets and 500 flak jackets for Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.[10] An October account listed transfers of 3,500 helmets, 1,000 gas masks, 2,000 vests, air-filtration systems and protective suits for engineering troops, while distinguishing these supplies from weapon systems.[20] Israel also agreed in October 2022 to provide military communications systems.[16]

After Russia began using Iranian-made drones, Israel offered help developing a civilian early-warning system and reportedly began sharing basic intelligence intended to help Ukrainian forces counter drone attacks.[10] Ukraine’s ambassador said in May 2023 that testing had begun on an Israeli anti-missile detection system intended to lengthen warning times.[10] In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for possible sales of anti-drone jamming systems; these approvals were licensing decisions, not confirmation of delivery.[10][16] Israeli officials described the systems as defensive and said the approvals did not change the policy against lethal assistance.[10] A broader 2023 account also listed vehicles, mine-protection units, gas masks and hazardous-material filtration systems among forms of assistance.[25]

United States transfers from stockpiles located in Israel constituted a separate channel of support for Ukraine.[26] In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells from its War Reserve Stocks for Allies in Israel for shipment to Ukraine.[26] In January 2025, it again accessed its stockpile in Israel and sent ninety Patriot interceptors to Ukraine after Israel decommissioned its Patriot batteries.[26] These were United States actions involving stored equipment rather than direct Israeli transfers of lethal assistance.[26]

Cultural engagement has included Israeli Cultural Centres, “Days of Israel,” and educational programs connecting Ukrainian Jews with Israeli institutions.[4] The Mahut Project brought together the Israel Defense Forces, Genesis Philanthropy Group, Friends of the IDF and Beit Morasha of Jerusalem to organize visits by IDF officers to diaspora communities, including Ukraine.[4] Intended to strengthen officers’ Jewish and Israeli identities and connections with world Jewry, the visits also prompted some Ukrainian Jews to reassess their heritage and learn about contemporary Israel.[4] Interviewees evaluating Israel-related programming called for greater consistency, better-prepared speakers and more sustained intellectual exchange.[4]

Pilgrimage to Uman, the burial place of Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, is another significant people-to-people connection; before the full-scale invasion, upwards of 20,000 pilgrims often travelled there for Rosh Hashanah.[25] In September 2023, the countries reached arrangements for border posts to operate around the clock and increase entry capacity for tens of thousands of pilgrims arriving from neighboring countries.[27] In 2024, they signed a memorandum allowing authorities, researchers and citizens access to documents held by their national archives, supporting research into Jewish heritage and the Holocaust and potentially helping immigration applicants establish Jewish ancestry.[6]

Cooperation concerning Iran became an explicit focus of diplomatic engagement during Sa’ar’s 2025 visit to Kyiv, when he announced a strategic dialogue involving sanctions and military coordination.[16] He met Zelensky and Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, discussed the war and Iran, and pledged support for Ukrainian humanitarian and air-defense needs.[16][22] In February 2026, Ukraine designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, a decision Sa’ar welcomed as a moral and political signal in efforts to counter Iran.[16]

Economic cooperation also remained active during wartime.[28] In December 2025, Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka led the first meeting of the Israel–Ukraine Intergovernmental Economic Commission since 2021 and said the relationship had improved.[28] Ukraine sought more Israeli humanitarian support for frontline municipalities and rehabilitation for injured soldiers and civilians, while discussions included water and food technology, energy and cyber protection.[28] Military support was being discussed separately between defense establishments and political leaders.[28]

Shared Jewish history continued to provide a setting for high-level contact.[29] On October 6, 2026, Zelensky met an Israeli delegation in Kyiv led by Ze’ev Elkin, visiting for the eighty-fifth anniversary commemoration of the Babyn Yar massacre.[29] Discussions covered the war, regional developments and strategic considerations involving Israel, Ukraine and the United States; Zelensky also raised Iran and Iranian-Russian drone cooperation.[29] The Ukrainian side expressed a desire for improved relations.[29]

The limits of Israeli military and diplomatic support have been a recurring source of disagreement.[30] In his March 20, 2022 video address to the Knesset, Zelensky criticized the absence of weapons and major sanctions against Russia, questioned mediation without choosing sides and declared that “indifference kills.”[30] Addressing Hebrew University students in June, he again expressed disappointment with government support while thanking the Israeli public for its emotional solidarity and displays of Ukrainian flags.[31] Israeli explanations emphasized Russia’s position in Syria, domestic defense requirements and concern that sensitive technology could reach Russia or Iran.[3][16]

The Institute for National Security Studies argued in January 2024 that neutrality could encourage Moscow to disregard Israeli interests and weaken solidarity with the United States.[32] Its June 2026 analysis described limited direct political and security channels, with some detection and electronic-warfare supplies but little evidence of institutionalized defense-company cooperation.[33] A March 2026 account reported continuing Ukrainian disappointment, unsuccessful efforts to arrange a Zelensky visit after October 7, 2023, and officials’ descriptions of ongoing intelligence cooperation.[34]

Disagreements also concerned reciprocal UN support.[25] In 2023, Ambassador Michael Brodsky warned that Ukraine’s support for what he characterized as 90 percent of anti-Israel resolutions would damage relations; that percentage was his characterization rather than an independently established count.[25] He particularly objected to Ukraine’s support for seeking an International Court of Justice opinion on Israel’s presence in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria; a Zelensky aide called Ukraine’s vote a “grave mistake.”[25] On February 24, 2025, Israel joined the United States in opposing a General Assembly resolution supporting Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity and a peaceful resolution of the war, drawing criticism from Ukraine’s ambassador.[35]

Travel disputes involved Ukrainian complaints about denied entry, deportations and interrupted refugee benefits, while Israel cited tourist-visa overstays; benefits were subsequently reinstated for 14,000 refugees.[25] Ukraine threatened to suspend visa-free travel in 2019 and 2022, and wartime Uman pilgrimage arrangements became entangled with disputes over tourists’ treatment and Ukrainian warnings about inadequate bomb shelters.[25] Netanyahu supported the safety warning while emphasizing access to the gravesite when conditions permit.[25] Historical memory, including Ukrainian involvement in the annihilation of Jews and antisemitism, also remained sensitive; a proposed historical committee had received no Ukrainian response by the 2024 archival-cooperation report.[6]

Public accounts of Patriot transfers required a distinction between direct Israeli provision and American onward transfers.[16][36] In June 2025, Israel’s Foreign Ministry rejected Brodsky’s statement that Israel had transferred Patriot systems to Ukraine; subsequent accounts described decommissioned American systems returned to the United States before transfer to Kyiv.[16][36]

In 2026, Ukraine alleged that grain cargoes arriving at Haifa originated in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, while Israeli officials disputed the evidentiary basis and handling of its requests.[33][37] The vessel Abinsk unloaded cargo in April despite Ukrainian objections; the Panormitis shipment was rejected by its Israeli importer rather than stopped by a government directive.[33] Ukraine threatened sanctions, while Sa’ar said evidence had not arrived through appropriate channels and criticized Ukraine’s public approach as “Twitter diplomacy.”[37]