Israel–Sudan Normalization Agreement

Sudan’s 2020 opening toward Israel followed a history that included both quiet contacts and periods of pronounced Arab opposition to recognizing Israel. Khartoum hosted the 1967 Arab League summit, at which the League adopted the “three no’s”: no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel.[2] Later contacts were described as having begun in the mid-1950s, and an account of Sudan-Israel relations also traced cooperation to President Jaafar Nimeiri, including Israeli assistance in evacuating Jews from Ethiopia.[2] These episodes formed a historical backdrop to the 2020 announcement, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presented as a break with the hostility associated with the Khartoum summit.[6]

Sudan’s transitional government was divided over how to handle relations with Israel and who had authority to approve a change. In February 2020, Sovereignty Council chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan met Netanyahu in Uganda; the meeting was reported as secret and as having taken place without the knowledge of Sudan’s civilian leadership.[7] A later account said Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok disavowed knowledge of Burhan’s trip, while analysis of the transitional government described Hamdok as favoring discussion within Sudanese society and separating the Israel question from the effort to remove Sudan’s U.S. terrorism-list designation.[2] Burhan’s deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, was described as favoring speedy normalization.[2]

The February meeting was followed by a public disagreement over contacts. In August 2020, a Sudanese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Sudan was in talks with Israel; the ministry promptly denied the statement, and the spokesperson was dismissed.[8] The United Arab Emirates was reported to have encouraged Sudan to normalize relations.[8] These developments showed that the later announcement grew out of prior contacts and contested decisions, rather than a sudden start to discussions in October.

Economic and diplomatic pressures were central to the context described in the sources. Sudan was experiencing a severe economic crisis and seeking investment, debt relief, and an end to U.S. sanctions.[2] The October announcement followed a multilayered package negotiated intensively for more than a year, with removal from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism list described as its main trigger.[2] Sudan had held the designation since 1993, which restricted foreign assistance and access to international financial institutions.[2][9]

The U.S. administration said Sudan’s removal from the list would proceed after Sudan agreed to provide $335 million in compensation to American victims of past terrorist attacks and their families.[6][9] Sudan deposited the funds in escrow for claims connected to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.[2] The designation was rescinded in December 2020.[10] Contemporaneous reporting fueled speculation that the administration had pressed Sudan to normalize relations with Israel in exchange, while Hamdok objected to linking the Israel issue to delisting.[9]

The formal U.S. statement placed normalization alongside measures affecting Sudan’s international and economic position, including steps to restore sovereign immunity and efforts to address the country’s debt burden.[1] A later Institute for National Security Studies analysis characterized normalization as the price Sudan paid for removal from the terrorism list and an accompanying $1 billion World Bank aid package, and described economic relief as Sudan’s overriding interest.[3] These assessments differ in emphasis from the official statement, which set out U.S. and Israeli commitments but did not state that normalization was a legal condition for every measure. The diplomatic agreement, delisting, compensation, debt relief, and aid were therefore described as parts of a connected package, although accounts varied in how directly they characterized the bargain.[2][9]

On October 23, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump, Sudanese Sovereignty Council chairman Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke by phone and issued a joint statement.[1] The statement said that the leaders had agreed to normalize relations between Sudan and Israel and end the state of belligerence between the two countries.[1] It situated the announcement amid Sudan’s political transition and efforts to promote regional peace.[1] Trump’s White House described the announcement as a U.S.-brokered peace agreement, while other accounts stressed that it announced an intention and a process rather than establishing full diplomatic relations immediately.[11]

The joint statement set out an agenda for practical cooperation. It said the countries would begin “economic and trade relations, with an initial focus on agriculture.”[1] Delegations were to meet in the coming weeks to negotiate cooperation in agriculture, agricultural technology, aviation, migration, and other areas.[1] The announcement thus combined a political commitment to normalization with proposed work on sectors where governments could develop concrete bilateral ties.

The statement also linked the proposed relationship to support for Sudan’s transition and economy. The United States said it would take steps to restore Sudan’s sovereign immunity and engage international partners to reduce Sudan’s debt burden, including discussions of debt forgiveness through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.[1] The United States and Israel said they would work with partners to support Sudan’s democratic institutions, food security, counterterrorism efforts, and economic potential.[1] These commitments were presented alongside the plans for bilateral trade and cooperation, not as completed projects or guarantees that all proposed assistance had already been delivered.[1]

The moment carried a personal dimension for Netanyahu, who referred to his February meeting with al-Burhan in Uganda as having taken place eight months earlier and said, “I hoped we could reach this day.”[12] Netanyahu also said Sudanese airspace was open to Israeli flights, and Sudan was reported to have agreed to allow Israeli aircraft to overfly its territory.[13]

The October announcement did not itself settle whether Sudan had completed normalization. Sudanese Foreign Minister Omar Qamar al-Din said the step was “an agreement to normalize” rather than completed normalization and that implementation depended on approval by the Sovereignty Council.[8] The Congressional Research Service separately reported that the transitional leadership considered normalization contingent on ratification by a legislative council that had not yet been formed.[14] The joint statement did not specify reciprocal embassies or full diplomatic relations, while the White House fact sheet presented the announcement as a peace agreement.[1][11]

The economic and security steps associated with the announcement included early practical gestures. An account of Sudan-Israel relations reported that Israel offered Sudan $5 million worth of wheat after the announcement; Sudan consumed about two million tons of wheat annually and relied heavily on imports.[13] The proposed wheat assistance was distinct from the broader economic and trade relations contemplated in the joint statement, and the account does not describe it as a completed long-term commercial arrangement.[13]

On January 6, 2021, Sudan signed the Abraham Accords Declaration in Khartoum, in a ceremony attended by U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin.[3] The U.S. document’s signature section identifies the Republic of Sudan and a witness.[15] The declaration set out broad principles, including peace based on mutual understanding and coexistence, respect for human dignity and religious freedom, interfaith and intercultural dialogue, and cooperation among states.[15] It also expressed a goal of “a life of dignity and hope, no matter their race, faith or ethnicity.”[15] Sudan’s signature was an important additional step following the October joint statement, but it did not by itself amount to a completed bilateral normalization treaty between Sudan and Israel.[4]

The sources use differing shorthand for the January step. The Congressional Research Service says Sudan signed onto the Abraham Accords in January 2021, following the October announcement and Sudan’s removal from the U.S. terrorism list.[14] A 2025 analysis specifies that Sudan endorsed the Accords’ declarative portion but did not sign on to full normalization.[4] A January news account reported that Sudanese Justice Minister Nasr al-Din Abd al-Bari signed the document with Mnuchin and that Sudan and the United States also agreed to address Sudan’s debt to the World Bank.[16]

By October 2021, reporting said practical implementation had not progressed and that unresolved issues remained under negotiation between Sudan and the United States.[17] The available accounts therefore describe further discussions and uncertainty rather than a settled package that immediately produced full diplomatic relations.

Domestic legal changes nonetheless removed a longstanding formal barrier to relations. Sudan’s 1958 Israel Boycott Act had barred Sudanese citizens and companies from agreements and dealings involving Israeli persons, entities, and goods, with penalties including imprisonment, a fine, and confiscation.[18] The Cabinet approved and referred a draft repeal on April 6, 2021; on April 19, the Cabinet and Sovereign Ruling Council jointly approved the draft law.[18] News accounts described the repeal as a step toward normalization but reported that diplomatic relations had still not been established and a peace agreement had not been signed.[10]

In the security sphere, an Israeli delegation led by Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen visited Sudan in January 2021 and met Sudanese officials.[13] The visit produced a memorandum of understanding on security-related matters, although the available material does not provide its contents.[13] By late 2021, Sudan had repealed the boycott law and conducted official security contacts, but ordinary diplomatic relations remained incomplete.[10][13] A 2025 analysis later described the Sudan deal as never having been formalized.[4]

That gap widened after Sudan’s October 2021 military takeover. The seizure of power removed civilian leaders from the transitional arrangement and froze the normalization process.[5] Because ratification had depended on Sudan’s transitional institutions, the takeover interrupted the expected political route to a final agreement.[14][5]

Sudanese military leaders said in January 2023 that Sudan would sign a normalization deal after a transition to civilian government.[5] In February, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen visited Khartoum and met al-Burhan and other Sudanese officials.[19] The parties discussed establishing relations and expanding cooperation, particularly in security and military matters; Sudan was also reported to have asked Israel for help achieving stability with the Palestinians.[19]

Cohen said the parties had agreed to sign a peace agreement after the formation of a civilian government.[19] A Washington Institute account reported that Israeli officials said a final draft had been prepared and informally approved during Cohen’s visit, but Sudanese authorities had not confirmed that negotiations had reached that stage.[20] It said formal signing depended on further political steps, including forming an interim civilian government and holding elections.[20]

The status of the proposed 2023 agreement was therefore not uniformly reported. Israeli officials presented the text as drafted and ready for eventual signing, while the Sudanese side’s public confirmation was more limited.[20][19] In April 2023, fighting between rival Sudanese military forces put the process at risk.[20] The civil conflict obstructed the planned transition that had been made a condition of signing and could delay further developments for the foreseeable future.[20][5]

The principal outcome of the 2020 initiative was a sequence of commitments and political steps rather than a fully implemented bilateral relationship. The October joint statement announced an agreement to normalize relations, and Sudan’s January 2021 signature on the Abraham Accords Declaration added a formal commitment to its broad principles.[1][3] Sudan also repealed the 1958 boycott law and held security-related contacts with Israel.[10][13] Accounts through 2025 distinguish these developments from the establishment of full diplomatic relations through a bilateral treaty.[4][4]

The Jerusalem Post reported in April 2021 that relations had not been normalized and that a peace agreement had not been signed, despite repeal of the boycott law.[10] The 2025 Washington Institute analysis likewise said that Sudan endorsed the declarative portion of the deal in January 2021 but never signed on to full normalization.[4] These assessments indicate that dismantling a legal prohibition and engaging in official visits did not automatically create ordinary diplomatic relations.

Official and commentary sources sometimes used broader descriptions, calling the arrangement a peace agreement or including Sudan among countries with normalization agreements.[11][21] Other accounts made a sharper distinction between Sudan’s endorsement of the Abraham Accords Declaration and a still-uncompleted bilateral agreement with Israel.[4][14] The 2025 analysis said normalization was never formalized in a full agreement and that the initiative was stopped by the war in Sudan.[4]

The distinction also appears in the chronology of the political process. The October 2020 statement announced an intention to normalize, while the January 2021 ceremony concerned the Abraham Accords Declaration.[1][3] The proposed comprehensive bilateral agreement remained dependent on political approval and a civilian transition.[20][14] The expected ratification mechanism remained unresolved as Sudan’s transitional institutions faltered.[14][5]

The expected economic benefits were closely bound to Sudan’s efforts to recover internationally and stabilize its economy. The U.S. statement set out steps on sovereign immunity, debt relief, and support for food security, counterterrorism, democracy, and economic potential.[1] The Washington Institute described investment, debt relief, and the end of sanctions as Sudanese priorities, and reported the $335 million escrow deposit connected to compensation claims.[2] INSS later characterized delisting and a $1 billion World Bank aid package as the benefits for which Sudan paid through normalization.[3] The official statement records public commitments, while later analyses interpret the political exchange differently.[1][3]

The process also demonstrated how changes in Sudan’s internal political balance affected foreign policy. Reports described disagreement between military leaders who favored rapid normalization and civilian leaders who sought broader consultation or separation of the Israel question from delisting.[2][9] The absence of a legislature intended for the transition, followed by the 2021 military takeover, meant that the proposed political route to ratification did not materialize as anticipated.[14][5]

In 2023, officials again presented normalization as attainable, but only after a civilian transition. The announced plan for a future signing was contingent on the creation of civilian institutions; the ensuing civil war then put those steps and the agreement at risk.[20][19] The Congressional Research Service judged that the conflict could delay further progress for the foreseeable future, and the 2025 Washington Institute account described the initiative as halted by the war.[5][4] Later commentary likewise characterized Sudan’s participation as effectively suspended.[22]

The initiative therefore remained diplomatically significant but institutionally incomplete in the period documented here. It marked an official Sudanese commitment to move away from the historic state of belligerence and produced a declaration of shared principles.[1][3] It was followed by repeal of the boycott law and security contacts.[18][13] At the same time, the absence of a completed bilateral treaty, continuing questions about ratification, and political upheaval prevented the announcement from developing into the full relationship originally contemplated.[14][4]

Accounts of the agreement differ most visibly over what the words “signed” and “normalization” mean in this case. The October 2020 joint statement explicitly said the leaders had agreed to normalize relations, and the White House called the announcement a peace agreement.[1][11] Sudanese officials, however, described it as an agreement to normalize rather than normalization itself, with further approval or ratification still required.[8][14]

The January 2021 declaration is also described differently across sources. Official U.S. materials record Sudan’s signature on the Abraham Accords Declaration, whose principles concern coexistence, religious freedom, dialogue, dignity, and cooperation.[3][15] The Congressional Research Service calls Sudan a signatory to the Abraham Accords, while a later analysis specifies that Sudan endorsed only the declarative portion and had not completed full bilateral normalization with Israel.[14][4] Some commentary uses broader formulations: a November 2020 Mosaic article called the arrangement a “follow-on peace agreement with Sudan,” and a 2023 Sapir Journal article described Sudan among countries with joint normalization agreements with Israel.[23][21] Those characterizations do not supply details of a Sudan-specific bilateral treaty and sit alongside sources that explicitly say full normalization was never formalized.[4]

Reporting on the proposed 2023 treaty also requires distinguishing claims made by Israeli officials from confirmation by Sudanese authorities. Cohen said the parties had agreed to sign a peace agreement after a civilian government was formed.[19] The Washington Institute reported that Israeli officials said a final draft had been prepared and informally approved, while noting that Sudanese authorities had not confirmed that negotiations had reached that stage.[20] The sources therefore support the conclusion that a comprehensive agreement was contemplated and that instability prevented its signing, but they do not offer a single consistent account of the draft’s precise status.[20][4]

The relationship between normalization and the United States’ delisting decision is similarly described with different degrees of certainty. The White House presented the October announcement alongside U.S. decisions and commitments regarding Sudan’s economic position and international standing.[1] The Congressional Research Service reported speculation that normalization was pressed as an exchange and noted Hamdok’s objection to linking the issues.[9] The Washington Institute described delisting as the main trigger in a package shaped by Sudan’s economic crisis, while INSS characterized normalization as the price paid for delisting and World Bank aid.[2][3] These accounts support describing delisting and economic assistance as central context, but they do not make every detail of the exchange identical across sources.

Domestic legitimacy was another persistent question. The October announcement was made jointly by military and civilian leaders, but reports describe disagreement over public consultation, the pace of normalization, and the authority needed to ratify it.[2][14] The transition’s planned legislative council had not been established, and the military takeover in October 2021 then froze the process.[14][5] Later military promises to sign after a civilian transition did not resolve reported uncertainty among civilian groups.[5]

The agreement’s historical resonance was shaped by the contrast between the 1967 Khartoum summit’s “three no’s” and the 2020 statement’s commitment to end belligerence.[2][6] The initiative also formed part of Sudan’s effort to emerge from international isolation and economic sanctions, while offering a framework for agriculture, trade, aviation, migration, and security cooperation.[1][2] Its legacy remains that of an announced and partially pursued normalization process rather than a completed bilateral treaty. The declaration and repeal of the boycott law were concrete steps, but the political transition and comprehensive agreement remained unfinished in accounts through 2025.[18][4]